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Large quantities of oil were discovered in the Albertine Rift Valley in 
Western Uganda in 2006. The sound management of these oil resources 
and revenues is undoubtedly one of the key public policy challenges 
for Uganda as it is for other African countries with large oil and/or gas 
endowments. With oil expected to start flowing in 2021, the current book 
analyses how this East African country is preparing for the challenge 
of effectively, efficiently, and transparently managing its oil sector and 
resources. Adopting a multidisciplinary, comprehensive, and comparative 
approach, the book identifies a broad scope of issues that need to be 
addressed in order for Uganda to realise the full potential of its oil 
wealth for national economic transformation. Predominantly grounded 
in local scholarship and including chapters drawing on the experiences 
of Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya, the book blazes a trail on governance of 
African oil in an era of emerging producers. Oil Wealth and Development 
in Uganda and Beyond will be of great interest to social scientists and 
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Economics, Energy Studies, Development, Politics, Peace, Security and 
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Uganda stands at an important crossroad in its history. In 2006, large quan-
tities of oil and gas were discovered in the Albertine Western Region of 
Uganda. Now more than a decade later, Uganda is on the verge of becoming 
a significant oil producer and exporter in Africa. The people of Uganda are 
awaiting the moment that oil starts flowing with great anticipation. This is 
expected to happen around 2021/22. And while Ugandans hope and pray 
that their country’s oil wealth will soon translate into improved social and 
economic outcomes for them, there exists a widespread sense of unease and 
concern among the population about whether Uganda is ready for the inflow 
of large amounts of oil revenues.
Given the history of oil exploration and exploitation in Africa, these 
concerns are not unfounded. Unfortunately, there are cases, both in Africa 
and elsewhere, that demonstrate that natural resource wealth, if mismanaged, 
will not be the route to development Eldorado but will produce the opposite 
result of poverty in the midst of plenty. However, the negative political, social 
and economic impacts of oil wealth—a situation also known as the ‘resource 
curse’—is not inevitable, as some countries with credible governance of the 
oil-producing class have shown (e.g. Norway). In this respect, everything 
depends on how a country’s oil resources and revenues are being managed. 
Moreover, countries with more effective, efficient and transparent institutions 
are clearly better able to take full advantage of their oil wealth.
The development of a sound and well-functioning oil governance regime 
is therefore arguably the major public policy challenge Uganda is currently 
facing. While the Government of Uganda, together with other important 
local stakeholders including the Parliament of Uganda, local businesses, civil 
society, the Ugandan Chamber of Mines and Petroleum, and Oil and Gas 
Service Providers, have been preparing for the moment that oil is expected to 
start flowing in the early 2020s, a major question remains how well prepared 
Uganda is to manage the oil production and revenues effectively, efficiently and 
transparently. This crucial question lies at the heart of this important book. 
More specifically, the current book aims to answer the following question: to 
what extent is Uganda ready to effectively harness its oil revenues for national 
and human development, thereby avoiding the oil governance curse?
In order to answer this crucial question, the current book brings together 
original scholarship by a stellar group of African researchers (mainly from 
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Uganda) concerning Uganda’s oil governance regime. It includes detailed 
chapters on the institutional, legal-regulatory, fiscal, environmental, social, 
macroeconomic, political and financial dimensions of the country’s oil regime. 
It also includes comparative insights from three other African cases, namely: 
Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. These case studies provide interesting insights 
and policy lessons which are extremely useful for Uganda.
Overall, this book constitutes a fascinating read and offers insightful 
reflections concerning Uganda’s oil governance regime, its main challenges 
and shortcomings as well as possible ways to improve it. It is my sincere hope 
that the Government of Uganda and all other local stakeholders will draw on 
the findings and policy lessons of this book to further strengthen Uganda’s 
oil governance regime, thereby ensuring that the country’s oil wealth will 
be managed wisely and for the benefit of all Ugandans.
Hon. Richard H. Kaijuka F.C.I.B.
Chairperson of the Board of Trustees of the Uganda Chamber of Mines 
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Oil Wealth and Development in Uganda 
and Beyond: Prospects, Opportunities 
and Challenges
Arnim Langer, Ukoha Ukiwo and Pamela Mbabazi
1.1 Setting the Stage
With an increasing number of African countries having discovered com-
mercially viable quantities of oil and gas in recent years, including, for 
example, Kenya, Chad, Ghana and Uganda, there is both excitement and 
trepidation about the prospects for increased incomes and investments, 
economic growth and development on the continent. This is due to compara-
tive historical evidence of the link between natural resource exploitation, 
economic growth and development on the one hand and natural resource 
exploitation, economic decline and socio-political crises on the other hand 
(see, for example, Ross, 2003; 2012; Sachs and Warner, 2001; Torres, Afonso 
and Soares, 2012). Indeed, a substantial body of empirical studies has shown 
that many countries ‘blessed’ with natural resources have paradoxically faced 
economic decline and severe socio-political crises (see, for example, Mehlum, 
Moene and Torvik, 2006; Ross, 2012; Sachs and Warner, 1995).
The observation that countries rich in oil, gas or other minerals often 
end up facing serious economic, social and political challenges rather than 
economic progress and political stability has led some scholars to claim that 
these countries experienced a so-called ‘resource curse’ (see, for example, 
Ross, 2012; Sachs and Warner, 2001). More specifically, the Natural Resource 
Governance Institute (NRGI) refers to the resource curse as ‘the failure of 
many resource-rich countries to benefit fully from their natural resource 
wealth, and for governments in these countries to respond effectively to 
public welfare needs’ (NRGI, 2015, p.1). It is noteworthy that many developing 
countries seem to be plagued by the resource curse. As noted by Arthur 
(2014, p.39) in this respect, ‘… there is increasing evidence that extractive 
natural resources have not helped developing countries, especially those in 
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Africa, to achieve prosperity and their desired socioeconomic ends’ (see also 
Obi, 2010a). In Africa, Nigeria and D.R. Congo are often seen as prominent 
examples of countries where the resource curse has manifested itself. To 
illustrate this point, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2012) posit that despite 
earning more than US$ 350 billion in cumulative oil revenues between 1965 
and 2000, Nigeria’s GDP per capita did not improve over this period. Instead 
the country has been plagued by endemic corruption, institutional failure 
and violent conflicts (see Ukiwo, 2008, 2011; Obi, 2010b).
A range of economic, social and political problems and challenges have 
been associated with the extraction and exploitation of natural resources. 
In terms of political challenges, Michael Ross—one of the leading scholars 
on the politics of resource-rich countries and the causes and consequences 
of the resource curse—asserts:
… there is strong evidence that one type of resource wealth—petroleum—
has at least three important [political] effects: It tends to make authoritarian 
regimes more durable; it leads to heightened corruption; and it helps trigger 
violent conflict in low- and middle-income countries, particularly when it is 
located in the territory of marginalized ethnic groups (Ross, 2015, p.240).
The possible ruinous impact of natural resource wealth on a country’s political 
institutions and the state of democracy is often linked to the issue of taxation. 
In particular, as noted by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI):
… governments are more responsive to their citizens and are more likely 
to transition to democracy when government spending is reliant on citizen 
taxation. When countries collect large revenues from natural resources, 
they are less dependent on levying taxes on citizens, and thus citizens feel 
less invested in the national budget. Politicians and government officials 
are also less directly tied to citizen requests or demands (NRGI, 2015, p.2).
With respect to the apparent empirical association between natural resource 
wealth and violent conflict risk, myriad plausible mechanisms have been 
proposed to explain this relationship (see, for example, Tadjoeddin, 2012; 
Humphreys, 2005; Ross, 2004). More specifically, Humphreys (2005, p.510) 
argues that there are ‘at least six rival families of mechanisms that could 
explain the relationship between natural resources and war onset’. These 
are: 1) the greedy rebels mechanism, 2) the greedy outsiders mechanism, 3) 
the grievance mechanism, 4) the feasibility mechanism, 5) the weak states 
mechanism, and 6) the sparse networks mechanism. Importantly, empirical 
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support seems to be stronger ‘for the weak state structures and grievance 
[mechanisms] than for the booty futures or state capture [mechanisms]’ 
(Humphreys, 2005, p.534).
While in the last two decades a large amount of research has focused on 
the relationship between natural resource wealth and its associated political 
consequences—or the so-called ‘political resource curse’ (Ross, 2015, p.239, 
emphasis added)—the original resource curse hypothesis was mainly 
concerned with possible negative economic consequences associated with 
an abundance of natural resources (Tadjoeddin, 2012). Indeed, the British 
economic geographer Richard Auty, who introduced the resource-curse 
concept in 1993, was predominantly concerned with the adverse effects of 
an abundance of natural resources on a country’s economic growth (see 
Auty, 1993). In this respect, Auty (1993) observed that ‘a growing body of 
evidence suggests that a favourable natural resource endowment may be less 
beneficial to countries at low and mid-income levels of development than 
the conventional wisdom might suppose’ (cited in Toedjaddin, 2012, p.111).
There are essentially three channels through which natural resource 
abundance can lead to lower economic grow (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 
2012). First, ‘natural resources generate rents which lead to rapacious rent-
seeking (the voracity effect), whose adverse manifestation is felt through 
political economy effects … and [through] increased corruption … which 
adversely affects long-run growth’ (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2012, 
p.574). Second, resource-rich countries are vulnerable to volatility in inter-
national commodity prices and ipso facto resource revenue volatility, with 
potentially adverse implications for economic growth. With regard to the 
volatility in resource revenues, the Natural Resource Governance Institute 
(NRGI) further observes:
… it is very difficult to effectively spend fluctuating and unpredictable 
revenues. Governments often get trapped in boom-bust cycles where 
they spend on legacy projects, such as airports and monuments, when 
revenues are rising and then must make painful cuts when revenues decline. 
Resource-rich governments have a tendency to over-spend on government 
salaries, inefficient fuel subsidies and large monuments and to underspend 
on health, education and other social services (NRGI, 2015, p.2).
Third, countries with an abundance of natural resources also appear to be 
more susceptible to the adverse effects of the ‘Dutch disease’ (see, for example, 
Larsen, 2006; Tadjoeddin, 2012; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2012). Tad-
joeddin (2012, p.112) explains that the Dutch disease refers to the ‘economic 
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disruption in the form of de-industrialization or de-agriculturalization (in 
accordance with what is the tradable sector in the economy) originating 
from the large inflow of foreign currencies from natural resource exports’. 
Similarly, Di John (2011, p.169) notes that the Dutch disease is a situation 
in which the export of natural resources leads to an appreciation of the 
exchange rate, which in turn ‘leads to a decline in the competitiveness, and 
hence production and employment, of the traded goods sector’ (Di John, 
2011, p.169).
Given the potentially disastrous political, social and/or economic problems 
and challenges facing resource-rich countries, it is understandable that the 
discovery of large quantities of mineral resources, especially in developing 
countries, has provoked a mixed reception from policy makers, civil society 
organisations and the general population. There are four important points to 
be made in this regard, however. First, it is worth emphasising that the resource 
curse is absolutely not inevitable. Indeed, there are a range of resource-rich 
countries, including, for example, Botswana, Canada and Norway, that have 
been able to prevent the resource curse from taking hold by introducing sound 
policies and developing an effective and transparent resource governance 
regime (see, for example, Holden, 2013; Lewin, 2011). Moreover, resource-rich 
countries with effective institutions and sound resource governance regimes, 
with Norway arguably being the benchmark in this regard, can enormously 
benefit from their resource wealth.
Second, in recent years scholars and policy makers have increasingly 
started using the term ‘governance curse’ instead of ‘resource curse’. This is a 
welcome change in terminology because ‘governance curse’ more accurately 
identifies governance failures—and not resources per se—to be the cause of 
the negative social, political and economic consequences often associated with 
the extraction of natural resources, such as oil, gas and other minerals (see, 
for example, NORAD, 2013; Pegg, 2006; Shaxson, 2007). Moreover, Germano 
Mwabu, one of the contributors to this book (see Chapter 16), argues that 
oil and gas resources are essentially ‘welfare neutral’, and that any welfare or 
efficiency consequences that may result from these resources fundamentally 
depend on how these resources are being extracted, managed, shared, and 
how their proceeds are being spent—or, in other words, it depends on the 
nature of the resource governance regime in place.
While the causes of ineffective management of natural resources are to 
some extent country-specific, it appears that natural resource-rich countries 
characterised by undemocratic and exclusionary regimes and/or a weak 
institutional and administrative capacity are more likely to manage their 
natural resource wealth badly and ineffectively (see Obi, 2011; Roll, 2011; 
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Ross, 2015). Furthermore, an increasing amount of research has shown that 
the relationship between the presence of natural resources and development 
outcomes is to a large extent dependent on and mediated through the quality 
of a country’s institutions (for example, Brunnschweiler, 2006; Cabrales 
and Hauk, 2011; Mehlum et al., 2006). In addition, poor institutional quality 
and weak administrative capacity are usually associated with insufficient 
knowledge and experience among government institutions and decision 
makers to design appropriate policies and implement these policies effectively 
and efficiently (for example, Roll, 2011).
Third, it is also important to note that countries that have recently discov-
ered commercially viable quantities of oil, gas or other mineral resources, 
and hence are facing the herculean task of developing a country-specific 
resource governance regime, do not have to reinvent the wheel completely 
in this regard. Indeed, in the last two decades an enormous amount of 
research and scholarship has been devoted to understanding the potential 
impact and governance challenges associated with the extraction and 
export of natural resources. In addition, a huge amount of knowledge is 
currently available globally to help emerging oil- or gas-producing countries 
in their efforts to develop an effective and suitable resource governance 
regime. There is widespread recognition in this respect that resource-rich 
countries can learn from each other in terms of how best to manage their 
mineral resources and revenues. Unsurprisingly, given Norway’s successful 
track-record in transforming its oil wealth into economic development and 
prosperity, several emerging and prospective oil-exporting countries in 
Africa, including Uganda, have looked towards Norway for guidance and 
technical assistance in the development of their oil governance regimes 
(Polus and Tycholiz, 2017). The recognition that resource-rich countries are 
facing similar challenges and hence can learn from each other’s governance 
approaches also partly explains why the comparative analysis of policy 
choices and pathways of resource-rich countries has continued to attract a 
lot of scholarship in recent times (see, for example, Akanni, 2007; Lewis, 
2007; Pinto, 1987; Roll, 2011).
Fourth, it is also worth emphasising that the quality of a country’s resource 
governance should not be seen in binary terms, i.e. good versus bad govern-
ance. Instead there is a lot of variation over time within countries (meaning 
that governance regimes are not fixed and can thus be strengthened or can 
become less effective over time) and between countries. To illustrate the latter 
point, Table 1.1 shows the variation in the quality of resource governance for 
a number of African countries. The resource governance index (RGI) shown 
in this table is composed by the Natural Resource Governance Institute 
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(NRGI) and measures how well countries govern their extractive resources.1 
From the table it is immediately clear that there is substantial variation in 
how well different African countries manage their resources. In particular, 
while Ghana (being ranked 13th out of 89 countries) and Botswana (ranked 
18th) are doing extremely well in both an African and a global context, Nigeria 
(ranked 55th), Angola (Ranked 70th) and D.R. Congo (ranked 75th) on the 
other hand are clearly not managing their resources very effectively, and 
these countries need to explore opportunities to improve and strengthen 
their resource governance regimes.
Table 1.1: Resource Governance Index Scores for Selected African countries 
Country Index Score Global Rank
Ghana (Oil and Gas) 67 13
Botswana (Mining) 61 18
South Africa (Mining) 57 23
Côte d’Ivoire (Oil and Gas) 55 28
Nigeria (Oil and Gas) 42 55
Angola (Oil and Gas) 35 70
D.R. Congo (Oil and Gas) 33 75
Source: Data drawn from the 2017 Resource Governance Index, Natural Resource Governance 
Institute (NRGI). Available at: https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/.
1.2 The Objective of this Book
Given the potential impact of natural resource wealth on countries’ de-
velopment trajectories and socio-political situation, the development of a 
sound oil governance regime is undoubtedly one of the key public policy 
challenges for Uganda as well as other African countries with large oil and/
or gas endowments (see Kimenyi and Lewis, 2016). Following the discovery 
of large oil reserves in 2006, the Government of Uganda started preparing for 
the future oil windfall by developing a governance regime for the exploration, 
development and management of its oil resources. Yet, as we get closer to the 
moment that oil and gas will actually start flowing (now expected in late 2021 
1 For a detailed description of the underlying methodology of Resource Governance Index 
(RGI), please visit https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/about/global-report.
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or early 2022), it is unclear how well prepared the country is to manage its oil 
wealth effectively, efficiently and transparently. Uganda’s record in terms of 
governance effectiveness, administrative capacity, institutional quality, and 
transparency and accountability is not particularly good, as evidenced by the 
country’s low rankings on the World Bank’s governance indicators.2 Given 
the challenges that Uganda is facing in terms of promoting and advancing 
good governance, this raises serious questions and concerns about how the 
country will manage its newly found oil and gas wealth. The objective of the 
current book is to analyse how Uganda is preparing to deal with its expected 
oil wealth in order to ensure that it will contribute to national development. 
The collection of chapters in this book together aim to answer the following 
overarching question: to what extent is Uganda ready to effectively harness 
its oil revenues for national and human development, thereby avoiding the oil 
governance curse?
In order to answer this question, the book aims to analyse how Uganda is 
planning to deal with the challenge of effectively, efficiently and transparently 
harnessing and managing its oil sector and resources, and to identify possible 
shortcomings and weaknesses that need to be addressed in order to realise 
the full potential of its oil and gas wealth. The book therefore provides a 
comprehensive analysis of the emerging Ugandan oil governance regime, 
which involves analysing institutional, legal, fiscal, environmental, social, 
macroeconomic, political and financial dimensions. In order to analyse these 
different dimensions of Uganda’s oil governance regime we take a decidedly 
multidisciplinary approach, and hence we combine political, legal, public 
policy, economic, gender and sociological perspectives and analyses. The 
book also includes comparative analysis and insights from other African 
countries, including Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana. While Nigeria has been 
exporting oil for more than four decades, Kenya and Ghana have only very 
recently become oil exporters. In the next section we will briefly review the 
different chapters that make up this book.
1.3 Overview of the Book
The book contains 17 chapters, including an introductory chapter and a conclu-
sion. The chapters are grouped into the following five parts: I) Institutional 
and Regulatory Framework, Policies and Challenges; II) Macroeconomic and 
2 See the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), retrieved from: https://
info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home.
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Fiscal Framework, Policies and Challenges; III) Other Major Governance 
Policies and Challenges; IV) International Comparison; and V) A Way 
Forward.
Part I, containing four chapters, is aimed at critically analysing Uganda’s 
legal-institutional and political framework for managing its oil resources and 
revenues. In Chapter 2, Pamela Mbabazi and Martin Muhangi analyse the role 
and functioning of the main formal institutions that have been established 
to manage, oversee and regulate Uganda’s oil exploration, development and 
revenue management. The authors argue that while Uganda has attempted 
to embrace the principles of good resource management, serious challenges 
remain. They further assert that the main challenge for Uganda lies not in 
the application of technical approaches to managing oil revenues, but rather 
in the political context in which these policies and approaches have to be 
implemented and/or managed.
Complementing Chapter 2, J. Oloka-Onyango analyses Uganda’s legal-
regulatory oil regime in Chapter 3. In line with Mbabazi and Muhangi 
(Chapter 2), Oloka-Onyango also concludes that Uganda has not yet complied 
with the best practices for managing natural resources and revenues. He 
asserts that there is too much space and leeway for abuse and misappropriation 
of oil funds in Uganda.
Chapter 4 by Kathleen Brophy and Peter Wandera further expands on 
the important theme of possible misappropriation and abuse of oil resources 
and revenues. In particular, the authors systematically examine the risks of 
corruption in Uganda’s burgeoning oil sector by mapping the opportunities for 
revenue mismanagement onto the standard oil revenue chain. They conclude 
that it is crucial to monitor ‘the interplay of corruption, oil and democracy 
in Uganda’ vigorously, thereby ensuring ‘that oil strengthens, rather than 
erodes Uganda’s democracy through a strong governance framework that 
limits all opportunities for corruption in the oil revenue chain’.
In Chapter 5, Badru Bukenya and Jaqueline Nakaiza investigate and 
analyse the dynamics of deal making between the Government of Uganda 
and international oil companies (IOC), as well as the strategies employed 
by the Government to remain in charge of the oil sector. The authors discuss 
the dominant role that is being played in these negotiations by the President 
of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni. Despite the secretive way in which Museveni 
proceeds in arranging oil deals with IOCs, the authors nonetheless conclude 
that ‘the deals reached so far appear to be in the national interest as they give 
few concessions to IOCs’. Yet, they rightly caution that this situation is clearly 
not sustainable and may lead to a lot of instability and tensions, when the 
current president is no longer holding the reins of power.
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Part II also consists of four chapters which together aim to provide a 
comprehensive analysis and assessment of Uganda’s macroeconomic and fiscal 
framework and policies. In Chapter 6, Corti Paul Lakuma analyses Uganda’s 
macroeconomic management regime and also the fiscal rules the Government 
of Uganda has put in place to achieve a balance between spending and saving 
of the expected oil revenues. The author makes a strong case for a ‘prudent 
management of these oil resources’ among other things by smoothing the 
production—and hence oil revenues—over time, and by committing ‘to 
making realistic and relatively conservative projections of future oil prices 
in order to mitigate unaffordable expenditure commitments in the event of 
oil revenues falling short of the forecasted levels’.
Chapter 7 by Joseph Mawejje explores the opportunities that the oil 
revenues offer with regard to social development. The author argues that 
‘oil revenues can support social development if a people-centred approach 
is taken that prioritises investments in agricultural sector transformation, 
human capital development, social protection, and harnesses the demographic 
dividend by focusing on interventions that can lead to sustainable improve-
ments in mortality and fertility outcomes’. However, he stresses that Uganda’s 
governance structures need to be strengthened across the board in order to 
ensure that the opportunities for social development are not missed.
In Chapter 8, Wilson Bahati Kazi examines Uganda’s fiscal regime in 
detail. On the basis of his analysis, he argues that Uganda’s fiscal regime 
is competitive and ensures certainty and stability. Moreover, he concludes 
positively that the ‘government has done enough preparatory work in terms 
of putting in place the necessary legal and institutional framework, including 
staff training and enhancing the capacities to deal with intricacies of assessing, 
collecting and managing oil revenues’.
Jackson Mwakali and Jackson Byaruhanga, who in Chapter 9 analyse the 
human resource challenges and opportunities facing Uganda’s emerging oil 
sector, come to a more sober conclusion concerning the preparatory work 
conducted by the Government of Uganda. In particular, despite a serious lack 
of skilled Ugandan people who could work in the oil and gas sectors, so far 
the Government has insufficiently remedied this situation. The authors offer 
a range of policy interventions that could help to address these important 
human resources challenges.
Part III again contains four chapters, each analysing an important govern-
ance aspect related to the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas resources. 
In Chapter 10, Moses Isabirye reflects on the main environmental issues 
linked to the oil development and assesses the adequacy of the existing 
environmental regulatory systems in regulating potential problems associated 
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with the upstream oil and gas activities in Uganda. The author warns that 
environmental challenges and issues are currently not a priority, despite 
the fact that environmental sustainability and considerations remain key 
determinants for the sustainable development of the oil and gas sector. He 
subsequently discusses a number of ways in which these environmental 
challenges can be addressed before oil exploitation and production will 
really take off.
In Chapter 11, Roberts K. Muriisa and Specioza Twinamasiko systemati-
cally examine the processes of land grabbing as a result of oil exploration and 
exploitation in Uganda. Based on their analysis, it is clear that land grabbing 
is a widespread problem in the oil production areas in the Western part of 
the country, and it has affected the livelihoods of a large number of people, 
especially women. The authors conclude that it is crucial to deal with this 
problem in an effective, constructive and transparent manner.
In Chapter 12, Musiime Chris Byaruhanga analyses the expectations of 
Ugandans concerning their country’s oil and gas resources, and how far 
the government and the oil companies have managed these expectations 
appropriately. It is noteworthy that most Ugandans appear to know relatively 
little about how the oil resources and revenues may potentially impact their 
country. But unsurprisingly most Ugandans hope that they will somehow 
benefit from the oil revenues, although there is a lot of doubt whether the oil 
wealth will be spent transparently and fairly. In line with this observation, 
the author argues that ‘the government’s biggest task should be to build trust 
and confidence with the population that oil money will be used for the greater 
public good and will not be stolen through corruption’.
The final chapter (Chapter 13) in Part III belongs to Tom Ogwang, who 
analyses the emergent social tensions and conflicts linked to the advent of 
oil exploration and exploitation in Uganda. Given the fact that most tensions 
and conflicts are related to land, and that more land will be needed for the 
expanding oil infrastructures, the author argues that ‘it would be prudent to 
develop and provide a clear description of the potential extent/magnitude 
of displacement of persons/settlements, including a clear compensation and 
livelihoods restoration plans (LRPs)’.
Part IV contains three additional African case studies. In Chapter 14, 
Ukoha Ukiwo analyses the Nigerian case; the Ghanaian case is analysed by 
Peter Quartey and Emmanuel Abbey in Chapter 15, and Germano Mwabu 
focuses on the Kenyan case in Chapter 16. These additional case studies 
provide important comparative insights into how these countries have man-
aged their natural resources and revenues. As noted above, while Ghana 
and Kenya have only fairly recently started exporting oil and gas resources, 
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Nigeria, on the other hand, has been Africa’s largest oil producer for many 
decades. Moreover, comparing Uganda’s oil governance regime with the 
regimes in Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana is extremely useful in terms of gaining 
insights concerning best practices, policies and institutions to manage oil 
and gas resources effectively, efficiently and transparently..
Part V contains the concluding chapter, in which we will draw a number 
of conclusions concerning the effectiveness and soundness of Uganda’s oil 
governance regime. A major conclusion is that oil wealth has enormous 
potential to accelerate development in Uganda as well as other African 
countries blessed with oil resources, but only if Uganda and other emerging 
as well as ‘old’ oil-exporting countries get both their politics and institutions 
right. In the final chapter, we also formulate a set of actionable policy recom-
mendations which could contribute to improving the (future) governance of 
Uganda’s oil windfall as well as that of other African countries, thereby not 
only preventing the governance curse from taking hold, but also ensuring 
that the oil windfall benefits as many people as possible.
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Uganda’s Oil Governance Institutions: 
Fit for Purpose?
Pamela Mbabazi and Martin Muhangi
2.1 Introduction
The discovery of commercially viable quantities of oil in the Albertine Graben 
in Western Uganda was announced by the Government of Uganda in 2006 
(Veit, Excell and Zomer, 2011). By the end of 2017/2018 Uganda had 21 oil and 
gas discoveries with an estimated accumulation of 6.5 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent, of which 1.3 billion barrels is recoverable (Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Development [MEMD], 2018). Uganda’s gas reserves are estimated 
at 672 billion cubic feet of gas, with 499 billion barrels of non-associated gas 
and 173 of associated gas. There is still considerable potential for discovering 
more petroleum, given that less than 40 per cent of the total area in Albertine 
Graben with the potential for petroleum production has been explored 
(MEMD, 2017). For instance, two more petroleum production licences were 
cleared by the Cabinet, and on 14 September 2017 the Government signed a 
production-sharing agreement with an Australian company, Armour Energy 
Limited.1
This is in addition to some eight licences that were previously granted over 
oil fields in Exploration Area 1 (EAI), Exploration Area 2 (EA2) and Kingfisher 
Area, and shared out between Tullow Uganda Operations Pty Limited, Total 
E&P Uganda B.V. and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 
Uganda Limited (MEMD, 2017). There are also efforts to search for oil and 
gas in other prospective areas of the country, including Amuru in Northern 
Uganda and the Karamoja area (MEMD, 2017).
1 The production-sharing agreement that Uganda signed with Australia’s Armour Energy Limited 
covers approx. 133 square miles of the Albertine Graben region. The area was previously licensed 
to existing operators (Total, CNOOC and Tullow) but the firms gave control of the block back to 
the Government in 2012 after explorations failed to find viable deposits. (Source: Biryabarema, 
E., 14 Sept. 2017. Uganda signs Oil Exploration deal with Australia’s Armoury Energy. Retrieved 
from: www.reuters.com).
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Cumulative foreign direct investment in petroleum exploration in Uganda 
since 1998 was estimated to be over US$ 3 billion at the end of 2016 (MEMD, 
2017). From 2017 to 2019 there has been little activity as the development phase 
is yet to commence pending the final investment decision by the international 
oil companies. Investment in the petroleum sector is expected to increase 
significantly as the country enters the development, and subsequently the 
production, transportation and refining phases of the petroleum value chain.
To add value to oil and gas resources there are plans to develop the Uganda 
Refinery with a capacity of 60,000 barrels per day and the associated down-
stream infrastructure. In addition, feasibility studies on the development of 
a crude oil export pipeline from the Albertine Graben in Uganda to the East 
African coast were undertaken, with a view of selecting the least-cost route 
for transporting Uganda’s crude oil to the coast (MEMD, 2017). The Hoima 
(Uganda)–Tanga (Tanzania) route was selected for being more secure, and 
cheaper in terms of cost.2 Consequently, a 1,445 km long, 24-inch diameter, 
heated East Africa crude oil pipeline (EACOP) will be developed to transport 
crude oil from Uganda to Tanga Port in Tanzania. The development of this 
pipeline is spearheaded by the licensed upstream oil companies in Uganda, 
with participating interests by the governments of Uganda and Tanzania 
(MEMD, 2017) through the Uganda National Oil Company and the Tanzania 
Petroleum Development Corporation respectively.
These developments are indicative of the expectations that oil production 
will increase government revenue, improve economic growth and promote 
development in Uganda (Veit et al., 2011). However, since the experiences of 
some oil-producing countries suggest that the oil discovery does not always 
lead to economic prosperity, there have been conscious efforts among recent 
discoverers of oil and gas to chart paths that would lead to oil becoming 
a source of blessing rather than a curse. This is the notion that countries 
that are richly endowed with natural resources such as oil and gas tend to 
be enmeshed in widespread poverty, with the benefits of the resources not 
enjoyed by the populace, and instead are beset by negative economic growth, 
entrenched corruption and political oppression (Deacon and Rode, 2012; 
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006; Mähler, 2010).
In Uganda, expectation of national benefits from oil production has sparked 
interests in the governance of oil wealth to avoid the experiences of other 
countries where discovery and exploitation of oil have attracted woes rather 
than wealth (Kiiza, Bategeka and Ssewanyana, 2011). This is against the 
background of growing recognition that the ‘oil curse’ is not an inevitable 
2 http://petroleum.go.ug/uploads/resources/Status_of_Policy_2017_dl.pdf.
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occurrence and that its negative effects can be avoided (see Anthonsen, 
Löfgren and Nilsson, 2009; Mehlum, Sachs and Warner, 1995; Thuber and 
Istad, 2010; Thuber, Hults and Heller, 2011). Indeed, the Ugandan president 
has promised its citizens that the Ugandan case will be different, and noted 
in this respect:
… There is a lot of nonsense that the Oil will be a curse. No way! The Oil of 
Uganda cannot be a curse. Oil becomes a curse when you have got useless 
leaders, and I can assure you that we don’t approach that description even 
by a thousandth of a mile… The Oil is a blessing for Uganda and money 
from it will be used for development …. (as cited in Kiiza et al., 2011, p.25).
In his Address to the Nation on 31 December 2009, President Yoweri Musev-
eni promised to ensure that oil becomes a blessing to Uganda and detailed 
how the oil resource will be well managed for national development: He is 
quoted to have noted that:
… The development of Oil resources will go hand in hand with the 
continued efforts to develop other sectors of the economy that is, the 
diversification of the economy will continue to be among the top priorities 
of Government in spite of the Oil wealth. The Government recognizes the 
critical importance of managing Oil resources well; to avoid the mistakes 
many other countries have faced. … Hence, Government will ensure 
that these resources are managed in a manner that facilitates sustainable 
development and avoids distortions such as a sharply appreciated exchange 
rate, which would destroy other sectors of the economy, by making them 
uncompetitive in terms of export. In other words, Oil and Gas resources will 
be managed in a manner that is consistent with the macro framework of the 
country. Since Oil is a finite resource, Oil revenues will be used to develop 
durable and competitive competences that will increase productivity in 
key sectors of the economy (as cited in Veit et al., 2011, p.5).
From the foregoing it is evident that the Ugandan political leadership has been 
influenced by the growing recognition that the ‘oil curse’ is attributable not to 
the discovery of abundant natural resources but to the nature of institutional 
arrangements that guide the exploitation and management of natural resource 
deposits and revenues (Okuku, 2015).
Ahead of the next chapter which provides detailed analysis of Uganda’s oil 
governance institutions, this chapter reviews evolving theoretical perspectives 
on the implications of the governance of natural resources for economic 
36 Pamela mBaBazi anD martin mUhangi
development. It explores the challenges of implementation of institutions 
developed for good resource management. In particular, the authors address 
how the political economy context affects the full realisation of the objec-
tives of the governance institutions in order to find sustainable options for 
maximally harnessing oil for national development.
The chapter proceeds as follows: the next section looks at the existing 
debates in oil governance. This is followed in section 3 with a discussion of 
the apex oil governance framework in Uganda and its myriad challenges. The 
concluding section raises a number of reform measures needed to strengthen 
the governance framework in order to maximise the benefits of oil wealth 
to Uganda.
2.2 Beyond the Resource Curse Perspective
There is no doubt that historically natural resources have had a decisive and 
positive role in supporting countries to attain economic growth (Karabegović, 
2009; Mikesell, 1997). Countries that have had sustainable growth because 
of natural resources include Australia, Canada, the United States, New 
Zealand, Norway, Denmark and Finland (Karabegović, 2009). There are also 
examples to indicate that the presence of natural resources is not by itself 
a conclusive basis for attaining economic growth and eradicating poverty 
(Ross, 2012; 2015).
Several empirical studies seeking to explain the absence of economic 
growth and development in some resource-rich countries have shown the high 
probability of the resource curse phenomenon in such resource-rich countries 
from the onset (see Ross, 2012; 2015; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001). The 
resource curse refers to the context where expected dividends of development 
do not follow the export of natural resources but ironically stimulate trends 
that stall development.
One of the noticeable signs of the resource curse is the ‘Dutch disease’. 
This occurs when economic resources are moved from the productive sector, 
such as agriculture and manufacturing, known for stimulating economic 
growth, to a newly booming sector of an economy, especially in the natural 
resource field (Sachs and Warner, 1995). This often results in neglecting the 
productive sectors of the economy due to increasing dependence on revenues 
from the extractive sector.
A major consequence of the disease is the appreciation of a country’s 
currency relative to other currencies, which is often due to the windfall in 
government revenues from the booming extractive sector of the economy 
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(Ross, 2012; 2015). The problem is usually manageable as long as prices of 
the natural resources remain stable and revenue flows are uninterrupted. 
However, the volatility of global market prices of natural resources, especially 
oil and gas, creates conditions for the manifestation of the curse phenomenon 
(Sachs and Warner, 1995; 2001). This is because of the balance of payments 
issues that arise from dependence on commodities experiencing glut and 
price slump.
Consequently, Frankel (2010) conducted an econometric analysis and 
concluded that possession of abundant natural resources does not necessarily 
lead to the resource curse syndrome, but rather factors such as commodity 
price volatility, the Dutch disease, political and civil unrest and poor institu-
tional quality set the stage for a resource curse. Karl (2005) emphasises that 
the resource curse problem is more political than economic. Barma, Kaiser 
and Vinuela (2012) have also shown that the poor governance indicators in 
most resource-rich developing countries are an attestation that the resource 
curse phenomenon has an institutional dimension.
Anthonsen, Löfgren and Nilsson (2009) submit that the quality of institu-
tions is the independent variable that explains the consequence of resources 
in the economy. This is a marked departure from the previous perspectives 
that regarded the quality of institutions as the intermediate or intervening 
variable. Institutions have been defined as the constraints devised by humans 
that structure political, economic and social interaction such as constitutions, 
laws and property rights (North, 1991).
Much historical evidence suggests that the quality of institutions or 
governance is more instrumental in cultivating economic growth than the 
availability of resources per se (Schubert, 2006). Considerable research has 
been undertaken to determine how countries richly endowed with natural 
resources such as oil and gas are building and using the quality of institu-
tions to attain good governance and optimum benefits from the resources 
(Anthonsen et al., 2009; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Isham, Wookcock, 
Pritchett and Busby, 2005; Mehlum et al., 2006; Sachs and Warner, 1995; 
Mbabazi, 2013). This is focused on determining how political and economic 
actions taken by governments typified by the quality of decisions made, 
policies and regulatory models selected, and institutional frameworks 
adopted, affect the management of the resources (Ibadildin, 2011; Weinthal 
and Jones, 2006).
Several scholars have rightly argued that the quality of institutions de-
termines whether natural resources would be a blessing or curse to a given 
country (Kaznacheev, 2017; Mehlum et al., 2006; Hunter, 2014; Ibadildin, 
2011). The most appropriate illustration of the impact of the quality of 
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institutions is the two neighbouring Southern African states of Botswana3 
and Angola. At independence in 1966, Botswana had 12 kilometres of paved 
roads and two secondary schools; but with the discovery of diamonds, the 
country was catapulted into a middle-income country with growth hovering 
at about 16 per cent in the 1970s and 1980s, and revenue to GDP ratio climbing 
as high as 60 per cent by the year 2010 (Hammond, 2011). The 2016 Human 
Development Index (HDI) graded the country at a score of 0.698 (ranked 
as 106 out of 188 participating countries) and it is categorised as a medium 
human development4 country (UNDP, 2017).
On the other hand, Angola is more often presented as the graphic ex-
ample of a developing country richly endowed with natural resources but 
experiencing armed conflict and poor performance in economic and social 
development (Hodges, 2004). Though the oil and gas sector contributes 
45 per cent of its GDP, the country has experienced rising poverty levels 
and political instability (Hammond, 2011). It is designated as a low human 
development country with a score of 0.532 and ranked at 150 out of the 188 
countries surveyed (UNDP, 2017).
This abysmal position is replicated in other resource-rich sub-Saharan 
African States such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad 
and the Republic of Sudan whose HDI-rankings are within the bottom 20 
places (UNDP, 2017). Table 2.1 shows how a country’s enabling environment, 
precipitated by the quality of governance institutions and practices, impacts 
on the resource management. This draws on pre-existing research to measure 
the broader governance context. A total of 89 resource countries were ranked. 
It is clear that the index scores for Angola and Equatorial Guinea suggest 
weak or failing natural resource governance.
It is important to note, therefore, that there is a correlation between strong 
and efficient institutions with better oil and gas management systems. This 
has been shown in case studies documenting the experience of Norway 
and Botswana (Mehlum et al., 2006). The question to be settled, however, 
is how the Ugandan model will work to achieve the successes evidenced in 
the Norwegian and Botswanan models.
3 Botswana does not have oil, but is a flagbearer for responsible management of natural resources 
in the form of diamonds.
4 The UNDP categorises four classes of HDI group: (1) countries with an index over 0.800 are 
categorised as Very High Human Development group; (2) countries with an index between 0.700 
and 0.800 are categorised as High Human Development, (3) countries with an index between 
0.550 and 0.700 are categorised as Medium Human Development and (4) countries with an index 
below 0.550 are categorised as Low Human Development group.
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1 Norway (Oil and Gas) 86 77 84 97
2 Chile (Mining) 81 74 81 90
13 Ghana (Oil and Gas) 67 65 65 70
18 Botswana (Mining) 61 40 62 81
36 Tanzania (Oil and Gas) 53 65 40 53
51 Uganda (Oil and gas) 44 42 42 47
70 Angola (Oil and Gas) 35 50 31 25
85
Equatorial Guinea (Oil 
and Gas)
22 29 18 17
Source: Data drawn from the 2017 Resource Governance Index, Natural Resource Governance 
Institute (NRGI). Available at: https://resourcegovernanceindex.org/.
Van Alstine et al. (2014) performed a qualitative study to investigate the 
dynamics of resource governance in Uganda. The research findings highlight 
four significant governance gaps, namely: lack of coherence among civil society 
organisations (CSOs); limited civil society access to communities and the 
deliberate centralisation of oil governance; industry-driven interaction at 
the local level; and weak local government capacity. Other available evidence 
posits that the political setting, citizen vigilance and societal institutions 
determine and shape how natural resources are exploited, and the way the 
proceeds are harnessed for the benefit of the society (Lederman and Maloney, 
2012; Okuku, 2015).
2.3 Uganda’s Governance Framework for Oil and Gas
This section examines the different institutions and practices that have been 
put in place in Uganda to manage and regulate the oil and gas sector. The 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda vests the ownership and control of 
petroleum in the Government on behalf of the people (Article 244 of the 
Constitution of Uganda). Accordingly, the Government of Uganda holds 
in trust for the people of Uganda all the natural resources, such as minerals 
and petroleum.
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The oil and gas sector is also being developed and governed in accordance 
with the national development plan that is underscoring programmes such 
as fiscal expansion for front-loading physical infrastructure investment, 
industrialisation through resource beneficiation, fast-tracking skills develop-
ment and strengthening governance or enabling business environment.
Within the constitutional context, the primary framework that guides 
the management of oil resources in Uganda is the national oil and gas policy 
(NOGP) (MEMD, 2008; 2014). With the overarching theme of using the 
resource to eradicate poverty and create lasting value to Ugandans, NOGP 
recognises that to attain the ultimate goal it should have as a primary objec-
tive the ‘development of institutions, including legislation and manpower 
necessary for effective management and regulation of the sub-sector’.
Prior to the coming in force of the NOGP, Uganda’s oil and gas activities 
were regulated under the Petroleum Exploration and Production Act, 1985, 
CAP 150 of the Laws of Uganda, which was implemented by the Petroleum 
Exploration and Production Department under the Ministry of Energy and 
Mineral Development (MEMD). This was a single department handling all 
the oil and gas activities in the country. This 1985 law covered exploration 
operations but did not have adequate provisions to cover development and 
production operations. The NOGP recommended the establishment of 
1) the Petroleum Authority of Uganda to handle the regulatory functions; 
2) the National Oil Company to handle the commercial interest of the state; 
and, 3) the Directorate of Petroleum to advise on policy issues and resource 
management.
These were eventually established under the Petroleum (Exploration, 
Development and Production) Act, 2013. Figure 2.1 shows the interaction 
of the recently established institutions together with other government 
ministries, departments and agencies.
Uganda’s oil and gas sector shares similar characteristics with East Timor’s 
governance framework which is internationally recognised as a robust system. 
Both Timor Leste and Uganda’s model of oil and gas revenue management 
were developed with assistance from the Norwegian Government. The Timor 
Leste model shows the interconnectedness of various institutions including 
civil society organisations for the prudent management of oil and gas revenues. 
The Timor-Leste oil and gas revenue management model has been hailed 
for providing a strong foundation for fiscal stability, investing oil and gas 
revenues in foreign portfolios and reducing the possibility of the ‘Dutch 
disease’ (Mackechnie, 2013).
One of the key features of a robust governance model is the role of the 
Parliament. The degree of parliamentary involvement varies among different 
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countries, and this usually starts at the point of initial licensing and contract-
ing with the companies extracting the resource. Given the importance of 
this level in developing a framework in which the resource will be exploited, 
some countries raise the profile of Parliament in having powers to approve 
and/or veto resource contracts (WBI, 2012). In Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
the Parliament has constitutional powers to ratify or veto international 
agreements, including extractive industry contracts. In Egypt, a production-
sharing contract can take effect only if approved by the legislature. In Liberia, 
investment contracts are ratified by Parliament (WBI, 2012).
The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda mirrors the above practices, 
as it places considerable responsibility on the Parliament to provide the 
oversight role in the management and exploitation of resources and other 
operations of the State of Uganda.5 The Parliament of Uganda is accordingly 
5 Section 79 of the Constitution provides that ‘[s]ubject to the provisions of this Constitution, 
Parliament shall have power to make laws on any matter for the peace, order, development and 
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the apex institution mandated to make laws for the regulation management 
and exploitation of the minerals and natural resources such as oil and gas in 
the country and the sharing of royalties arising from petroleum exploitation 
and other related activities.
However, the legal regime in Uganda is not as strong as that of Liberia or 
Egypt, where the international agreements or investment contracts are given 
effect only after parliamentary approval/ratification. In Uganda, the Minister 
responsible for petroleum (Minister of Energy) negotiates and enters into 
petroleum agreements (section 9 of the Upstream Act and section 8 of the 
Midstream Act) and does not require parliamentary approval. Although there 
is a national resources committee of Parliament, there is no oversight role of 
Parliament during the negotiation and contracting process. As a result, Parlia-
ment has no control of the negotiated contract terms and appears to be merely 
a bystander or spectator in the process. The Minister is part of the executive, 
and as such this process is prone to political interference and direction.
The Parliament of Uganda has enacted laws to regulate oil operations 
in Uganda. However, most of the laws passed by Parliament concentrate 
powers in the hands of the executive (the Minister of Energy and Minerals 
Development), and this has implications for ensuring accountability and 
transparency in the oil sector. This is largely attributable to the governance 
system that has Cabinet Ministers who are Members of Parliament selected 
from the majority party (WBI, 2012). In such a situation, where the ruling party 
has an overwhelming majority, Parliament will have no firm basis to develop 
independent capacities (Barkin, 2009; WBI, 2012). It is a common practice 
in the Ugandan Parliament for the ruling party, the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM), which currently controls 293 out of 400 Members of 
Parliament, to make critical decisions ahead of parliamentary deliberations 
in its caucus. In effect Parliament ends up endorsing decisions agreed upon 
from the party caucus. The Parliament also seems to have ceded some of its 
oversight responsibilities by allowing the executive to have absolute powers 
in the governance of the oil sector.
There is evident political interference in the management of Uganda’s oil 
and gas sector. The President has arguably been adamant about maintain-
ing firm control over the oil industry. He has been quoted to have said, ‘In 
the case of petroleum and gas, I direct that no agreement should ever be 
signed without my express written approval of that arrangement’ (Watkins, 
2010). This poses a major challenge to the oil sector and undermines the 
authority of the oil governance institutions (Patey, 2015). Moreover, the powers 
good governance of Uganda’.
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vested in the Minister of Energy and Mineral Development in Uganda are 
arguably rather excessive and provide a conducive milieu for possible misuse 
and abuse (Golombok and Jones, 2015; International Alert, 2009; Veit et al., 
2011). This explains why the Minister of Energy could refuse to have the 
production-sharing agreements debated on the floor of Parliament on the 
pretext of protecting proprietary rights (WBI, 2012).
There has been some undisclosed information on the Government’s 
management of the oil and gas industry in Uganda that are undermining the 
credibility and quality of governance institutions and practices. In Uganda, 
there is limited access to information on oil and gas activities. A case in point 
is that the production-sharing agreements (PSAs) remain inaccessible to 
the public. This may be due to different statutes/laws giving contradictory 
positions on the right of citizens to access information (Veit et al., 2011). 
For instance, section 151 of the Petroleum Act on accessing information on 
petroleum activities by the public is not robust enough. Whereas the provi-
sion avers that the Minister may provide information about the petroleum 
agreement to the public, it does not indicate how much of the information 
regarding the contents of the agreement can be provided; are they details 
as to the parties or all the clauses in the agreement in question? This lack of 
transparency has created negative perceptions and worries as to whether the 
PSAs were well negotiated for the benefit of the people of Uganda.6
There is also concern that the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Develop-
ment, and more specifically the Directorate of Petroleum, is simply too lean 
to fully execute its role in the petroleum sector. The effort to reorganise 
and strengthen the Ministry has been constrained by limited funding. The 
constrained funding has also affected both the strategic and operational 
business activities of fully developing the oil and gas sector in the country 
(MEMD, 2016; Parliament of Uganda, 2016). Government has been slow in 
developing and skilling human resources for the sector. Not all the staff are 
well grounded in technical petroleum and ancillary matters such as negotia-
tion, licensing and contract management (Kashambuzi, 2010).
Although Uganda’s oil industry is operating outside communities, degrada-
tion of the ecological biodiversity of the Lake Albert region is increasingly 
becoming a reality due to poor environmental governance (Patey, 2015). Oil 
companies are basically self-regulating. Uganda’s National Environment 
Management Authority is underfunded, understaffed and lacks political 
6 The Black Monday protestors used these restrictions as one of the justifications for protesting 
against corruption in government (see www.monitor.co.ug: 3 December 2012: ‘A nt i -
corruption Activities Call for Black Money Protests’).
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authority. Environmental impact assessments have been conducted, but 
there are few guidelines on waste management.
2.4 Conclusions: Towards Strengthening Uganda’s Oil 
Governance Institutions
Karl (1997) suggests that oil states have little interest in developing sound 
institutions because stronger institutions demand higher accountability. It 
has also been argued that weak institutions are chiefly responsible for the lack 
of growth and development in many of the oil-rich countries in the global 
south (Acemoglu et al., 1999). The case of Uganda shows that attempts have 
been made to develop sound institutions to manage the oil sector. Uganda 
is undoubtedly at a crossroads and how it manages its oil resources will have 
a profound impact on its future. For Uganda to take full advantage of its oil 
resources and become one of Africa’s oil success stories, it must strengthen 
its oil governance institutions and become more transparent and accountable 
in the way it manages its emerging oil industry. This chapter has explored the 
institutional framework under which Uganda’s emerging oil sector is being 
managed. It is clear that the Government has made efforts to establish a 
number of institutions which are required to effectively manage the industry, 
but a number of gaps exist still. A lot more needs to be done to strengthen 
the institutions.
As argued in this chapter, there is also need for more checks and balances 
to ensure that the industry is well regulated. The autonomy of most of the 
institutions is still lacking especially in light of the excessive powers vested 
in the Minister of Energy. Following the consideration of the performance 
of the different institutions, it is only pertinent that recommendations are 
made for improving oil governance in Uganda. We therefore propose the 
following policy recommendations:
– There is need to set good practice in management and governance of the 
sector through giving effect to the institutions as defined in the legal 
and regulatory framework. The President’s oversight role should be 
operationalised through Cabinet, and not through direct instructions on 
agreements and other operational matters. It is important that governance 
institutions’ roles are clearly spelt out, and conflicting and grey areas 
cleared out.
– There is need to review the powers of the Minister to prevent abuses. 
The powers need to be tempered with clear lines of accountability and 
transparency.
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– There is need for enhancement of the powers of Parliament so that it 
can effectively provide oversight to the executive and other regulatory 
institutions in the sector.
– The executive needs to show greater transparency and accountability in 
its dealings with the oil companies. The Government should provide full 
disclosure of activities in the sector.
– The contradictions in accessing information on oil governance need to 
be cleared to ensure transparency and accountability in the management 
of the oil resources. It is a principle of giving with one hand and taking 
away with the other. For example, the executive claims to have laid the 
signed PSAs before Parliament but the actual fact is that Members of 
Parliament can only look at them, without being allowed to take any 
notes, copy, or even take a screen shot of any of the contents therein. 
The Government would do well to amend the Petroleum Act (2002) and 
enact laws creating the environment for transparency, accountability and 
good resource management.
– The Bank of Uganda should take an active role in influencing the policies 
and practices in revenue management and align with agents of restraint. 
A good starting point would be to encourage Government to fast track 
the process of joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI).
– There is need for active focus on ensuring that there are policies to stop 
the callous degradation of the environment especially in light of the 
rich biodiversity in the Albertine Graben. The oil is projected to flow for 
barely 25–30 years; it would be foolhardy to allow such a short stint of a 
non-renewable resource to run down the environment.
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Although indications of the availability of oil can be traced to the 1920s, 
exploration for the resource in Uganda was not taken very seriously until the 
early 1980s. The colonial government did not believe that oil was available in 
sufficient quantities to justify its exploitation (Okuku, 2015, p.4). Post-colonial 
governments took a similar view until a survey ‘indicated a possibility of the 
existence of hydrocarbons in the Albertine area in the north-western part of 
the country’ (Okuku, 2015, p.4). From the 1990s onwards, more serious efforts 
were devoted to exploration in the area. However, no petroleum exploration 
or production took off in Uganda until 2000 (Bainomugisha et al., 2006, p.23).
It is therefore not surprising that Uganda lacked a comprehensive legal 
framework to regulate her oil sector. The law applicable to the management 
of all activities in Uganda’s oil and gas sector was the Petroleum (Exploration 
and Production) Act, No. 20 of 1985.1 The law covered exploration, discovery 
and production; the obligations of licensees, and the registration, transfer 
and cancellation of licences; restrictions and surface rights, and financial 
matters. However, given that no oil had yet been discovered in exploitable 
quantities, that legislation was barely used. The primary source of regulation 
of the Ugandan oil sector is the 1995 Constitution of Uganda, which inter alia 
requires the Government to ensure that resources are used for the benefit 
of all Ugandans.2 Article 244(2) of the Constitution further mandates the 
1 Since repealed by the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act 2013.
2 See ObjectiveXIII of the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, and 
Article 244(1) of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda.
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Parliament of Uganda to make laws regulating the exploitation of petroleum 
and minerals, and the sharing of royalties arising from petroleum exploitation 
and other related activities. As a result, Uganda currently has a number of 
laws, policies and regulations in place to govern the oil and gas sector. Some of 
these include the National Oil and Gas Policy (NOGP), 2008, the Oil and Gas 
Revenue Management Policy (OGRMP), 2012, the Petroleum (Exploration, 
Development and Production) Act, 2013 (the ‘Upstream Act’); the Petroleum 
(Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage) Act, 2013 (the 
‘Midstream Act’); and the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) of 2015.
This chapter critically analyses the laws and regulations adopted to manage 
the oil sector, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses. The discussion in 
the remainder of this chapter will be structured around the following issues: 
ownership of oil resources in Uganda (Section 2), access to information 
about oil resources and revenues in Uganda (Section 3), Uganda’s exploration 
and production regime (Section 4), and Uganda’s oil revenue management 
regime (Section 5).The chapter concludes by addressing the extent to which 
Uganda’s legal and policy regime governing the oil sector sufficiently protects 
the country from the proverbial oil curse.
3.2 Ownership of Oil Resources
The issue of ‘ownership’ is linked to and has an impact on how oil resources 
are controlled, by whom and on whose behalf. Understanding ownership 
therefore provides important insights into who controls the resources and 
who is likely to benefit from them. Article 244(1) of the 1995 Constitution 
of Uganda, as amended in 2005, places the entire property in and control of 
all minerals and petroleum in, on or under any land or water in the hands of 
the Government on behalf of the Republic of Uganda. It also prohibits the 
unlicensed exploration or development of petroleum. The guiding philosophy 
behind this provision is the public trust doctrine which obliges the Govern-
ment to account to its people as principals/owners, ensuring they participate 
in the management of their affairs either by themselves or through elected 
representatives (International Alert, 2011, p.15).
Article 244(2) of the 1995 Constitution further mandates Parliament to 
make laws to regulate the exploitation of minerals and petroleum, the sharing 
of royalties arising from petroleum exploitation, conditions for the payment 
of indemnities arising out of the exploitation of petroleum and minerals, and 
the restoration of derelict lands. Consequently, various pieces of legislation 
have been enacted by Parliament to give effect to the relevant constitutional 
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provisions. Section 4 of the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Pro-
duction) Act and Chapter 4 of the Oil Gas Revenue Management Policy, 
2012 respectively affirm the position of the Constitution that Government 
shall hold petroleum rights on behalf of and for the benefit of the people of 
Uganda. At the time of writing this chapter, the Petroleum (Exploration, 
Development and Production) Act, 2013 is the major legal regime governing 
the oil industry in Uganda.
Consequently, the people of Uganda are the largest and most important 
stakeholders in the country’s oil resource exploitation. The question conse-
quently shifts to how the people can ensure that their government, as the 
controller of the resource, abides by the rules in managing this finite resource 
for their benefit. Access to information becomes crucial at this stage, which 
is an issue we turn to in the next section.
3.3 Access to Information and the Law in Uganda
In Uganda, all oil resources belong to the Government, which must control 
and exploit them for the benefit of the people in a fiduciary arrangement. It is 
this fiduciary arrangement which naturally imposes the need for transparency 
and accountability on the part of the Government, and also necessitates 
access to information so that the people—as the principal beneficiaries of 
the resources—can ably gauge the same Government’s performance and hold 
it accountable. Simply put, therefore, access to information enhances the 
ownership structure as by law established. This section examines the above 
concepts within the context of Uganda’s prevailing legal regime.
Under Article 41 of the 1995 Constitution, every citizen of Uganda has the 
right of access to information in the possession of the State or any organ or 
agent of the State, except where the release of such information is likely to 
prejudice security or interfere with the right to privacy of another person. It 
is on this basis that the Access to Information (A2I) Act, 2005 was enacted. 
The Act was also designed to promote an efficient, effective, transparent and 
accountable government and to empower the public effectively to scrutinise 
and participate in government decisions that affect them.3
Guiding Principle 3 of the NOGP is about transparency and accountability 
which entails openness and access to information. This information enables 
stakeholders to assess how their interests are being affected. The NOGP seeks 
to promote high standards of transparency and accountability in licensing, 
3 Section 3 of the A2I Act, 2005.
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procurement, exploration, development and production operations, as well 
as in the management of revenues from oil and gas. Both the Upstream and 
Midstream Acts allow for public access to information relating to petroleum 
activities such as the announcement of new areas for petroleum exploration, 
the publication of application notices and bidding processes,4 and access 
to some information/reports from the Petroleum Fund and the Petroleum 
Revenue Investment Reserve (PRIR).5
Section 61 of the PFMA requires the Minister of Finance to present to 
Parliament the estimated inflows and outflows of the Petroleum Fund of 
each financial year. One major criticism of this provision is that there is no 
requirement for the Minister to ensure that such payments are disaggregated 
in accordance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
standards stipulating the payment type, origin and source. This makes it 
impossible to follow company payments with government receipts, since 
the national budget recognises only one single figure from the oil and gas 
industry (Avocats Sans Frontières, 2015, p.7).
Under section 151 of the Upstream Act, the Minister may make available 
to the public details of all agreements and licences or approved field develop-
ment plans upon payment of a prescribed fee. However, use of the word 
‘may’ rather than ‘shall’ implies that the availability of such information is 
provided at the discretion of the Minister, who may choose to disclose only 
selected information while withholding other such. Section 153 goes on to 
prohibit the disclosure of information furnished or in a report submitted 
by a licensee, to any person who is not a minister or an officer in the public 
service except with the consent of the licensee. Government employees are 
even subjected to an oath of secrecy and strict penal sanctions are imposed 
for its breach. While the Government should honour its commitment to 
join the EITI and make it an open policy to publish all the contracts on the 
ministry’s website, there is also a need for the transnational oil companies 
to publicly demonstrate their willingness to disclose the information they 
have (Avocats Sans Frontières, 2015, p.7). This will increase public trust in 
government and bring about enhanced transparency and accountability in 
Uganda’s petroleum industry.
Even with such information being accessed, there remains a challenge 
in ensuring that Ugandans—the majority of whom are illiterate or know 
only basic English—are able to be included in its dissemination and debate 
(International Alert, 2011, p.21). Furthermore, the processes of accessing 
4 Sections 52 and 54 of the Upstream Act.
5 Sections 57–75 of the PFMA.
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information are tedious and can be expensive. Finally, the culture of govern-
ment secrecy over state affairs remains deeply entrenched, to the extent 
that even the courts of law have been shy to enforce provisions that would 
compel the Government to divulge information on the agreements made in 
the oil sector.
Such reluctance was apparent in the Charles Mwanguhya Mpagi & Angelo 
Izama v. The Attorney General case6 in which two journalists sought cop-
ies of agreements made between the Government of Uganda and various 
companies involved in prospecting for and the exploitation of oil.7 Although 
the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of Energy did not directly reject 
the request, he responded to it by stating that more time was needed to 
consult other government bodies before he could properly react. The Solicitor 
General also stepped in to argue that the agreements could not be accessed 
due to a confidentiality clause prohibiting their disclosure. Using section 18 
of the A2I Act, the petitioners took the PS’s non-committal response and the 
SG’s opinion as a refusal to release the information, and filed a complaint in 
the Chief Magistrates’ Court at Nakawa under section 37 of the Act.8 The 
court dismissed the Government’s argument that the information could 
not be released for fear of breaching a confidentiality clause contained in 
the agreements because to do so would mean that the State would be able to 
restrict all information arising out of agreements by simply inserting language 
which covered this angle. This was a positive response to the Government’s 
attempt to place a blanket cover over the release of the agreements.
However, the court went on to assess both the public interest and the harm 
contemplated by the disclosure and declared that it was not satisfied that the 
public interest in the disclosure was greater than the harm contemplated. 
After examination, the court held that the two journalists did not show how 
they would use the information for the benefit of the public. According to 
the court, ‘Government business is not in its entirety, supposed to be in the 
public domain’. The court determined that demonstrating such a benefit was 
necessary to prove a public interest in disclosure.9
6 Miscellaneous Case No. 751 of 2009.
7 The analysis in the following paragraphs is taken from Africa Freedom of Information Centre, 
Analysis of the Court Ruling in Charles MwanguhyaMpagi and Angelo Izama vs. Attorney General 
(Miscellaneous Cause No. 751 of 2009) against the Framework of the Uganda Access to Information 
Act, 2005 and International Access to Information Standards, retrieved from: http://www.right2info.
org/cases/r2i-charles-mwanguhya-mpagi-and-izama-angelo-v.-attorney-general.
8 Ibid., at 3.
9 Ibid., at 6.
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The Mwanguhya & Izama case can be criticised on two main grounds. First 
of all, it is for the public authority to prove that any disclosure of information 
in its possession would be more harmful to the public interest that its non-
disclosure. It is not for the persons requesting that information to prove it. 
Secondly, there is no provision in the law that requires the person requesting 
the information to justify how they are going to use it.10 Nevertheless, the 
decision was arrived at within the context of a heated exchange between Parlia-
ment and the executive, with threats issued by the President that eventually 
deterred the legislature from further pursuing the matter. When eventually 
accessed, Global Witness found many loopholes in the agreements (Global 
Witness, 2015a; 2015b).11 While Government claims that the agreements 
have been provided to Parliament, MPs continue to complain of a lack of 
information and transparency about the sector (Odyek, 2016, p.7).
Signs of an early disconnect between laws and practice are thus begin-
ning to show, even with the same laws containing various inconsistencies. 
Consequently, it is plausible to say that unless Uganda fully adheres to the 
requirements of full disclosure of information, it is bound to make the same 
mistakes as many other earlier oil-producing countries have, and to fall into 
the same traps they fell into or are in. Without access to information, the 
public will be blindsided as to the Government’s actual activities, thereby 
providing a cloak for the same embezzlement and misappropriation of oil 
revenues that befell (and continue to befall) countries like Nigeria, Gabon, 
Angola and Equatorial Guinea (Gary and Karl, 2003, pp.25–42). It is however 
hoped that the signing into law of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (the Wall Street Reform Act) in the US will have 
a positive impact on access to information by compelling oil companies 
registered with the US Securities and Exchange Commission annually to 
disclose information on payments made to foreign governments (Veit et al., 
2011, p.2). This is so especially since 29 of the 32 largest global oil companies 
are registered with the Commission. However, only Total SA and CNOOC, 
in Uganda’s case, would ‘appear’ to be bound by this law. Further questions 
are raised by the recent changes to the Dodd-Frank Law engineered by the 
Republican-dominated Congress with the support of President Donald 
Trump’s administration (Lane, 2017). Many of the provisions in the law 
relating to tighter accountability and transparency have been dismantled.
10 Ibid., at 6.
11 Also see Global Witness, ‘A Good Deal Better? Uganda’s Secret Oil Contracts Explained’, 
September 2014, Retrieved from: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/reports/good-deal-better/.
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Putting aside the negative developments in the United States, it is impera-
tive that the Ugandan Government adopt a binding practice of full disclosure 
and unhampered access to information in order to enhance accountability 
and public confidence and avert the threat of a resource curse. Inevitably, this 
also means ending the reign of confidentiality clauses in oil-related contracts 
or agreements and following through with the planned application to join 
the EITI, amongst other initial steps.
3.4 Uganda’s Exploration and Production Regime
This section examines the following three concepts which broadly fall within 
the ambit of Uganda’s exploration and production regime: 1) licensing and the 
regulation of oil exploitation activities in general, 2) national oil companies, 
and 3) the issue of local content.
3.4.1 Licences and Concessions
The 2008 National Oil and Gas Policy (NOGP) was designed to ensure that 
the country’s oil and gas resources contribute to the early achievement of 
poverty eradication and create lasting value to society. The NOGP sets out its 
first objective as ensuring efficiency in licensing areas with the potential for 
oil and gas production in the country. The policy provides for the initiation of 
gradual licensing as against licensing all areas at once; open and transparent 
bidding; execution of due diligence on companies applying for licences and 
avoiding the undesirable situation of a monopoly by licensing and maintaining 
several oil companies.
The Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act, 2013 (the 
‘Upstream Act’) and the Petroleum (Refining, Conversion, Transmission 
and Midstream) Act, 2013 (the ‘Midstream Act’) also govern licensing. The 
Upstream Act regulates the licensing and participation of commercial entities 
in petroleum activities and provides for an open, transparent and competitive 
process of licensing. Section 5 of the Act prohibits petroleum activities in 
Uganda without an authorisation licence, permit or approval. Anybody who 
contravenes the provision commits an offence and is liable on conviction to a 
fine not exceeding 100,000 currency points or imprisonment for a maximum of 
ten years, or both.12 For a body corporate, the fine is a maximum of 1,000,000 
12 A currency point is equivalent to UGX.20,000. As at the time of writing, US$1 is equivalent 
to UGX.3,700.
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currency points.13 Section 6 gives power to the Government to enter into 
agreements relating to petroleum activities with any person with respect to 
granting or renewing a licence. Section 8 of the Act empowers the Minister 
to grant and revoke licences, issue petroleum regulations and to negotiate 
and endorse petroleum agreements, among other functions.
The Minister is also tasked to develop a model production-sharing agree-
ment or any other model agreement which must be approved by Cabinet and 
laid before Parliament. Once approved by Cabinet, this model is supposed 
to guide future agreements. In November 2015, a model production-sharing 
agreement that had been approved by Cabinet was laid before Parliament 
and referred to its Committee on Natural Resources (Ekwau, 2016, p.8).
At present, the Uganda National Oil Company makes Uganda’s model 
production-sharing agreement publicly available on its website.14 Importantly, 
the Act does not provide any penalties for failure to disclose model production-
sharing agreements to Parliament and it has been correctly argued that Parlia-
ment’s role as regards such model agreements is merely advisory (Ekwau, 2016, 
p.8). This has created the situation where the Government has consistently 
refused to make the main agreements on exploration, development and produc-
tion of oil publicly available, thereby violating the constitutional right of access 
to information and thus rendering this provision ineffective (Avocats Sans 
Frontières, 2015, p.10). Moreover, an attempt to seek disclosure of the contents 
of these agreements was rejected by a magistrates’ court ostensibly because the 
applicants failed to show that the public benefit in their disclosure outweighed 
the harm to the third parties, i.e. the Government and the oil companies.15
The situation of non-disclosure raises the risks of poorly negotiated 
production-sharing agreements. Full disclosure forces the Government to 
negotiate tougher and better terms because any slips will stir controversial 
public debate to its detriment. Secrecy creates an incentive for either corruptly 
or incompetently bargained terms that are unfavourable to the nation’s interest 
as a whole.
Section 52 of the Upstream Act requires the Minister, with Cabinet ap-
proval, to announce areas open for bidding for a petroleum exploration licence. 
The announcement must be published in the official Gazette and in newspapers 
of national and international circulation. Direct applications may be accepted 
13 Section 5(2)(a) and (b).
14 See https://www.unoc.co.ug/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MPSA.pdf, last accessed on 
14 August 2019.
15 See Charles Mwanguhya Mpagi and Izama Angelo v. Attorney General, Misc. Cause No.751 
of 2009. For a critique of the case see Oloka-Onyango (2015), pp.27–28.
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in exceptional circumstances and in consultation with the authority, and must 
also be published in the Gazette and at least one national newspaper of wide 
circulation.16 In response to the announcements made, a person intending 
to carry out petroleum exploration activities must apply in writing to the 
Minister. The Minister must then require an applicant to make arrangements 
for the execution of a bond or other form of security and to take out insurance 
policies necessary to protect against liabilities that may arise as a result of 
activities carried out under the petroleum exploration licence.17 Section 58 
stipulates that the licence may be granted by the Minister in consultation with 
the petroleum authority and with the approval of Parliament on conditions 
made by the Minister. Unless otherwise determined, the duration of such 
licence should not exceed two years after the date of grant, although the licence 
can be renewed for another two years upon application.18 When granted, this 
licence remains in force and confers on the licensee the right to explore for 
petroleum and carry on petroleum exploration activities.19 As of the present 
time, there is no plan for companies applying for the reconnaissance permits 
and petroleum exploration licence to prevent social and environmental 
destruction, yet drilling is an extremely dangerous activity with significant 
risks (Minio-Paluello, 2012, p.4).
Section 69 of the Upstream Act gives exclusive rights to the holder of a 
petroleum exploration licence who has made the discovery of petroleum in 
his or her exploration area to apply for the grant of a production licence. Any 
other person may apply notwithstanding that he or she does not hold the 
petroleum exploration licence in respect of the exploration area.20 Application 
for a licence may be made to the Minister in the manner prescribed by the 
regulations and must, under section 71, be accompanied by a report on the 
petroleum reservoir and a field development plan. Such plan should contain 
information related to proposals for the development and production of the 
reservoir; estimated production profiles; cost estimates; safety measures 
to be adopted in the course of the production of petroleum; the applicants’ 
proposals for employment and training of Ugandan citizens and the applicants’ 
proposals with respect to the procurement of goods and services from Uganda.
The petroleum production licence must be granted on the basis of technical 






58 J. OlOk a- OnyangO
understanding of the petroleum reservoir as well as other conditions as 
determined by the Minister.21 Under section 75, the Minister may grant 
a production licence after consultation with the authority and approval 
by Cabinet in such manner as the Minister may determine. A petroleum 
production licence may continue in force for a period not exceeding 20 years 
and can be renewed for another period on conditions determined by the 
Minister.22 Once granted, such a licence confers on the licensee exclusive 
rights to carry on petroleum activities and to sell or otherwise dispose of 
the licensee’s share of petroleum recovered in accordance with the field 
development plan. Under section 87, a licence cannot be transferred without 
the written consent of the Minister in consultation with the Authority, and 
may be cancelled or suspended under section 90 where a licensee is in default 
because of violations of Ugandan law. In such a case, the Minister may, in 
consultation with the authority and with the approval of Cabinet by notice 
in writing served on the licensee, proceed to do so.
The Act generally gives the Minister too much discretionary power to 
approve licences and their content. Given such power, if there is no tightly-
defined model licence there is a likelihood that one licence could substantially 
differ from another in terms of content. This risks creating an incentive 
for companies forcefully to negotiate and influence the Minister to ensure 
favourable conditions for themselves and possibly to water down liability 
and social and environmental protection measures (Global Witness, 2012, 
p.8). The extensive ministerial powers also pose a threat of a concentration 
of political (and economic) power, common to oil-endowed nations where 
mismanagement reigns supreme, with the potential to reinforce corruption 
as there are few or no checking safeguards to counteract it (Gary and Karl, 
2003, p.24).
The Midstream Act, which provides for midstream operations including 
the planning, preparation, installation and execution of operations related 
to refining, conversion, transmission and storage of petroleum products, 
has similar provisions related to licensing contained in the Upstream Act.23 
Anyone who operates without a licence is liable on conviction to a fine not 
exceeding 100,000 currency points or imprisonment of up to ten years, and 
for a company a fine of up to 200,000 currency points.24 All conditions and 
21 Section 73.
22 Sections 77 and 80.
23 Section 2 of the Petroleum (Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage) 
Act, 2013.
24 Section 9(1) and (2) of the Midstream Act.
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procedures related to the application, grant duration and cancellation of 
licences are similar to those in the Upstream Act.
3.4.2 National Oil Companies
The national oil company is provided for under the NOGP and is born out of 
the State’s need to create an entity to handle its commercial interests in the oil 
sector. Under regulatory best practice 7.2.5 of the NOGP, the intended roles of 
the oil company are outlined and include: managing the business aspects of 
state participation, developing in-depth expertise in the oil and gas industry, 
participating in contracts and investigating and proposing new upstream, 
midstream and downstream ventures locally, and later internationally. The 
policy correctly observes that financing the national oil company will be 
difficult in the initial period and, therefore, the oil company will not be able 
to attract shareholders. The proposal is for the national oil company to be 
supported as an embryonic unit at the beginning, thus starting with minimal 
resources and growing steadily by learning from experienced actors.25
Section 42 of the Upstream Act provides that the national oil company is 
to be incorporated and wholly owned by the State to manage the commercial 
aspects of Uganda’s petroleum activities. The Act also provides for some 
functions of the national oil company and under section 44 introduces a 
board of directors for the company who shall be appointed by the President 
with the approval of Cabinet. The Board of Directors is expected to submit 
audited accounts of revenues and expenditure to the annual general meeting 
with respect to the State’s participating interests, together with an annual 
report containing an overview of the participating interests managed by the 
company.
The Midstream Act acknowledges that the national oil company shall be 
deemed to be established for its purposes. However, section 7(3) makes it 
clear that it is up to the Minister with the approval of Parliament to decide 
that the national oil company shall participate in midstream operations. 
Whereas provision for the national oil company in the various policies and 
laws is commendable, the provisions are not as comprehensive as should be 
expected and need to be improved in detail. This background will later allow 
us to turn to the most recent development in the area of oil legislation, viz., 
the Public Finance Management Act of 2015.
25 Principle 8.1.3 on financing the national oil and gas policy.
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3.4.3 The Question of Local Content
The failure to exploit resources sustainably and to ensure that citizens take 
part in decision making and employment greatly contributes to conflicts 
emanating from natural resource endowments (Mushemeza and Okiira, 
2016). Furthermore, the lack of involvement of citizens in the exploitation and 
use of the natural resource sector greatly hinders the trickle-down effect of a 
resource like oil, resulting in negative effects to the economy (Gwayaka, 2014, 
p.2). Placing an emphasis on local content ensures that non-tax benefits stay 
in-country or in the backyard of resource regions, and local ownerships and 
capital are guaranteed in the long term (Avocats Sans Frontières, 2015, p.11).
Objective 7 of the NOGP aims at ensuring optimum national participation 
in oil and gas activities through strategies such as promoting state participation 
in production-sharing agreements; promoting use of the country’s materials, 
goods and services in the oil and gas sector, and promoting the employment 
of Ugandans in the sector, among others. In the same spirit, Objective 8 of 
the NOGP seeks to support the development and maintenance of national 
expertise through strategies such as the provision of goods and services to the 
sector by national enterprises and entrepreneurs and broadening the national 
education curricula to prepare the necessary workforce for engagement with 
the sector.
These objectives are reflected in both the upstream and midstream laws 
such that, while applying for a licence, the application must contain a state-
ment on how the applicant intends to employ and train Ugandan citizens.26 
However, there is no strategy listed in the Acts to ensure that licensees follow 
up this training. Section 125 of the Upstream Act provides that licensees 
and their contractors shall give preference to goods produced or available 
in Uganda and to services rendered by Ugandan citizens and companies. 
Although well-intentioned, this section has been criticised for its ambiguity. 
The law does not define what a ‘Ugandan’ company is, thereby leaving a gap 
for exploitation. Strict interpretation of the word ‘company’ versus ‘business 
entity’ limits the application of the section only to companies. This leaves 
out other well-recognised commercial entities such as partnerships and 
cooperative societies, among others (Gwayaka, 2014, p.12).
The Midstream Act attempts to correct the ambiguity by providing that 
the licensee and its contractors shall give priority to citizens and registered 
entities owned by Ugandans in the provision of goods and services. Unlike the 
Upstream Act, the Midstream Act therefore considers other business entities 
26 Sections 56(3)(f) of the Upstream Act and 10(6)(s) of the Midstream Act.
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in addition to companies. However, both Acts lack provisions to ensure that 
Ugandans employed by the oil companies receive the same treatment, pay 
and opportunities at the workplace as their foreign counterparts (Avocats 
Sans Frontières, 2015, p.12). The legislation is also silent on other forms of 
inclusion and equity including gender, ethnic and social status.
An estimated 996 Ugandan-owned companies prospected in 2018 to 
provide oil-related services by registering with the Petroleum Authority’s 
national supplier database for the oil and gas sector, a register of service 
providers in the oil and gas sector (Musisi, 2018). It is also estimated that 
the sector will create 150,000 jobs at peak oil production, and 30,000 at the 
start of production, which is expected to occur in 2022 based on revised 
forecasts (URN, 2018). Most Ugandan entities are expected to participate 
extensively in the sectors reserved to promote local content: logistics, clearing 
and forwarding, supply chain management, catering, light air transportation, 
security and camp management. If legislation is strengthened and practice 
is made to accord with the rules contained in that legislation therefore, the 
benefits accruing from the resulting effective promotion of local content will 
be valuable for meaningful growth and development.
3.5 Uganda’s Oil Revenue Management Regime
Revenue management is the most important link in the chain of oil exploita-
tion. Even the best production process cannot cure the debilitating effects of 
a poor use of oil proceeds. It determines whether the oil-exploitation process 
laboured through for years at a huge cost yields real benefit so as to become 
a great asset to the nation, or results in a resource curse. Flawed revenue 
management has the power to cripple nascent economies, extraordinarily 
grow poverty and income inequality, breed more entrenched autocracies 
and catalyse conflict, amongst other possibilities. This section therefore 
critically analyses Uganda’s existing oil revenue management legal regime 
and its potential impact on the whole oil story. In this respect, the Public 
Financial Management Act (PFMA) of 2015 plays a particularly important 
role. The PFMA repealed the Public Finance and Accountability Act, 2003 
and can be credited for its effort to provide strong checks against government 
expenditure and conformity of sector budgets to gender and equity budget 
guidelines. The PFMA mainly addresses four critical issues, namely the 
Petroleum Fund, the Petroleum Revenue Investment Reserve (PRIR), the 
Investment Advisory Committee and the issue of royalty-revenue sharing. 
These are separately discussed below.
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3.5.1 The Petroleum Fund
The PFMA establishes a Petroleum Fund into which all the revenues which 
accrue to Government from the resource shall be paid.27 All petroleum 
revenue due to the Government is to be collected by the Uganda Revenue 
Authority (URA) by the seventh day of the next month.28 The Act makes 
provision for petroleum as a form of payment other than cash using a value 
calculated in an international and freely convertible currency.29 This will 
enable the country to have its own petroleum reserve under the fund. 
Section 57(5) stipulates that such petroleum received as payment shall be 
received and recorded by the national oil company, which must then submit 
a copy of the record to the Minister, URA, the Secretary to the Treasury, the 
Accountant General, as well as to the Auditor General. This practice will 
ensure the maintenance of clear records, thereby encouraging transparency 
in the management of the Petroleum Fund. Section 58 of the Act permits 
withdrawals from the fund only under authority granted by an Appropriation 
Act and a warrant of the Auditor General. Although section 59(3) guarantees 
that money from the fund shall be used to finance the infrastructure and 
development projects of Government and not recurrent expenditure, no 
extra measures are given under the Act to distinguish between the two, and 
the resultant ambiguity could therefore result in the misuse of Petroleum 
Funds by the Government.
This ambiguity has already manifested itself in practice. In August 2016, 
the President authorised payment of 6 billion shillings out of oil revenues 
to 42 public officials for their contribution towards recovering capital gains 
tax from Heritage Oil and Gas Limited and Tullow Oil Uganda in the course 
of an arbitration case in London (Musoke, 2017; COSASE, 2017). While 
this transaction—referred to as the ‘presidential handshake’—was justified 
by many of its beneficiaries and the President on the ground that it was an 
appreciation of a job well done amidst ‘pressures and temptations’, the fact 
that it was not sanctioned by law and was in fact prohibited by section 59 of 
the PFMA shows that there is little regard for laws and rules.
More recently, the Government withdrew 200 billion shillings from 
the Petroleum Fund to fund a budget deficit for the 2018/2019 financial 
year that ended in June 2019 (Musisi and Kyeyune, 2019). The Account-
ant General also claimed that this and other withdrawals will be ‘offset’ 
27 Ibid., section 56(1) and (2).
28 Ibid., section 57(1).
29 Ibid., section 57(4).
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when oil production commences, at which time the fund will be ‘better 
managed’. In November 2017, the Government had also withdrawn 125.6 
billion shillings to finance the 2017/2018 budget. The fund, which initially 
stood at over 470 billion shillings in June 2018 primarily because of capital 
gains tax inflows, was reduced to 288 billion shillings by May 2019, without 
any clear indication of what precise expenditures the money was used to 
finance (URN, 2019). In defence of these withdrawals, the Accountant 
General is quoted as having said, ‘It does not make sense at all to keep 
money in the Fund lying idle yet we have a deficit’ (Musisi and Kyeyune, 
2019). In response to these withdrawals, Parliament has called on the 
Government to establish a petroleum investment framework (URN, 2019). 
Without clear indications of the nature of expenditures financed and a 
demonstration of prudential self-control on the part of Government rather 
than seemingly impulsive withdrawals, the Petroleum Fund is at a high 
risk of mismanagement.
For purposes of accountability, section 60 of the Act requires the Account-
ant General to maintain proper books of accounts and proper records. The 
Accountant General must submit semi-annual and annual reports to the 
Minister, Secretary to the Treasury and the Auditor General. Section 61 of the 
Act requires the Minister to present to Parliament the estimated petroleum 
revenue for the financial year, as well as both semi-annual and annual reports 
indicating the various transactions in and out of the Petroleum Fund. These 
reports are to be published in newspapers and on the website. This provision 
not only enhances transparency over the monies collected, but also ensures 
public involvement in the same. However, the Act gives the Minister (of 
Energy and Mineral Development) the responsibility for the overall manage-
ment of the Petroleum Fund, which is anomalous to the effort of reducing the 
concentration of power in a single individual without making provision for 
the necessary checks and balances. The aim should be to create multi-tiered 
mechanisms of accountability rather than to concentrate power in the hands 
of a single individual.
3.5.2 The Petroleum Revenue Investment Reserve (PRIR)
The PRIR is another significant feature created by the PFMA. The PRIR 
operates in such a way that by warrant of the Auditor General Parliament is 
given the power to appropriate money to be paid from the Petroleum Fund to 
the PRIR, which money shall be invested in accordance with the petroleum 
revenue investment policy issued by the Minister in consultation with the 
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Secretary to the Treasury and on the advice of the Investment Advisory 
Committee.30
Section 63(2)(a)-(c) imposes an obligation on the investment policy to 
include a requirement that investments should not jeopardise the macroeco-
nomic stability of Uganda and that the money in the reserve must be invested 
in an internationally convertible currency, a debt instrument denominated 
in internationally convertible currency that bears interest, or any qualifying 
instrument prescribed by the Minister. Although the Act requires the Minister 
to lay such instrument before Parliament, the fact that there is no mechanism 
put in place to assist the Minister in determining the qualifying instrument 
means that the Act may be said to give the Minister fairly wide discretionary 
powers which can possibly result in miscalculated and unchecked decisions 
that could ultimately prove costly to the investment reserve.
Under section 64(1)–(3), the operational management of the PRIR is 
placed in the hands of the Bank of Uganda (BoU) to be managed within the 
framework of a written agreement between the Minister and the Governor. 
This agreement is to be based on the principles of transparency, account-
ability, intergenerational fairness and equity and shall provide for liability 
for paying to the Government damages that may arise out of negligence on 
the part of the BoU or an external manager/service provider operating under 
an agreement with the Bank.31 There is also a provision for the PRIR to be 
managed separately from the other reserves of the BoU. The Act adequately 
covers the issue of undue risk under section 64(6)(a)-(b) by requiring the 
BoU to establish satisfactory risk management arrangements for instruments 
to be used in the management of the reserve. The BoU must also appoint an 
external investment manager in accordance with the Public Procurement 
and Disposal of Public Assets Act, 2003 who must adhere to the petroleum 
investment policy and have the necessary qualifications stipulated in the Act.32
The Minister may also issue policy guidelines to the BoU concerning 
government expectations regarding the performance of the PRIR which 
must first be tabled before Parliament, thus helping to check the Minister’s 
powers.33 Section 69 imposes a duty upon the BoU to maintain proper books 
of accounts and records for the reserve. The Bank must prepare and submit 
semi-annual and annual financial statements of the reserve to the Minister 
with a copy to the Auditor General, the Secretary to the Treasury and the 
30 Ibid., sections 62 and 63.
31 Ibid., section 64(4)(a)-(b).
32 Ibid., section 64(7), (8) and (9).
33 Ibid., section 65.
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Accountant General. This provision denies Parliament and the public access 
to these financial statements.
The Bank must also submit to the Minister monthly performance reports 
which shall be made publicly available.34 Under section 71, the BoU must 
prepare an annual plan for each financial year for the reserve which must be 
submitted to the Minister for approval. The Minister must then submit the 
annual plan to Parliament for approval. This too is required by the Act to be 
published, thus fulfilling the constitutional right of access to information. An 
annual report is also required by the Bank to be submitted to the Minister 
and the Auditor General and must be tabled before Parliament by 1 April of 
the following financial year.35
Unfortunately, the independence of the Bank of Uganda has recently been 
questioned. First of all, the Bank’s Governor has on several occasions given 
in to executive pressure to ill-advisedly facilitate questionable transactions. 
In 2011, the Governor facilitated the use of US$ 740 million for the purchase 
of fighter jets from Russia without prior Parliamentary approval, on the 
understanding that oil revenues would be used to replenish the money spent 
(Mugerwa, 2011). The Bank has also been criticised for indirectly facilitating 
electoral financing for the presidency during election seasons (Kalinaki, 
2014) and for facilitating unlawful payments to a city businessman in 2011 
(Sserunjogi, 2011). Furthermore, the Bank’s activities regarding the supervi-
sion of financial institutions have been the subject of a parliamentary inquiry 
which was concluded in February 2019 and revealed inefficiency, recklessness 
and a disregard of rules by Bank officials in the execution of the Bank’s main 
mandate (COSASE, 2019).
To ensure accountability and transparency in the petroleum sector, sec-
tion 73 requires the Petroleum Fund and the PRIR to be audited in accordance 
with the National Audit Act, 2008. In order to ensure total safety of the 
assets in the Petroleum Fund, section 74 prohibits the financial assets of the 
Petroleum Fund from being earmarked, pledged, loaned out or otherwise 
encumbered by any person or entity. Government shall not borrow money 
from the Petroleum Fund or hold a financial instrument that may place a 
contingent liability on the fund. Consequently, any contract that encumbers 
a financial asset of the Petroleum Fund is null and void. It is clear that the 
purchase of fighter jets referred to above, which was done on the understand-
ing that the monies used would be refunded using oil revenues, violated 
section 74. Also, the claim that monies withdrawn from the Petroleum Fund 
34 Ibid., section 70(1) and (2).
35 Ibid., section 72.
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will be offset when oil production commences is irrationally circular because 
it is a claim that money ‘borrowed’ from the fund will be repaid using the 
fund’s future resources. In essence, nothing will be repaid to the fund.
3.5.3 Investment Advisory Committee
In the spirit of transparency and accountability, section 66 of the Act creates 
the Investment Advisory Committee to advise the Minister on the investments 
made under the reserve. The committee is to consist of seven members with 
representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the ministry in charge of 
petroleum activities, one from the National Planning Authority, and four 
who are not public officers, all to be appointed by the Minister, who will 
consider gender representation in the appointment. All members must have 
substantial experience, training and expertise in financial investment. Again, 
the terms of appointment of the committee members are left to the Minister 
for determination, although the Act requires all the names of those appointed 
to be published.36
Section 68 sets out the functions of the committee as being to include 
advising the Minister on the performance of the PRIR as well as other related 
issues. In giving its advice, the committee must take into account the economic 
conditions, opportunities and constraints in the investment markets and the 
constraints under which the BoU operates.37 The committee is also tasked 
within 30 days of the end of each period of three months with submitting 
a report on its performance to the Minister.38 This will enable the Minister 
to keep track of the committee’s performance and provide accountability. 
However, there is no stipulation requiring these reports to be presented to 
Parliament or shared with the public.
3.5.4 Sharing Revenues from Royalties
According to the current law, the Central Government is to retain 94 per cent 
of the revenue from petroleum production, while 6 per cent will be shared 
among local governments located within the petroleum production areas. 
50 per cent of the revenue from the royalties due to the local governments 
will be shared among the local governments involved, based on the level of 
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local governments shall be shared among all the local governments based 
on population size, geographical area and terrain. Government shall grant 1 
per cent of the royalty due to the central government to a gazetted cultural 
or traditional institution.39
Several observations can be made about the manner in which the issue of 
revenue-sharing is formulated in the law. First of all, there is no individual 
reporting line for these payments to enable local communities and subjects 
to hold their local governments accountable for such monies. Using local 
government budget lines makes it complicated for ordinary stakeholders 
within the districts to know if the local governments are getting a fair share 
(Avocats Sans Frontières, 2015, p.8). Secondly, the percentages allocated 
to the local government and cultural institutions are peanuts compared to 
what the central government retains, yet it is the local governments that 
interact directly with the people and bring services directly to them. This also 
runs counter to the expressed principles of devolution and decentralisation 
embedded in the 1995 Constitution, aside from providing more avenues for 
corruption at the centre. Finally, because these provisions are not enshrined 
in the Constitution but are merely ordinary legislation, they can easily be 
changed to the detriment of the local actors. There is thus a need to achieve 
consensus on the sharing formulae, especially with the communities based 
within the production areas and a sufficiently entrenched codification of the 
same in order to avoid disruptive and illegitimate tampering. It is in the best 
interests of the nation that this be done to avoid even the remotest possibility 
of any forms of conflict that usually arise from revenue/royalty-sharing 
arrangements as is the case with Nigeria (Oyefusi, 2007).
3.6 Conclusion: Edging Beyond the Oil Curse?
This chapter has explored a fairly rich collection of laws, policies and regula-
tions. Looking on the bright side of things, the legal regime in Uganda appears 
to be determined to avoid the debt trap associated with oil-producing states 
in Africa in which the future is mortgaged on the basis of oil, a finite resource. 
It is often the case that rents accruing from oil booms create a tendency of 
governments to inflate expenditure, especially in sectors that do not have a 
sustainable and positive impact on development. When the unreliability of 
oil revenues causes discrepancies between projected and realised revenues, 
governments often resort to heavy borrowing on the basis of oil, thereby 
39 Ibid., section 75.
68 J. OlOk a- OnyangO
endangering their economies and future generations (Gary and Karl, 2003, 
p.27). Oil-backed loans, for example, are endangering Angola’s future. As 
of March 2016, its oil-backed debts were estimated to total US$ 25 billion 
(George, 2016). The result, as is often the case, is that more and more of 
Angola’s crude oil flows to its creditors to offset the debts, leaving less of it 
available as ‘profit’ for the state (George, 2016).
Section 74 of the PFMA of 2015 prohibits the placement of any encumbrance 
whatsoever on the Petroleum Fund’s assets by way of lending, pledging, 
committing, earmarking or otherwise. This means that the assets of the 
Petroleum Fund cannot be used as collateral for a debt, and neither can 
the Government borrow from the fund. The Petroleum Fund is thus the 
designated reservoir for all petroleum revenues due to the Government and 
is distinct from the Consolidated Fund, from which all moneys for public 
expenditure are derived. Even when payment due to the state is made in the 
form of oil, the National Oil Company holds such oil as an asset belonging 
to the Petroleum Fund, and upon its sale all proceeds must be paid into that 
fund. Any withdrawal from the Petroleum Fund must also be made under the 
authority of an Appropriation Act and a warrant of the Auditor General for 
only two purposes, support of the annual budget or for investment purposes 
by the Petroleum Revenue Investment Reserve. Money withdrawn from the 
Petroleum Fund to support the annual budget must also be channelled to 
the Consolidated Fund first, before extraction for its approved expenditure. 
The separation of oil monies from other monies of the State is thus a positive 
element of prudential management whose effect will also enhance the State’s 
ability better to execute fiscal controls for macroeconomic stability. This is 
a promising enactment that should be able to largely curtail the risk of the 
debt trap that the likes of Gabon have succumbed to (Gary and Karl, 2003).
Additionally, Uganda’s national oil company as envisaged is also less 
likely to have the same negative impacts as have most of its counterparts 
in other oil-producing States in Africa. In particular, it is less susceptible 
to the shortcomings that afflict the likes of Sonangol (Angola’s national oil 
company) whose participation in the oil sector exceeds the bounds of simply 
pursuing the Government’s strict commercial interests and enters the arena 
of mainstream industry management by, for example, collecting revenue and 
regulating the sector. Such a concentration of power creates glaring conflicts 
of interest and avenues for mismanagement, as can be seen from Sonangol 
which is used as a vehicle for under-reporting oil revenues in Angola (Gary 
and Karl, 2003). Separation of the Government’s role as regulator and its 
revenue collection department from the national oil company’s mission as 
a pursuer of the State’s commercial interests is thus ideal and imperative.
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Uganda has taken the first step towards achieving the separation. Regula-
tion is placed in the hands of Government and bodies such as the Petroleum 
Authority; revenue collection is placed within the ambit of the Uganda 
Revenue Authority; custody of collected oil revenue is entrusted to the 
Petroleum Fund, while investment of the same revenue is in the hands of 
the petroleum revenue investment reserve. Pursuance of the Government’s 
commercial interests in the oil sector is a preserve of the national oil company. 
This proliferation of duties is key to the deconcentration of power and a further 
deterrence to mismanagement. The hiccup however, as already mentioned, 
lies in the fact that the PFMA places control and overall management of 
the Petroleum Fund in the hands of the Minister, which is problematic. The 
national oil company is also subject to influence from the Minister who, under 
section 46 of the Upstream Act, may issue instructions to it in the execution 
of its tasks. Given Uganda’s track record in deviating from sound policies and 
laws on paper to adopt the contrary paths in practice, any benefits from the 
positivity in these parts of the legal regime will greatly depend on the Govern-
ment’s own adherence to the rules. As already mentioned, the upstream law 
requires improvements that include a tightening up of the bidding process, 
greater oversight of the licensing and allocation process, and a greater role 
for Parliament. There is also the need to buttress the independent oversight 
role of institutions such as the Auditor General and for the introduction of a 
much more robust regulatory framework that limits the scope of companies 
to negotiate on key terms such as revenue rates and environment and social 
safeguards, among others (Global Witness, 2015a; 2015b). Furthermore, the 
licence allocation process is still quite opaque. The long title to the Petroleum 
(Exploration, Development and Production) Act, 2013 stipulates commitment 
to an open, transparent and competitive licensing process. However, the 
Minister of Energy and Mineral Development is accorded unfettered powers 
to circumvent the bidding process in certain instances. Indeed, on the whole, 
the powers conferred on the Minister are excessive.
The Government of Uganda has, after several years of pressure from civil 
society and international development institutions, agreed to join the global 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI framework 
promotes open and accountable management of oil, gas and mining industries 
through public participation in holding governments accountable as trustees 
of their natural resources. Several African countries including Nigeria, Si-
erra Leone, Ghana, and Liberia have enacted the EITI into their domestic 
laws. Both neighbouring Tanzania and Kenya have adopted progressive 
and transparent policy and legislative frameworks in line with the EITI. 
Countries like Ghana have witnessed positive outcomes with the EITI in 
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place.40 Sierra Leone has taken extractive transparency one step further, with 
the establishment of an online electronic mining cadastre administration 
system (MCAS) which has improved the recording and reporting of mining 
revenues. All information related to mineral processing and any financial 
transactions in the sector are thus available to the general public in real time.
Despite making a commitment to joining the EITI as far back as the 
NOGP in 2008, none of the legislation on oil production took this com-
mitment further. This commitment was renewed under the 2012 Oil and 
Gas Revenue Management Policy (OGRMP), but found no mention in the 
Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act of 2013. This 
raised critical questions as to the actual commitment of the Government to 
the transparency guidelines enshrined in the ETTI. In January 2019, however, 
Cabinet resolved that Uganda would join the EITI and the Government is 
expected to make a formal application to do so in October 2019 (Draku, 2019; 
Kamugisha, 2019). On 12 August 2019, civil society organisations led by the 
Africa Institute for Energy Governance penned an open letter to the Minister 
of Finance, stating that the Government of Uganda was not ready to join and 
utilise the EITI (Kamugisha, 2019). In the letter, the CSOs argue that, based 
on the Government’s conduct regarding the 6 billion shilling ‘presidential 
handshake’, the recent withdrawal of 200 billion shillings from the Petroleum 
Fund to finance a budget deficit, the raiding of the treasury to buy fighter jets 
in 2011 and other similar events, the Government is unprepared to comply 
with the EITI unless it undertakes urgent reform. The CSOs recommend 
that the Government should make the EITI guidelines binding through 
enacting legislation, undertake a national audit of conditions necessary for 
the successful implementation of the EITI, and amend the PFMA to create 
individual liability.
There is a further problem relating to transparency, in that the three oil 
companies operating in Uganda, namely Total, CNOOC and Tullow, are 
currently not required by domestic law to disclose information regarding 
the payments they make to the Government (Veit et al., 2011, p.10). Reliance 
is thus, for now, placed on foreign law to bind them. As mentioned earlier, 
the Wall Street Reform (Dodd-Frank) Act may have been binding on Total 
and CNOOC to disclose information on payments made to the Government 
of Uganda by way of an annual report to the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission of the US Government. However, the recent amendments to the law 
40 Since signing on to the EITI in 2003, Ghanà s corporate income tax has risen from 25 to 35 per 
cent; it has fixed the mineral royalty rate at 5 per cent and developed guidelines for the allocation 
and use of mineral royalties (Oil in Uganda Newsletter, June 2016, p.8).
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could change this. On the other hand, Tullow has, in the past, voluntarily 
disclosed payment information in line with mandatory European Union 
(EU) standards. Companies which, however, receive licences in future may 
not be covered by the EU or US laws on disclosure (Global Witness, 2015a; 
2015b). This makes it even more imperative that domestic law step in to create 
such a requirement.
In the end, the strongest determinant of whether Uganda will learn from 
the experiences of other oil-producing countries and avoid the oil curse 
depends on the choices that the governing regime will make and continues 
to make. At the moment, few of those choices can be considered reassuring. 
Indeed, the choices thus far made are worrying, to say the least. But, perhaps 
even more importantly, public pressure and joint activism from the media, 
civil society organisations, international financial institutions and even the 
countries of origin or domicile of the multinational oil companies entering 
into agreements with the Ugandan Government can and should influence 
government choices and, ultimately, the path Uganda will take in relation 
to its nascent oil sector.
In sum, the Government of Uganda has largely not yet fully complied 
with the best practices in the oil sector. This creates space for the abuse and 
misappropriation of oil funds, ultimately culminating in the oil curse. A 
genuine allegiance to the principles of openness and full access to information 
that enables the various stakeholders to participate fully in the oil sector is 
still lacking. While the legal regime can be commended for creating certain 
prudent parameters of operation necessary to stave off the onset of the resource 
curse, several improvements are necessary. These include a tightening up of 
the bidding process, greater levels of oversight of the licensing and allocation 
process, and a much stronger role for Parliament.
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Keeping Corruption in Check in Uganda’s 
Oil Sector? Uganda’s Challenge to 
Let Everybody Eat, and Not Just the 
Lucky Few
Kathleen Brophy and Peter Wandera
4.1 Introduction
The discovery of oil and subsequent transition into an oil-producing State is 
a complex task for any country. The social, political and economic impacts of 
oil are multifaceted and far-reaching and the transition into an oil-producing 
State is a unique process for every country. Though there is no exact formula 
for success in harnessing oil extraction for shared prosperity and widespread 
development, certain best and worst practices have certainly emerged. 
When managed well, oil revenues can transform a country’s economy and 
significantly contribute to development and poverty alleviation. But, in 
many countries around the world oil has served to enrich only the select 
elite, entrenching and exacerbating pre-existing systems of clientelism and 
corruption.
According the popular ‘resource curse’ theory, discovery of natural 
resources in developing countries can often lead to more harm than benefit 
and can cause widespread instability in a country (Kathman and Shannon, 
2011). Experts have cited this as the catalyst for breakdown in many countries 
including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Nigeria 
(Shepherd, 2013). This paradoxical phenomenon refers to the inverse effect 
that increased resource rents can have on the standard of living in a given 
country. According to Bategeka and Mawejje:
The natural resource curse refers to a situation in which, exploitation of 
newly discovered natural resources does not lead to a reduction in poverty 
and improvements in human development, but instead, exacerbates poverty 
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and negatively affects the people’s living standards (Bategeka and Mawejje, 
2013, p.1).
In fact, the ‘curse’ itself has little to do with the resource. Instead, the re-
source curse refers to the challenges associated with successful governance 
and management of resource benefits and revenues (Kiiza, Bategeka and 
Sswanyana, 2011). The negative effects associated with resource discovery 
are due to a complex set of interrelated factors. As stated in a 2012 African 
Development Bank study:
These counter-intuitive trends however are more complex … The abun-
dance of a resource is after all, not the cause of poor growth. Rather, the 
abundance of a resource creates incentives for poor wealth management 
which in turn result in less rather than more growth (Castel and Ximena 
Meijia, 2012, p.2).
While the resource curse refers to many different negative impacts of resource 
extraction, this chapter focuses on one particular element, i.e. corruption 
and mismanagement of resource revenues. For the purposes of this chapter 
corruption will be defined in line with Transparency International’s definition 
as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (see Transparency Interna-
tional, 2018). This includes any unauthorised and deliberate manipulation 
of circumstances leading to private benefit derived from public revenue.
Based on this definition of corruption, this chapter will examine the risks 
of corruption in Uganda’s burgeoning oil sector by mapping the opportunities 
for revenue mismanagement onto the standard oil revenue chain. Then the 
various vectors for corruption will be explained and analysed in the context of 
Uganda. Finally, the chapter will explore the various frameworks and initia-
tives in place aiming to prevent corruption in the development of Uganda’s oil 
sector. The chapter will then close with reflections on the interplay between 
oil, democratic governance and corruption with prescriptions for Uganda.
4.2 Natural Resources in Uganda: Some Basic Facts
When Uganda announced the discovery of commercially viable reserves of 
oil in 2006 reactions were mixed. Many were naturally excited that oil would 
lead to investment and transformative development. On the other hand, 
some were sceptical that the oil would in fact lead to widespread prosperity 
due to the country’s history of endemic corruption. It is certainly true that 
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the discovery of oil will endow Uganda with significant returns—once com-
mercial production begins the reserves are expected greatly to impact on 
government revenue annually for at least 25 years. What is less certain is who 
will benefit from these revenue windfalls and, furthermore, who will suffer 
the consequences of mismanagement. In a 2012 brief by Global Witness, the 
watchdog organisation summarised these concerns as follows:
The industry is born into a deteriorating governance environment, 
characterized by the consolidation of Uganda’s neo-patrimonial regime; 
increasing perceptions of corruption and high-level state looting; and 
some early warning signs that the government’s own commitments to 
good governance standards laid out in its oil and gas policy are not being 
implemented (Global Witness, 2012, p.1).
According to projections by the organisation, the outlook for good governance 
of oil revenues is concerning ‘in a country with Uganda’s recent history of 
deteriorating governance standards, high-level corruption and nepotism’, 
and ‘the succession of scandals surrounding the misappropriation of public 
and donor funds over the last ten years’ (Global Witness, 2010, p.16).
According to 2012 World Bank worldwide governance indicators, Uganda 
loses US$ 286 million annually from corruption.1 Instances of bribery, 
embezzlement and graft persist from the most local levels of government up 
to the highest executive offices. For instance, in 2012 the Office of the Prime 
Minister was alleged to have stolen US$ 12.7 million in donor funds intended 
to go to recovery programmes in war-torn Northern Uganda (Reuters, 
2012). Unfortunately, this type of scandal has been continuously repeated 
in the country’s recent history, leading some to believe that a general level 
of impunity has set in among government officials.
Despite the country’s history of corruption, Government has not put in 
place adequate safeguards to prevent malfeasance in Uganda’s burgeoning oil 
sector. Discounting international best practice guidance promoting enhanced 
transparency and accountability in the extractive industries, the Government 
has continued to operate in secrecy, keeping critical information about oil-
sector developments hidden from the general public. This opacity presents a 
serious risk that oil and mining revenues may be wasted or corruptly diverted 
instead of spent on much needed public services.
1 See World Governance Indicators. Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/
index.aspx#home.
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Oil has not yet left the ground in Uganda but there is already sufficient 
evidence of mismanagement associated with pre-production revenues. Instead 
of seeing the benefits of oil revenues in the form of local school renovations 
and improvements in the country’s lacking electrical grid, Ugandans learn 
about oil revenue expenditures in the headlines of local newspapers detailing 
the latest scandals uncovered.
In 2011, the Government struck a deal with a Russian arms exporter for 
a US$ 740 million advance for the purchase of six fighter jets. Addressing 
Members of Parliament, the Governor of the Bank of Uganda said he con-
sented to the advance on the assurance that it would be repaid by future oil 
revenues (Mugerwa, 2015). This one-off discretionary expenditure represents 
a quarter of the entire 2011/2012 national budget and over four times the 
combined education and health budgets for that year.
That same year, Members of Parliament alleged that three senior members 
of Cabinet, including the Prime Minister, had received ‘oil bribes’ from certain 
oil exploration firms. However, the parliamentary ad hoc committee in charge 
of the resulting investigation found no evidence to support the allegations 
due to the inability to access the necessary information (Republic of Uganda, 
2013). The committee’s report of findings did note huge sums of oil revenues 
unaccounted for, including discrepancies at times amounting to nearly US$ 
500,000 missing in several account transfers between the different government 
entities tasked with collecting oil revenue (Republic of Uganda, 2013, p.13).
More recently, in January 2017 it was discovered that US$ 1.6 million 
had been paid as a reward to 42 government officials loosely involved in the 
recovery of Shs 1.5 trillion in capital gains tax owed from Heritage Oil and 
Gas. The scandal, named the ‘presidential handshake’ controversy, revealed a 
disturbing lack of regard for the protocols outlined in the petroleum section 
of the Public Finance Management Act, 2015 (PFMA) governing withdrawals 
from the Petroleum Fund.
These instances, described in more detail below, paired with a continuous 
lack of access to information for citizens, mean that the oil sector is developing 
in Uganda with little transparency or accountability. Citizens simply lack 
the information necessary to hold Government accountable. According to 
the needs analysis performed in the creation of The National Communication 
Strategy for Oil and Gas, a widely evidenced information gap exists between the 
Government and people related to oil and gas sector development (Republic 
of Uganda, 2013, p.13). According to the analysis, over 50 per cent of the people 
sampled had little knowledge of the policy and regulations around the sector, 
and many people also believed that information surrounding the oil activities 
was shared only among elites (Republic of Uganda, 2013, p.14).
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According to political scientist Michael Ross, without coherent and insistent 
demands from an informed public, the Government-citizen relationship could 
break down in the process of resource extraction and the Government could 
become increasingly despondent (Ross, 2001). Unless this is averted through 
greater access to information for citizens regarding oil sector developments, 
the industry will continue to operate in secrecy, devoid of public scrutiny.
4.3 Conceptualising Corruption as ‘Leakages’ in the 
Petroleum Revenue Chain
There are many risks in ensuring transparency and accountability in the 
emerging extractive industries in Uganda, as in any country. These risks can 
be divided between the horizontal (company to government) and vertical 
(intra-government) opportunities for corruption in the petroleum revenue 
chain. ‘Horizontal’ risks can be summarised as illicit reductions in the revenue 
base paid to government while ‘vertical’ risks can be thought of as illicit 
diversions of the oil revenue once paid to government. In other words, these 
risks can be phrased as two separate but interrelated questions—did the 
Government get what it was rightfully owed and did those revenues paid to 
Government successfully reach citizens? This conceptualisation is based on 
the standard petroleum revenue chain, modelled in this case according to 
the petroleum revenue management scheme established in Uganda’s Public 
Finance Management Act, 2015, as depicted in Figure 4.1.
According to the Constitution, petroleum is a national resource, to be 
managed by Government in trust of the citizens. Therefore, the Government 
is the agent, managing natural resource extraction on behalf of the citizens 
as ultimate owner and principal. In this framework, revenue derived from oil 
extraction must be returned to citizens Similarly, when Government allocates 
extraction rights to companies, companies also take on the role of the agent, 
extracting on behalf of Government as the principal. In both cases, there is 
an opportunity for the principal-agent problem to arise, wherein ‘the agent 
pursues his own interests rather than those of the principal who hired [or 
in this case elected] the agent’ (Bategeka and Mawejje, 2013, p.19). In either 
case, such an issue leads to agents behaving out of individual self-interest, 
so that either less oil revenue goes into government coffers or is taken out of 
government coffers. Either way, the result leads to less oil revenues distributed 
to citizens for public benefit.
Conceptually, ‘corruption’ in the petroleum revenue chain can also be 
thought of as ‘revenue leakages’ or instances where money may go ‘missing’. 
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Weak areas in the revenue chain can cause revenue leakage in so far as they 
may be exploited to divert money from the public financial realm into the 
private in an unauthorised manner. This must also include money that never 
formally entered the public domain in the first place, but rightfully should 
have, as explained further below in the horizontal leakages section. Thus, 
standards for good governance dictate that oil revenue management schemes 
should be insulated and protected from this sort of discretionary diversion 
through statutory requirements for transparency, accountability and oversight 
throughout the entire revenue chain.
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4.4 Horizontal Leakages and Risk Areas for Uganda
As depicted in Figure 4.2, the horizontal relationship between companies 
and Government represents the cadre of transactions and agreements that 
take place between the two entities prior to and during extraction. There are 
many instances during these transactions where corruption could occur, 
limiting the maximum amount of money that could then be introduced into 
the revenue chain and later transformed into public benefit. First, companies 
must bid for the right to extract. As with any public contract, the public 
procurement process may be corrupted in many ways, especially when the 
contract is of high value.
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4.4.1 Contract Negotiations and Corruption in the Bidding 
Process
Often, procurement and negotiation processes for oil sector contracts happen 
behind closed doors in an ad hoc fashion. This is especially true in the oil 
industry for frontier areas that have not yet been fully explored where the 
reserve potential is not widely known. In such cases, companies are often 
handled on a first-come-first-serve basis, with little formal regulation or 
oversight of the bidding and negotiation process. During such processes, a 
small number of government officials are given the discretion to negotiate 
the contract directly with the company. In such a setting, officials may be 
tempted to accept suboptimal terms of contract with the promise of individual 
benefit on the side. In this way, government officials may be compromised 
and negotiate a poor deal for the country, due to an offer for some sort of 
compensation by the company for doing so. Therefore, the individual govern-
ment official gains while the country loses out on future revenues due to 
corrupted negotiations.
Procurement processes may also be manipulated by relevant decision 
makers, with conflicts of interest illicitly influencing the choice of bidder. 
Often, these conflicts of interest are undisclosed by politically exposed persons 
and relate to a company’s ultimate beneficial owners. Politically exposed 
persons with high-powered connections often manipulate contract processes 
and win licences based on patronage associations or clientele relationships 
rather than the merit and quality of the bid. According to a 2012 report by 
Global Witness:
Too often private ‘shell’ companies with opaque ownership structures 
are awarded lucrative concessions with little information available as to 
who the beneficial owners of the company are, how much (if anything) 
the company has paid for the license, and what the country has gained in 
return (Global Witness, 2012, p.3).
These opaque licensing procedures are used to award contracts to government 
officials or their private sector proxies outside a fair, open and competitive 
bidding process (Global Witness, 2012). For instance, in Nigeria in 2005 a 
company named Conoil Producing Ltd partnering with local company New 
Tigerhead PSTI Limited, won an offshore oil licence. Based on investiga-
tions, it was later found that the Chair of the Nigerian Senate Committee 
on Petroleum Resources Upstream responsible for bid allocation, was the 
majority shareholder of New Tigerhead PSTI Limited (Global Witness, 2012, 
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pp.22–23). Of course, such a stark conflict of interest taints the integrity of 
the bidding process, and also brings into question the actual merits of the 
selected bidder.
In worst case scenarios, the chosen bidder lacks the qualifications to carry 
out the contract and ends up transferring the contract to another company 
for a profit, at the cost of the State. In such cases involving corruption in 
rights allocation, the State sells the licence to the politically exposed person 
for less than market value due to the conflict of interest held by an influential 
official, and the country loses out on revenues that could have been gained 
in a non-corrupted, market-based transaction.
Conflicts of interest can taint the rights allocation process at many steps 
in the bidding process. Thus, international best practice recommends that 
countries allocate rights using fair, open and competitive bidding processes 
that are standardised and closely regulated. That way, undue influence cannot 
easily manipulate the process. Considering contract negotiation and procure-
ment manipulation to be a form of corruption, the Ugandan case has already 
proven problematic. The first set of exploration and production licences to 
Tullow, Total and CNOOC were granted in direct, non-competitive closed 
negotiations. While some could argue that this was necessary based on the 
state of oil-sector development at the time, it led to many issues.
First, in 2010, the production-sharing agreement (PSA) between the 
Government of Uganda and Heritage Oil was leaked to the public. This 
leak allowed civil society to undertake joint work and engage in dialogue 
with the Government on the weaknesses and risk areas illustrated in the 
agreement and ways to improve the terms of contract. The agreement included 
many problematic components. Upon review, the Norwegian Agency for 
Development, NORAD, ultimately declared, ‘[The PSAs] cannot be regarded 
as being in accordance with the interests of the host country’ (Civil Society 
Coalition on Oil and Gas in Uganda, 2010, p.16). The Petroleum Exploration 
and Production Development (PEPD) Commissioner also admitted that the 
heritage PSAs were not in Uganda’s best interest. The agreement was later 
revised when Heritage Oil was acquired by Tullow Oil, which entered into 
a joint venture partnership with oil majors Total and CNOOC.
Due to the continuous secrecy of oil sector contracts and suspicions of 
malfeasance, in 2011 the Parliament of Uganda passed a motion establishing a 
moratorium on the issue of new oil sector agreements (Parliament of Uganda, 
2011). This motion mandated the executive to pass updated oil laws and 
publicly share all signed oil sector agreements before new licences could be 
issued. It also authorised the investigation into allegations of oil sector bribery 
involving the then Prime Minister, Rt. Hon Amama Mbabazi, the current 
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Foreign Affairs Minister, Hon. Kutesa Kahamba Sam, and the former Internal 
Affairs Minister, Hon. Obaloker Hillary Onek (Parliament of Uganda, 2011).
All three officials were accused of various high-level revenue manipulation 
and embezzlement offences in collusion with oil companies. Kutesa was 
alleged to have received payments from Tullow Oil PLC, amounting to over 
€30,000,000 through transfers to his company, East Africa Development 
Limited (Republic of Uganda, 2013). Similarly, Onek was accused of receiving 
transfers from a Tullow account to his foreign account in Dubai. Onek, 
along with Mbabazi, was also accused of personally benefiting from the sale 
of production rights from Eni SpA to Heritage Oil (Republic of Uganda, 
2013). Mbabazi was also accused of receiving money from a shell company 
called TKL Holdings set up for his benefit in London by Eni SpA (Republic 
of Uganda, 2013). The parliamentary investigation committee eventually 
exonerated all the three of the oil bribery allegations but cited a general 
inability to perform its investigation due to lack of access to information from 
banks and lack of cooperation by government institutions as key weaknesses 
hindering the outcomes of the investigation (Republic of Uganda, 2013).
Subsequently, for over two years, the Government of Uganda then spent 
public monies battling Tullow Oil in court over a discretionary tax incentive 
offered by Energy Minister Irene Muloni in closed-door negotiations with 
the oil company (Larsen, 2014). During negotiations, Muloni’s team offered a 
capital gains tax exemption which, according to Article 152 of the Constitution, 
is outside their mandate (Larsen, 2014). Then, when the Uganda Revenue 
Authority later charged the company its full capital gains tax liability, the 
company took the Government to court. Even though the two parties eventu-
ally settled, the Government spent thousands of dollars fighting the case in 
Ugandan courts and eventually international tribunals. Although corruption 
on the part of Muloni was never alleged, the discretionary incentive offered 
in the closed-door negotiations eventually cost the Ugandan Government 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in public revenues.
4.4.2 Corporate Tax Planning and Tax Base Erosion
Once the contracts are signed, the Government has to make sure that all 
due revenues are collected. This is especially difficult, given the prevalence 
of aggressive tax-avoidance activities and base erosion and profit shifting in 
the global extractive industries (African Union Commission/United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa, 2015). Once contracts are awarded, there 
are many opportunities for companies to manipulate their accounting and 
reporting to artificially maximise profit and deprive the State of revenues owed.
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According to the International Monetary Fund, this is especially pertinent 
in countries with a legal regime operating through profit-sharing agreements 
whereby the company is contracted to extract the resource and is rewarded 
with a share of the production in return (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 
2007). Thus, the oil is divided between ‘cost oil retained by the contractor 
to cover cost and profit oil, which covers the remaining production and an 
agreed formula for dividing profit oil between the government (and/or NOC) 
and the contractor’ (IMF, 2007, p.22).
One common form of manipulation under this regime is an inflation of 
cost oil figures or ‘recoverable costs’ by companies to misrepresent the costs 
of the project and therefore retain more revenue than the company is due. 
As described in a 2010 report by the Civil Society Coalition on Oil and Gas 
in Uganda:
When the cost oil total is increased this reduces the quantity of oil remain-
ing as ‘profit oil’ but as the profit oil is split between the companies and the 
state this only hurts the state because the cost of ‘allowable expenditures’ 
is passed onto the state in the form of reduced profit oil (Civil Society 
Coalition on Oil and Gas in Uganda, 2010, p.9).
As described by extractive industries economist Don Hubert (2016), this 
sort of cost manipulation is a form of tax base erosion. ‘Because the bulk 
of government revenue normally comes from profit-based taxes—that is 
taxes that are assessed on net income- (after cost income-) inflated costs 
can significantly reduce the tax base’ (Hubert, 2016, p.8). Companies can 
fraudulently inflate their costs using many tax planning tools such as transfer 
mispricing of transactions between associated entities, or thin capitalisation 
manipulation. Because of this sort of activity, the Government must diligently 
consider which types of costs to deem ‘recoverable’ to check that companies 
are not including expenses that should not be counted as recoverable.
In Uganda, such issues have arisen in past and current contracts. For 
instance, Heritage Oil attempted to submit voluntary corporate social re-
sponsibility initiatives as cost recoverable, although this is not an authorised 
recoverable cost. This type of misrepresentation occurred in Heritage Oil’s 
reported cost recoverable figures. According to an Ernst & Young audit 
of the company’s activities, the company over-claimed unauthorised cost 
recoverable expenditures of over US$ 500,000 (Civil Society Coalition on 
Oil and Gas in Uganda, 2010).
According to a 2014 analysis by Global Witness of the leaked 2012 PSAs 
signed between Government and the joint venture partners, many recoverable 
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cost issues are also present in the current PSAs. According to the analysis, 
clauses in the PSAs to limit the artificial inflation of costs due to thin capi-
talisation and transfer mispricing are weak and put the Government at risk 
of undue revenue loss (Global Witness, 2014, p.37).
Outside recoverable costs, multinational companies employ aggressive 
tax-planning schemes to artificially reduce their general tax liability to the 
Government. In 2010, eleven days before Heritage Oil was to sell its oil shares 
in Uganda, the company deliberately re-domiciled its country of incorporation 
from Bahamas to Mauritius to avoid paying the Government of Uganda US$ 
400 million in capital gains tax (BBC News, 2016). Because Uganda has a 
double tax agreement with Mauritius, and Mauritius does not impose capital 
gains tax, the company decided to relocate to Mauritius in order to zero out 
its tax liability to the Government of Uganda (BBC News, 2016). The ensuing 
court case between the Government of Uganda and the company to recover 
the money from both Heritage and Tullow Oil dragged on for years and cost 
the Government additional money (BBC News, 2016). The aggressive tax 
avoidance scheme employed by the company was only fully uncovered in 
2016 when emails surfaced during the massive ‘Panama papers’ leak. Other 
than information gleaned from this leak, it is very difficult to expose such 
practices by companies, despite the frequency of such acts.
In addition to these ‘horizontal’ risks, there are also many ‘vertical’ risks 
of revenue leakage in the intra-government management of oil revenues, 
as depicted in Figure 4.3. These types of leakages fall more in line with 
conventional notions of ‘corruption’ and are more commonly identified 
as such. Within the government revenue chain, it is very important that 
petroleum revenue is strictly managed with sufficient oversight in order to 
prevent embezzlement and malfeasance in the use of oil money. Given the 
potential for direct and immediate benefits to politicians from natural resource 
revenues, the principal-agent problem again arises wherein politicians as the 
agents become tempted to divert the newfound revenue stream for personal 
or political benefit, rather than for the benefit of the principal, in this case 
the citizens of Uganda.
In sum, oil revenues can incentivise and increase instances of political 
corruption. According to Robinson, Torvik and Verdier:
In countries with institutions which limit the ability of politicians to use 
clientelism to bias elections, resource booms tend to raise national income. 
When such institutions are absent, the perverse political incentives may 
dominate and income can fall—there is a resource curse (Robinson, Torvik 
and Verdier, 2006, p.466).
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As the logic goes, resource rents simply present yet another opportunity, 
in the form of an additional revenue stream, for graft and embezzlement 
by politicians in resource-rich countries that politicians in resource-scarce 
countries do not have. According to Kiiza, Bategeka and Sswanyana, ‘The 
“paradox of plenty” as the resource-curse is often termed, is embedded in 
the age-old maxim: Necessity is the Mother of Innovation. Resource-poor 
countries are forced to innovate and attain economic viability. By contrast, 
resource-rich countries suffer the paradox of plenty and remain poor’ (Kiiza 
et al., 2011, p.9).
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4.4.3 Executive Capture
In countries with an overly dominant executive, oil revenues can ‘leak’ out 
of the public revenue chain by acts of executive interference. Simply put, if 
resource revenues can be easily called upon by a president or other powerful 
members of the dominant political party for instance, with no mechanisms to 
limit or regulate their usage, revenues risk becoming a slush fund for patronage 
and corruption. Importantly, because resource revenues are rent-based and 
not tax-based, there is often less accountability than with money that was 
earned or derived from citizens through taxation.
According to Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, oil can create perverse political 
incentives and entrench corruption.
The existence of natural resources incentivizes the current political regime 
to over-extract regardless of the socially efficient rate of extraction because 
they cannot guarantee that they will have permanent access to the resource 
as they do now and thus due to political uncertainty, must reap maximum 
benefit they can in the short-term (Robinson et al., 2006, p.466).
Therefore, the ruling regime feels pressure to take advantage of the benefits of 
extraction, uncertain whether power over the resource revenues will change 
hands in the near future. Often, regimes publicly exert their perception of 
control over the resource. It is common that the regime in power at the time 
of discovery will personalise possession of the oil, treating the resource as a 
possession of the ruling entity, abetting a transition into a kleptocratic State. 
This is most common in countries with an overly dominant executive, able 
to thwart protocols and regulations to limit political capture, as is certainly 
the case in Uganda.
In Equatorial Guinea, for instance, the Obiang regime exercises far-
reaching control over all arms of government. Over more than two decades, 
the regime has managed to enshrine a fully functioning and intricate system 
of corruption to divert almost all of the country’s natural resource revenues 
to the Obiang family and surrounding elite. Due to the degree of corruption, 
Open Society Foundation (2010, p.3) labelled the country ‘an almost perfect 
kleptocracy’ marked by ‘a system of corruption unparalleled in its brazenness’. 
According to the report, the President and his son and nephew controlled 
the government oil account, and the three account signatories authorised 
the removal of US$ 34 million from the government oil account to shell 
corporations and accounts in tax havens all over the world to the benefit of 
the ruling family (Open Society Foundation, 2010, p.6).
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In Uganda, President Museveni commonly refers to the oil as his direct 
possession, reinforcing suspicions of problematic personalisation of the 
national resource. According to Ugandan newspaper the Daily Monitor, at an 
international oil and gas summit in November 2016, the President ‘accused the 
opposition of being after “my oil” and wanting him to quit leadership at time 
when the country is about to start oil production an earn revenues; which he 
said he won’t leave in the hands of his opponents’ (Musisi, 2016). During the 
2016 campaigns, the President commonly referred to the oil as ‘my oil’ and 
vowed to maintain his control over the resource. According to the Guardian, 
Museveni made such statements several times, including at campaign rallies, 
quoting the President as saying, ‘You hear people say “Museveni should go”, 
but go and leave oil money?’ (Mwesiga, 2016).
This is especially concerning, given that in Uganda the President can easily 
thwart almost all statutory limits to executive capture to call upon revenues 
whenever necessary. In 2011, the Government struck a deal with a Russian 
arms exporter for a US$ 740 million advance for the purchase of six fighter 
jets (Imaka, 2011). News of the purchase resulted in public outrage due to the 
negative impacts the sale had on the already stressed economy. During the 
subsequent parliamentary investigation into the purchase, the Governor of the 
Bank of Uganda explained that the President instructed the release of public 
funds without parliamentary authorisation for this purchase, on the condition 
that the money would be replenished by future oil revenues (Imaka, 2011). 
However, this is in contravention of the Government’s position on oil revenue 
expenditure—that oil revenues will be used for infrastructure and development.
In January 2017, the President again decided to reward Shs six billion to 
42 various government officials involved in the recovery of Shs 1.5 trillion in 
capital gains tax owed from Heritage Oil & Gas. This payment, which came 
to be known as the ‘presidential handshake’ was another disturbing example 
of the President’s ability to make decisions in contravention of domestic 
laws. Not only was it revealed in subsequent investigations that many of the 
government officials, including high level Cabinet members, had absolutely 
no involvement in the case, all of the payments were in contravention of the 
Public Finance Management Act, 2015 (Musoke, 2017).
Contrary to the statement issued by the Uganda media centre after the scan-
dal broke, asserting that the payments went through the ‘necessary approval’ 
process as mandated by the PFMA, the payments were explicitly contrary to the 
rules outlined in the Act, and without legal warrant. As revenues derived from 
‘the exploitation of petroleum reserves in Uganda’, as outlined by the PFMA, 
the CGT award won in the case against Heritage falls under the designation of 
‘petroleum revenues’. According to the PFMA, all oil revenues are to be paid 
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into a newly created Petroleum Fund, hosted by the Bank of Uganda (Public 
Finance Management Act [PFMA], 2015). The Annual Reports from the Bank 
of Uganda for 2014/2015 and 2015/2016 indeed confirm the partial payment of 
these monies into the Petroleum Fund in the past two years. Once money has 
been deposited into the Petroleum Fund, it may only be withdrawn
Under authority granted by an Appropriation Act and a warrant of the 
Attorney General—(a) to the Consolidated Fund, to support the annual 
budget; and (b) to the Petroleum Revenue Investment Reserve, for invest-
ments to be undertaken in accordance with section 63 (PFMA, 2015, p.55).
Further still, the PFMA clearly restricts the use of oil revenues, stating that 
‘[f]or avoidance of doubt, petroleum revenue shall be used for the financing of 
infrastructure and development projects of Government and not the recurrent 
expenditure of Government’ (PFMA, 2015, p.56). The petroleum section of 
the PFMA, and the specific creation of a strictly managed Petroleum Fund, 
was written to prevent exactly this type of discretion and executive capture 
in the expenditure of oil revenues. This scandal demonstrated that, despite 
excessive posturing and rhetoric, the Government may have no interest in 
implementing the controls over oil revenue utilisation outlined in the PFMA. 
Lack of regard for such controls, coupled with little to no mechanisms for 
accountability or penalty for dubious actions, poses great risk for future 
corruption in Uganda’s oil sector.
Based on Uganda’s history with corruption, analysts project that politicians are 
likely to fall to the temptations of resource rents and engage in corrupt practices. 
According to Kiiza et al., ‘If the systemic corruption in Uganda’s public office is 
not disabled, oil discovery will beget a resource-curse’ (Kiiza et al., 2011, p.12).
4.4.4 Institutional Mismanagement of Funds, Lacking Oversight 
and Accountability
The degree to which politicians can feasibly mismanage and embezzle resource 
rents depends on the level of agency and discretion allotted to the given actors. 
According to Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, institutions are the critical factor 
in determining the manner in which the extractive sector will ultimately be 
governed.
The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically 
on institutions since these can determine the extent to which political 
incentives map into policy outcomes. The relevant institutions here will be 
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political ones which promote the accountability of politicians, and generally 
develop state institutions away from patrimonial practices towards the use 
of rational and meritocratic criteria in allocating public sector resources 
(Robinson et al., 2005, p.450).
The potential for corruption depends on the quality of institutions in a 
given country. As argued by Bategeka and Mawejje, ‘low quality institutions 
… encourage non-productive policy choices (that is, policies that inhibit 
widespread engagement and growth in productive activities) by allowing 
politicians to plunder and engage in inefficient transfers of resources for 
purposes of buying votes and tightening their grip on power’ (Bategeka 
and Mawejje, 2013, p.12). Kiiza, Bategeka and Ssewanyana also defend the 
importance of strong institutions. Illustratively:
Why does some resource abundance deliver positive developmental 
outcomes in some countries and economic failure in others? The answer 
arguably lies in cross-national differences in the quality of domestic institu-
tions. Resource-rich countries that have a malfunctioning bureaucracy 
and insecure property rights tend to attain lower growth outcomes and 
more violent conflicts than those that have high quality systems of public 
administration and predictable/reliable property rights institutions. In 
other words, institutions matter (Kiiza et al., 2011, p.12).
According to Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, the resource curse proceeds in 
countries with ‘grabber friendly’ rather than ‘producer friendly’ institutions. 
‘Grabber friendly’ institutions allow for rent-seeking activities and do not 
enforce adequate oversight or separation of powers to disable corrupt practices 
(Robinson et al., 2006). ‘Producer-friendly’ institutions, on the other hand, 
enforce the efficient management of resource revenues through mechanisms 
for tracking and due diligence checks and balances. Therefore, the rents are 
able to penetrate the economy in productive ways and translate into positive 
economic benefits for the country.
In the case of Uganda, where use of public funds is always a controversial 
topic, the correct intra-government collection, transfer, management and 
dispersal of oil revenues is paramount. This type of corruption is made pos-
sible by weak regulations for sufficient oversight and protection of resource 
revenues. Revenues must be insulated and protected from such political 
interference through strict prohibitions on withdrawals and transfers as well 
as extensive oversight over foreign investment of oil revenues.
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According to a 2013 public expenditure and financial accountability 
assessment performed in Uganda, the Government lacks fiscal discipline 
and adequate mechanisms for effective accountability with regard to intra-
government revenue utilisation. The country received a failing score in 
multiple key areas including ‘composition of expenditure out-turn compared 
to original approved budget, extent of unreported government operations, 
transparency of inter-government fiscal relations, and effectiveness of payroll 
controls’ (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2012). 
While the study reported adequate budget transparency mechanisms, the 
ineffective budget control mechanisms in Uganda present an opportunity 
for corruption.
In 2015, the Government passed the Public Finance Management Act, 
intended to strengthen and standardise public financial management and 
accountability protocols in the country. However, less than a year later, 
the Government pushed amendments through to undo some of the key 
mechanisms for financial accountability originally passed into law. Five 
months before the 2016 elections, Government successfully amended the 
Act to allow it to borrow money from the Central Bank without seeking 
prior parliamentary approval (Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group, 2015). 
According to local budget advocacy groups, ‘This therefore means that 
Government can finance supplementary budgeting through re-allocation 
of funds of the annual budget without parliament approval’ (Civil Society 
Budget Advocacy Group, 2015, p.2).
In the report findings of the 2013 parliamentary investigation into oil 
bribery and oil revenue mismanagement, the parliamentary committee 
identified numerous areas of concern. Primarily, the committee found that 
the reporting of monies between the Uganda Revenue Authority, the Ministry 
of Finance, the Ministry of Energy and the Bank of Uganda was inconsistent 
and required urgent harmonisation (Republic of Uganda, 2013, p.43). The 
committee also reported the presence of multiple petroleum accounts held 
in the Bank of Uganda opened by different government entities with little 
coordination (Republic of Uganda, 2013, p.50). Different government enti-
ties also reported conflicting narratives of utilisation for the same revenue 
streams. In sum, the report demonstrated many overlapping problems in 
the management of oil revenues to date, all of which could allow for revenue 
leakages for corrupt gain.
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4.5 Preventing Oil Sector Corruption in Uganda
4.5.1 Anti-corruption Framework in Uganda
Uganda has instituted multiple government bodies and entities tasked with 
preventing and prosecuting corruption, including the Anti-Corruption Court, 
the Inspectorate of Government, the Auditor General, the Directorate of 
Public Prosecutions and other related bodies. However, due to lack of capacity, 
these entities continuously fail to fulfil their important tasks, bringing into 
question whether these bodies will provide the oversight necessary to prevent 
oil sector corruption.
According to a 2013 Human Rights Watch report, ‘Uganda’s current political 
system is built on patronage and that ultimately high-level corruption is 
rewarded rather than punished’ (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p.2). In its 
report, Human Rights Watch explains that trends in Uganda’s lacklustre 
anti-corruption responses are deliberate and political. Instead of prosecuting 
the highest government officials ultimately responsible for the numerous 
cases of ‘grand theft of public resources’, fledgling anti-corruption institutions 
penalise the technocrats under them as scapegoats for the kingpins. As the 
report rightfully asserts, during the entire tenure of Museveni’s presidency, 
no minister has served prison time despite numerous cases of grand-scale 
corruption (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p.3).
This is also due to the chronic incapacitation of Uganda’s many anti-
corruption entities. As the report states:
Most importantly, President Museveni and parliament, which is heavily 
dominated by ruling party members, have failed to empower key institu-
tions, either by failing to fill key vacancies or by failing to establish institu-
tions such as the Leadership Tribunal which could challenge inaccurate 
financial asset declarations (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p.3).
For instance, the position of Deputy Inspector General of Government, 
which legally must be filled in order for the office to prosecute cases, was 
left vacant from 1995 to 2013 and filled only after concerted donor pressure 
(Human Rights Watch, 2013, p.3). In 2015, Transparency International 
Uganda produced a report examining in closer detail the reasons for failure of 
these key institutions. Particularly, the report investigated the exact reasons 
for continuous failure to prosecute high-level corruption by the relevant bodies 
including the Anti-Corruption Division of the High Court, the Directorate of 
Public Prosecutions and other related government entities. While the report 
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details many technical obstacles to prosecution in corruption cases, many of 
these technical issues arise out of lack of political will fully to operationalise 
and capacitate these corruption-focused prosecutorial bodies. Moreover, 
‘it is paradoxical that the government commits to the resource-demanding 
establishment of anti-corruption organs and legislation while simultaneously 
leaving these organs incapacitated’ (Transparency International Uganda, 
2015, p.36). This paradox brings into question the Government’s intentions 
for the anti-corruption institutions themselves, as the report notes. ‘It is up 
for debate whether Uganda’s institutional framework in the fight against 
corruption is actually “meant” to be effective in curbing corruption, or whether 
it is intended to serve political purposes’ (Transparency International Uganda, 
2015, p.11). Such concerns are directly relevant to the country’s ability to 
deter corruption in Uganda’s burgeoning oil sector.
4.5.2 Uganda’s Oil Legislation and Attempts to Stop the Leaks
The Government of Uganda has put in place multiple pieces of legislation 
to guide oil exploration, development and production. Most relevant to 
the topic of corruption are the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and 
Production) Act, 2013 and the Public Finance Management Act, 2015. These 
two pieces of legislation dictate how rights to extraction will be granted 
to companies and how the monies from the oil sector will be managed by 
government—addressing both the horizontal and vertical risks for corruption 
as depicted in Figure 4.4. With the exception of a few key provisions, the 
final laws contain many weak areas that could enable oil sector corruption.
The Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act, 2013, 
known as the Upstream Act, outlines how rights to extraction will be allocated 
and how each company’s upstream activities will be regulated. According 
to the analysis above, this Act covers the scope of ‘horizontal’ transactions 
between companies and Government. The Act establishes a tripartite structure 
for oil sector management, dividing roles between a petroleum directorate, 
a petroleum authority, and the national oil company (NOC). The petroleum 
directorate is tasked with managing the sector headed by the Minister of 
Energy. The petroleum authority is tasked with providing independent over-
sight over the sector, while the NOC is tasked with managing Government’s 
commercial interests in the sector.
While this tripartite structure does provide important separation of 
powers, due to an over-concentration of powers given to the Minister, it is 
unclear whether the system will provide effective checks on power. Neither the 
authority nor the NOC holds substantial powers compared to the Minister 
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(Petroleum Act, 2013, p.20). Although the petroleum authority is supposed 
to be independent, the Minister can send directives to the authority, and 
members of the Board of the authority can be removed directly by the 
President (Petroleum Act, 2013, pp.24–26).
Although the law was passed in 2013, the petroleum authority was not fully 
operationalised until 2016, which provides cause for concern since many 
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important elements of the authority’s stated mandate, including overseeing 
the licensing process, occurred prior to this without the authority in place. If 
the body is not fully capacitated and able to fulfil its mandate, it will represent 
yet another disingenuous attempt at oversight by the Government of Uganda. 
As explained in a 2011 Global Integrity Report, ‘oversight institutions ex-
ist, but they operate under considerable restrictions. The executive branch 
inhibits their independence and often ignores or only partially implements 
the recommendations in their reports’.2 The oil sector cannot afford to have 
such an inactive and unutilised oversight body.
With regard to the allocation of rights, the Upstream Act does establish 
processes of fair, open and competitive bidding to be followed. However, 
according to section 53 of the Act, the Minister may also receive direct bids 
in ‘exceptional circumstances’ (Petroleum Act, 2013, p.43). This provision, 
coupled with the sweeping powers allotted to the Minister in the Act, could 
be abused to allow for procurement-related corruption.
While the Act does establish standard content to be included in applica-
tions and licences, the law fails to mandate contract transparency. Although 
section 151 of the Act gives the Minister the right to share information with the 
public, section 152 weakens this assertion by establishing that all information 
shared between the licensee and Government will be kept confidential unless 
the licensee provides authorisation for disclosure. Despite repeated calls for 
public disclosure, the contents of the production-sharing agreements signed 
between Government and companies remain secret and are not accessible to 
the public, with the exception of two instances where PSAs have been leaked 
by civil society actors (Global Witness, 2014). This opacity limits citizens’ 
ability to hold government officials accountable during contract negotiations, 
meaning that government officials are less incentivised to negotiate a good 
deal knowing that it will be scrutinised by the public.
In 2015, Government passed the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 
to establish the protocols for the ‘vertical’ or intra-governmental management 
of oil revenues. Importantly, the law establishes a Petroleum Fund into which 
all petroleum revenues will be deposited, separate from the rest of govern-
ment revenues. Notably, the law introduces multiple forms of oversight over 
activities of the fund, including publication of the annual reports and audited 
accounts of the fund.
For instance, section 61 of the Act currently provides a strong foundation 
for critical information-sharing. According to section 61, semi-annual and 
2 Global Integrity. Global Integrity Report: Uganda, 2011. Available at: https://www.globalin-
tegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/GIRScorecard2011_Uganda_comments.pdf.
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annual reports, including such information as the inflows and outflows of 
the Petroleum Fund, the volumes and values of the petroleum produced 
and the source of the petroleum revenue, will be tabled before Parliament 
and made publicly available (PFMA, 2015, p.72). While these provisions 
for transparency must be applauded, all of the requirements for disclosure 
are ex post, meaning that the decision has been made and the money has 
already been utilised at the time of reporting. If, for instance, the money was 
embezzled, the Government could have significant difficulty recovering the 
stolen funds. It would be preferable for the procedures to be strengthened 
through provisions for more substantive multi-party involvement before the 
approval of key decisions.
Furthermore, the law offers no detailed provisions for petroleum revenue 
utilisation. The PFMA merely establishes that revenues from the Petroleum 
Fund will be put in a petroleum investment reserve or transferred to the 
Consolidated Fund ‘to support the annual budget’ and to ‘be used for the 
financing of infrastructure and development projects of government’ (PFMA, 
2015, p.71). The legislation does note that the petroleum revenues will not be 
used for unplanned withdrawals or the collateralisation of loans. But there is 
no detailed information on spending. This represents a significant void in the 
legislation as Government should be required to publicly present a spending 
and allocation plan to inform the citizenry and allow for the monitoring of 
expenditures.
Apart from transfers to the Consolidated Fund, petroleum monies will 
also be put into a petroleum investment reserve (PFMA, 2015, p.66). The 
investment reserve serves many purposes and has an important mandate to 
help guarantee macroeconomic stability throughout the entire period of oil 
extraction through diversification of the oil revenue portfolio. Yet, protocols 
to ensure sound management of the investment reserve are relatively weak 
compared to the Petroleum Fund. Specifically, the protocols mandating 
transparency and sharing of information regarding the petroleum revenue 
investment reserve are largely absent (PFMA, 2015, p.76).
If details of the activity of the petroleum revenue investment reserve are not 
made public, this fund runs the risk of becoming a slush fund for corruption 
as petroleum monies could easily be invested into foreign assets and offshore 
accounts connected to politically exposed persons. Sovereign wealth funds 
have notoriously been linked to corruption in numerous countries around the 
world, so any sovereign wealth fund established in Uganda must be managed 
transparently with strong rules for investment and adequate protocols for 
effective oversight (Bauer et al., 2016, p.60).
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4.5.3 Non-governmental Efforts to Promote Good Governance
Apart from government efforts, civil society actors, bilateral donors and other 
stakeholders have undertaken concerted efforts to prevent corruption and 
mismanagement in Uganda’s oil sectors. Since the discovery of oil, a strong 
coalition of local and international civil society organisations has persistently 
engaged Government to ensure that a strong governance framework is put in 
place for oil sector management. In 2010, civil society organisations analysed 
the country’s first ever leaked production-sharing agreements, providing critical 
feedback to Government on many problem areas in the initial agreements (Civil 
Society Coalition on Oil and Gas, 2010). Again in 2014, Global Witness leaked 
two of the current PSAs, providing in-depth analysis of the environmental, social 
and economic provisions of the agreements, to instruct the Government on how 
to improve future agreements truly to get the best ‘deal’ (Global Witness, 2014).
These leaks supplemented previously unsuccessful attempts to access 
petroleum contracts using Uganda’s 2005 Access to Information Act. In 2009, 
two journalists from the Daily Monitor filed a case against Government after 
they were refused access to the country’s production-sharing agreements signed 
with companies. The Solicitor-General in his response cited the confidentiality 
agreements in the contracts prohibiting public disclosure (Africa Freedom of 
Information Centre, 2011). The court acknowledged that mandatory disclosure 
was warranted in cases of public interest (Africa Freedom of Information 
Centre, 2011). However, the court ruled that the journalists had not duly 
demonstrated how they would use the information for public benefit, and 
thus struck down their request (Africa Freedom of Information Centre, 2011).
Civil society organisations, alongside Members of Parliament (MPs), were 
also very active in the debate on the upstream and midstream oil laws from 
2011–2013. As stated, above, MPs went so far as to declare a moratorium on the 
issue of new licences until an adequate legislative framework was put in place 
to guide the processes. Although the executive did not heed this moratorium, 
MPs continued voicing adamant dissent to issues of corruption and executive 
interference in the oil sector. Such dissent resulted in the attempted suspension 
of a small number of MPs, labelled the ‘oil MPs’, from the ruling NRM party 
(Nalubega, 2013). President Museveni accused the dissident MPs and their 
civil society allies of ‘trying to bypass the oil and gas experts in the ministry 
in the interest of their foreign backers’ (Mugerwa, 2012).
The international donor community also provides another form of pressure 
on the Government of Uganda to adopt strong mechanisms for transparency 
and accountability in the extractive industries. Since 2009, the Government 
of Norway, through the bilateral NORAD Oil for Development Programme, 
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has provided official assistance to the Government of Uganda in capacity and 
institutional development regarding the country’s nascent oil sector. According 
to the stated outcomes of the partnership, the NORAD assistance aims to ensure 
government accountability in the management of the oil sector through the 
establishment of a strong policy, legal and regulatory framework ‘for managing 
the petroleum sector in an economically, socially and environmentally sustain-
able way’ (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development [MEMD], 2015, p.22).
In this partnership, NORAD has achieved the intended outcomes in 
helping the Ugandan Government in formulating the country’s national oil 
and gas policy as well as associated laws (MEMD, 2015, p.7). NORAD also 
assisted in the development of the Public Finance Management Act as well 
as the Oil and Gas Revenue Management Policy while the Norwegian Oil 
Taxation Office worked with the Uganda Revenue Authority to develop a 
petroleum tax manual (MEMD, 2015, p.15). These policies, formulated with 
NORAD assistance, prominently highlight the principles of accountability 
and transparency in oil revenue management.
Notably, the Oil and Gas Revenue Management Policy (2012, p.37) commits 
the Government of Uganda to ‘observe the highest standards of transparency’ by 
joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an international 
initiative to promote good governance in the global extractive industries through 
payment transparency. Through EITI implementation, companies publish their 
payments to government while governments publish their payment receipts from 
companies, enabling reconciliation between the disclosures and reconnaissance 
of any discrepancy or ‘missing funds’ between the two.
Despite this assertion, the Government remained reticent to actually 
operationalise this commitment. However, in 2019, the Government publicly 
declared its intention to join the EITI. It is still too early to tell whether this 
intention will be carried out or whether this is empty rhetoric.
4.6 Conclusion
While this analysis has focused on the present opportunities for corruption in 
Uganda’s oil sector, the potential for oil to entrench and catalyse new forms of 
corruption and the potential for democratic regression have been less exam-
ined. As described in the discussion of the ‘resource curse’ theory, scholarly 
research has determined an inverse relationship between oil extraction and 
democracy in countries around the world. As shown by political scientist 
Michael Ross (2001), ‘oil and minerals have strong antidemocratic effects’.
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Oil rents historically correlate with heightened vulnerability to corruption 
and a decline in democratic processes (Ross, 2001). Thus, the inflow of resource 
revenues can sometimes weaken the strength of democracy in oil-producing 
countries, particularly related to the relationship between the citizenry 
and government (Ross, 2001). Without organised and insistent demands 
from an informed public, the government-citizen relationship could become 
completely alienated in the process of resource extraction.
If democratic institutions are weakened in the wake of natural resource dis-
covery, the country is at risk of developing into a ‘rentier state’. In this scenario, 
such a great proportion of national wealth derives from oil rents that normal 
democratic processes become completely distorted. As researchers Anyanwu 
and Eriacho explain, ‘a few political elites collect the revenues from the oil export 
and use the money for cementing their political, economic and social power by 
controlling government and its bureaucracy’ (Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2012, 
p.5). This trend is especially worrying since democracy becomes even more 
important in the context of natural resource discovery. Given the temptations 
presented by natural resource windfalls, protecting domestic democratic 
institutions becomes essential to a continuously thriving democracy.
The challenge in Uganda and any evolving democracy is to incentivise 
political leadership continuously to work in good faith for the trust of the 
citizens in order to limit corruption and abuse of office. While the temptations 
of oil revenue may further incentivise corruption, discretion can be limited 
through mechanisms for oversight, accountability and continuous citizen 
engagement. Uganda’s track record might lead some to predict continued 
corruption in the country’s oil sector, but it should not be assumed that 
Uganda’s oil is destined for graft. However, the interplay of corruption, oil 
and democracy in Uganda should continue to be analysed and monitored so 
that attempts can be made to ensure that oil strengthens, rather than erodes, 
Uganda’s democracy through a strong governance framework that limits all 
opportunities for corruption in the oil revenue chain.
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5 
Closed but Ordered : How the Political 
Settlement Shapes Uganda’s Deals with 
International Oil Companies
Badru Bukenya and Jaqueline Nakaiza
5.1 Introduction
In 2006 commercially viable quantities of oil and gas were announced in 
Uganda. It was estimated that the revenue from the country’s oil reserves 
when production starts would be about US$ 2 billion per year, or around 12 
per cent of GDP (Vokes, 2012), although later estimates downgraded this 
potential by one third, citing price volatility (Patey, 2015). Such oil quantities, 
if properly managed, can put Uganda on the world list of oil-producing and 
exporting countries with a real opportunity of fuelling the transition from 
a poor to a middle-income and perhaps even high-income country. For the 
benefits to emerge, however, numerous actors need to work collectively 
in the best interests of the country to transform oil resources into useable 
end products. The oil value chain is divided into three sub-sectors namely, 
upstream, middle stream and downstream (The World Bank, 2015).
While the upstream level includes activities related to oil reserve explora-
tion and development, middle stream activities largely include oil and gas 
production, processing and refining into petrochemicals and natural gas. 
For their part, downstream activities are mainly dominated by products 
transportation, temporary storage, marketing and distribution to the middle 
and final consumers. It is generally understood that upstream and mid-
dle stream activities are complex and require huge sunk costs (Wamono, 
Kikabi and Mugisha, 2012). In the context of poor countries like Uganda, this 
makes such streams a preserve of the rich and experienced international oil 
companies (IOCs) and international companies that service the auxiliary 
functions of the oil industry. Wamono et al.’s (2012) analysis of Uganda’s oil 
sector suggests that even downstream activities are likely to be dominated 
by foreign companies due to constraints on capital for many of Uganda’s 
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small and medium enterprises (SMEs) alongside the Government’s interest 
in attracting foreign investors (despite the legal provisions for local content).
Given this background, therefore, the oil sector has attracted many foreign 
companies. Yet, the Government of Uganda (GoU) has been quite secretive 
in its dealings with these companies. Oversight bodies such as Parliament, 
the media and other civil society organisations (CSOs) are largely sidelined, 
not only from the negotiations between Government and the IOCs but also 
from accessing information about these negotiations (De Kock and Sturman, 
2012). While such an opaque environment would predict a worse-off posi-
tion for GoU in relation to the resultant deals with the usually experienced 
international players, available evidence so far indicates the opposite. For 
instance, the modelling report done by Global Witness showed that the 
Government of Uganda negotiated better deals in the production-sharing 
agreements (PSAs), the lack of important human rights and environmental 
safeguards notwithstanding.1 In addition, the PSAs largely reflected the 
country’s priorities with respect to guaranteeing the establishment of an oil 
refinery that the IOCs were initially reluctant to commit to (Hickey, Bukenya, 
Izama and Kizito, 2015; Patey, 2015).
The current chapter aims to investigate and analyse the dynamics of deal 
making between the Government of Uganda and foreign companies. Our 
discussion is anchored in the political settlement framework for, as one 
key informant rightly noted, ‘it is the politics that is determining what the 
technocrat does and who gets what’ in Uganda’s oil sector. To explore how the 
interplay of Uganda’s political settlement and the ‘deals space’ is influencing 
the Government’s ability to protect national interests in negotiations with 
IOCs and its interactions with the other stakeholders involved in the oil sector, 
the chapter draws on both primary data and secondary sources. Primary data 
were collected from about 30 key informants with substantial knowledge 
of the oil sector in 2016. These included government officials, employees of 
IOCs, MPs, journalists and members of CSOs.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the discussion proceeds with 
the mapping of the key actors in the oil sector, and thereafter conceptualises 
the political settlement and nature of state-business relations or the ‘deals 
space’. The chapter then discusses the strategies employed by Government 
in its dealings with IOCs as well as the other local actors with an interest in 
the sector. The last section concludes.
1 Global Witness suggests that Uganda is likely to receive between 80 and well over 90 per cent 
of revenues after costs have been recovered, depending on the amount of oil which is discovered 
and its price.
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5.2 Actors in Uganda’s Oil Sector
Actors in Uganda’s oil sector fall into two broad categories, namely, internal 
and external. The internal actors are mainly the President and key military 
figures (see the discussion of political settlement below). The list of internals 
also has some Cabinet Ministers and technocrats, especially those from the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD) and the Ministry 
of Finance Planning and Economic Development (MFPED), the Bank of 
Uganda (BoU) and the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). Within MEMD, 
the primary agency is the Petroleum Exploration and Production Department 
(PEPD), to which the President has accorded relative protection to develop 
capabilities currently unparalleled by any other mainstream government 
agency (Hickey and Izama, 2016). The less powerful actors include the 
Parliament and the numerous CSOs with an interest in natural resources, 
governance or accountability issues.
On the external side it is international oil companies (IOCs) that dominate. 
The exact number of IOCs that are active in Uganda is difficult to ascertain, 
for the reason that some come and leave within a short time frame. How-
ever, a picture emerges when one examines documented deals between the 
Government of Uganda (GoU) and IOCs. It is reported that Uganda’s first 
production-sharing agreement (PSA) under the national resistance movement 
(NRM) government was signed in 1991 with the Belgian company Petrofina. 
This was for the entire Albertine Graben region. Petrofina did little with its 
PSA as it pulled out of the country in 1993. In February 1995 the Govern-
ment signed a similar PSA with a small US-based company called Uganda 
Works and General Engineering Company (Rwakakamba and Lukwago, 
2013). Its operations were however suspended by GoU in March 1996 due to 
unsatisfactory progress. In January 1997 the country witnessed another PSA 
in which the Government gave Heritage Oil and Gas exploration rights in 
the Semiliki basin and the southern part of Lake Albert. Subsequent PSAs 
were signed with other companies, namely, Hardman in 2001, Neptune 
Petroleum-Uganda in 2005 and Dominium Petroleum in 2007.
In 2006 commercially viable oil deposits were announced in blocks jointly 
licensed to Heritage Oil (Canada) and Tullow Oil PLC (Ireland). Heritage 
sold its stake to Tullow for US$ 1.5 billion, after which Tullow brought in 
investment from two bigger players—Total E&P (French) and China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)—each of which agreed to pay US$ 1.45 
billion to split the area three ways (Vokes, 2012; Wass and Musiime, 2013). 
The farm-down was finalised in 2012 and it is regarded as ‘one of the most 
impressive consortia in Africa’ (Patey, 2015, p.15). By 2014, the Government 
106 BaDrU BUkenya anD JaqUeline nak aiza
estimated the country’s petroleum reserve capacity at 6.5 billion barrels of oil 
while the projected recoverable stood at between 1.8 and 2.2 billion barrels. 
The Government claims that these estimates are based on only 40 per cent 
of the area expected to have oil2 and, given the impressive 87 per cent success 
rate in encountering hydrocarbons (Van Alstine, Manyindo, Smith, Dixon 
and Aminga Ruhanga, 2014), some have predicted that Uganda is destined 
to become one of the oil giants in sub-Saharan Africa (Vokes, 2012).
Oil companies themselves need to hire firms to provide drilling and other 
expensive services, such as seismic surveying and transport. Halliburton, 
Schlumberger, Baker Hughes and Weatherford are some of the big companies 
in Uganda’s oil services and drilling industry.
5.3 Uganda’s Political Settlement
A political settlement (PS) is described as ‘the balance or distribution of power 
between contending social groups and social classes, on which any state is 
based’ (Di John and Putzel, 2009). It emerges through a process of struggle 
and bargaining between elite groups. According to Khan (2010) the political 
settlement shapes the capacity and commitment of Government and political 
elites to invest in building institutions and relationships that can underpin 
the development of countries. Khan identifies four types of PS namely: 
dominant leader/party, vulnerable authoritarian, weak dominant party and 
competitive clientelism. The dominant PSs, whose defining characteristics 
are a high degree of internal coherence and weak opposition from excluded 
elites, provide ruling coalitions with space to develop and implement longer 
term visions and invest in the development of state capabilities to realise these 
visions. Such conditions are likely to support the emergence of pro-reform 
coalitions. Conversely, the PS least likely to be developmental is competitive 
clientelism where the holding power of the ruling elites is under constant 
threat from their opponents in the opposition or internally within the party, 
thereby giving them no time to focus on long-term developmental projects. 
The preoccupation of ruling coalitions under competitive clientelism is on 
implementing short-term moves to retain power. In this respect, elites would 
be compelled to invest the oil revenues into regime maintaining areas as 
2 Uganda’s oil is potentially present in four basins, namely, Albertine Graben, the Hoima basin 
(to the east of Lake Albert), the Lake Kyoga basin (further east, in the centre of the country), and 
the Kadam-Moroto basin, still further east, in the Karamoja sub-region, but the main focus of 
the current exploration is in the first.
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opposed to development programmes that benefit citizens more broadly 
(Bukenya and Hickey, 2018).
It is argued that political settlements are not static as countries can shed 
some of the defining characteristics of one category and increasingly take 
on those of another. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, for example, in 1986 Uganda 
started off as a dominant party PS but, since the early 2000s, it has increasingly 
adopted features of competitive clientelism. The defining characteristics of 
Uganda’s current PS are that both the capacities of groups excluded from 
the coalition (horizontal power) and those of lower-level factions within the 
ruling coalition (vertical power) have increased.
Using PS lenses to look at Uganda we find that when President Museveni 
and his NRM party took power in 1986 a dominant party/leader form of 
political settlement emerged. Politics was by consensus via the move-
ment system (no party/single party politics) with a broadly based ruling 
coalition that comprised key figures from the political and military wings 
of the NRM, members of other political parties who did not participate 
directly in the liberation struggle, and leaders of rebel groups who agreed 
to negotiate with the new government. The consensus principles of politics 
and governance remained until the early 2000s when elites increasingly 
challenged President Museveni’s leadership and the NRM’s hegemony 
(Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2013). As elaborated below and in Figure 5.1, 
due to the increased agitation from within the ruling party (vertical power) 
and pressure from the opposition (horizontal power), the settlement has 
Figure 5.1: Uganda’s Political Settlement
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shifted to ‘weak dominant’ and tending towards competitive clientelism 
(Kjær, Ulriksen, Kangave and Katusiimeh, 2017, p.13). Today there is more 
resistance against President Museveni and the group around him from 
within the NRM party, particularly from younger party members who were 
not part of the National Resistance Army’s guerrilla war in the early 1980s 
(Kjær et al., 2017, p.14). These developments have far-reaching implications 
for state capacity and the strategic vision of the ruling elite. Whereas it 
was easier to implement economic and fiscal reforms successfully while 
Uganda was in the movement political system, in which presumably ‘everyone 
agreed on the basic principles’ (Wang and Rakner, 2005), the heightened 
political competition seems to have caused compulsions of preserving 
political power by the ruling elite to take precedence over support for 
reform implementation.
Currently, the ruling coalition is comprised of three levels of elites as 
follows: an inner core, the inter-mediate circle and the outer circle (see Fig-
ure 5.2). At the centre of power—the inner core—is the President himself; 
his immediate family including the first son, wife and brother, all of whom 
hold influential positions in government; leading figures in the armed forces 
as well as the police force; and powerful regional political elites, most of 
whom were central in the liberation struggle (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey 
2013). The intermediate circle comprises Cabinet Ministers and some of the 
high-ranking bureaucrats positioned in key government agencies. These 
are ‘display’ elites carefully selected on the basis of region, ethnic origin, 
and/or religious background ‘so that their constituencies can see that they 
are represented at the highest levels of government’ (Golooba-Mutebi and 
Hickey, 2013, p.17). The broader outer circle has a more localised network that 
involves state ministers, local elites that occupy political and administrative 
positions in local governments, leaders within the NRM party, traditional 
authorities, religious leaders, and some of the leading business personalities.
Only the outer layer and, to some extent, the intermediate circle of the coali-
tion change membership. Change mainly originates from party and general 
elections whose outcomes are used by the inner core as the basis for admitting 
or expelling members. However, there have been defections from the ruling 
coalition by high-ranking elites, mostly those with presidential ambitions 
who perceive Museveni as mopolising the position. Some formed their own 
political organisations while others joined existing ones—something that 
has seen the opposition raising a credible threat to NRM’s hold on power 
during elections (Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey, 2013).
As the ruling coalition has become more fragmented and to some extent 
vulnerable, its sustainability now is dependent on the President’s ability to 
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control the military and persuade the most powerful factions to remain within 
the coalition (Kjær et al., 2017). The main strategy used by the ruling elite to 
maintain members within its fold and win the support of those outside the 
coalition ‘has combined the use of patronage resources with coercion and 
informal socio-political networks’ (Khisa, 2016, p.730). Securing the loyalty 
of the security apparatus has been useful for the ruling elite in deploying it 
to coerce dissenting voices into silence.
Another strategy is the personalisation of political power through a ‘system 
organised around and fully dependent on decisions taken by the president’ 
(Polus and Tycholiz, 2016). In this case the President presents himself as the 
solver of all challenges that citizens and investors face. This so-called Musev-
enism avoids the use of public policies and political institutions to mediate 
official relationships between government and other entities (Rulekere, 2011). 
Interest groups like business owners, taxi drivers, teachers, and tribal leaders 
among others, have their concerns addressed after meeting the President, 
rather than the respective ministries (Rulekere, 2011). Such a strategy has 
clear political utility, ‘it is a way of creating a private sector constituency 
that is grateful and loyal to the ruling party, particularly the President, and 
therefore most likely to become a source of campaign financing’ (Mwenda, 
2006). As discussed in the following sections, IOCs have learned the reality 
that everything starts and ends with the President, including awarding oil 
deals. The implications for public policy in the country are that official policies 
can easily be replaced with presidential directives (Bukenya and Muhumuza, 
2017). Similarly, ministries cannot take major decisions without consulting 
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the President, with those that do not heed to his will risk being embarrassed 
when he instructs them to reverse their decisions.
Lastly, the President needs resources to give to the numerous interest groups 
that flock to his residence for help. In the past, revenue from international 
development aid was a good source. It should be remembered that President 
Museveni from the early days of his rule established himself as a strategic 
ally of the West and a promising reformer. Thus, the international financial 
and donor community played a key role in funding Uganda’s development 
programmes through bilateral budgetary support and development assistance 
(Khisa, 2016). However, Mwenda and Tangri (2005) argue that funds via 
donor-initiated programmes were captured and instrumentally deployed 
towards regime survival. In other words, donor interventions in Uganda 
inadvertently provided President Museveni with resources he used to entrench 
his rule. Meanwhile, since the mid-2000s donors have become disillusioned 
due to the continued misuse of their funding. Some unilaterally withdrew 
their support while others changed funding modality from budget support 
to project funding. The latter gives limited latitude to Government on how to 
spend the aid. As the international sources through donor agencies increas-
ingly became unreliable, the country was blessed with oil discoveries in the 
Albertine Graben. If tightly controlled by the ruling elite, the sector promises 
a reliable source of revenue that can be deployed to serve political ends. This 
perhaps explains the high presidential interest in the sector. As observed by 
some, Uganda’s oil sector is growing rapidly and will soon be one of the key 
organs of its economy and at the heart of its politics (Wass and Musiime, 2013).
5.4 Conceptualising State-Business Relations: The Politics 
of Deal Making in Uganda
In countries like Uganda that are characterised by a weak capability of 
government for policy implementation there are ubiquitous and widespread 
deviations of actual practice from ‘rules that create winners and losers and 
prevent inclusive economic institutions from emerging’ (Pritchett and Werker, 
2012, p.39). Therefore, negotiations between business and government are 
defined by ‘deals’ as opposed to ‘rules’. In the ‘rules’ environment, ‘the stated 
“rules of the game” have near [full] predictive power for what will actually 
happen’ (Pritchett and Werker, 2012, p.39). On the other hand, the ‘deals’ 
environment is where the legal or de jure policies are of only minimal relevance 
to business decisions. Indeed, within Uganda’s oil sector, informal institutions 
and arrangements tend to prevail over rules-based approaches. As noted by a 
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key informant, while Uganda on paper has very good laws and institutions, 
the political environment does not allow them to work:
According to the law it’s the directorate of the petroleum that is supposed 
to come up with policies, it’s the petroleum authority that is supposed to 
regulate the oil companies both international and local, and parliament 
has its role of oversight. In actual sense it is the President who does all this 
(Oil Uganda, personal communication, November, 2016).
It is important to note that deals can be relatively ordered or disordered in 
terms of the likelihood of their being honoured and lasting (‘ordered’ vs. 
‘disordered’); and also relatively ‘open’ or ‘closed’, with reference to whether 
deals are widely available to all investors, large or small, as opposed to being 
captured by a smaller number of investors with strong political connections 
(Pritchett and Werker, 2012). As illustrated in Figure 5.3 a combination of 
these produces four types of business environment in which developing 
countries can be categorised.
Given Uganda’s political settlement, it is clear that the deal space within 
which government and IOCs operate is closed but moderately ordered 
(Bukenya and Hickey, 2018). In other words, while it is mostly those with 
political connections that get to make deals, investors are confident that 
the deals will be honoured (seen in the huge capital investment of IOCs). 
However, as will become evident in the forthcoming discussion, the longevity 
of deals in the oil sector is linked to President Museveni’s continuity in 
power. In the following sub-sections we expand on these observations with 
clear illustrations of the strategies employed by Uganda’s ruling elite in their 
dealing with IOCs.
Figure 5.3: A Taxonomy of Informal Institutions: The Deals World
Closed Open
Disordered  
Only those with political 
connections get to make deals, 
and even they can’t be certain that
ocials will deliver 
Anyone can make a deal, but no-one is 
certain that ocials will deliver
Ordered 
Only those with political 
connections get to make deals, 
but they can be confident that 
ocials will deliver
Anyone can make a deal, and they can be 
confident that ocials will deliver 
Source: Authors’ design based on Pritchett and Werker (2012, p. 46). 
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5.5 Personalisation of the Oil Resource by Uganda’s 
‘Big Man’
President Museveni has personally supervised the developments in the oil 
sector since the 1980s. Many commentators believe that he takes oil in Uganda 
as his ‘personal project’, as seen in his assertions of ‘my oil’ and that ‘I am the 
one who discovered oil’ (Ssekikubo, 2013; Van Alstine et al., 2014). To facilitate 
his firm grip, Cabinet passed a call to classify oil as a ‘strategic resource’. 
According to Ugandan regulations, strategic resources are placed under the 
control of the presidency and the military high command (Hickey and Izama, 
2016, p.12). As shown in the next sub-section, the military through the special 
oil protection unit have been deployed in the oil-producing regions to give 
security to IOC installations. The President also ensured that laws give the 
powers to negotiate and endorse petroleum agreements and to grant and 
revoke licences in the oil sector (to all main contracts and sub-contractors) 
to the Minister (who is directly answerable to him) instead of the more 
independent petroleum authority. Indeed, Parliament had granted such 
powers to the latter but this was changed on the President’s orders.
In 2013, when Parliament was debating the legislative arrangements on 
oil, particularly the Petroleum Exploration, Development and Production 
Bill, the President ruthlessly fought to ensure that the executive branch 
maintained control over key aspects of oil governance through neutralising 
the most challenging actors from civil and political society (see later discus-
sion). The President accused the groups which wanted the responsibility to 
go to the petroleum authority of trying to bypass the oil and gas experts in 
the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development in the interest of their 
foreign backers (The Daily Monitor, 2012). However, activists insist that all 
that the ‘big man’ wanted was full control over the dealing process in the 
oil sector as he has absolute control over the politically appointed ministers 
(Key informant from a CSO, personal communication, 28 February 2014).3 
These political appointees act only after thorough consultations with their 
appointing authority. And where necessary he deals directly with IOCs:
For most of the negotiations these companies go to the President directly. 
He is the one who accepts them or not; in 2012 we had made a law that 
powers belong to the Petroleum Authority, the President changed it. 
When parliament made resolutions in 2011 saying there should be no oil 
3 Because of the worsened security situation of civil society people in Uganda, we need to 
ensure their absolute and complete anonymity.
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transactions until laws have been put in place the President himself said 
no, those resolutions cannot be accepted! He went ahead to enter into 
transactions with Tullow in 2012, he allows Tullow to sell its assets to 
CNOOC and Total and in 2015 the government is made to lose $222M 
because of those transactions (Key informant from a CSO, personal com-
munication, November, 2016).
Therefore, the President has been able to define his supreme position over the 
control and governance of oil, and with this has been able to identify suitable 
partners to work with, negotiate contracts with them, and influence the coun-
try’s strategy for distributing oil revenue without much trouble. The sector is 
closed (i.e. only a few selected firms can participate) in the interest of the ruling 
elite. As noted by a key informant, ‘there is no decision that is done without his 
consent’. While this appears to be a major strength in the bargaining process, 
it also seems to be the main weakness. According to one industry expert, ‘we 
are too slow on everything, actually it is evident that Uganda is not ready to 
do business at an international level’. Another industry expert explained how 
the President’s involvement is affecting the operations as follows:
It is the President who meets the investors and makes directives on who 
should be awarded licenses. The technocrat from the ministry, who knows 
the required procedure, only accepts the application from the company 
that the President wants. The rest of the applications you close your offices 
and go for a holiday. When the deadline passes you come back to evaluate 
the only application you received and award the license [sic] (Industry 
expert, personal communication, October, 2016).
Moreover, the President is the appointment authority for officers in senior 
government positions. Jobs are given to those of whom he is sure that they ‘will 
more or less act in the interest of the appointing authority who is being looked 
at as a God father’ (Industry expert, personal communication, October, 2016; 
also see Bukenya and Muhumuza 2017). This was evident in the appointment 
of three ruling party affiliated politicians, who had failed in their previous 
electoral campaigns, as board members of the national oil company. Their 
appointment was clearly patronage by the appointing authority.
There are both positive and negative implications arising from the big man 
syndrome of oil governance in Uganda. On the positive side, it has helped the 
Government to send a clear message to the IOCs that ‘the companies are at 
the mercy of government not the other way round’ (CSO activist, personal 
communication, July, 2016). One would have anticipated Government, given 
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Uganda’s political settlement, to rush the process and strike deals with IOCs 
in order to obtain resources to deploy for patronage and other regime survival 
needs. However, the President has portrayed an image of a resilient govern-
ment that can survive with or without the oil revenues. This is accurately 
captured by Polus and Tycholiz (2016) as follows, ‘the Museveni regime can 
afford to present a tougher stance in licensing negotiations with oil companies, 
even at the expense of further delays, because oil revenues are not absolutely 
necessary for its survival’. Negotiations for the pipeline and refinery have 
also dragged and extended the production starting dates for the country. 
And even when formerly concluded deals collapse, for example the case of 
RT Global Resources for building the refinery, the Government is willing 
to return to the drawing board and start fresh negotiations without caving 
in to the demands of the oil companies.
On the negative side, Uganda’s experience so far indicates that President 
Museveni is able to use the oil money in any way he wants, given the weak 
institutional safeguards. For example, Polus and Tycholiz (2017) report that in 
2011 the President asked the Governor of the Bank of Uganda (BoU) to release 
US$ 741 million for the purchase of fighter jets from Russia. Despite the fact 
that such big amounts of public money should be approved by Parliament, the 
Governor ‘released the funds on the verbal assurance that the money would 
be refunded when oil corporations begin paying tax’ (Polus and Tycholiz, 
2017, p.12). The authors conclude that, despite the theoretical independence 
of the BoU, President Museveni is not only able to withdraw funds from the 
national bank without Parliament’s approval, but he can also collateralise 
future oil-related revenues. A related case arose from the ‘golden handshake’ 
scandal where the President allowed selected government officials to share 
millions of oil money for winning an oil tax dispute. While a parliamentary 
probe was instituted in January 2017 to investigate the implicated bureaucrats, 
the President shielded them from culpability. What this means for IOCs is 
that since the President is quite an influential figure in Uganda’s oil sector, 
personal relations with his office are important not only in relation to sharing 
oil revenues but also in securing oil deals and the stability of the same.
5.6 Involvement of the Military
Given the importance that President Museveni attaches to the role played 
by the military in establishing security in Uganda and its continuing role in 
preserving the ruling coalition, it is not surprising that he has given them a 
central role in oil governance. Hickey et al. (2015) find that while there was no 
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discussion of oil in the Cabinet until 2010, the military high command had 
been consulted and briefed about the discoveries and had had access to the 
first round of production-sharing agreements long before they were lodged 
in Parliament. The Government in 2012 announced the creation of a military 
unit called the Oil and Gas Protection Directorate to secure the Albertine 
Region. Until early 2017, the President’s son commanded the Special Forces 
unit overseeing security in oil exploration areas. While oil companies employ 
additional private security companies to maintain security around their 
installations the company providing this service, Saracen, the main private 
security company, is associated with the President’s brother.
However, and borrowing on Pritchett and Werker’s (2012) deals terminolo-
gies, while IOCs can be assured that deals struck in such an environment 
can be relatively ordered, i.e. honoured in the short run, the likelihood of 
them being long-lasting is debatable, especially if President Museveni leaves 
office. The possibility of him losing power makes IOCs nervous. For instance, 
the president of Total was in Uganda at the peak of the 2016 election period 
and met the President. The suspicion was that he wanted reassurances from 
the President that his Government was in control of the political situation, 
although it was officially reported that he had come to negotiate the pipeline 
deal and to push for the production licences that had derailed (Journalist 
observer, personal communication, October, 2016). Similarly, every time 
the President travels to China he meets the president of CNOOC to discuss 
similar issues. Analysist argue that IOCs are aware that Museveni has man-
aged to maintain control over the army, but the future of the army’s loyalty 
with respect to another president is basically unknown (Polus and Tycholiz, 
2017). In other words, the continuation of President Museveni’s reign is key 
in the stability of the deals IOCs make with the Government of Uganda. 
According to our respondent, ‘If you are an oil company your paramount 
interest is to have stability and make sure that the government that gave 
you a deal remains in power’ (Journalist observer, personal communication, 
October, 2016).
5.7 Working Through Pockets of Effectiveness with 
Strong Presidential Backing
The primary agency responsible for Uganda’s oil sector is the Petroleum 
Exploration and Production Department (PEPD) in the Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Development (MEMD). PEPD was established in the mid-1980s 
with a mandate to establish and promote the country’s petroleum potential. 
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Following NRM’s power capture in 1986, the new Government cancelled the 
negotiations with international oil companies, particularly with Shell and 
Exxon, that had been started by its predecessors in the early 1980s. PEPD 
received gradual and systematic capacity building sanctioned by President 
Museveni. He is understood to have first wanted to work on the country’s 
capacity to manage the sector before moving ahead with exploration. Ac-
cording to key informant accounts,4 corroborated by independent analysts 
(for example, Patey, 2015; Polus and Tycholiz, 2017), the new Government 
sponsored Ugandans to attend specialised oil-related training overseas, 
for example as geologists. This was then followed by the establishment of 
a petroleum unit in the Geological Survey and Mines Department in 1990 
which was reorganised a year later into the PEPD. By this time, the PEPD had 
capacity for ‘data gathering/research; they did all the gravity surveys, airborne 
surveys and exploration and did mapping’ (Geologist Tullow, personal com-
munication, November, 2016). At the time of writing, the PEPD has been 
elevated into the Petroleum Directorate in MEMD. Apart from the formal 
training, the PEPD also received technical support from bilateral agencies, 
for example, the Norwegian Government, advice from Swiss oil consultants, 
and legal support from American lawyers.
With such capacity, the Government, using its technical staff, has been in 
a strong position to negotiate favourably with IOCs of all types and sizes. The 
following example on negotiations over the oil refinery can help to substanti-
ate this claim. According to Hickey and Izama (2016) official discussions 
about the refinery, which was part of the broader MoU with the Tullow-led 
consortium, began in early 2013 and went on for almost a year (March 2013 
to February 2014) with up to eight meetings and numerous letter exchanges 
taking place between the IOCs and government officials. Meetings were 
usually chaired by the Minister of Energy and Mineral Development, with 
the support of the permanent secretary and the commissioner of PEPD, along 
with senior representatives from the finance ministry, the Uganda Revenue 
Authority, the Bank of Uganda, and the Uganda Investment Authority. More 
significantly, half of these meetings involved the physical presence of the 
President, usually for the entire duration of the meeting.
The IOCs are naturally interested in profit maximisation as early as possible. 
For Uganda they intended to achieve this by constructing a pipeline to pump 
crude oil out of the country to the coast. President Museveni saw the export 
of oil in its crude form wasteful, describing it as ‘sustain[ing] the good life 
of outsiders’ (as cited in Patey, 2015, p.15). Ugandan experts had advised 
4 November 2016, interview with a geologist working with Tullow.
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him that oil attracts better value when it is first processed. Therefore, he 
insisted that oil companies be obliged to first send oil to a domestic refinery 
for processing before being exported. On their part, IOCs were concerned 
that a refinery would leave insufficient reserves for export. To make matters 
worse, the Government pushed for a large refinery to produce quantities 
roughly the size of the entire East African oil consumption needs (Patey, 
2015). In 2010, the Norwegian Government funded a feasibility study in 
which Foster Wheeler, a Swiss-based engineering company, reported that a 
150,000 barrel-a-day (bpd) refinery (estimated to cost US$ 2 billion to set up) 
would be a viable option for Uganda. Tullow objected to this, suggesting that 
a 30,000 bpd refinery was adequate since Uganda’s own market needed only 
22,000 bpd. In the end, Government and IOCs agreed on a small refinery 
of 30,000 bpd, scalable up to 60,000 bpd. This was considered a concession 
on the part of Government as it dropped its ambition of satisfying the fuel 
demands across the entire East Africa region. It is important to note that 
the President emerges as a balancing force in these discussions, and he is 
the one who offers concessions to the oil companies in recognition of their 
motivations. Hickey and Izama (2016, p.182) observe that ‘he does not want 
to be so hard on them, and on the other hand he does not want the country 
to be taken for a ride or to be exploited’.
Meanwhile the technocrats have also been keen to stamp their mark in 
these negotiations. In their analysis of the factors responsible for the delayed 
oil production in Uganda Polus and Tycholiz (2016) argue that technocrats 
who are keen on showing the Ugandan public that they take time to scrutinise 
all issues before making major administrative decisions and that they take 
no bribes to shortcut the long process perpetuate the delays. These dynamics 
have allowed Uganda to negotiate the best deals and perhaps, as confessed 
by a representative of the IOCs, ‘one of the worst deals’ for the oil companies 
(Polus and Tycholiz, 2017). Indeed, negotiations for PSAs between the Govern-
ment and Tullow Oil and Total took over three years to finalise (Polus and 
Tycholiz, 2017). Such a protracted process, while closed to public scrutiny, 
instils confidence among investors in the stability of the resultant deal. The 
strategy has also worked to boost public confidence in Government despite 
the secrecy surrounding the negotiations. One key informant explained:
I applaud the government because they have tried everything to be pro-
Ugandan. They have tried to negotiate the best deals in which they retain 
the higher percentage no matter what. That is why Tullow has been on and 
off but government doesn’t care. At the moment it claims the PSAs don’t 
favour them and the government says if they are not happy then they would 
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rather sell out and leave. The government did very good training for the 
people in the petroleum sector. The staff employed at Uganda Petroleum 
Authority, are highly trained, they understand the sector laws, and what 
is best for Uganda… they bargain, advise government very well and the 
President listens to them (Tullow Oil Company employee, personal com-
munication, September, 2016).
Therefore, in spite of the overwhelming experience of IOCs in the oil sector, 
the Ugandan technocrats with the backing of their President have managed 
to control them.
5.8 Keep the ‘Enemies’ Small
Following IOCs’ and government’s agreement over the terms of the refinery, 
government shrewdness came to the fore again during the awarding of the 
contract for constructing the refinery. Six companies, namely, Marubeni of 
Japan, Vitol, the China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau, Russia’s Rostec Global 
Resources (RTGR), SK Energy, and Petrofac were interested. In a move seen 
as intended to limit the influence of IOCs, in particular the Chinese who 
already had a production licence, President Museveni and his team side-lined 
them from the refinery deal. This could be interpreted as a contingency plan for 
protecting government interests just in case relations with China degenerated 
in future. Out of the six, GoU shortlisted RT Global Resources and South 
Korea’s SK Energy. The Russian firm was ultimately selected. However, 
just prior to the expected signature date at the beginning of June 2016, the 
RT-Global Resources Consortium made additional demands from the 
Government, seeking to reopen and renegotiate issues that had already been 
agreed between the two parties, which caused the deal to collapse.
Notwithstanding the mishaps with the RTGR deal, our point is that the 
Ugandan Government is wary of letting one player become too powerful for 
its capacity. As indicated by a key informant, ‘this government does not allow 
monopoly’ (Geologist Tullow Oil, personal communication, November, 2016). 
This can be seen in another incident. In 2009, when Heritage sought to sell its 
oil stakes to Italy’s ENI, Tullow used its contractual rights to make the US$ 
1.4 billion purchase itself. However, the Ugandan Government cautioned that 
it could veto the sale, as Tullow would hold a monopoly over the industry. It 
was not until Tullow made it known that it was bringing new partners, Total 
and CNOOC, on board with an equal 33.3 per cent share in the exploration 
areas that the Government relented. Otherwise the GoU is understood to 
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have considered ENI. Our informants further noted that while Tullow, Total, 
and CNOOC are joint venture companies and expected to work together, 
they negotiate their contracts separately and have different levels of access to 
the President (Geologist Tullow Oil, personal communication, November, 
2016). It is claimed that the Chinese, with their CNOOC, have easier access 
to the President compared to their counterparts and ‘their things get done 
very fast… actually at the moment the Chinese are way ahead of the other 
companies’ (Oil Uganda, personal communication, September, 2016).
5.9 Warding Off Competition from Alternative Centres of 
Power at Home
Following the Government’s announcement of commercially viable deposits 
in 2006, a force of civil society emerged to influence the course of events in 
Uganda’s oil sector. Their goal was to present Uganda with an opportunity 
to harness the oil resource underpinned by principles of justice and inclusive 
development. The late 2000s initially saw individual CSOs such as ACODE, 
International Alert, Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Uganda, and Oil Watch 
Network among others showing interest in the oil sector (Van Alstine et al., 
2014). Their approach was to work with Parliament, particularly through a 
pressure group called Parliamentary Forum on Oil and Gas (PFOG). CSOs 
aimed to support Parliament in making informed policy decisions on, and 
ensuring adequate oversight of, Uganda’s nascent petroleum industry. They 
claimed that their advocacy was aligned with the intentions of the national 
oil and gas policy that guarantees optimum national participation in oil and 
gas exploration, production and decision making. However, as these hitherto 
bystanders (civil society and Parliament) piqued interest in the sector, tensions 
developed between them and the executive, whose monopoly of oil issues 
had historically gone unchallenged.
During the rewriting of section 9 of the Petroleum (Exploration, Develop-
ment and Production) Act 2012,5 about whether the Minister or the Petroleum 
Authority should have the power to license and revoke licences, President 
Museveni ‘convened at least up to eight caucus meetings to be able to get 
5 Parliament successfully passed section 9 whose essence was to give the negotiation and 
licensing powers to the Petroleum Authority instead of the Minister. Its reasoning was that ‘the 
Minister is a political person and therefore could be influenced by the powers that be. … Politicians 
are bound to be compromised by the appointing authority whereas the Petroleum Authority is 
accountable to the citizens’ (Ssekikubo, 2013, p.2).
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MPs accept to change what they had passed’ (Key informant from a CSO, 
personal communication, February, 2014). This was unprecedented because, 
normally, it would take him one meeting to change the opinion of NRM 
legislators. This provoked the President’s anger against CSOs because his 
informers told him that ‘it is ACODE that have made these MPs stubborn’ 
(Key informant from a CSO, personal communication, February, 2014). 
Indeed, on 13 December 2012, President Yoweri Museveni, during a special 
parliamentary sitting, accused some MPs and CSOs of ‘working on behalf of 
foreign interests’ to ‘cripple and disorient the development of the oil sector’ 
(Museveni, 2012, p.2). In his speech the President singled out the Advocates’ 
Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE), NAPE, Global Rights 
Alert, Centre for Constitutional Governance, AFIEGO and the Parliamentary 
Forum on Oil and Gas (PFOG) as some of the saboteur NGOs promoting 
the so-called foreign interests. He vowed to stop them ‘by legal, political and 
media actions’ (Museveni, 2012, p.15).
The ruling elite devised various strategies to keep CSOs in check. The 
critical ones, such as ACODE, were subjected to dubious government 
investigations. For example, in March 2012, the Bank of Uganda issued a 
memorandum requesting all financial institutions in the country to report on 
ACODE’s financial transactions (Matsiko, 2012). This was to signal to other 
NGOs that ‘[i]f you don’t check your ways, you are in trouble’ (Matsiko, 2012). 
The Government also revised the NGO law to ensure that it has firm control 
over civil society advocacy and mobilisation activities. According to one KI 
‘they are planning to introduce a new arrangement where you must reveal to 
government where you get the money that supports your activities. They are 
borrowing this from Ethiopia’ (CSCO, personal communication, February, 
2014). Indeed, the activities of NGOs are now guided by the NGO Act 2016, 
which observers have noted to be targeting advocacy CSOs (Global Witness 
Alert, 2017). According to one respondent:
the NGO law and the Public Order Management Act restrict freedom 
of association. What will happen when the people in Hoima, Buliisa [oil 
production areas] want to demonstrate against the oil companies, do they 
have to comply with the public order management act? Do they have to seek 
permission? And if police say they are not granting permission what do 
you do? Will you be enhancing accountability in the oil sector? (Ugandan 
Journalist, personal communication, October, 2016).
Similarly, Government indicated that since oil is a national resource, advocacy 
activities around it should be funded by resources mobilised nationally, 
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from the people who have a stake in the sector. However, the Civil Society 
Coalition on Oil and Gas believes that this is likely to constrain CSO activities 
‘because very limited resources can be mobilised locally’ (CSCO, personal 
communication, February, 2014). The President and senior NRM officials 
also launched verbal attacks on CSOs to undermine their credibility. They 
accused them of frustrating the activities of the NRM party and its caucus 
in Parliament by deliberately trying to misinform MPs on oil issues. In 2012 
President Museveni (2012), who is also the NRM chairman, alleged that 
MPs who participated in the workshops organised by CSOs were paid huge 
honorariums as a way of bribing them. Similarly, in his submission in Uganda’s 
daily, the New Vision, on 4 December 2012, Mr Ofwono Opondo, the vice 
spokesman of the NRM, suggested that ‘it is necessary to examine who funds 
the noisy MPs and NGOs in the oil debate’. He accused CSOs of being ‘agents 
of external forces’ hostile to Uganda. He singled out one donor agency, USAID, 
as not wishing Uganda well on oil because an American firm, ExxonMobil, 
had lost out on acquiring oil deals in Uganda’s petroleum sector so far.
Some outspoken parliamentarians were also persecuted by the NRM 
party for their stance on the control and governance of oil. In April 2013, the 
ruling NRM party expelled four of its Members of Parliament for indiscipline, 
accusing two of them of belonging to PFOG, a pressure group of legislators 
advocating for greater transparency in the oil and gas sector, but which the 
party said was ‘opposed to the NRM position on oil’ (Ssekikubo, 2013, p.3). The 
Constitutional Court later ruled that the expelled MPs should also lose their 
positions in the Parliament. The so-called ‘rebel MPs’ however successfully 
managed to challenge the ruling in the Supreme Court. Nonetheless the action 
sent a strong warning to other MPs. As a key industry watcher put it, ‘many of 
them got scared of engaging in PFOG activities’ (Key informant from a CSO, 
personal communication, October, 2016). The forum eventually lost steam. 
This was reflected in the poor attendance at PFOG’s subsequent activities 
including general meetings. For example, out of the estimated membership of 
200 MPs, only seven turned up for PFOG’s 2013/2014 annual general meeting. 
With such strategies the ruling elite regained authority over ‘its oil’. According 
to Hickey and Izama (2016, p.11) the President entreats citizens to entrust him, 
rather than government institutions, to manage the oil resource.
Meanwhile, IOCs have also deployed ‘soft power’ strategies to help the 
Government in demobilising opposition from civil society. Through their 
corporate social responsibility arrangements, they have given lucrative 
opportunities for employment and training to civil society activists. It is 
reported that the activists opt to undertake jobs and scholarship opportuni-
ties offered by oil companies and drop the advocacy work (Daily Monitor, 
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3 November 2012, p.6). For example, in 2012, beneficiaries of Tullow Oil group 
scholarships award included two outspoken civil society activists among 
the 20 recipients pursuing master’s degrees (petroleum related) at selected 
universities in Britain (ibid.). One of the activists, the former chairperson of 
the Hoima NGO Forum, went on to pursue a degree in oil and gas manage-
ment at the University of Coventry. The second one, the former treasurer of 
the Midwestern Regional Anti-Corruption Coalition, took a master’s degree 
in management science and finance at the University of Manchester. The 
increased exodus of activists out of CSOs to join oil firms is said to weaken 
capacity and cohesion in local CSOs. Thus, CSOs are increasingly constrained 
to perform their watchdog roles over Government and its dealings with IOCs.
5.10 Conclusion
In 1986, when the NRM captured state power, the Government suspended 
all oil exploration activities that its predecessors had commissioned. Under 
the guidance of President Museveni, it was agreed that Uganda’s capacity 
for petroleum exploration and production required development before 
any deals could be initiated with international oil companies. Indeed, the 
Government selected several of its technical staff and sent them overseas 
to attend specialised courses on petroleum. The country commenced the 
issue of PSAs in the early 1990s. The process was again halted following the 
discovery of commercially viable quantities in 2006. This time deal making 
was stopped to allow the setting-up of the necessary legal framework to guide 
the process. While these moves suggest a government that has foregone the 
short-term benefits of securing quick deals, the competitive character of 
the political settlement has meant that the governance of oil is informal and 
personalised by the President. President Museveni has a strong personal 
interest in the negotiations with oil companies and he has assigned a key 
role to the military. He has however restricted the participation of the other 
actors such as Parliament and civil society. As noted by Hickey et al.:
… The process is dominated by key actors from within the ruling coalition, 
who negotiate with rentier oil companies in a highly secretive manner, … 
and adopt a repressive approach to those who oppose its plans and activities 
in the sector at both local or national levels (Hickey et al., 2015, p.12).
Surprisingly, this ‘close-ordered’ deals environment has delivered, since the 
deals reached so far appear to be more in the national interest as they give 
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few concessions to IOCs. The evidence presented shows that the President 
has proved capable of controlling rent-seeking activities in the sector and is 
willing to enable high-capacity oil technocrats to operate with significant 
levels of autonomy (Bukenya and Hickey, 2018). It seems unlikely, however, 
that these strategies will remain effective beyond the current President. As 
seen throughout this chapter, it appears that just one man has investors’ 
confidence and holds Uganda’s oil sector vision. The desire to maintain this 
stability could perhaps explain why processes including constitutional revi-
sions to make Mr Museveni president for life have been vigorously pursued.
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In 2006, Uganda discovered a large amount of recoverable oil deposits in the 
Albertine Graben (Energy International Agency [EIA], 2016). The discovery 
of oil in Uganda presents a unique opportunity to transform the economy 
through infrastructure development and poverty alleviation. Oil is expected 
to contribute an average net present value of US$ 2 billion (10 per cent of 
GDP) for at least 26 years. In this regard, oil and gas have been identified 
as an important building block to realising the long-term aspirations and 
objectives of Uganda’s Vision 2040 of ‘A Transformed Ugandan Society from a 
Peasant to a Modern and Prosperous Country within 30 Years’ (Government 
of Uganda [GOU], 2015).
Uganda’s oil sector is undergoing rapid development. Included in this 
development are upstream projects, such as the building of a refinery and 
the establishment of an export pipeline to the coast. The development of this 
sector will generate significant foreign direct investment in the country and 
is likely to bring windfall revenues to the national treasury. However, oil 
revenues also present significant macroeconomic challenges, especially in a 
low global oil prices environment. Oil can breed risk, leading to economic 
stagnation and wastage. These risks include Dutch disease, rent-seeking 
behaviour among political elites and corruption among others. In this chapter 
I will analyse Uganda’s macroeconomic framework and policy approaches for 
dealing with these potential risks. In this regard the chapter has two specific 
objectives. First, it aims to document policies aimed at facilitating prudent 
macroeconomic management in order to mitigate the negative impact of the 
fluctuation of international oil prices. In this respect I will particularly focus 
on the following issues: the rate of extraction and welfare, inter-governmental 
revenue-sharing mechanisms, the relevance of a refinery, the effects of Dutch 
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disease, the extent of local participation in the oil value chain and the tax 
code used to regulate the oil industry.
Second, the chapter also aims to discuss and analyse the fiscal rules the 
Government of Uganda has put in place to achieve a balance between spending 
and savings of the expected oil revenues. Where possible, the chapter will state 
the problems, their manifestation or likely manifestation, efforts to address 
them in the Ugandan context and possible outcomes/scenarios.
This chapter derives information from various government documents, 
contract information and past studies on Uganda’s oil industry. The remainder 
of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 will discuss and analyse 
Uganda’s macroeconomic management regime, while Section 3 will focus 
on Uganda’s fiscal regime. Section 4 reviews how Uganda aims to achieve 
a balance between spending and saving its expected oil revenues. The last 
section concludes and offers some policy reflections.
6.2 Macroeconomic Management Regime
Oil and gas revenues are subject to volatility in volume and prices. Mitigation 
of such risks through fiscal policies is imperative. Prudent macroeconomic 
management policies are key to charting the sustainable path for production 
and revenue minimising the impact of Dutch disease and the boom and bust 
cycle. These and other issues are explored below in the context of Uganda.
6.2.1 Uganda’s Production and Revenue Profiles
There are three clusters of 18 oilfields in the Lake Albert region known as 
Kingfisher, Kaiso Tonya, and Buliisa (Doshi, Joutz, Lakuma, Lwanga and 
Manzano, 2015). They are operated by Tullow Oil Company, Total and the 
Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC). Excluding enhanced 
oil recovery (EOR), estimates suggest that close to 1.3 billion barrels will 
be recovered over 26 years with a peak of 230,000 bpd (Ibid.). Production 
is projected to start at a modest daily output of about 20,000 bpd (MFPED, 
2015a). The Government’s take will be 40 per cent of the first 5,000 barrels per 
day, rising to 65 per cent for production above 40,000 barrels per day (Doshi 
et al., 2015).1 The Government’s take includes a national oil company (NOC) 
1 Information derived from public information on the oilfield characteristics and reserve 
estimates as well as existing upstream regulations and contract information on the fiscal regime. 
However, this could be adjusted.
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or state participating interest (estimated to be 15 per cent with exploration 
and production and development cost carried).
Figure 6.1 is bell-shaped, which suggest that Uganda’s recoverable oil is 
finite and may last for only 26 years, which poses a challenge for transforming 
the resource into a permanent income, sustaining higher growth without 
overheating the economy and avoiding the Dutch disease. In this regard, the 
ministry responsible for energy and oil companies will decide on the amount 
of oil to be produced within a given period consistent with their development 
plans (MFPED, 2012). However, the extent to which the Government resists 
pressure, both political and from international oil companies (IOCs), will 
determine the rate of extraction. Given the need to recover costs faster, it 
is in the interest of the IOCs to exploit the resource at a faster rate, regard-
less of underlying national interest. However, a decision on the extraction 
rate should weigh the counterfactual evidence, which suggests that excess 
exploitation has a pass-through effect on the prices of products such as 
retail natural gas, retail electricity and commodity chemicals (Hausman 
and Kellogg, 2015).
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Owing to its waxy content, Ugandan crude oil may sell at a 30 per cent 
discount on benchmark crudes such as Brent. The discount is to account for 
its high viscosity that requires heating while in freight to export terminal(s) 
on the Indian Ocean (Doshi et al., 2015). Figure 6.2 shows the expected profile 
of the oil revenues for different oil prices (US$ 60/bbl, US$ 75/bbl and US$ 
90/bbl).2 Industry estimates suggest that the marketability of Ugandan 
oil will depend on prices being above US$ 60. As such, protection of the 
budget from potentially large fluctuations in oil revenue as a result of price 
variability poses a challenge and must be managed in order to maintain 
macroeconomic stability. One alternative to cushion the budget from large 
variability is by sustaining the strengthening of non-oil domestic resource 
mobilisation through sustaining tax administration reforms and registration 
of the non-oil informal sector.
2 The revenues are expressed in 2012 real shillings by transforming nominal $ into real shillings 
by applying the average depreciation of the shilling and the average growth rate of the Ugandan 
GDP deflator.
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The Government envisages a multi‐institutional committee for the purpose 
of determining the price of oil. The committee will include officials from the 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED), the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD), the Uganda Revenue 
Authority (URA) and other specialised agencies. The committee will also 
set the price at which profit oil received in kind by the national oil company 
will be disposed of. However, the international price of oil is discovered in 
designated centres such as Singapore. Moreover, Uganda is a small producer 
and is effectively a price taker, and thus cannot influence world prices. This 
limits the relevance of the price-setting committee to setting domestic refined 
oil prices. Given this background, such a committee will be vulnerable to 
political pressure to discount the domestic price of refined oil to meet some 
political objectives. The committee’s influence on regional prices may also 
be limited by the quality of fuel produced and the quantity demanded by 
the region. It is envisaged that the role of such a committee may be limited 
to setting benchmark prices.
6.2.2 Fiscal Decentralisation of Oil Revenues in Uganda
As provided for by various legal instruments including the Constitution, the 
management of natural resources is a responsibility of the central government. 
However, in the interest of social cohesion and a stable investment and produc-
tion environment Uganda has a revenue-sharing mechanism. The Government 
will allocate 7 per cent of all royalty revenues to local governments located 
in the oil and gas-producing areas (MFPED, 2012). In this regard, 93 per cent 
will be retained at the centre. The criteria for allocation shall consider local 
governments within the oil resource rich region which may not produce oil 
themselves but are affected by oil activities and incur the social cost related 
to these activities. The criteria shall also consider each local jurisdiction 
level of production.3 The transfer shall not exceed 100 per cent of the current 
non-oil fiscal transfer in order to encourage local tax mobilisation and mitigate 
dependence on oil revenue.
In absolute terms, each local government currently receives an average 
of UGX 15 billion per annum from the central government and mobilises 
5 per cent of total transfers from central government out of local taxation 
(Lakuma, Marty and Kuteesa, 2016). Given that a local government cannot 
3 LGRSi = R/2 * (Weighted LG population sharei + Weighted LG production sharei), where: 
LGRS = individual local government royalty revenue share; LG = local government, R = total 
local government royalty share.
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receive more than 100 per cent of its non-oil fiscal transfer, the paper estimates 
that each local government will receive a maximum of UGX 30 billion. As for 
local governments with absorptive constraint, any unspent balance will be 
appropriated by the MFPED and reallocated to the same local government 
in the next financial year (MFPED, 2016). However, this can lead to a race 
to spend in a bid to prevent expropriation of unspent resources.
The aforementioned revenue-sharing criteria suggest that the Government 
of Uganda model for revenue sharing favours a mix of the derivation principle 
and those allocation principles that are similar to inter-governmental fiscal 
transfer formulas.4 The former ensures that each local government’s share is 
related to the oil revenue originating in its territory. The derivation principle 
model has proven to be successful in preventing natural resource conflict risk 
(Strachan, 2014). However, the model may promote or exacerbate already 
existing horizontal inequality between local governments in producing areas 
and those that have limited capacity for revenue collection. Certainly, older 
oil-producing district such as Hoima have relatively better fiscal capacities 
than newly created oil-producing districts like Buliisa and Nwoya or newly 
created districts with no proven natural resources such as Ngora, Sironko 
and Pader.
Given the poor standards of living and the infrastructural deficit in rural 
areas, the revenue-sharing formula used by Uganda will provides a relatively 
small proportion in transfers of oil proceeds to local government compare to 
other reference countries. For example, sub-national governments in Bolivia 
receive 60 per cent of the fiscal take (Aresti, 2016).5 The Indonesian Govern-
ment allocates 15.5 per cent of net oil revenues to sub-national governments 
(Strachan, 2014). In Nigeria, Parliament revises the formula for oil revenue 
sharing every five years, and a minimum of 13 per cent of oil revenue must be 
reserved for oil-producing states (Haysom and Kane, 2009).
The extent to which the model will facilitate the improvement of living 
standards could face significant challenges. While the revenue transferred 
may be perceived to be inadequate, this may be in the best interest of local 
government to prevent budget distortions in light of absorption constraints 
and fluctuating oil prices. Fluctuating oil prices could also encourage local 
governments to adopt shorter planning horizons in the face of fluctuating 
prices due to uncertainty about future income. This could increase corruption 
4 The inter-governmental fiscal transfer formula uses criteria such as population, needs or tax 
capacity to determine revenue share.
5 Fiscal take is composed of direct tax, royalties, patents and any proceeds from fiscal 
co-participation.
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if local government officials have no confidence in the stability of government 
funds. This creates an incentive for local governments to appropriate as much 
as possible and as quickly as possible before oil revenues wane.
As mentioned earlier, one significant advantage with the Uganda’s revenue-
sharing model is that it explicitly specifies that the central government will 
regulate and govern hydrocarbon revenue sources and has the authority to 
issue licences for new explorations. While there is no ambiguity in the power 
relations between central government and local government with regard to 
policy guidance in matters of natural resources, the intra local government 
relationships and the relationship between local governments and cultural 
institutions are not clearly defined by the law and could prove to be a source 
of disagreement.6
6.2.3 Refining of Expected Crude Oil
Uganda plans to refine some or all of the expected oil production for domestic 
consumption and regional export. A feasibility study by Foster Wheeler 
(2011) found that a refinery was commercially viable with a net present value 
(NPV) of US$ 3.2 billion at a 10 per cent discount rate and an internal rate of 
return (IRR) of 33 per cent (MEMD, 2015). The proposed refinery will have 
an initial output of 30,000 bpd, growing to 60,000 bpd (Doshi et al., 2015). 
Estimates suggest that a refinery will save Uganda US$ 1 billion annually in 
two ways: the first is self-sufficiency in petrol, diesel and kerosene with spill-
over employment effects. The second is through supplying fuel to Rwanda, 
Burundi and parts of Kenya (Patey, 2015).7
A refinery also holds strategic importance for Uganda that cannot be 
discounted. Uganda is landlocked and imports its product through Kenya. On 
several occasions, Uganda has experienced supply disruption due to technical 
inefficiencies and political risk in Kenya (Patey, 2015).8 If government plans do 
not change, the refinery will have the first call on crude. This suggest that over 
time all the crude produced in Uganda could be refined as production reaches 
6 MFPED (2016) states that each local government may, in consultation with the Ministry 
responsible for culture and the other local governments, agree to allocate a share of its royalty grant 
to cultural institutions recognised by the Constitution in its locality. In addition, sub‐counties 
within each of the eligible local government areas shall be entitled to share in the royalties received. 
However, the royalty shared with sub‐counties shall be net of subventions to cultural institutions 
and will be on the basis of weighted population (MFPED).
7 Oil constitutes 10–15 per cent of Uganda’s imports.
8 There were fuel shortages and price rises in Uganda following the post-election violence in 
Kenya.
134 COrti PaUl lakUma
peak and capacity to refine increases. Also, subject to domestic production 
capacity, the refinery may obtain crude oil or raw gas from outside Uganda 
(MEMD, 2012). This has been a point of contention among international oil 
companies participating in Uganda’s oil sector (Patey, 2015).
What seems to be missing in the policy discussions is the fact that the 
operation of the refinery will be contingent on import cost and regional 
demand for crude refined in Uganda. In this regard, Patey (2015) notes that 
Uganda’s refinery’s product would have to compete for market share with 
imports from large and efficient refiners in the Middle East and India. There is 
also a possibility of new refineries emerging from Kenya, Tanzania and South 
Sudan. It is important for policy makers to consider that the performance of 
a refinery varies depending on region, demand for oil, market structure and 
price of oil. Foster Wheeler (2011) points out that the profitability of Uganda’s 
refinery will depend on the international oil price not being below US$ 60.
Nevertheless, evidence also suggests that the profitability of refineries 
after the recent fall in crude oil prices has varied among refining countries. 
Refiners in Asia and Europe scored higher margins buoyed by heightened 
demand for oil to build inventories (Fitzgibbon, Kloskowska and Martin, 
2015). North American margins fell sharply due to loss of some of the region’s 
recent structural advantages versus the rest of the world (Fitzgibbon et al., 
2015). This calls for a comprehensive cost benefit analysis before embarking 
on financing a refinery. On that note, financing a refinery would cost around 
US$ 4 billion and the Government would probably use fuel subsidies to satisfy 
domestic demand, exacerbating public cost. Cost will also be incurred in 
transporting the crude to Rwanda, Burundi and parts of Kenya.
6.2.4 Mitigating the Risks of Dutch Disease
Empirical literature shows that the increase in profitability of the oil bids 
up the prices of factors of production, and draws such factors away from 
other sectors in the economy. The movement of factors of production into 
the oil sector contracts the non-oil tradeable sectors (manufacturing and 
agriculture) and bids up prices in the non-tradeable (services). In addition, 
large expenditure increases in public investments and transfers may also 
impede the competitiveness of the tradable sectors such as agriculture. The 
literature describes this as the Dutch disease. The impact of Dutch disease is 
worsened by volatility in oil prices and mostly harms the poor, exacerbating 
income inequality (Leamer, Maul, Rodriguez and Schott, 1999). Figure 6.3 
shows a simulation by Doshi et al. (2015) that illustrates the impact of Dutch 
disease using Uganda’s data. The first column of Figure 6.3 suggests that a 
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large increase in spending can push up relative prices (real effective exchange 
rates and wages) in favour of non-tradable sectors. This leads to a movement 
of labour and capital from the tradable (agriculture manufacturing) to non-
tradable (services) sectors, as shown in the second column, reducing the 
contribution and competitiveness of the tradable sector (third column).
In relation to this, a large body of government of Uganda documents 
relating to oil governance points to the need for prudent macroeconomic 
management policies in the face of oil production. In particular, the Govern-
ment has put in place a set of laws through the Public Finance Management 
Act (2015) to guide the resource-funded spending. The World Bank and 
many other civil societies have also pushed for prudent macroeconomic 
management of oil revenues in developing countries. However, alternative 
wisdom suggests that while revenue governance criteria are useful, they 
should not be overly strict or externally imposed for them to survive changing 
bargaining strengths and external conditions (Gérin and Houdin, 2010). 
Lessons from Chad and Cameroon are instructive: ‘a country will develop 
its natural resources whether it is “institutionally ready” to administer the 
benefits or not’ (Gérin and Houdin, 2010, p.2).
The extent to which Uganda strikes the right balance between resource 
and non-resource revenue generation will determine the degree of reliance 
on the former as the main source of budget financing. Empirical evidence 
suggest that the non-resource revenue sector is often neglected, which poses 
the risk of government over-relying on one commodity for its fiscal revenues. 
In this regard, the willingness of government to resist the pressure to draw 
from the petroleum fund to fund off-budget and unproductive activities will 
define the degree of the distortion caused by oil revenues. However, pressure 
to expand the non-oil budget deficit, given the level of infrastructural deficit 
and the rate of poverty could pose a challenge. The poverty rate was estimated 
to be at 20.7 per cent in 2012/2013 (Sewanyana and Kasirye, 2014).
6.2.5 Local Content Policy
Through the local content policy, the Government plans to address vocational 
skills and align them with the needs of the oil sector. The Government is also 
planning to expand and strengthen the delivery of oil and gas sector-related 
education and training through local institutions, and supporting capac-
ity development of local private-sector players in the provision of ground 
handling and logistical services (MFPED, 2012). However, these are countable 
jobs, given that the oil and gas industry is an enclave activity that requires 
substantial skills that cannot be developed in the short run. In this regard, 
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the direct mass participation of Ugandans and local enterprises may prove 
to be elusive.
Nevertheless, the idea of diversifying away from oil activities to mitigate 
dependence and excessive volatility, which hurts the poor, has also been 
proposed. In this regard, Uganda has taken a keen interest in lessons from 
resource-rich countries that have diversified their economies. For instance, 
Indonesia used much of her oil revenue to promote manufacturing and 
agriculture through public investment and market-friendly reforms (Ross, 
2003). However, some policy makers have argued for development of the oil 
sector to be more pro-poor by creating employment through backward and 
forward linkage activities such as developing a petrochemical industry that 
ensures local participation (local content) in the oil value chain. Ravallion 
and Datt (1996) show that India has succeeded in building value chains 
by building the capacity of its citizens to participate in the intermediate 
petrochemical industry. Indeed, the expansion into petrochemicals has 
catalysed the diversification of countries in the Gulf Countries Cooperation 
(GCC) (Budde and Shah, 2014). The region’s chemical industry currently 
supports an estimated 840,000 jobs. In 2011, chemicals represented 4.5 per 
cent of non-oil and gas GDP in Saudi Arabia (Budde and Shah, 2014).
Therefore, it is prudent for Uganda to consider the development of a 
petrochemical industry in its local content policy. A petrochemical industry 
would be not only be a source of employment, but also an avenue for exporting 
manufactures in plastics, mattress, pharmaceutical, fertilisers, chemicals, tyres 
and other intermediates that are used in other industries such as agriculture 
and manufacturing. This will integrate sectors such as agriculture and industry 
into the oil and gas industry. In general, the promotion of local content should 
strive to develop indirect participation in the industry as opposed to direct 
participation. As such, a refinery and the expected petroleum by-products such 
as naphtha could act as a feedstock and support the growth of a petrochemical 
industry.
6.3 Uganda’s Fiscal Regime
The current fiscal regime for the petroleum sector is based on a production-
sharing contract or agreement (PSA). Under this arrangement, the oil 
companies are contracted by Government and are rewarded with an agreed 
share in the production. Like Algeria’s, Uganda’s tax system tends to follow 
a tax on rent in the form of net cash flow. This requires firms to bid for the 
right to exploit the resource. Empirical research suggest that PSAs tend to 
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perform better than a system that grant exemption to upstream activities, 
such as those in Ghana (EY, 2015). Nevertheless, countries’ fiscal regimes 
vary depending on local political, economic and institutional conditions. 
Some countries treat extractive sectors more favourably than most other 
industries, through favourable treatment of such capital expenses as depletion, 
exploration and development, and the cost of acquiring resource properties 
(Broadway and Flatters, 1993).
The law imposes on the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) in collaboration 
with other relevant technical departments under the Ministry responsible 
for Energy the responsibility to collect and administer taxes, dues, charges 
and levies on gas and oil-related activities. In its simplest form, the fiscal 
provisions of a production-sharing agreement have four main components: 
royalties, cost recovery oil, profit oil, and income tax (MEMD, 2012). The 
Government’s total revenue is composed of royalties, which are payments 
made in lieu of resource extraction and are based on volume or value of the 
resource extracted. Royalties are made either in cash or in kind. Royalties are 
paid on the commencement of production. Percentages are provided in each 
PSA and depend on barrels of oil per day (bopd) (EY, 2015) Rough estimates 
suggest that royalties are between 7 and 12.5 per cent of production (MFPED, 
2016). In some instance, a company in a PSA may decide to retain extracted 
oil to compensate for the costs associated with exploration, development and 
production. The PSA prescribes a ceiling for the amount of oil that can be 
retained to recover costs in a given period. Although a contractor can carry 
forward any costs that are not recovered for recovery in subsequent years, 
the Government must approve any cost recovery and, as such, unapproved 
costs are not recoverable. Profit oil refers to the share of production remaining 
after the contractor has retained the share attributed to cost recovery. This is 
split between the contractor and government according to an agreed formula. 
The share due to government is either paid in cash or taken in kind. The 
contractors’ share of profit is subject to an income tax (30 per cent of profit).
Nevertheless, there is scope for transparency in Uganda’s PSAs. Many of 
the obligations and requirements imposed on interested parties have been 
kept confidential (EY, 2015). The specific details such as financial obligations; 
health, safety and environment (HSE) requirements; and other data and 
reporting obligations are not known to the public (Ibid.). This can create 
room for corruption and backroom dealing. In addition, ambiguities in the 
tax code have led to several disputes between the Government of Uganda and 
international oil companies which have delayed the industry’s development 
(Patey, 2015). First, contractors disputed Uganda’s decision not to export all 
oil. Second, there was a dispute on what is taxable when transferring interest 
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to a third party and capital gains tax on such interest. Lastly, long negotiations 
between the Government of Uganda and international oil companies on terms 
of production licences constrained the industry from further development. 
However, hard bargaining on infrastructure, tax, and contract demands 
is not unique to Uganda. It is common for resource-rich countries to have 
fairly flexible policies and laws due to political demands on the legislation 
and institutions running the sector.
Nevertheless, Ugandan policy makers need to note that instability in tax 
law may raise the discount rate that investors apply in evaluating projects. 
This can reduce the rent value of the resource, and therefore the amount of 
revenue that can be extracted without distorting investment. Frequent changes 
in taxation code may raise the supply price of the investors to investors to 
such an extent that low rates of taxation are required to attract investment. 
On the other hand, policy makers may need to note that low tax rates are 
counterproductive when high profitability is achieved. High profitability in 
turn generates pressure for change in the taxation arrangement and further 
increases the supply price of investment, thus yet again increasing the pressure 
for change in the tax arrangement.
In addition, Uganda’s law is ambiguous about what happens when cash 
flow or production is negative. It is not clear whether the Government will 
provide a cash payment to the investor to compensate for the negative cash 
flows in such a case. In some practices, the Government depreciates the 
capital expenditure over a number of years as with standard income tax until 
such an investment is abandoned and assumed to be unsuccessful, or until 
there is an assessment of super profit against which it can be credited. There 
is also no clear law about undepreciated capital expenditure and unutilised 
tax credit. Normally, undepreciated capital expenditure and unutilised tax 
credit are accumulated at an interest rate equal to the government bond rate 
and carried forward. As mentioned earlier, it is not clear whether Uganda 
will treat undepreciated capital expenditure and unutilised tax credit as 
such. The URA needs to examine this clearly before the oil starts to flow to 
mitigate disputes.
There is also no clear guidance in the law on the taxation of downstream 
activities such as pipeline, refinery, storage and transport. While this is 
untestable, given that the midstream is currently a government monopoly, 
it is prudent to define the rules of engagement as the sector opens up to the 
private sector in the medium term. The fiscal regime also does not spell out 
how the IOC will transfer upstream knowledge and technology to the NOC. 
These impede the future capacity of NOC to explore and produce oil either 
solely or in a joint venture.
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6.4 The Balance between Spending and Saving of the 
Expected Oil Revenues
This section analyses how and how far fiscal rules are being used to create a 
trade-off between saving and spending of expected oil revenues.
6.4.1 The Petroleum Fund and Front-loading of Public 
Investment
The Government of Uganda faces the challenge of transforming a finite 
resource (oil) into a permanent income. A permanent income is a sustainable 
constant consumption flow equal to the present value of the resource wealth. 
In this regard, a policy that encourages saving of the oil windfall provides fiscal 
sustainability, preserves the resource wealth for future generations, prevents 
intergenerational inequality and mitigates the real exchange appreciation 
associated with the Dutch disease (Doshi et al., 2015). To address the above 
concern, the Government will establish a petroleum fund with a twin objective 
of financing the budget and saving for future generations (MFPED, 2012). The 
petroleum fund shall hold all revenues emanating from dues, charges, taxes, 
royalties and fines on oil and gas. This will include the proceeds from the 
sale of the Government’s share of oil extracted that will be received in kind. 
The Government envisages quarterly reports from the Investment Advisory 
Committee on the performance of the fund. There is a possibility that in the 
future the fund could be invested in securities and equity outside Uganda. 
However, this aspect has not been considered in the current legal framework.
As earlier alluded to, savings in a petroleum fund may not be compatible 
with the social status (poverty, human and physical capital scarcity and credit 
constraints) of a developing country such as Uganda. This strengthens the 
argument for frontloading of public investments in the transport, education 
and health services. The infrastructural deficit notwithstanding, established 
fiscal prudence should be continued to ensure that oil and gas revenues 
are used productively to address the infrastructure and social needs of a 
fast-growing population.9 However, high oil prices could produce unhealthy 
rates of expansion in the petroleum fund and pressure to expand the size of 
government, leading to a drop in efficiency. The Government of Uganda has a 
culture of creating new administrative jurisdictions (districts), some without 
the capacity to govern. It is possible that production of oil may encourage 
the creation of more administrative jurisdictions. In 2016, Uganda had 114 
9 Uganda has a good reputation for fiscal prudence.
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districts, more than double the number in 2002.10 In the event of revenue 
volatility, the consequence would be unexpected interruptions in government 
programmes. Long-term projects in the transport sector that require years 
of sustained government funding and management will also be disrupted. 
In addition, people tend to invest in their future if government policies and 
institutions are stable. If citizens lose confidence in government policies and 
institutions, they will be less inclined to invest in their own future, hurting 
the poor.
Expected oil revenues have also incentivised a frontloading of public invest-
ment in Uganda. While this contributes to the closing of the infrastructure 
gap, it could lead to a fall in the quality of public investments, which can 
be harmful. The Government of Uganda needs to be observant because a 
rapid rise in revenues can lead to a desire to speed up economic growth or 
pressure from rent seekers leading to a relaxation of government standards 
for choosing investments, leading to a squandered windfall. High revenues 
can create a strong incentive to accumulate debt, given the perceived ability 
to service the debt. Nevertheless, many countries, and particularly those in 
Africa, have used oil revenues to finance infrastructure and deliver social 
services (Collier, van der Ploeg, Spence and Venables, 2009). Other countries 
have used the resource revenue to service external debt (Daban and Helis 
2010). Yet others have used a mix of public investment, social service delivery 
and sovereign wealth fund (SWF) to address economic challenges and save 
resources for future generation (Berg, Portillo, Yangand and Zanna, 2013).
For illustration, the blue line in the left-hand panel of Figure 6.4 shows a 
simulation of oil revenues being spent in the form of transfers to households.11 
On the other hand, the red line shows an alternative policy in which the 
resource revenues are frontloaded in public infrastructure and the green line 
stand for gradual expenditure, which is equivalent to a SWF. Unlike transfers, 
frontloading public investments tend to have a longer lasting but lagged 
impact on poverty alleviation through an increase of productivity.12 However, 
frontloading of investments and transfers can lead to Dutch disease. In the 
case of the SWF, expenditure is spread over a longer time span. A majority of 
the oil revenues are saved in the equity and investment funds. Gradual public 
investment further delays the consumption increase, but it is more sustained 
10 There were 56 districts in 2002.
11 The rationale for household transfers in developing countries is immediate poverty alleviation 
by increasing present consumption (and thus welfare). However, financial transfers can lead to 
rent-seeking and dependency.
12 The productivity effect applies only to public investment policies, either front-loaded or 
gradual.
142 COrti PaUl lakUma
and higher over time than both transfers and frontloading investment. On 
the other hand, the right-hand panel of Figure 6.4 shows that the increase in 
the efficiency of the utilisation of labour and capital in production of GDP is 
much lower under the gradual policy but lasts longer.13 The transfers policy 
produces the lowest and most short-lived impact on GDP.
6.4.2 Public Debt
Uganda can maintain its debt at the current rate (35 per cent) by servicing 
new contracted (accumulated) debt with oil revenues. This however will 
come at a cost to service delivery. This calls for strengthening of the debt 
rules. There is also a perception that Uganda’s engagement with traditional 
development partners in Europe and North America will be limited, given 
the new oil find and emergence of new lending partners, especially China. 
However, estimates suggest that Uganda’s oil output will not be sufficient 
to meet all its financing needs. Therefore, engagement with development 
partners may be sustained in the medium term.
13 GDP is a product of labour and capital (and technology). Since resource wealth is spent much 
more slowly, the substitutability between money and capital is much slower.
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6.4.3 Efficiency of Public Investments
While oil and gas present an opportunity for Uganda to accelerate its 
development process, utilisation of these resources is subject to the absorp-
tive capacity of the economy. More often, many developing countries face 
absorptive constraints where (high) investment rates lead to large cost over-
runs, leading to low capital accumulation (Van der Ploeg, 2012). On average, 
sub-Saharan projects cost 74 per cent more than initial investment estimates 
(International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2012). To mitigate misuse of natural 
resource revenues, Uganda plans to integrate oil and gas revenues into the 
overall macro economy and the fiscal framework (MFPED, 2012). In the 
short to medium term, the Government will limit the growth in government 
expenditure by linking overall expenditure to the non-oil-related revenues 
rather than to total revenues (MFPED, 2012).14 However, the Government 
14 Total revenues include oil revenue.
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plans to allow for flexibility to adjust government spending to a level that is 
consistent with the economy’s needs and absorptive capacity in the medium 
term. In the long‐term, the Government envisages that expenditure will be 
restored to a level that is equivalent to interest earned on the petroleum fund. 
This will ensure that the principal of the petroleum fund is saved for future 
generations (MFPED, 2012).
However, the issue is whether Uganda can select the right projects subject 
to its institutional capacity to appraise, implement and monitor those pro-
jects. As mentioned earlier, public investment effectiveness will be subject 
to institutional capacity. Figure 6.5 simulates two different scenarios of 
front-loaded public investment policies in Uganda’s economy. The blue line 
represents the case where the country can fully absorb investment. The red 
line represents the case where the country wastes half of public investment. 
The red line suggests that absorptive constraint significantly impacts on 
GDP, consumption and wages by reducing the productivity of public capital. 
However, absorptive constraint has no impact on the real exchange rate. This 
suggest that the spending effect of public investment, whether absorbed or 
not, will trigger Dutch disease.
6.5 Conclusion and Policy Options
Oil production will generate significant additional revenues for Uganda. 
However, the emergence of a natural resource windfall is usually accompanied 
by several challenges. These challenges are mainly of a macroeconomic, 
budgetary and governance nature. The impact of these additional revenues 
on Uganda’s competitiveness and economic transformation will critically 
depend on the prudent management of these oil resources. On the basis of 
the above analysis, we can formulate a number of policy recommendations 
which could contribute to this goal.
First, on the basis of the estimated production profile, the best strategy is to 
smooth production to spread the revenue over time. A sequenced development 
of oilfields will facilitate a smooth distribution of the resources over a longer 
period of time. This policy would also help in mitigating the impact of price 
volatility by enabling the smoothing of price shocks over time. Production 
should be focused on the first third of the production lifecycle contingent on 
prices. Ideally the highest production should be achieved when prices are the 
highest and have a very high impact on the overall economics.
Second, intergovernmental fiscal transfers may promote equity, but may 
also undermine efforts to mobilise resources at the local level. As such, political 
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commitment to fiscal rules is imperative. The fiscal rules should emphasise 
counter‐cyclicality, should ensure a sustainable debt path and should be 
consistent with the medium-term expenditure objectives.
Third, there is a strong case for the Ugandan Government to commit to 
making realistic and relatively conservative projections of future oil prices in 
order to mitigate unaffordable expenditure commitments in the event of oil 
revenues falling short of the forecasted levels. Related to this, the streamlining 
of the collection of oil revenues is key to ensuring transparency and account-
ability. In particular, the petroleum fund should support fiscal policy and a 
policy of inter-generational equity. As such, the fund should be separated 
from the reserve bank’s exchange reserves.
Fourth, more information needs to be generated on the refinery before it 
is actually built. The refinery would benefit from more research on the cost of 
transporting refined oil to the region, market structure, regional demand for 
oil and the price of oil. Furthermore, there is scope for sharing information on 
the value and future prospects of natural resources to ensure that all parties 
are equally well informed.
Fifth, frontloading investment has a positive impact on public capital 
through the productivity channel. Transfer to household has a positive impact 
on welfare through the spending channel. However, both of these polices 
may have a Dutch disease effect. Gradual investment has a positive impact 
on public investment, but the impact is delayed. Moreover, importantly, the 
Government should build the institutional capacity to resist pressure to 
increase the annual allocations above the level budgeted. Any amendments 
should be orderly and fully justified. In this case, parliamentary oversight 
and involvement of the civil society will be imperative.
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Uganda has set ambitious targets aimed at propelling the country to upper 
middle-income status by 2040. The ability of Uganda to transform from 
a largely low-income agrarian economy to a modern diversified economy 
depends, in part, upon available avenues for revenue mobilisation and the 
ability of government to transform such revenues into prudent investments. 
Given Uganda’s demographic structure, with more than 50 per cent of the 
population aged less than 16 years, it makes sense to prioritise investments 
that can unlock such human capital potential to ensure a sustainable and 
inclusive growth path.
The emergence of the oil sector provides a timely opportunity to generate 
the necessary means to finance the social and economic transformation of 
society, including for the marginalised groups such as women, rural inhabit-
ants and the urban poor. In addition, the population has formed strong 
expectations about improvements in service delivery that could potentially 
arise from development of the oil sector (Tumusiime, Mawejje and Byakagaba, 
2016; Mawejje, 2019). Managing such expectations, while putting in place 
developmental institutions to minimise leakages and rent-seeking, will be 
critical in deriving maximum benefit from oil resources.
A key feature of the oil and gas sectors is that they are enclave activities with 
minimal links to the rest of the economy. Aside from generating significant 
revenues that can be used to strategically invest in other sectors, the direct 
development impact of oil and gas sectors is limited. Given that oil develop-
ment is highly capital-intensive, only a few thousand jobs can be expected to 
be generated, mostly for technical and highly-skilled personnel. It is estimated 
that at peak production the oil and gas sector will require 15,000 direct jobs 
and 35,000 indirect jobs, with an additional 100,000 jobs created through 
the redistribution of oil revenues in the local economy. Even then most jobs 
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will be shed after the development phase, with only about 25 per cent of the 
direct jobs retained during the operations phase (SBC, 2013). This therefore 
implies that the social development outcomes arising out of the direct and 
indirect employment will be limited.
Dutch disease and resource curse literature has shown potentially 
detrimental effects of natural resource sectors on social sectors, including 
agriculture (Apergis, El-Montasser, Sekyere, Ajmi and Gupta, 2014), education 
(Cockx and Francken, 2016) and health spending (Cockx and Francken, 
2014). Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that the development of the oil and gas 
sector provides a springboard for agricultural transformation and improves 
service delivery in the social sectors, particularly health and education. Recent 
discussions have explored the risks and opportunities that the oil sector 
presents for accelerating sustained development in Uganda (Mawejje and 
Bategeka, 2013). Gelb and Majerowicz (2011) highlighted the potentially large 
effects of using oil revenues to roll out cash transfer programmes as a way of 
ensuring social protection, particularly for the elderly and other vulnerable 
categories of people. Wiebelt, Paw, Martov, Twimukye and Benson (2011) 
analysed the potential poverty reduction impacts of spending oil revenues 
for agricultural transformation.
In addition, opportunities can be created if local content opportunities 
are exploited. In this regard, investments that improve the business environ-
ment, skills development, and support the capacity development of the local 
entrepreneurial class to engage in the supply of local content by exploiting 
backward linkages are critical (Tordo, Warner, Manzano and Anouti, 2013). 
The Government of Uganda has taken the strategic decision to invest in 
the development of a refinery in the Albertine Region near the oil explora-
tion areas. This creates opportunities for private-sector engagement in the 
development of forward links in other spin-off industries that straddle the oil 
and gas value chain. Such investments that diversify the economic benefits 
from natural resources can generate sustained employment creation beyond 
the life cycle of the resource.
This chapter explores the opportunities that the oil sector presents with 
regard to social development. We advance the argument that oil revenues 
can support social development if a people-centred approach is taken that 
prioritises investments in agricultural sector transformation, human capital 
development, social protection, and harnesses the demographic dividend 
by focusing on interventions that can lead to sustainable improvements in 
mortality and fertility outcomes. While oil revenues can advance social and 
economic development in Uganda, it should be emphasised that other factors 
such as inefficiencies due to rent-seeking, elite capture and fraud could derail 
Oil revenUes anD sOCial DevelOPment in UganDa 151
the anticipated positive impacts. Therefore, strengthening the governance 
structures across the board is required to ensure that the opportunities for 
social development are not missed.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. First, Section 2 sets 
out the economic and social context of Uganda. Section 3 then discusses 
the development of the oil sector in Uganda, while Section 4 discusses the 
options for scaling up social development with the help of the anticipated 
oil revenues. Section 5 concludes.
7.2 Uganda’s Economic and Social Context
Uganda’s growth and social development patterns were disrupted by the politi-
cal mismanagement that followed independence. Specifically, the economy was 
marred by economic crises resulting from extreme political instability during 
1971–1986. Most productive sectors were badly damaged during that period, and 
real growth rates were effectively negative during 1980–1987. The infrastructure 
stock was virtually wiped out during the post-independence period as political 
unrest led to neglect and limited investment. The restoration of peace and 
stability, starting in 1986 with President Museveni’s new government, coupled 
with policy reforms that mostly focused on promoting macroeconomic stabil-
ity, liberalisation, and privatisation formed the basis for economic recovery 
in the post-conflict years (Kuteesa, Tumusiime-Mutebile, Whitworth and 
Williamson, 2010). Subsequently the economy recorded impressive growth 
rates in the post-crisis era. Real economic growth averaged 6.9 per cent during 
the 1990–1999 period and reached 7.2 per cent during the 2000–2010 period.
The growth attained over the years has led to significant headcount poverty 
reduction. Based on the proportion of the population living on less than a 
dollar per day, poverty declined to 20.7 per cent in 2013 from 56 per cent in 
1992 (see Figure 7.1). Consequently, the number of poor people dropped 
from 9.8 to 7 million in the last decade alone, signifying the robust poverty 
reduction effects of economic growth (Ssewanyana and Kasirye, 2014). 
However, the benefits of growth were not shared equally among the various 
regions. For example, the Northern region did not benefit much from this 
recovery owing to a protracted and brutal armed conflict during 1986–2006, 
the cost of which was estimated at 3 per cent of GDP (Okidi, Ssewanyana, 
Bategeka and Muhumuza, 2007).
The strong growth trajectory, however, has not been sustained during 
the period following the global financial crisis. During the five fiscal years 
from 20011/2012–2016/2017 the economy grew by an average of 4.5 per cent 
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less than during any other period since 1990. The slow-down in economic 
performance during this period has been occasioned by the large global imbal-
ances, unfavourable domestic demand and supply factors and challenging 
geopolitical situations such the re-emergence of instability in South Sudan. 
Moreover, the latest Uganda poverty assessment shows that more Ugandans 
are slipping into poverty with the number of poor people increasing to 10 
million in 2016/2017. With these developments, income poverty levels have 
increased to 27 per cent, signifying a significant reversal of trends after a 
sustained poverty reduction period.
Uganda’s recent growth experiences reflect some fundamental challenges 
for long-term economic growth. While the share of agriculture in total GDP 
has remarkably declined, the contribution of industry has largely stagnated at 
about 18 per cent of GDP. Rather tellingly, the share of labour in agriculture 
has not declined as would be expected if growth were structurally transforma-
tive (Brownbridge and Bwire, 2016). This points to challenges emanating 
from low productivity growth in the agricultural sector leading to weak 
forward linkages to industrial development. Thus, the major source of growth 
continues to be in the services sectors. However, these have not created many 
employment opportunities because a large proportion of the services sector 
is still dominated by low-productivity micro and small informal businesses 
with limited opportunities for growth (Brownbridge and Bwire, 2016).
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Source: Author’s computations based on data drawn from Uganda Bureau of Statistics (2017).
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Moreover, people continue to grapple with other forms of non-monetary 
facets of poverty, particularly due to constrained service delivery in critical 
areas such as education, health, nutrition, access to electricity and sanita-
tion. The recent discovery of oil reserves promises alternative pathways for 
accelerating the growth and performance of the economy. It is expected that 
oil revenues will generate government revenues equivalent to about 10 per 
cent of GDP at peak production and that the lifetime cumulative revenues 
from oil and gas sector are expected to be approximately 250 per cent of 2013 
GDP (Adam, Bevan and Ohlenburg, 2014). The oil sector thus presents an 
enormous opportunity for accelerating growth, scaling up social development 
and poverty reduction.
7.3 The Development of the Oil Sector in Uganda
Uganda is among a list of African countries that have discovered significant 
natural resource wealth in the last decade. Exploration efforts so far have 
largely been concentrated in the Albertine districts and have confirmed the 
existence of oil reserves estimated at 6.5 billion barrels with approximately 
1.4 billion barrels believed to be recoverable. This has placed Uganda among 
the top owners of proven oil reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 7.2). 
However, the exact oil potential is unknown, considering that exploration 
efforts have so far covered only about 40 per cent of the region confirmed 
to have oil deposits. Production is not expected before 2022 (Verma and 
Mukherjee, 2019). The Government is going ahead with plans to have a small/
medium-sized refinery that will process 30,000–60,000 barrels per day. The 
expectation is that this refinery will service the local and regional markets. 
In addition, the Government is finalising plans for an oil pipeline for the 
export of the excess crude oil via Tanzania’s Tanga port. It is expected that 
oil production will peak at 225,000 barrels/day around the year 2025 and, 
barring any further discoveries, decline until 2044. However, the current 
slow-down and uncertainty in the international oil prices will probably affect 
the timing of the project.
The expectation is that oil prices will hover within the US$ 50–60 range 
per barrel over the medium term. Annual revenues are, therefore, expected to 
peak at around US$ 600 million around the year 2025 if prices rise to within 
the US$ 60 range per barrel (see Figure 7.3). Cumulative government revenues 
are therefore expected to be in the range of US$ 5,000–9,000 million. Annual 
revenues are expected to be in the range of 5 to 10 per cent of GDP. To put 
this in context, Uganda collects the equivalent of about 14 per cent of GDP in 
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annual taxes. Clearly, oil will bring a modest contribution to the economy. If 
well managed, such revenues can achieve improved socio-economic outcomes, 
but are potentially disruptive if badly handled.





















Source: Author’s computations based on data drawn from ENI Energy Statistics.
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Source: Author’s computations using Global Witness oil models for Uganda.
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7.4 Options for Scaling Up Social Development Using 
Oil Resources
Uganda has the opportunity to achieve high growth levels leading to social 
and economic transformation through the prudent use of natural resource 
revenues from the oil and gas sectors. To achieve this, adequate consideration 
must be accorded to expenditures that are inclusive and socially transforma-
tive. Improving the productivity of agriculture will have the largest potential 
for social transformation considering the ubiquity of the sector. In addition, 
prioritising social protection and improved service delivery in the education 
and health sectors will ensure a labour force that is skilled, healthy and produc-
tive. In equal measure, adequate attention must be paid to interventions that 
will lead to employment creation. In this regard, enterprise development by 
leveraging local content possibilities will doubtless harness the potentially 
large benefits of the large young population. In particular, oil can lead a 
diversification drive, enabling the development of other non-oil primary 
sectors. These issues are discussed in the subsections that follow.
7.4.1 Improving the Productivity of Agriculture
The narrative on improving the social and economic conditions of Ugandans 
should be cognizant of the fact that most households in Uganda are still 
based in the primary sectors, notably in agriculture. Indeed, agriculture 
remains the dominant sector, employing some 72 per cent of Uganda’s working 
population (Uganda Bureau of Statistics [UBOS], 2016). However, as shown in 
Figure 7.4, the agricultural sector’s productivity as measured by value added 
per work has been steadily declining since the early 2000s. This implies that 
real wages in the agricultural sector are declining. This decline in productivity 
is worrying because the sector continues to provide the most employment 
opportunities and provides the lowest hanging fruits for poverty reduction 
and the realisation of superior social outcomes (World Bank, 2016).
The declining productivity in the agricultural sector is due to a number 
of factors, including falling soil fertility and limited use of modern inputs; 
dependence on rain-fed production; limited innovations due to low levels 
of research and development; more frequent climate shocks; and limited 
commercialisation in the sector leading to weak links with limited value 
addition.
There are a number of ways through which well-thought-out utilisation 
of oil revenues can support improved productivity in the agricultural sector. 
First, oil revenues can be used to finance research and development to ensure 
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the development of appropriate technologies and innovations in the sector. 
Second, oil revenues can be used to finance water for production and to 
promote the development of climate-smart agriculture. Third, oil revenues 
can be used to finance the development of warehouse receipt systems with 
a view to facilitating agricultural commercialisation and developing value 
added links to manufacturing and agro-processing. Fourth, oil revenues can 
be strategically used to improve access to financing in the sector, for example, 
through an agricultural bank, or any other special-purpose vehicle to bridge 
the financing challenges that are specific to the sector. We will now explore 
each of these policy options in more detail.
Research and Development for Agriculture
The agricultural research system in Uganda is centrally managed through 
the National Agricultural Research Organisation (NARO). The organisation 
coordinates a system of six sector-specific research institutions in crops, 
livestock, fisheries and forestry. These include: the National Crops Resources 
Research Institute, the National Fisheries Resources Research Institute, the 
National Forestry Resources Research Institute, the National Livestock 
Resources Research Institute, the National Semi Arid Agricultural Research 
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Source: Author’s computations based on data drawn from World Development Indica-
tors, The World Bank, 2017. Available at: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/
world-development-indicators.
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Institute and the National Coffee Research Institute. These institutes have 
done well, particularly in the generation of new technologies. However, they 
continue to face constraints and cannot keep pace with the growing demands 
of the sector. For example, in the year 2014/2015 only 49 production technolo-
gies were generated out of a planned 90. This represents a performance rate of 
54 per cent compared to 113 per cent (80 planned, 90 delivered) in 2012/2013. 
In addition, NARO is grappling with non-performance with regard to the 
completion of research studies, ostensibly due to insufficient, delayed and 
non-release of funds (Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Develop-
ment [MFPED], 2016).
Agriculture research is particularly constrained by two issues that oil 
revenues could help to resolve. First is the issue of financing. It is reported 
that the high cost of laboratory analyses and equipment, limited funding for 
supervision, delayed procurements and inadequate technical staff are some 
of the most crippling challenges affecting the performance of agricultural 
research in Uganda. Second is the issue of weak research-extension-farmer 
links. Uganda does not have an effective agricultural extension system, having 
restructured the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) in 
July 2014 to focus on input procurement and distribution. The role of exten-
sion has since been re-incorporated into the greater Ministry of Agriculture 
Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF) under the single-spine system. 
However, the current state of the extension system is challenged by huge 
human resource gaps that have undermined agricultural productivity. The 
revenues from the oil sector could, therefore, be strategically used to solve 
some of the challenges of agricultural research and extension by enabling 
more reasonable resource allocations.
Water for Production and Climate-smart Agriculture
Another area where oil revenues could be used to transform the agricultural 
sector in Uganda is through investments in water for production. Increased 
episodes of climate variability mean that Uganda faces frequent and sometimes 
prolonged periods of drought and floods that result in losses of agricultural 
output. Mwaura, Katunze, Muhumuza and Shinyekwa (2014) estimate that 
such losses cost up to 8 per cent of gross domestic product in Uganda in 
the year 2010 alone. These losses could be avoided with adequate invest-
ment in water for production and climate-smart agricultural technologies. 
Unfortunately, the adoption of irrigation technology is low in Uganda. Only 
0.59 per cent of farming households applied modern irrigation techniques 
on their plots in 2014 (see Figure 7.5), fewer than in 2011 when the adoption 
rate was 2.59 per cent.
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This low adoption of water for production techniques poses risks to food 
security, poverty traps and missed opportunities to enhance human develop-
ment outcomes and social and economic transformation. These risks provide 
compelling evidence of the potential gains from investing in appropriate 
irrigation technologies to improve agricultural productivity for social develop-
ment. Earlier efforts to improve water for production by investing in valley 
dams in some of the country’s most vulnerable districts were patterned with 
political capture, rent seeking and allegations of fraud. If governance issues 
around expenditure and the selection of projects can be resolved, the oil 
revenues could be used to scale up investments in water for production and 
irrigation, especially for smallholder farmers who are most vulnerable.
Investing in Warehouse Receipt Systems
Productivity in the agricultural sector has remained low on account of limited 
opportunities for value addition, commercialisation, trade, and the weak links 
to manufacturing. In many ways, investing in warehouse receipt systems can 
alleviate some of these challenges by minimising, among others, post-harvest 
losses, and encouraging agriculture commercialisation and trade through 
bulking and collective marketing (Katunze, Kuteesa, Mijumbi and Mahebe, 
2017). In addition, investments in agricultural technologies can be encouraged 
when farmers know that prices are protected and markets guaranteed. With 












Source: Author’s computations based on data from the 2011 and 2014 Uganda National 
Household Survey (UNHS) datasets. Available at: http://www.ubos.org/unda/index.php/catalog
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such systems in place barriers to innovations in agricultural insurance and 
climate-smart technologies can be greatly reduced. Moreover, warehouse 
house receipts can be traded or even used as collateral, thus facilitating access 
to credit. Thus, they have the capacity to transform and drive efficiency in 
agricultural markets. Therefore, using part of the oil resources to fast track 
the development of the warehouse receipt system is one way in which oil 
revenues could be used to drive agricultural transformation.
Agricultural Financing
Lastly, a major constraint that oil revenues could help to ease in order to support 
growth in agricultural productivity is the challenge of access to financing. 
There have been a number of interventions that have tried to improve access to 
credit, especially by smallholder farmers. These include interventions through 
the microfinance support centre, the prosperity for all programme and the 
agricultural credit facility. However, the impact of these interventions has been 
minimal for a number of reasons. First the interventions were scattered across 
ministries and departments, thus enlisting weak implementation and coordina-
tion. Financing of agriculture is also inhibited by the various risks, particularly 
the lack of bankable agricultural projects that are attractive to commercial lenders 
and the inherent climate risk that many insurance companies are not willing 
to pick up. The result is that financing of agriculture has averaged less than 10 
per cent of total private-sector credit over the past three years (see Figure 7.6).
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160 JOsePh maWeJJe
Some of these challenges can be overcome through measures to improve 
governance in the sector to ensure that any additional financing to the 
sector yields the expected results. One way through which oil revenues 
can support agricultural financing is by expanding the available financing, 
particularly the Agricultural Credit Facility which is operationalised through 
participating commercial banks and subsidised by the State to provide 
cheaper loans.
7.4.2 Human Capital Development
Uganda has one of the fastest growing populations in the world. Popula-
tion growth rates are estimated at about 3.2 per cent, meaning that the 
population can potentially double every 20–23 years. Indeed, according 
to some projections, the population will grow to more than 80 million 
by 2040. The high population growth rate has persisted because of the 
high fertility rate, estimated at about 5.9 children per woman. Because of 
this high fertility rate, the population is guaranteed to continue growing 
even if the fertility rate drops to 2 births per woman in accordance with 
the Vision 2040 aspirations. Indeed, the population would continue to 
grow and only stabilise at about 170 million people by about the year 2100 
(Uganda National Planning Authority [NPA], 2014). With such high 
fertility rates, investments in education and health have not kept pace 
with the growing population, with deleterious consequences for human 
development. Consequently, the potentially transformative effects of a 
demographic dividend might not be realised (United Nations Development 
Programme [UNDP], 2015).
Uganda can ensure sustained social and economic transformation if oil 
resources are used to ramp up investments in human capital so as to improve 
the capabilities and productivity of the population. In particular, focus should 
be on improving the outcomes in education and ensuring that the labour 
force, particularly the youth, is adequately skilled; and focusing on health 
outcomes, including efforts to reduce child and maternal mortality.
Improving the Quality of Education and Skills Development
The education sector in Uganda introduced reforms targeted at increas-
ing literacy and numeracy by encouraging increased school enrolment. 
Universal primary education was introduced in 1997, and later a universal 
post-primary education and training (UPPET) programme was introduced in 
2007. As a direct result of these reforms, school enrolment rates initially rose 
quickly. However, gains in enrolment were not matched by commensurate 
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improvements in attainment and the overall progress has not been sustained: 
school enrolment rates have stagnated, completion rates are low and literacy 
rates have not improved much. This has been due to a combination of limited 
funding that has constrained investments in infrastructure and training to 
improve the quality of teachers to keep pace with the growing population. 
These challenges have affected teacher motivation leading to absenteeism. 
In addition, the situation reflects a much larger problem of underfunding to 
the education sector.
In effect, government expenditure on education as a percentage of both 
total expenditure and total GDP has been falling since the early 2000s. For 
example, education expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure has 
declined from 20 per cent in 2004 to 12 per cent in 2011 (see Figure 7.7). Thus, 
improvements in education infrastructure and spending have not kept pace 
with the increasing population. In addition, the quality of such expenditure 
has been poor with many schools and laboratories poorly constructed and 
maintained. At the school level, the central government transfers approxi-
mately UGX 50,000 (US$ 14) for each pupil over the primary cycle of seven 
years. Unfortunately, this amount has not been adjusted for price changes 
since the inception of UPE.
The challenges in Uganda’s education system, particularly at the primary 
level, have been highlighted by a recent World Bank evaluation of service 
delivery in the sector. The World Bank service delivery indicators (SDI) 
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study in education showed that only 19.5 per cent of teachers have the 
minimum expected knowledge and mastery of the curriculum they teach; 
teacher school absenteeism was estimated at 26.0 per cent, and textbooks 
were available to only 5.0 per cent of the pupils. These results show that 
service delivery in Uganda’s education sector is lagging behind that of 
other East African countries for which comparable data is available. In 
particular, teacher ability, effort, knowledge and availability of inputs are 
lower in Uganda (see Table 7.1). In addition, Uganda has relatively crowded 
classrooms, as observed through the pupil-teacher ratio of 47.9 compared to 
35.2 in Kenya and 43.5 in Tanzania. Consequently, survival rates to primary 
Table 7.1: Education Service Delivery in Selected East African Countries
Uganda (2013) Kenya (2012) Tanzania 
(2014)
Teacher ability
Minimum knowledge (% teachers) 19.5 40.4 21.5
Test scores (out of 100) 45.3 57.1 48.3
Teacher effort
School absence rate (% of teachers) 26.0 14.1 14.4
Classroom absence rate (% of 
teachers)
52.8 42.1 46.7
Scheduled teaching time 7h 18min 5h 37min 5h 54min
Time spent teaching 3h 18min 2h 49min 2h 46min
Availability of inputs
Observed pupil-teacher ratio 47.9 35.2 43.5
Textbook availability (% pupils) 5.0 48.0 25.3
Minimum equipment availability (% 
classrooms)
80.6 78.8 61.4
Minimum infrastructure availability 53.7 59.5 40.4
Pupil learning
Language test score (out of 100) 47.1 75.4 36.5
Mathematics test score (out of 100) 43.4 59.0 58.2
Source: Wane and Martin (2015a, p.10).
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seven, primary seven completion rates, numeracy and literacy rates are very 
low (Uwezo, 2016).
The universal primary education programme has helped to keep the 
primary school enrolment rate high, mainly due to free primary education. 
Unfortunately, more than half of the pupils drop out of school before complet-
ing primary school. Keeping children in school by creating a conducive study 
environment and investing in both teachers and infrastructure is one way 
through which the oil resources could contribute to the education of Uganda. 
Equally worrying is that enrolment in secondary schools has remained low, 
occasioned by the rather high drop-out rates during primary school and the 
low progression rate from primary to secondary level. These challenges have 
made skilling the population a challenge because the primary and secondary 
schools have not been effective in imparting the necessary pedagogical bases 
necessary for onward skilling. Improving service delivery and skilling the 
youth, therefore, is one area where oil revenues can support the education 
sector to improve the social and economic outcomes.
There are ongoing efforts to improve the skilling of the youth. The Uganda 
Petroleum Institute Kigumba has been revamped with a special focus on 
providing skills for the oil and gas sector. However, given that government 
policy is looking to diversify the economy to support also the non-oil sectors, 
oil revenues can support the development of skilling centres in other non-oil 
activities in line with the diversification strategy. Improving service delivery 
using additional resources from the oil sector should be done in the awareness 
of the likely rent seeking and fraud that usually undermine the performance 
of expenditures in Uganda. Circumventing these challenges requires that 
funding is conditioned upon specific outcomes.
Improving the Quality of Health Service Delivery
The health sector in Uganda attracted increasing funding during the early 
1990s through to the 2000s. This increased funding, however, was driven 
mainly by external actors. During 1995–2010 external resources for health 
increased from 12 per cent and reached 51 per cent. The increase in external 
development financing, which was usually targeted at specific projects, has 
led to phenomenal improvements in health sector outcomes over the past 
years. For instance, births attended by skilled workers have increased from 
38 per cent during 1990–1995 to 60 per cent during 2011–2015. Likewise, 
improvements have been recorded in various measures of mortality and 
access to basic healthcare including for HIV/AIDS and malaria.
Fertility rates have also started declining and averaged 5.92 during 2011–
2015, down from 7.06 children per woman during 1990–1995. Consequently, 
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life expectancy has increased from an average of 44.2 during 1990–1995 to 
63 in 2014, as indicated in Table 7.2.
However, external financing started declining in 2011. By 2013 external 
financing to the health sector reached 35 per cent and is set to continue 
declining due to changing landscapes for external development finance (see 
Figure 7.8). Therefore, the authorities in Uganda ought to start looking for 
innovative and alternative sources of financing to sustain the improvements in 
health outcome indicators. Oil revenues could play an important role here by 
helping to plug the financing deficits in the health sector. In addition, service 
delivery in the health sector has been deteriorating on account of reduced 
funding, increasing population, and reduced motivation of health workers. 
In particular, like in many departments, the health sector has suffered from 
low budgeting for operations and maintenance, meaning that much of the 
infrastructural stock has been deteriorating with minimum provisions for 
repair.











Births attended by skilled health staff 
(% of total)
37.80 36.90 41.90 58.00 60
Maternal mortality ratio (national estimate, 
per 100,000 live births)
529.00 524.00 418.00 432.00 -
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births) 105.92 95.42 76.86 55.96 41.44
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live 
births)
177.95 158.78 124.20 86.68 61.14
Fertility rate, total (births per woman) 7.06 6.93 6.71 6.33 5.92
Antiretroviral therapy coverage 
(% of  people living with HIV)
- - 3.60 15.00 38.50
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population 
ages 15–49)
12.62 9.12 6.80 6.76 7.15
Under 5 children with fever receiving 
antimalarial drugs, % 
- - 61.00 64.50 -
Life expectancy 44.20 45.02 49.60 54.40 63.3
Source: Author’s computations based on data from the World Development Indica-
tors, The World Bank, 2017. Available at: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/
world-development-indicators.
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A service delivery survey of health facilities in Uganda by the World 
Bank indicated that Ugandan health service providers have relatively lower 
caseloads per day (6.0) compared to providers in Kenya (15.2) and Tanzania 
(7.3) (see Table 7.3). This might be attributed to lower demand for health 
services in Uganda. Despite this lower caseload, Uganda’s score on service 
delivery indicators such as absence from a health facility (46.7 per cent), 
diagnostic accuracy (58.1 per cent), adherence to clinical guidelines (41.4 per 
cent), management of maternal and neonatal complications (19.3 per cent), 
drug availability (47.2 per cent) and equipment availability (21.9 per cent) 
are all low and worse than in Kenya and Tanzania.
These poor service delivery outcomes are obtained despite Uganda having 
better health infrastructure availability (63.5 per cent) than both Kenya (46.8 
per cent) and Tanzania (50.0 per cent). While achieving improvements in 
some of the indicators does not require increases in budget allocations, others, 
particularly equipment and drugs availability, require budgetary increments. 
In addition, many social workers in Uganda, including in the health sector, 
are de-motivated owing to poor working conditions, the unavailability of 
equipment and drugs, and poor pay. Some of these challenges might explain 
the poor efficiency within health service delivery. Oil revenues can provide 
the financing necessary to ensure that drugs, equipment and infrastructure 







2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)
Health expenditure, public (% of government expenditure)
Source: Author’s computations based on data drawn from the World Development 
Indicators, The World Bank, 2017. Available at: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/
world-development-indicators.
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are in place. In addition, improving the remuneration of health workers 
and investing in the logistics management systems to ensure efficient drug 
distribution and delivery would improve outcomes in the health sector. 
But the complete overhaul of the health systems will require improving the 
institutional set-up in which the different actors operate. In other words, 
oil revenues alone cannot solve some of the service delivery challenges; 
interventions are required to tackle the governance issues surrounding service 
delivery in the health sector.
Expanding Social Protection
In addition to investments in education and health, oil revenues could be 
spent on ensuring social protection, particularly for the elderly and vulnerable. 
Uganda is already piloting a social protection grant under the Expanding 
Social Protection Programme (ESPP) with funding from DFID. The major 
objective of the programme is to reduce material deprivation, increase 
economic security, reduce social exclusion and increase access to services. 
While the programme has registered positive outcomes such as reduced 
poverty and increased demand for social services, there are concerns over 
its sustainability and scalability (Oxford Policy Management et al., 2013). 
These challenges can be overcome if a proportion of oil and gas revenues is 
invested and a part of the proceeds is used each year to offer social security 
for the vulnerable in Uganda.








Caseload (per provider per day) 6.0 15.2 7.3
Absence from facility (% providers) 46.7 27.5 14.3
Diagnostic accuracy (% providers) 58.1 72.2 60.2
Adherence to clinical guidelines (% clinical cases) 41.4 43.7 43.8
Management of maternal and neonatal complications 
(% clinical guidelines)
19.3 44.6 30.4
Drug availability (% drugs) 47.2 54.2 60.3
Equipment availability (% facilities) 21.9 76.4 83.5
Infrastructure availability (% facilities) 63.5 46.8 50.0
Source: Wane and Martin (2015b, p.10).
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7.4.3 Harnessing the Demographic Dividend
One possible area that will facilitate the sustained attainment of both social 
and economic goals from the use of oil resources pertains to investments that 
will harness the demographic dividend. Capturing the demographic dividend 
will entail pursuing investments that will increase labour productivity by tak-
ing advantage of a changing demographic structure and population dynamics. 
Uganda’s population is fairly young: 82 per cent of the population is below the 
age of 35, with 60 per cent below the age of 20 and 18 per cent below the age of 
5. With this very young population structure, the dependency ratios are very 
high. Results from the 2014 Census showed that for every 100 economically 
active people, there are 103 dependants (UBOS, 2014). Such high dependency 
ratios stifle social and economic progress because they alter savings and 
investment decisions and perpetuate poverty to a significant degree.
There are a number of ways through which oil revenues could be invested 
in ways that can fast-track capturing the demographic dividend. Some of 
these investments, such as interventions in health, education, and skilling, 
have been discussed earlier. Accelerating the demographic transition requires 
sustained investment to reduce mortality and fertility, while improving 
the skills sets and productivity of the population. With falling fertility and 
mortality rates, the country can quickly transit into a period of rapidly falling 
dependence ratios. With fewer dependants, a larger share of working age 
population can then lead to improved standards of living if the right mix of 
supportive policies is implemented.
One such policy should be aimed at ending child marriages. Uganda’s 
fertility rate has not declined fast enough and is estimated at 5.9 children 
per woman, significantly higher than the Sub-Saharan average of about 4.8 
children per woman. With these high fertility rates, population growth rates 
have remained high, stabilising at around 3 per cent per annum, significantly 
straining improvements in service delivery. Child marriage is commonplace 
in Uganda. The World Bank (2017) estimates that three in ten girls have 
their first child before their eighteenth birthday, and more than one in three 
marry before the age of 18. As a consequence, both child marriage and early 
child-bearing account for 25 per cent of school drop-outs for girls aged 10–18 
years, exacerbating low educational attainment.
Ending child marriage would reduce fertility by up to 8 per cent nationally, 
and potentially lower the overall population growth rate by close to 0.2 per 
cent. Moreover, child marriage is associated with other agency costs that 
include higher risks for stillbirths, stunting, child mortality and gender-based 
violence. Moreover, ending child marriage improves labour participation 
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rates for women with significant knock-on effects for lifetime earnings and 
welfare (Wodon, Nguyen and Tsimpo, 2016). Overall, the economic and 
social costs of child marriage are large. Therefore, using oil resources to 
invest in girls’ education, end child marriage and prevent early childbearing 
would significantly contribute to efforts that would harness the demographic 
dividend and lead to better social and economic outcomes.
7.5 Conclusions
The development of the oil sector presents enormous opportunities for the 
social and economic development of Uganda. However, the realisation of 
these opportunities partly depends on the quality of investments that the 
Government chooses to undertake. In this chapter we have examined the 
investments that would probably have the largest positive impact on social 
and economic outcomes in Uganda. The development of the oil and gas 
sector comes at a time when Uganda’s economy is experiencing multiple 
domestic and external shocks. There is a risk that the current periods of low 
growth might reverse the gains in poverty reduction and socio-economic 
development. The Government has made it clear that oil resources will be used 
above all for the development of the country’s infrastructures, particularly 
in the transport and energy sectors. This position is understandable, given 
the huge infrastructural deficits the country is facing.
However, using oil resources to ensure sustainable growth requires fol-
lowing a people-centred approach in which the capabilities of the people 
are enhanced so that they can participate better in the growth processes. 
This requires interventions that will promote and support human capital 
development, in particular by improving people’s health, education and 
skills outcomes. Transforming the sectors that provide the most livelihood 
opportunities is also key. In Uganda’s case, investments that would improve 
agricultural productivity, health and education systems, as well as deepening 
social protection systems, should therefore be prioritised. In addition, sup-
porting young girls to achieve their full potential by addressing the social, 
cultural and economic issues that perpetuate early child marriages, early 
childbearing, and eventually leading to low educational attainments is critical.
This chapter has discussed how these issues can be approached. In the 
agricultural sector, oil revenues can be used to improve productivity by fund-
ing research and development, water for production, agricultural financing 
and the development of warehouse receipt systems to facilitate value addition 
and commercialisation. With regard to human capital development and 
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improving the capabilities of the population, focus should be on skilling the 
labour force through the prioritisation of technical and vocation education 
away from the current policy that has favoured universities. In addition, 
improving service delivery in both the education and health sectors and 
deepening social protection are key interventions that could be financed 
with oil revenues. Particular attention should be placed on governance by 
scrutinising all planned expenditures to avoid instances of rent-seeking, 
fraud and/or corruption. Lastly, better social outcomes can be forged through 
harnessing the demographic dividend by improving schooling outcomes, 
especially for girls. Higher educational outcomes will positively affect people’s 
lifetime earnings and overall welfare.
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8 
Getting a Good Deal? An Analysis of 
Uganda’s Oil Fiscal Regime
Wilson Bahati Kazi
8.1 Introduction
Uganda has discovered large quantities of recoverable oil reserves since 2006. 
In August 2016, Uganda granted eight production licences to a range of joint 
venture partners, including Tullow Uganda Limited (TUL), China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and Total E&P Uganda Limited (Kazi 
and Beyeza, 2017). The revenues from these licences are estimated to be in the 
region of US$ 1.5 billion a year for the duration of the different oil fields (Kazi 
and Beyeza, 2017). The relationship between the Ugandan government and 
the different international oil companies is governed by so-called production-
sharing agreements (PSAs). PSAs stipulate precisely what proportion the 
Government gets, and how much of production will be retained by the oil 
company (Global Witness, 2014). PSAs regulate the relationship between 
governments and the oil companies. The oil companies need licences to 
operate. The Government uses the licensing system to grant exclusive rights 
to companies to explore for and extract the oil. Licences are therefore a key 
element of PSAs, which are at the heart of the oil fiscal regime.1
The key issue to be addressed in the design of fiscal terms is how the 
investment costs are recovered and the profits shared (Kazi and Beyeza, 
2017). The fiscal terms must enable Government to maximise returns from 
its oil resources by encouraging the appropriate levels of exploration and 
development activities, as well as enabling oil companies to build equity 
while maximising returns on investment by finding and producing oil in 
the most cost-effective way (Kazi and Beyeza, 2017). The Centre for Energy 
Economics (2007) posited that the fiscal terms which deliver a fair return to 
1 Exploration licences give the exclusive right to companies to explore for oil within a given 
timeframe and specific area, while production licences give oil companies that have discovered 
oil the exclusive right to extract the oil in a specific area (see Global Witness, 2014).
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both a government and an investing oil company must discourage unnecessary 
speculation, limit excessive administrative and compliance costs, and should 
be flexible enough to ensure healthy competition and market efficiency. 
The most common oil sector fiscal regime consists of production-sharing, 
income tax, royalties, annual surface rentals and bonus payments (Sunley, 
Baunsgaard and Simard, 2002).
In this chapter we will analyse the basic fiscal instruments being used or 
developed by Uganda for oil revenue generation and collection. We will also 
examine the returns from the fiscal regime in terms of realised and unrealised 
revenues and critically evaluate and assess the main strengths and weaknesses 
of Uganda’s oil fiscal regime in terms of sustainability, effectiveness and 
expected revenue returns. The chapter will proceed as follows. Section 2 
covers Uganda’s legal-institutional framework for oil revenue administration. 
Section 3 provides a systematic overview of the main fiscal instruments and 
issues associated with oil revenue generation and collection. Section 4 then 
contains an analysis of the revenues collected so far and also reviews the 
anticipated oil revenues. Section 5 subsequently analyses the main strengths 
and weaknesses of Uganda’s fiscal oil regime. Section 6 concludes and offers 
some policy reflections.
8.2 Legal-Institutional Framework for Oil Revenue 
Administration
The legal framework for Uganda’s oil revenue administration is derived from 
the PSAs,2 the revenue laws,3 the upstream law,4 the midstream law,5 the 
Public Finance Management Act, 2015,6 the National Oil and Gas Policy and 
the Oil and Gas Revenue Management Policy. These laws define the scope of 
oil revenues7 and how the revenue will be collected, reported and accounted 
2 These can be classified into pre-2008 PSA and the 2012 PSAs. This is because Uganda signed 
its first PSAs before 2008 and others in 2012.
3 These include the Income Tax Act, Stamp Act, Customs Management Act, VAT Act, and 
Traffic and Road Safety Act.
4 Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act, 2013.
5 Petroleum (Refining, Conversion, Transmission and Midstream Storage) Act, 2013.
6 See Ministr y of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Uganda Public 
Finance Management Act 2015, retrieved from: https://f inance.go.ug/test/ser vices/
uganda-public-finance-management-act-2015/.
7 The royalties, taxes, bonus payments, dividends, premiums, and in‐kind revenues will be 
reported on a gross basis, indicating all adjustments required in official fiscal documents (oil and 
gas revenue management policy, 2012).
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for. The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) and the Directorate of Petroleum 
(DOP) are responsible for the assessment and collection of the tax and non-tax 
revenues respectively from the oil industry. The Uganda national oil company 
(UNOC) will be responsible for receiving and marketing the Government’s 
share of profit oil and the UNOC, as government nominee, has elected to 
take the Government’s participating interest in all the production licences 
so far issued at a level of 15 per cent, as provided for in the respective PSAs. 
The Bank of Uganda (BoU) will manage the petroleum fund on behalf of the 
Government. The Auditor-General’s Office is responsible for ensuring that 
the petroleum fund is prudently managed and there is value for money in its 
application. The Petroleum Authority of Uganda (PAU) will monitor and 
regulate the exploration, development and production activities. All these 
institutions are mandated with the collection and prudent management of 
the oil revenues.
8.3 Overview of Fiscal Instruments
The oil sector is characterised by substantial economic rents, perverse price 
uncertainty, information asymmetry, high sunk costs with long production 
periods and extensive involvement of international oil companies (Kazi and 
Beyeza, 2017). Gudmestad, Zolotukhin and Jarlsby (2010) postulated that 
oil and gas resources provide an extraordinary rate of resource rent. For 
these reasons, a special tax regime rooted in the rent theory is needed for 
the oil sector, taking into account these peculiarities (Mazee, 2010). The tax 
handles for Uganda’s upstream oil are royalties,8 cost recovery, production 
sharing, corporate tax, ring-fencing, capital gains tax (CGT),9 windfall 
profits tax, non-tax revenues10 and indirect taxes (Kazi and Sarker, 2012). In 
this chapter the authors concentrate mainly on upstream taxes and not the 
indirect taxes which are more associated with the midstream and downstream 
oil operations. The regime delivers 67.5 per cent of ‘profit oil’ to Government 
and 32.5 per cent to oil companies. Uganda’s oil fiscal regime emphasises 
fiscal responsibility and sustainability (Kazi and Sarker, 2012). The African 
8 In addition to the daily production royalty, the 2012 PSAs introduced a new cumulative 
production royalty (see article 10 of the 2012 PSAs).
9 The ITA of Uganda imposes CGT on gain from the direct or indirect transfer of an interest 
in a petroleum agreement, and share disposals in a company whose property principally consists 
directly or indirectly of an interest or interests in immovable property located in Uganda.
10 Annual surface rentals, signature and discovery bonuses, training fees, and stamp duty are 
among the non-tax revenues provided for in Uganda’s PSAs.
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Development Bank (2009) states that proxies for profit, the internal rate of 
return and the Government’s take determine which oil fiscal regime a country 
should adopt. Sunley et al. (2012) pointed out that evidence suggests that oil 
fiscal terms endogenously respond to global oil prices.
The Government can benefit from oil production through royalties, profit 
oil share and corporate taxes on the oil company’s profits. This implies that 
if a project fails the Government does not suffer any loss but the contractor 
does. The recoverable costs from production net of royalties are reduced by 
the value of cost oil received, with any unrecovered costs carried forward to 
later years until full recovery is made. It should be noted that this is not a tax 
or any kind of relief like indemnity, but is simply the recovery of expenditure 
incurred by the oil company. PSAs are contractual in nature, with the Govern-
ment retaining resource ownership and the approvals of the oil company 
budgets, work programmes, expenditure, procurement and employment, 
while the oil company provides finance, equipment and technology required 
for the exploitation of the oil resource (Kazi and Beyeza, 2017). Thus, the oil 
produced is shared between Government and the company at negotiated 
production-sharing percentages (Kazi and Beyeza, 2017).
8.3.1 Royalty and Additional Royalty
In addition to the single royalty in the pre-2008 PSAs11 that is based on daily 
production, the 2012 PSAs contain an additional royalty based on cumulative 
production which, according to Global Witness (2014), is an unusual PSA 
revenue provision in favour of Uganda. With the additional royalty, revenue 
will continue to accrue even when oil extraction starts declining because the 
cumulative royalty is assessed based on the amount of oil extracted from 
the time production started. This implies that, with an increased rate of oil 
production, the rate of royalty due to Government increases. Royalties will be 
collected on a monthly basis.12 The PSAs of Uganda provide for incremental 
royalties. Because royalties are deducted from production before cost recovery, 
they guarantee upfront revenue for Government soon after production begins. 
The royalty on gross daily production will be charged at rates of between 5 
and 12.5 per cent (see Figure 8.1 below), depending on the level of production, 
while additional royalty on cumulative production will be charged at rates 
of between 2.5 and 5per cent (see Figure 8.2 below). Thus, Uganda’s royalty 
11 For the purposes of this chapter, all PSAs signed in 2008 and before are referred to as ‘pre-2008 
PSAs’ while those PSAs signed in 2012 are referred to as ‘the 2012 PSAs’.
12 See article 10 of the 2012 PSAs, p.26.
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regime has an in-built profit element.13 Royalty payments are tiered, so if daily 
production was 6,000 barrels then the company would pay 5 per cent on the 
first 2,500, 7.5 per cent on the next 2,500 and 10 per cent on the remaining 
1,000 (Global Witness, 2014).
8.3.2 Cost Recovery
The recoverable costs are pooled together each year and reduced by the cost 
oil received. In other words, cost oil refers to an oil company’s entitlement 
to production as cost recovery under a PSA. This means that an oil company 
gets cost oil from which it deducts recoverable cost when commercial oil 
production has commenced. The Uganda PSAs provide that the amount to be 
retained as cost oil is 60 per cent of total oil production after deducting royalty. 
If cost oil is less than the costs available for recovery, any unrecovered costs 
are carried forward to subsequent years until their full recovery.is completed. 
However, if cost oil is more than the recoverable costs, the excess of the cost 
oil forms part of the profit oil. It is worth noting here that recoverable costs 
incurred in respect of licence area can only be offset against oil produced 
from that area. This practice, called ‘ring-fencing’, prevents companies from 
recovering costs for areas where no commercially viable oil reserves are 
found. Therefore, such costs are borne by the company. The Government 
must approve recoverable costs before they can be reduced from cost oil. 
This is likely to raise governance issues such as rent seeking and corruption, 
which might ultimately pose a risk of revenue leakage.
8.3.3 Production-sharing
Once the company deducts 60 per cent from total production as cost recovery 
after royalty, what remains is profit oil. The size of profit oil depends on the 
international price of crude oil, the project’s internal rate of return and also 
the size of any surplus of cost oil over the amount needed for cost recovery. 
According to the 2012 PSAs, the Government’s share of profit oil will be 67.5 
per cent and 32.5 per cent for the company at peak production. The share of 
profit oil due to the Government will be received and marketed by UNOC. 
The profit oil split will depend on the level of production; for example, as 
production increases so will the Government’s share, while the company 
share will decline (see Figure 8.3 below). The negotiated profit split ratios 
13 See Chile, Thailand, etc for details of royalty regimes with some profit element (Sunley et al., 
2002).
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between Government and the oil companies give PSAs a built-in flexibility 
which helps to offset differences between basins and licensed areas (Kazi 
and Beyeza, 2017).
8.3.4 Income Tax
Prior to 2008, there was no specific taxation regime provision for oil operations 
in ITA, though the PSAs contained some tax provisions. In 2008, Part IXA, 
containing a specific tax code in relation to petroleum operations, was inserted 
in the 1997 ITA through the Income Tax (Amendment) Act of 2008.14 This 
issue of whether the ITA or PSA was the one applicable in the context of 
taxes was prominent during the CGT disputes, as oil companies urged that 
the tax clauses of the PSA took precedence over the ITA when it came to 
the taxation of oil operations, including the transfer of an interest in an oil 
licence (see Uganda Legal Information Institute, 2014). The amendment was 
meant to clarify the ambiguity as well as plug the potential tax loopholes in 
the taxation of oil operations. In the provisions it is stated that in the event 
14 In addition to providing for the taxation of upstream petroleum operations, this part of ITA 
also has special provisions dealing with the taxation of mining operations.
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of an inconsistency between Part IXA of ITA and PSAs, as well as other 
provisions of the ITA, Part IXA takes precedence.
The profit oil share of the company attracts 30 per cent corporation tax in ac-
cordance with the ITA. And any distributions of company profits (dividends) 
after corporation tax will attract 15 per cent withholding tax in the hands of 
the shareholder. The ITA thus provides for a comprehensive set of income 
tax rules that accords with the commercial principles under which the oil 
sector operates. These provisions clarify and provide certainty on how oil 
sector activities will be treated for income tax purposes.
8.3.5 Ring-fencing
Corporation tax is a key element of an oil PSA imposed on the ‘taxable income’ 
of a contractor computed on a block-by-block basis. The costs incurred in 
respect of one block cannot be used to reduce income from other blocks 
(see 1.3.2 Cost recovery. above). Ring-fencing bars consolidation of income 
and deductions for tax purposes across various oil activities and projects 
undertaken by the same taxpayer. ‘Ring-fence’ applies to both income and 
expenditures. By ring-fencing tax accounts of individual blocks in accordance 
with the provisions of the PSAs, corporate tax deferral is effectively curtailed 
(Kazi and Beyeza, 2017). This measure helps to streamline oil taxation in 
order to secure government revenues.
8.3.6 International Tax Issues in the Oil Sector
In the context of the oil sector, the size of the corporate tax base depends 
on the amount of contract costs incurred and any profit-shifting practices 
adopted by the multinational oil companies (MNCs) (Kazi and Beyeza, 2017). 
In this section we focus on the practices used by MNCs to shift profits and 
reduce their corporation tax base in order to minimise their tax liabilities.
Thin Capitalisation
Thin capitalisation rules prevent financing structures with high debt-equity 
ratios. Interest expense is tax deductible while dividend is not, so high debt to 
equity can reduce taxable profits and hence tax payable. Sunley et al. (2002) 
stated that thin capitalisation affects interest deductibility and corporation tax 
base. Under this rule, interest payments of thinly capitalised companies are 
disallowed and taxed as constructive dividends in some countries. In Uganda, 
interest deductible is restricted to the foreign debt to foreign equity ratio of 
1.5:1 (Kazi and Beyeza, 2017). The excess amount of interest is disallowed for 
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corporation tax purposes. However, unlike in the UK and other countries, 
Uganda does not treat the disallowed interest portion as a constructive 
dividend, and therefore does not impose withholding tax on it. Note that if 
interest deductibility were not restricted, MNCs would use excessive loan 
finance in order to utilise the interest thereon to shift profits to associated 
companies domiciled in tax havens. The measure therefore limits tax avoidance 
through the use of low-taxed interest payments in line with the base erosion 
and profit shifting (BEPS) project of the Group of 20 countries (G20) and 
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
It should be noted, however, that effective from 1 July 2018, this thin 
capitalisation rule under section 89 of the ITA was repealed by the Income 
Tax (Amendment) Act, 2018 and replaced with a new interest deductibility 
limitation provision under section 25 of the same Act. The new rule requires 
that the amount of deductible interest in respect of all debts owed by a taxpayer 
who is a member of a group shall not exceed 30 per cent of the tax earnings 
before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA). Any interest 
amount that exceeds 30 per cent of the EBITDA shall be carried forward for 
a maximum period of three years. The excess interest is treated as incurred 
during the following year of income. This implies that deductible interest 
in a year of income is capped at 30 per cent of EBITDA and excess interest, 
if any, is deferred for deduction in the next three years of income, beyond 
which the excess interest cannot be claimed as deductible expense for income 
tax purposes. In other words, after three years of income, if there is still any 
excess interest it will be disallowed and taxed.
Transfer Pricing
Companies seek to minimise taxable profits through transfer pricing (Sunley 
et al., 2002). Transfer pricing can be used to shift profits between tax juris-
dictions in related party oil transactions.15 Baunsgaard (2014) stated that 
transfer-pricing risks in the oil sector can be minimised through the use of 
joint venture structures, standard output measures and prices. Observable 
physical operations, standardised measurements and benchmarking using 
international prices can assist in mitigating the transfer-pricing risk (Kazi and 
Beyeza, 2017). Uganda’s transfer-pricing regulations enacted in 2011 and the 
information exchange provisions in the DTAs are means designed to address 
15 Such transactions may involve the use of hedging instruments, leasing of equipment, plant 
and machinery, intra-group loans, high technical service fees and high management fee pay-outs 
(see Kazi and Beyeza, 2017).
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tax avoidance using cross-border transactions.16 The transfer-pricing regula-
tions, like the 2012 PSAs, require that related party transactions be reported 
at arm’s length price (i.e. the price that would be charged to an independent 
company for the same services or goods under similar conditions). They call 
for a comparability analysis to ensure that technical service fees paid to an 
associated company are at arm’s length. Global Witness (2014) observed that 
comparability analysis may be difficult to make in practice because there 
are relatively few comparable providers of technical services in East Africa, 
besides it being hard to determine the services rendered.
Treaty Shopping
Treaty shopping allows the unintended use of tax treaties by third country 
residents. This practice leads to loss of tax revenues in the source State; hence 
the anti-treaty shopping domestic law provisions. The anti-treaty shopping 
provision is contained in section 88(5) of ITA, but it is only section 88(5) 
that overrides any provisions of DTAs.17 This section was restructured 
following Heritage’s attempt to re-domicile from the Dominican Republic 
to Mauritius in order to avoid CGT on the sale of its oil interests to TUL 
because the DTA between Mauritius and Uganda exempts capital gains 
from tax. The domestic tax law criteria non-resident entities must fulfil 
in order to access DTA benefits such as reduced tax rate or an exemption 
were clarified to put limits to treaty shopping and curtail revenue leakage. 
Non-resident entities other than publicly listed companies will not access 
Ugandan treaty benefits unless: (a) they receive the income in a capacity other 
than that of a beneficial owner; (b) they do not have a full and unrestricted 
ability to enjoy that income and to determine its future uses; and (c) they 
do not possess economic substance in the country of residence (EY Global 
Tax Alert Library, 2017).
The above is a radical departure from the earlier limitation of benefit 
(LoB) rule that restricted the DTA benefits application in Uganda only to 
resident persons of the other contracting state where 50 per cent or more of 
the underlying ownership of that person was held by resident individuals 
of that other contracting State for purposes of the DTA. The anti-abuse 
provisions cannot operate effectively if not supplemented by the exchange 
16 These regulations are yet to be updated to bring them into line with the 2017 OECD TP 
regulations which take into account the BEPS action points 8–10 and 13 of the G20/OECD project.
17 Uganda has DTAs with Denmark, UK, South Africa, Mauritius, India, Zambia, the Neth-
erlands, Norway and Italy. In the case of inconsistencies between the DTA provisions and those 
of the ITA, the DTA provisions will prevail over the provisions of the ITA except in cases of tax 
avoidance.
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of information18 with other tax jurisdictions. Uganda is a signatory to the 
OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters 
(MAAC). This means it can now request for information about taxpayer 
operating in 104 countries to facilitate audits and investigations of MNCs, 
including those involved in oil sector.
8.3.7 State participation
Under the 2012 PSAs, Uganda will get 15% of the oil company’s share of profit 
oil under state participation provisions should government opt to exercise its 
right to participate in oil development and production. Indeed, through the 
UNOC, government elected to take its participating interest in all the eight 
production licences so far issued at a level of 15% in accordance with the PSAs 
(Kazi & Beyeza, 2017). The oil companies will meet Government’s costs but 
the companies are entitled to recover these costs, including interest at the 
London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR), out of the cost oil.
The government is therefore entitled to a proportion of the oil produced 
and saved from each contract area equal to its 15% interest in the joint venture 
assets (The 2012 PSAs). UNOC will dispose of the state’s share of profit oil 
at a price determined by the Multi-institutional committee19 and remit the 
sales proceeds to the Petroleum Fund operated and managed by BoU.20 
Uganda will be responsible for paying any taxes arising out of its share in 
the Joint Venture, and it will get its share of its participating interest directly 
or indirectly in the form of dividends taxable at 15% withholding tax. The 
government’s role as a regulator and shareholder (owner) in these oil licenses 
raises governance issues of conflicts of interest and corruption which may 
lead to revenue leakage. Given the level of institutional maturity in Uganda, it 
might be wise for government to focus on taxing and regulating oil activities 
for now and leave the oil operations to companies.
18 On 4 November 2015 Uganda became the 95th country to sign the Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MAAC). The deposit of the instrument of ratification 
was done on 25 May 2016 and the MAAC came into force in Uganda as law on 1 September 2016. 
Uganda also ratified the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) Agreement on Mutual 
Assistance in Tax Matters
19 The committee includes officials from the MFPED, MEMD, URA, and any other specialised 
agencies to be determined by the Finance Minister; the value of oil produced is a function of a price 
and the quantities. The quantities to be produced within a given period will be agreed between 
the Energy Ministry and the oil companies.
20 See Ministr y of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Uganda Public 
Finance Management Act, 2015, retrieved from: https://finance.go.ug/test/services/
uganda-public-finance-management-act-2015/.
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8.3.8 Capital Gains Tax (CGT)
Capital gains tax (CGT) is imposed on a gain made on the assignment or 
transfer of an interest in an oil licence from one contractor to another (see 
section 89G(a) of the ITA).21 The determination of a gain on disposal of an 
interest in an oil licence is governed by the provisions of the ITA. Taxable 
gains arise on the disposal of business assets such as company shares or 
commercial property and an interest in an oil licence either directly or indi-
rectly.22 An indirect transfer takes the form of the sale of shares in a company 
whose assets are principally immovable property23 located in Uganda. It 
often involves non-resident shareholders selling their interests to a resident 
company. Because of the difficulty of collecting taxes from non-residents, the 
CGT is paid by the resident oil company acting as an agent of the non-resident 
company. For example, the CGT of US$ 449 million on Heritage’s transfer 
of its assets to TUL was paid by TUL acting as the agent of Heritage.
CGT may also be triggered on a person24 (including oil companies) located 
in Uganda whose assets and liabilities are deemed to have been realised and 
re-acquired or re-stated through a direct or indirect change in its ownership 
by 50 per cent or more within a three-year period (section 75 of the ITA, as 
amended by the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 2018). The direct and indirect 
change of ownership of an entity located in Uganda gives rise to income 
(capital gains) sourced in Uganda.
It should be noted that CGT is not a reliable revenue source because it arises 
only when a business asset is transferred or assigned. Besides, it is difficult to 
determine the cost base of an oil interest where the interest in question is being 
transferred to a third owner. For instance, one of the issues contested when 
TUL disposed of the interest it had acquired from Heritage to Total E&P and 
CNOOC was the determination of the cost base. In practice, the cost base is 
the base price paid for the interest plus incidental costs of the disposal. The 
incidental costs include contingent, guarantee and commitment fees, stamp 
duty on acquisition, legal fees and signature bonuses. Should the costs not yet 
recovered by the transferor under the cost recovery clauses be part of the cost 
21 This includes the transfer of the whole or part of the interest in a petroleum agreement.
22 ‘Business asset’ means an asset which is used or held ready for use in a business, and includes 
any asset held for sale in a business and any asset of a partnership or company. For capital gains 
purposes business asset excludes trading stock and a depreciable asset (see the ITA);
23 Improvable property is defined to include ‘any intangible asset which is a business asset or 
any part of the business’ (see Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 2018).
24 Person excludes an individual, a government, a political subdivision of government and a 
listed institution.
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base of the asset? These are pertinent issues that must be clearly addressed if 
Government is to get its fair share of revenue on any transfer of an oil interest.
As a result of the CGT disputes, the current PSAs clearly provide that the 
transfer of an oil interest shall attract CGT in accordance with the ITA, and 
that tax disputes in relation to the PSAs shall be handled in accordance with 
the dispute resolution mechanisms stipulated under the Laws of Uganda (see 
the 2012 PSAs). Global Witness (2014) maintains that the Uganda-Heritage 
arbitration in London over the CGT assessment relating to the 2010 farm-
down to TUL was far from settled.
8.3.9 Oil-related Non-tax Revenues (NTRs)
Non-Tax Revenues (NTRs) are an important source of revenue for government 
during the pre-production phase of oil. These NTRs include bonuses, annual 
surface rentals, training and development fees, proceeds from the sale of oil 
data and of the oil refinery feasibility study report. The NTRs are assessed 
and collected by the DOP of the Energy Ministry. The 2012 PSAs provide 
for the collection of US$ 300,000 in signature bonuses and US$ 2,000,000 as 
discovery bonus. The annual surface rental of US$ 7.50 per square kilometre for 
an area under an exploration licence is collectable, while it is US$ 500 per square 
kilometre for an area under a production licence. The company exploring for 
oil is required to pay US$ 37,500 half yearly, and on the grant of a production 
licence US$ 200,000 annually to cater for oil-related training and development 
of Ugandans.25 Stamp duty is also collectable on the registration of oil contracts 
and performance security (for example, insurance bonds and bank guarantees) 
and on transfers of oil interests at the rate of between 0.5 and 1.5 per cent. NTRs 
motivate oil companies to explore and develop oil in a licensed block rapidly and 
they are easy for Government to administer and for companies to comply with.26
8.4 An Analysis of Uganda’s Oil Revenues: Looking Back 
and Looking Ahead
The oil sector will generate a significant number of revenue streams for 
Uganda. Oil revenues will be collected either in cash or in kind (Kazi and 
25 The government personnel that have so far benefited from this training are officials of BoU, 
URA, the Energy Ministry, the Finance Ministry and officials of any other government agency 
concerned with oil exploitation.
26 W.B. Kazi and B. Beyeza, supra n. 3.
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Beyeza, 2017). The organs mandated to assess and collect oil-sector revenues in 
Uganda are URA, DOP and UNOC.27 The in-kind revenues will be collected 
by UNOC and disposed of in the manner provided for under the PFMA, 2015. 
The revenues must be transparently collected in a coordinated manner using 
streamlined revenue collection and reporting systems. Oil receipts collected 
by each organ shall be transmitted to the petroleum fund under the BoU. In 
the next two sub-sections we will examine how much oil revenue has been 
collected since 2001, and how much revenue can be realistically expected to 
flow to the Government in the future.
8.4.1 Revenues Collected
There are currently 40,385 barrels of the non-flared crude oil from well testing 
in stock.28 The Government plans to sell this crude oil on a competitive basis. 
Taking the June 2017 international crude oil price of US$ 60.43 per barrel 
as the benchmark, then the Government would earn US$ 2,440,466 from 
selling this stock of oil. Even before Uganda’s oil begins to flow, the country 
has collected substantial revenue from capital gains on transfers of interests 
in oil licences. For instance, CGT of US$ 449 million was collected when 
TUL bought out Heritage’s interest, while the CGT of US$ 467 million29 
payable arose when TUL sold 66.67 per cent of its interests to Total E&P 
and CNOOC (Kazi and Sarker, 2012). But the CGT amounts sparked off tax 
disputes between the Government and the oil companies, partly because of 
the interpretation and application of the provisions of PSAs in the context 
of the ITA. In particular the interpretation of article 23 of the pre-2008 PSAs 
was disputed. TUL claimed that article 23 exempted them from CGT, a claim 
which was disputed by the Government (see Uganda Legal Information 
Institute, 2014). The amount excludes corporate tax and royalty which will 
start flowing in when commercial production starts.
The total revenues received over the 2001/2002–2013/2014 period amount 
to US$ 630,068,004 (see Table 8.1). The amount comprises CGT on transfer of 
Heritage’s interest to TUL, stamp duty on the farm-down of part of the interest 
of TUL to Total E&P and CNOOC and oil-related NTRs and interest income 
27 See Ministr y of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Uganda Public 
Finance Management Act, 2015, retrieved from: https://finance.go.ug/test/services/
uganda-public-finance-management-act-2015/.
28 It is stored at Ngiri-2 and Kasamene-1 well sites as well as Tangi camp (see MEMD annual 
report 2014).
29 The figure was arrived at after the TUL took URA to TAT on the grounds that the transaction 
was exempt from CGT under article 23.5 of the model PSA of 1993.
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from investing stamp duty monies in short-term money market deposits.30 
The table indicates that oil-related NTRs form a small portion (1 per cent) of 
the revenues, while CGT forms a bigger part (71 per cent) followed by stamp 
duty at 21 per cent. This serves to indicate that the tax administration systems 
and procedures and the tax laws must be streamlined and strengthened, and 
staff should be well equipped with skills in the valuation of oil, cost audits, 
cost monitoring and apportionment to avert the possible loss of revenues due 
to inflation of costs by the oil companies. The CGT revenue balances were 
deposited in the oil tax fund at the Bank of Uganda.31
8.4.2 Anticipated Revenues from the Oil Sector
The upstream oil revenue sources are royalties, ‘profit oil’, corporate tax, 
bonuses, annual surface rentals and other fees. The 2012 PSAs provide for 
the possibility of collecting windfall profits taxes in cases of a rise in oil 
prices, which adds to the amount of revenues potentially collectable from 
the oil sector. However, no environment taxes are provided for under the 
PSAs. Asymmetric information, volatile prices, massive sunk costs and the 
long production periods make the forecasting of oil revenues very difficult. 
Nonetheless, the authors attempt to make forecasts of the revenues expected 
30 Oil-related NTRs comprise signature bonuses, annual surface rentals, sales of oil data, sales 
of the oil refinery feasibility study report, training fees and permit fees.
31 The oil tax fund was renamed the petroleum fund following the enactment of the PFMA, 
2015.
Table 8.1: Oil Revenues Collected 
Revenue handle Amount (in USD)
Percent of gross 
revenue
CGT 449,424,960 71%
Stamp duty 171,000,000 27%
Interest (in 2013 & 2014) 403,044 0%
Oil related NTRs (FY2001/02–FY2013/14) 9,339,625 1%
Total 630,167,629 100%
Source: Data drawn from: 1) Bank of Uganda (BoU). Annual Reports 2011–2016. Available 
at: https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/publications_research/annual_reports.html; 2) Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD). Statistical Abstracts 2013 & 2014. Available at: 
https://www.energyandminerals.go.ug/.
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from Uganda’s oil project. Below, we first review the oil revenue forecasts for 
Uganda so far made by analysts in order to inform our choice of model to use 
to make our oil revenue estimates for the purposes of this chapter.
Global Witness (2014) reported that the cumulative royalty would bring 
in an additional 1–2 per cent of government take. This could translate to 
between US$ 27 million and US$ 190 million with a 10 per cent ‘discount 
rate’32 for one licence area alone, depending on oil prices and field size, and 
potentially far more if larger oilfields are discovered or long-term oil prices 
rise. The Global Witness forecasts were based on the two PSAs for EA1 and 
Kawabata Prospect Area that TUL and Uganda made in February 2012. 
Global Witness (2014) used a conservative starting oil price of US$ 80 per 
barrel33 and estimated that Uganda would receive between 80 and well over 
90 per cent of revenues. In their analysis, they compared the fiscal terms in 
the 2012 PSAs34with those in the pre-2008 PSAs to conclude that improved 
2012 PSA fiscal terms would increase government take by around 1–2 per cent. 
It also estimated that oil production from blocks EA1, 2 and 3A would earn 
Uganda roughly between US$ 15 billion and US$ 21billion with a 10 per cent 
discount rate in revenues over the lifetime of the project: about US$ 3.3bn per 
year over a 20-year period based on the oil volumes and changes in oil prices.
Henstridge and Page (2012) used oil prices and the production time 
horizon assumptions to make the first forecasts for Uganda’s oil revenues 
and estimated that between 86 and 99 per cent of the net present value of 
the combined investments would accrue to the Government from various 
revenue streams.35 The Oxford Policy Management (OPM) (2013) study 
estimates that oil revenue is expected to account for 17 per cent of baseline 
government revenue over the 30-year oil-production period. These findings 
reflect both the significant project size and Uganda’s current low tax collection 
rates.36 Over the first ten years of production, new oil revenues are expected 
to account for 2 per cent of GDP if prices decline by 25 per cent, and 6.9 per 
32 Investors and governments value money now more than money in the future. They therefore 
apply a ‘discount rate’ to projected future revenues in order to calculate the value of those returns 
to them at the present time. This does not affect the actual revenues received. A 10 per cent discount 
rate is fairly standard for the industry.
33 This price is inflated at a very standard rate of 2.5 per cent and the prices quoted in the various 
studies as reference points also use standard inflation methodologies.
34 These PSAs were signed in February 2012 between TUL and Uganda and the Kanywataba 
Prospect Area located in EA 3A; these licensed areas are jointly owned by TUL, CNOOC and 
Total.
35 W.B. Kazi and B. Beyeza, supra n. 3.
36 In 2009 Uganda’s total revenue expressed as a share of GDP was only 12.5 per cent (IMF 
2013a).
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cent of GDP if prices increased by 25 per cent. In absolute terms, Uganda’s oil 
revenues would be US$ 2.6 billion over the first ten years of production. This 
will represent 31 per cent of GDP, reflecting the country’s relatively narrow 
tax base and low tax collection rates.
Global Witness (2014) quoted the World Bank’s predicted revenue of 
US$ 3billion per year near oil peak production for Uganda while the Oxford 
Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies (Oxcarre) predicted 
that the Government would receive US$ 20 billion for its oil over the life of 
the project with a 7 per cent discount rate. According to Global Witness, these 
estimates were most likely based on lower rates of production that reflected 
the smaller finds at the time. While putting their estimates in perspective, 
Global Witness reported that in 2013 GDP was about US$ 21 billion, while 
the government budget was about US$ 4.4 billion. Using the World Bank’s 
Commodity Market Review Report which quoted a crude oil price of US$ 
60.43 per barrel (June 2017) and 1.4 billion barrels of recoverable reserves, 
the authors estimated that Uganda’s oil revenues from the Albertine Graben 
project would amount to US$ 43.4 billion (not discounted) over a 30-year 
period (see World Bank, 2017).37 Clearly with the production of oil, Uganda’s 
GDP, budget and revenues will potentially increase and socio-economic 
infrastructures will be provided to the people of Uganda absent corruption.
8.5 Uganda’s Oil Fiscal Regime: Strengths and 
Weaknesses
According to Global Witness (2014), it is not possible to ascertain if a PSA 
presents a good or bad deal simply by reading it. The oil fiscal terms must be 
modelled to determine the revenues that government will reap, assuming the 
PSAs are publicly available. Platform et al. (2010) analysed the fiscal terms 
of some PSAs signed by Uganda with oil companies before February 2008 
(hereafter the pre-2008 PSAs) and greatly criticised the deals Uganda had 
signed, stating that the PSA represented a bad financial deal for Uganda. In 
contrast, Global Witness (2014), based on an analysis of two PSAs signed by 
Uganda and oil companies in February 2012 (hereafter the 2012 contracts), said 
37 The authors also assumed an average royalty rate of 8 per cent, cost oil of 60 per cent, the 
State’s share of profit oil of 65 per cent and corporation tax at 30 per cent. We also assumed that the 
amount of oil produced throughout the 30-year period would be uniform. This revenue comprises 
royalty, additional royalty, the State’s share of profit oil and corporation tax, but excludes the 
dividend on 15 per cent of equity share, NTRs and CGT.
190 WilsOn Bahati k azi
that Uganda had achieved a better financial deal in the 2012 PSAs compared 
with the ones in the pre-2008 PSAs. In what follows we examine the main 
strengths and weaknesses of Uganda’s oil fiscal regime.
8.5.1 Strengths of Uganda’s Oil Fiscal Regime
The 2012 PSAs provide that Uganda will resolve any tax disputes through 
either the court system or arbitration within Uganda. The 2012 PSAs provide 
for ‘joint and several liability’, implying that all joint venture partners in a 
licensed area will be liable in the case of contractual breaches by any one 
of them. For instance, any taxes due from a partner can be recovered from 
other joint venture partners. This safeguards government revenues and also 
indemnifies the paying partners from potential court actions by the partner 
that is liable for paying the taxes. For instance, Heritage’s CGT liability was 
recovered from TUL after a protracted and costly legal battle, but Heritage 
later sued TUL for non-settlement of its debt.
Stabilisation clauses insulate companies against regulatory changes that 
impact on project profitability and thus provide assurance to the oil companies 
which meet upfront costs and risks that they will recoup their investment 
without Government having to impose undue regulatory burdens on them 
by encouraging companies to undertake oil sector investments. For instance, 
the pre-2008 PSAs’ stabilisation clauses provided that in the event of changes 
in the financial terms resulting in extra compliance costs, Uganda would 
compensate the oil companies. However, the 2012 PSAs’ stabilisation clauses 
are limited to taxes and stipulate that any ITA changes that impact on the 
oil company’s profitability substantially and adversely will call for an ‘in 
good faith’ renegotiation of PSA terms so as to restore and/or maintain 
the company’s profitability prior to the change. The clauses also permit 
Government to impose windfall taxes on additional profits resulting from 
increased global oil prices. Thus, Uganda’s fiscal regime for oil is responsive 
to macroeconomic changes and will thus generate additional revenues from 
windfall profits taxes for the State.
Given Uganda’s experience with tax disputes, the 2012 PSAs provide in 
clear terms that companies will pay CGT on transfer of their interests in oil 
licences, thereby providing certainty on CGT.38 These PSAs also provide for 
38 The Government of Uganda is involved in two tax disputes with Tullow Oil; one over VAT 
and another over the capital gains tax assessment for the sale to Total and CNOOC. Tullow 
maintains that its PSA for EA 2 exempts it from capital gains tax, a point which the Government 
disputes. The Government of Uganda–Heritage Oil arbitration in London over the capital gains 
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settlement, in Ugandan courts and/or using local arbitration mechanisms, 
of any tax disputes relating to the PSAs. The CGT clause will help Uganda 
avoid the kinds of costs and difficulties encountered during the previous tax 
disputes and preserve future revenue from transfer of interests. Note, however, 
that CGT is payable only when a company sells a part, or all, of its interests 
in a licensed area, making it hard to rely on CGT as a predictable revenue 
source, since it is difficult to predict if and when companies will transfer their 
interests. The fiscal regime provides for daily and cumulative production 
royalties. Thus, as overall cumulative production rises, so will government 
revenue from this additional royalty. The cumulative production royalty is 
a rare revenue clause of PSAs which will generate more revenue for Uganda 
based on the amount of oil produced in a given licensed area. Royalties can 
secure an upfront revenue stream39 from day one of production and have 
an element of progressivity, i.e. the rate increases as production increases.
Bonuses are a one-off payment to the State by the company. A signature 
bonus payment is made to Government on the signing of a PSA, while 
discovery bonuses are paid when oil has been found. The signature bonuses 
due to Uganda are US$ 0.3 million40and US$ 0.2 million,41 and the discovery 
bonus is US$ 2 million for both licensed areas. Bonuses contribute a small 
portion of government revenues but they motivate companies to speed up oil 
exploration. To put this in perspective, a total of US$ 500,000 was collected in 
signature bonuses when the 2012 PSAs were signed in February 2012 and US$ 
2 million in discovery bonus when oil was found in February 2013, thereby 
guaranteeing the Government upfront revenue.
Under the PSAs, oil companies meet exploration and development costs, 
but they begin to recoup these costs when oil begins to flow. While the cost 
oil of 60 per cent of production is high by international standards, it will help 
companies to recoup their investments faster, and thus encourage investments 
in the oil sector in Uganda (Global Witness, 2014). The ‘ring-fencing’ bars 
companies from recovering costs incurred in licensed areas where neither 
oil has yet been found or commercially exploitable oil has not been found, 
and thus it enables the Government to generate revenues from those areas 
where oil has been discovered and production is taking place. Ring-fencing 
tax assessment relating to the 2010 farm down to Tullow oil is still ongoing (see Global Witness, 
2014).
39 Royalties generate revenue for government as soon as production commences,
40 See clause 9 of PSA between Uganda and TUL for the Kanywataba Prospect Area February, 
2012
41 See clause 9 of PSA between Uganda and TUL for Exploration Area 1 (EA1) February, 2012
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therefore helps the Government to counter tax avoidance and evasion through 
manipulating transfer prices.
In view of the foregoing, Uganda’s oil fiscal regime encourages investments, 
guarantees government revenues and ensures sustainability. The royalty 
and production-sharing regimes have an element of progressivity, making 
the fiscal regime responsive to current prices and the inherent risks of the 
oil industry. The implementation of PSAs is simple since they consolidate 
all fiscal elements of oil exploration and development in a single document. 
Through corporate tax both the Government and the oil companies share 
the risks of oil production and development. The oil company pays tax when 
it has taxable profits and any carried-forward tax losses are offset against 
future taxable income as a deduction. The corporation tax paid in Uganda 
will be available to offset against tax payable to the home country of the oil 
company. However, the corporate tax base can easily be decreased through 
transfer pricing, thin capitalisation and treat shopping.
8.5.2 Weaknesses of Uganda’s Oil Fiscal Regime
Cumulative royalty may lead companies to opt out of the project early because 
it may reduce the profit that the company expects as companies pay higher 
royalty rates even while production is falling. Royalties enable companies to 
make minimum payments for the oil extracted. Kazi and Beyeza (2017) observe 
that developing countries find it hard to cope with mundane processing and 
reporting, thereby hindering effective filing and payment enforcement, while 
the IMF (2012) indicated that the administration of royalties involves frequent 
assessments, no annual tax returns and no reconciliation to corporation 
tax returns, making it inefficient. Annual surface rentals generate minimal 
revenues, but they can encourage companies to explore and develop contract 
areas and/or to relinquish their rights in a contract area. These would help 
to isolate the incompetent investors.
Royalties discourage investments by increasing the marginal cost of oil 
extraction. Royalties are never claimed as foreign tax credits against the 
home country income tax assessed. The corporate income tax and the PSAs 
are hard to administer, since they require specialised skills in cost audits and 
valuation and experience in negotiating PSAs respectively, which are lacking 
in Uganda. Uganda’s fiscal regime offer is loaded with exemptions, such as 
VAT on imports, which are hard to administer and may aid tax evasion and 
avoidance.
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8.6 Conclusion and Policy Options
Uganda’s fiscal regime is very competitive and ensures certainty and stability, 
and there will not be need for frequent revisions in fiscal terms. Uganda’s 
PSAs have clauses on taxation, royalty and additional royalty, cost recovery, 
signature and discovery bonuses, annual surface rentals, CGT and windfall 
profits tax. This kind of fiscal regime generates government revenues both 
in the pre-production stage and in the production stage. International oil 
companies will be able to recoup their investments and make profits in the 
production stage. Uganda’s oil fiscal regime combines upfront government 
revenue with a sufficiently high return on capital for the oil companies. A 
combination of corporation tax, royalty regime and production-sharing 
regimes generates government revenues without distorting incentives to 
invest in oil exploration and development.
Uganda secured significant additional revenues in the 2012 PSAs with the 
adoption of a new cumulative production royalty in addition to the existing 
daily production royalty. In 2014, Global Witness analysed the fiscal terms 
in both the pre-2008 PSAs and 2012 PSAs and concluded that the Govern-
ment of Uganda would potentially receive additional revenues from the 
cumulative production royalty and the levying of windfall taxes, if global 
oil prices increased over and above what was expected (see Global Witness, 
2014). Unlike corporation tax and PSAs, the oil-related NTRs are easy to 
administer since they do not require specialised skills in oil valuation, cost 
audits, cost allocations and apportionment (Kazi and Beyeza, 2017). The oil 
production is yet to start, but oil revenues from both NTRs and CGT have 
already flowed into the Government’s account.42
We could not empirically ascertain the effectiveness and sustainability 
of key fiscal instruments for the oil sector such as corporation tax, royalties 
and production-sharing tax the collection of which is dependent on oil flow. 
The tax regime in place remains a work in progress. However, it is clear that 
Uganda has successfully negotiated more favourable fiscal terms by securing 
a higher share of revenue. The fiscal regime presents a good deal for Uganda 
because, if the Government opts to introduce a new windfall tax, government 
revenue will go up without eating into the anticipated company profits. If 
oil prices rise above what is expected or project costs are significantly less 
42 Petroleum revenues means tax charged on income derived by a person from petroleum 
operations, the Government’s share of production, signature bonus, surface rentals, royalties, 
proceeds from the sale of a government share of production, and any other duties or fees payable 
to the Government from contract revenues under the terms of a petroleum agreement.
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than predicted, then Uganda would receive significant additional revenues 
through royalties (Global Witness, 2014).
Based on the information available, it appears that the Government has 
done enough preparatory work in terms of putting in place the necessary 
legal and institutional framework, including staff training, and enhancing 
the capacity to deal with the intricacies of assessing, collecting and managing 
oil revenues. Moreover, Uganda’s oil fiscal regime appears to be flexible and 
progressive enough to allow lessons learned during its implementation to 
further help in refining it without the regime having to be renegotiated as 
the profitability of oil companies increases.
Uganda should however optimise production recovery rates through the 
oil licensing regime. Uganda should publish the oil PSAs’ fiscal terms to assist 
in tracking state revenues and in making reliable and accurate forecasts of 
expected revenue from the sector. TUL, CNOOC and Total are registered and 
listed on the stock market in the US, EU and Norway, whose new rules will 
require the publishing of detailed breakdowns of the payments they make to 
governments, and so it will be much more difficult for Uganda to hide under 
the national and corporate confidentiality veil. Uganda’s Government should 
start publishing disaggregated oil sector data to promote good governance 
and avert white collar crimes in the sector.
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Human Resources and Oil in Uganda : 
An Analysis of Uganda’s Human Resource 
Development for the Oil Sector
Jackson A. Mwakali and Jackson N.M. Byaruhanga
9.1 Introduction
In 1992 the Government of Uganda issued the first petroleum exploration 
licence, followed by the second one in 1997. Since then significant and com-
mercially exploitable hydrocarbons have been discovered in the Albertine 
Graben. It is expected that many direct and indirect employment and business 
opportunities will be available in the midstream and downstream phases of 
the petroleum value chain, when oil field development, production, refining 
and evacuation will go full blast. However, the extent to which Ugandans 
will be able to take advantage of these opportunities will crucially depend 
on the preceding human resources development.
In this chapter we aim to analyse the human resource challenges and 
opportunities facing Uganda’s emerging oil sector. We will start by tracing 
the evolution of Uganda’s education and skills development sector from the 
British colonial era in the early twentieth century to the post- oil discovery 
years in the twenty-first century. We will then analyse the impact of oil dis-
covery on the human resource development dynamics. Subsequently, we will 
examine the reciprocal influence of the country’s human resource profile on 
the development of the fledgling oil and gas industry. Subsequently, Uganda’s 
human resource supply side is compared and contrasted with the oil and gas 
sector’s demand side in the upstream, midstream and downstream segments 
of the entire value chain during the country’s anticipated 40-year-or-so oil 
boom epoch. In the last section we will conclude and provide some policy 
reflections.
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9.2 A Brief History of Business, Technical and Vocational 
Education and Training (BTVET) in Uganda
9.2.1 Colonial Era
Vocational or occupational education is a type of education that aims at 
imparting practical skills to learners. It is productive education or education 
for job creators. It is skill-based as opposed to general education, which is an 
academic type of education (Rauner and Maclean, 2009). In Uganda, business, 
technical, vocational education and training (BTVET) are put together as 
separate, but all of them can conveniently be called vocational education. 
The system of formal vocational skills training or education in Uganda dates 
way back in the colonial period, especially in the late 1940s when the World 
War II former camps were converted into skills training centres to re-train 
demobilised soldiers and younger children to acquire skills for survival. 
During that time, the general practice of most organisations was to employ 
a youth as a helper or a cleaner under the name of ‘spanner boy’. In this way, 
the boy picked up a smattering of skills without proper guidance. In 1952, the 
Artisan Training Organisation was established in the Ministry of Labour, 
headed by a director, to train artisans in various trades. It was particularly 
put in place for the resettlement of World War II veterans. Later on, in 1953, 
the trade testing and guidance section was established to assess the skills 
competences of persons being trained.
During the colonial times, Uganda’s education system was developed 
largely by voluntary organisations, especially Christian missionaries. Good 
educational facilities were available to only a small group of elites and oriented 
towards white-collar jobs, while the majority of the people remained illiterate 
or poorly educated. This system produced mainly clerical and administrative 
personnel required by religious foundation bodies and the colonial admin-
istration. The colonial education produced people with a general education 
devoid of technical or vocational skills, and these products—the educated 
workers—were to serve as clerks, chiefs and administrators. Such jobs as those 
of clerks, interpreters, chiefs and administrators attracted heftier benefits in 
monetary terms than vocational jobs. The high cost of vocational education 
therefore made missionaries think more of general education, an irony which 
has not changed at all in Uganda’s education system. As a start to exercising 
control, the Government of Uganda (GOU) established the Directorate of 
Education in 1925. Thereafter in the 1950s and 1960s the education sector 
expanded rapidly.
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The negative attitude towards technical vocational education was aggra-
vated by the British popular notion in Uganda that ‘the rulership’ of the world 
was in the hands not of technicians but of those who studied humanities. There 
is a little regard for technical and commercial studies; physical work is not 
necessarily considered as an essential part of education. The general practice 
is for the ‘brighter’ pupils to go on and on with theoretical studies and for the 
less talented to branch off into technical or vocational courses. Cleverness is 
still judged only on the basis of ability to memorise and regurgitate theoretical 
information, and practical people are automatically regarded as less bright. 
Despite repeated criticisms of the inherited colonial system of education 
as anachronistic and irrelevant and the efforts of successive governments 
to change it, no fundamental transformation has occurred over the years 
of independence in relating education to the social and cultural realities of 
Uganda.
9.2.2 Post-independence
Note must be taken of the fact that the colonial government in Uganda tried 
its best to give vocational education to the people in Uganda but it was not a 
success story, unlike the general education system. Government through the 
selection system in the country promoted the inferior tendencies of technical 
education; the selection system for academic and technical schools played an 
adverse role in the success of technical schools. It was the students who were 
scoring low marks at the end of primary or secondary school education that 
were being channelled into technical schools. Students with high marks were 
being selected for higher levels of education. As much as there is an upsurge 
in the demand for the vocational education system, people’s attitude towards 
it has not been corrected fully. The enrolment of technical and vocational 
institutions is still low. For example, in 2007 there were only about 30,000 
students in all the technical, vocational education and training institutions. 
Largely the stigma and negative attitude attached to BTVET courses hinders 
the sub-sector from getting good learners. Because enrolment is very low, most 
of these institutions are operating below capacity (Okinyal, 2006). Whereas 
most BTVET subjects are science-related, students who pass sciences do not 
easily opt for BTVET and so the sub-sector continues to admit low grade 
students into its institutions. Currently, BTVET institutions can admit 
students only after the universities have selected the best students. In terms 
of selection at the national level, candidates for the Uganda Advanced Cer-
tificate of Education (UACE) are selected first, and then technical vocational 
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institutions grab the remnants. Yet, as the National Council for Higher 
Education (NCHE) notes in this respect:
Besides the over-emphasis that students and parents put on university 
education at the expense of other tertiary programmes, the sad trend [has 
been] the continuing neglect of technical education as well as of the Hotel/
Tourism sectors. Unless this country changes its attitudes, we shall continue 
importing skilled labour to work on our roads, in our factories, hotels and 
tourist resorts (National Council for Higher Education, 2007, p.14).
The current skills capacity bottlenecks … can partly be attributed to the 
inability of tertiary institutions to produce skilled human resources as a 
result of under-funding and probably the over-emphasis on universities at 
the expense of Other Tertiary Institutions. By concentrating on technical, 
diploma in health, veterinary, agriculture and vocational training, the 
chances are that certificate and diploma holders are less likely to go abroad 
for greener pastures than university graduates (Ibid., pp.36–37).
However, the status of vocational education is beginning to change now 
that the academic education system can take one nowhere in the job market.
As observed in the preceding section, the BTVET as we know it today 
was a small sub-sector designed to produce manual labourers, mainly the 
underprivileged and uneducated sections of society. This was the beginning 
of the social stigmatisation of BTVET. No focused policy existed specifically 
to guide the development of BTVET until 1972 when the Directorate of 
Industrial Training (DIT) was established as the first deliberate move by 
GoU to accord skills training legal and therefore due attention, although 
implementation faced challenges for a long time thereafter. With the enact-
ment of the National Curriculum Development Centre Act in 1976, com-
mittees were formed to address the specific BTVET curricula requirements. 
Earlier in 1967, the Japanese Government offered the Uganda Government 
the building of a modern vocational training institute at Nakawa to increase 
the production of craftsmen and women and retraining the same to meet the 
industrial demands. In 1968, GoU came up with a strategy of strengthening 
the industrial vocational training schemes. The idea did not take off until 
1972, when the Employment Act was repealed and the Industrial Training 
Decree No. 2 of 1972 together with the Industrial Apprenticeship Training 
Regulations was promulgated. This made apprenticeship training more 
prominent than ever before, especially among the manufacturing and repair 
industries and organisations.
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In 1987, GoU appointed the Education Review Commission to inquire 
into policies governing education in Uganda and recommend how to make 
education relevant to the development needs of the country, embrace modern 
curricula and pedagogic trends and developments, assess the role of the private 
sector in providing education and make the education system as a whole cost 
effective. With regard to technical and vocational education training, the 
Commission categorised it in three levels, in particular:
– Stage 1: Vocational education primary school: emphasis was laid on 
the need for attitudinal change at this level and mastering fundamental 
knowledge and skills with much focus on teaching agriculture.
– Stage 2: Vocational education ordinary level: according technical 
education the status of other traditional subjects and adequately equipping 
technical and commercial schools and converting them into vocational 
secondary schools with students at these choosing one vocational subject 
for specialisation.
– Stage 3: Vocational education advanced level: further specialisation 
was recommended and the creation of regional polytechnics through the 
merger of five Uganda Technical Colleges (UTCs) and Uganda Colleges 
of Commerce (UCCs). The establishment of one polytechnic per district 
with adequate facilities for girls was also recommended, but this seems 
to have remained on paper (Okinyal, 2012, p.7).
In 2002 the first ever BTVET strategic plan was produced and the BTVET 
Act came into being in 2008. In addition, the First and Second National 
Development Plans emphasise public-private partnerships (PPPs) on skills 
development covering formal, non-formal and informal avenues of acquiring 
skills and competences (The Republic of Uganda, 2010; 2015). Relevance, 
equitable access, efficiency and effectiveness are underscored as core themes 
in education development.
Generally, Uganda’s education system is not practically oriented. The 
current BTVET system is not in a position to cater for the present and future 
skills requirements of the economy. Most BTVET providers do not refine their 
students to the required current and future skills needs. The training contains 
too much theory and too little hands-on experience. Even practical skills are 
theoretically explained with gestures and pictures. Looking at the outdated 
curriculum as a contradiction to the development of the vocational education 
system, there has been no serious policy put in place to try to review the 
curriculum of the TVET institutions. Although some attempts to review the 
curriculum were made in 1998 by both the Curriculum Development Centre 
and the former Uganda Polytechnic Kyambogo, no changes were affected, 
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leaving the TVET institutions to continue with the outdated curricula. 
Technology rapidly changes with time. To match the job market requirements 
the training curricula must be up to date. Effective curriculum planning 
and development in this area should be a dynamic process (Okinyal, 2006).
9.3 Manpower Demands of the Oil and Gas Sector
According to Industrial Base Line Survey findings, the Lake Albert basin 
development projects will generate thousands of direct jobs in Uganda, 
with a peak of about 13,000 workers in the construction phase and a plateau 
of 3,000 people in the operation phase. Out of the total manpower required 
15 per cent are engineers and managers, 60 per cent are technicians and 
craftsmen and 25 per cent are people without any educational background 
(‘unskilled’). Education focus should be on civil construction, electrical 
and mechanical fields. Beyond direct jobs that will be created on site, oil 
and gas (O&G) activity will also have the potential to generate 100,000 to 
150,000 indirect and induced jobs. Out of the total newly created jobs, 80 
per cent will be short-term for the peak of construction and will have to be 
transferred to other sectors of the industry or to the neighbouring countries 
to remain sustainable.
The survey highlights industries whose capacity or compliance with O&G 
standards requires future support in order to avoid massive imports. All 
sectors will need to upgrade the quality of their overall management standards 
and quality of delivery to align with oil and gas expectations. Some sectors 
will need a complete transformation to be able to cope with future needs 
as the gap between future demand and current supply is at the range of the 
multiplier, like transport and logistics (goods) or hazardous waste manage-
ment and hazardous waste disposal. Transport and logistics (goods) include 
freight transport by road, warehousing and storage, lifting services, and other 
transportation support activities (clearing, customs, and forwarding) and 
hazardous waste disposal. The survey reveals that a few industries should be 
able to absorb the peak of demand, like cement or structural steel.
Ugandan companies call for more visibility of the future needs of the O&G 
projects and support from large companies, banks and public authorities. 
Emphasis should be put on the training of skilled people, the reinforcement 
of the oil and gas certification process and supporting the educational system 
by reinforcing the best academic institutions already in place and by founding 
a training centre to develop qualified technicians.
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Some specific sectors should be supported by O&G partners in Uganda. 
Specific industries to support include hazardous waste management, opera-
tions and maintenance services, light equipment manufacturing, work safety 
products (PPE), agriculture, metal scaffolding and road safety.
9.4 The Government of Uganda’s Petroleum Sector 
Skilling Programme
Recognising the weaknesses and opportunities in the current BTVET system, 
the Government of Uganda (GoU)’s strategy to improve the BTVET system 
and provide training for the skills needed by the petroleum sector has two 
main components: the Skilling Uganda programme and the development 
of Uganda Petroleum Institute Kigumba (UPIK) as a benchmark for other 
technical colleges.
9.4.1 Uganda Petroleum Institute Kigumba (UPIK)
The GoU realises that it must help to provide manpower for the petroleum 
industry. In 2009, it established UPIK in north-western Uganda envisaged to 
be a centre of excellence (CoE) for the training of technicians, craftsmen and 
professionals in the petroleum sector. The UPIK institutional development 
plan (IDP) 2014/2019 outlines the strategies and actions to be undertaken 
to address the institutional weaknesses and gaps (Ongode and Nalubega, 
2014). To be relevant, UPIK aims to adopt a demand-driven programme 
development and delivery to ensure that industry representatives play a 
major role in identifying curriculum standards, training programmes design, 
equipment specifications and training programme delivery. The first UPIK 
intake programme was at times too broad and not developed in close collabora-
tion with the local industry. However, UPIK has established relations with 
Rogaland Training and Education Centre (RKK) and the Stavanger Offshore 
Technical College of Norway to obtain support for curriculum development, 
management development and staff skills development to offer a two-year 
diploma in petroleum studies with options in drilling, electrical installation, 
instrumentation and welding. Upon completion of the diploma at UPIK, 
students undertake an additional six month apprenticeship programme at 
Kenson School of Production Technology in Trinidad and Tobago, which 
provides graduates with City and Guilds of London international vocational 
qualifications in electrical installation, instrumentation, welding and pipe 
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fitting and fabrication. UPIK should also support other BTVET institutes 
to deliver basic-level training in the above-mentioned disciplines.
To be relevant, UPIK will have to ensure that the international oil compa-
nies (IOCs), the national oil company (NOC) and petroleum industry service 
companies and other development partners are effectively represented on its 
Governing Council for policy making, planning and development and delivery 
of its programmes. The institute is in the process of developing and delivering 
certificate and diploma courses for skilled technicians in petroleum upstream 
operations, petroleum downstream operations, mechanical and electrical 
maintenance, instrumentation maintenance and other disciplines that may 
be required for IOCs, NOC and petroleum industry service companies and 
refinery operations. By 2018/2019, UPIK will start graduating approximately 
224 students annually in the foregoing disciplines. The two-year upstream 
operations in petroleum engineering diploma course content will include 
petroleum industry service companies’ and exploration and production 
companies’ field production techniques and equipment, reservoir engineering 
including enhanced recovery, gas processing, drilling, petroleum chemistry, 
technical communications, petroleum engineering, geosciences, petroleum 
safety fundamentals and geology. For downstream operations, a two-year 
diploma in either chemical or engineering technology which covers most 
downstream equipment or processes that turn raw petroleum resources into 
final products, gas processing, refining and petroleum production programme 
will include oil and gas chemistry, process equipment, unit operations, mate-
rial and energy balances, plant processes and pipelining.
According to UPIK IDP 2014/2019, the current UPIK instructors have 
acceptable academic qualifications with some exposure in oil and gas industry 
operations and technical training at Stavanger, Norway, and from Trinidad 
and Tobago. However, they lack hands-on practical workplace experience 
and have little or no knowledge of competence-based training (CBT) and 
assessment. Up to August 2013, 88 students had benefited. With support 
from DFID, UPIK established an instructor development programme in 
Trinidad and Tobago for CBT to provide them with on-the-job training 
placements in chosen fields starting in January 2014. UPIK is implementing 
technical conversion courses with the University of Trinidad and Tobago 
(UTT) to reorient scientists and engineers trained in non-petroleum fields to 
become managers in the petroleum sector. A long-term approach to Ugandan 
instructor development should be established at UPIK in partnership with an 
internationally recognised training organisation in the petroleum sector which 
can mobilise its own expatriate instructors over a three- to four-year period 
to deliver training programmes to students and Ugandan instructors as well.
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In the short to medium term, UPIK should emphasise artisanal and 
technical skills and conduct studies for degrees later after it has attained 
acceptable standards in the former. It is envisaged that UPIK will graduate 
460 students between 2017 and 2019. UPIK intends to expand access through 
recognition of prior learning and recruit students with either A or O level 
prerequisites for selected short courses and also develop clear pathways for 
UPIK graduates to continue on to university degree-level programmes. 
Twinning institution instructors along with UPIK national instructors was to 
begin teaching the five targeted programmes in July 2016, graduating its first 
batch of instrumentation, electrical and mechanical maintenance students 
in June 2017. Upstream operations students should complete their two-year 
diploma programme and graduate in June 2018. CNOOC, Total and Tullow 
Oil have indicated that the UPIK graduation schedule synchronised well 
with field development plans and that they look forward to hiring certified 
graduates. UPIK has a programme through its Student Job Placement Unit 
and the Petroleum Sector Skills Council (SCC) to place its graduates in the 
three major petroleum and service companies such as Schlumberger (UPIK 
IDP, 2014–2019). All expatriate instructors are expected to leave in July 2017 
and turn over all programmes to UPIK national instructors.
For effective governance, UPIK will seek increased autonomy to determine 
its own curriculum, set its own fees, and budget, hire and fire teaching staff, 
determine remuneration, and adjust its training programmes and content to 
respond flexibly to petroleum needs while at the same time being accountable 
to its supervising ministry. UPIK should continuously lobby for the introduc-
tion of a petroleum skills training fund and supporting legislative reforms 
to allow it to generate additional revenue by selling services or courses on a 
fees-for-service basis. A UPIK governing council with considerable autonomy 
has been appointed by GoU with significant representation from the private 
sector and the oil industry. The challenge the council has is to put in place a 
competent and dedicated management team with an in-depth understanding 
of the labour needs of the petroleum industry. UPIK needs to develop a 
sustainable financing model for both operating and capital expenses that 
has contributions from GoU, students, donors, and the petroleum industry.
A key success factor of a petroleum training institute is the organisation 
that supports the education and training facilities. All the elements of a CoE 
for petroleum education such as effective organisation and governance ar-
rangement with autonomy, high calibre chief executive officer, administrative 
staff and instructors, relevant curriculum development and programming, 
quality instruction and delivery, sustainable financing and strong industrial 
linkages and support are missing at UPIK and should be introduced as soon 
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as possible. According to the UPIK campus’ master development plan (Sep-
tember 2013), equipment purchased should support the new operations and 
maintenance. More practical curriculum training facilities and equipment 
specific to oil and gas industry applications are needed. There is currently 
no location for a well pad in the master plan. A small drilling rig or service 
rig is a common component of oil and gas technical training facilities with 
a fully cased 1,000-metre directional well. There is no location for a typical 
oilfield production facility that would include a common training pilot plant/
simulator used at petroleum technical institutions throughout the world. The 
ratio of classroom space to workshop training laboratory appears to be too 
high. DFID is assisting UPIK with initial purchases of workshop equipment.
Large-scale training equipment possessing industrial characteristics 
should be used in the practical workshops and laboratories, and if possible 
UPIK should work out an arrangement to use some of the equipment from 
petroleum contactors or service companies (such as Schlumberger, Baker 
and Hughes, and Halliburton). Pilot plants and simulators ordered by UPIK 
should have full data acquisition and automation systems comparable to those 
used by the oil and gas industry in Uganda. The training equipment specified 
should be state-of-the-practice, not state-of-the-art, equipment often used for 
undergraduate engineering training. Among key performance indicators of 
UPIK are training cost per graduate, the employment rate of graduates within 
the oil and gas sector and the completion rate of graduates. Unfortunately, 
the majority of UPIK graduates are unemployable by the petroleum sector 
due to lack of quality relevant skills (The Observer, 2013).
9.4.2 Skilling Uganda Programme
As indicated in the “Industrial Base Line Survey” findings referred to above, 
most of the jobs to be created by the O&G activity will be indirect and induced 
jobs in the non-oil sectors that will also mainly supply low risk low technology 
and some high-risk low technology inputs to the O&G sector. It is therefore 
imperative that Uganda develops strong and dynamic BTVET as a key sector 
to train and supply skills to the O&G activity and the economy in general. 
This effort requires enormous resources, technical training and expertise. 
Therefore, it will have to be a well-coordinated and collaborative intervention 
by Government of Uganda, International Oil Companies, the private sector, 
development partners and other non-state actors.
Uganda’s Vision 2025 and the National Development Plan (NDP) 
2010/2011–2014/2015 identify BTVET skills shortages based on which the 
BTVET (2012/2013 to 2021/2022) Strategic Plan for Skilling Uganda was 
hUman resOUrCes anD Oil in UganDa 207
developed (The Republic of Uganda, 2015). The plan incorporates activities 
by the BTVET Department and DIT under the Ministry of Education and 
Sports, and its strategies go beyond the traditional formal BTVET under 
the education sector to serve development interests of other sectors, notably 
agriculture, health, trade, tourism and industry. Part of the total costs will 
therefore be borne by government sectors other than education. The Strategic 
Plan provides for establishment of a Skills Development Authority (SDA) 
reflecting the broadened mandate of the BTVET sector and the need for 
broader partnerships. Under the Strategic Plan, the BTVET system will be 
transformed from an educational sub-sector into a comprehensive system of 
skills development for employment, enhanced productivity and growth to 
create employable skills and competences relevant in the labour market instead 
of educational certificates. It will embrace all Ugandans in need of skills, not 
relegated to (low achieving) primary and secondary school leavers as in the 
past. At its final transition, the proposed SDA will be a private sector-led 
institution that will provide the mechanism to promote a demand-driven 
BTVET in the country. While delivery of BTVET content has been largely 
through the school system, the shift aims at a flexible, modular workplace-
oriented environment.
On 23 October 2012 the Minister of Education and Sports established the 
Reform Task Force (RTF) for Skilling Uganda chaired by Uganda Federation 
of Employers and composed of 26 members drawn from the private sector, 
the Ministry of Education and Sports and other key ministries, civil society 
and trade unions. The purpose of the RTF is to spearhead reform of the 
system of BTVET and to oversee and manage the Skilling Uganda reforms 
until a permanent, integrated SDA is established. The strategic plan has five 
objectives, namely: 1) to make BTVET relevant to productivity development 
and economic growth; 2) to increase the quality of skills provision; 3) to 
increase equitable access to skills development; 4) to improve the effective-
ness in BTVET management and organisation; and 5) to increase internal 
efficiency and resources available to BTVET. To achieve economic relevance, 
it is envisaged that by 2020, 70 per cent of employers will be satisfied by the 
competences of BTVET graduates and 80 per cent of BTVET graduates will 
have found employment or be self-employed generating sufficient income. 
The coverage of a legally recognised and implemented Uganda Vocational 
Qualifications Framework (UVQF) will be expanded and accelerated.
The share of Uganda Technical Colleges graduates of all tertiary BTVET 
graduates is to be increased to 40 per cent by 2020 (baseline: 15 per cent in 2008). 
At least 50 per cent of all post-secondary BTVET enrolment covers defined 
priority areas. Agriculture training will be expanded and improved. By 2020, 
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at least 70 per cent of informal sector and medium scale enterprises utilising 
BTVET graduates should confirm that upgraded skills contribute to higher 
productivity and the raising of product quality. A labour market information 
system (LMIS) will be established to regularly produce data and information 
for BTVET. To increase the quality of skills provision, UVQF assessment pass 
rates should have increased to 90 per cent by 2020. The institutional capacities 
of BTVET providers will be strengthened by upgrading at least 250 public and 
private institutions. The aim is to increase enrolment in BTVET instructor 
training by 10 per cent annually and widen the range of occupational areas 
in line with labour market priorities. Major efforts will also be undertaken 
to upgrade the existing corps of BTVET instructors to make them fit for 
competence-based education and training (CBET). The target is to upgrade 
up to 500 existing BTVET instructors annually by 2015. Funds have been 
set aside to kick-start incentive schemes for BTVET instructors to increase 
attractiveness. A quality assurance system for both public and private BTVET 
providers in line with regional standards and practices will be put in place.
At least 40 public BTVET institutions will undergo comprehensive 
institutional strengthening. Development of the oil industry in Uganda 
will be given immediate priority. In view of limited capacities in Uganda, 
the Government of Uganda will seek partnership arrangements with leading 
vocational and technical institutions in other countries. In addition, a BTVET 
investment fund will be set up to provide resources for private and public 
BTVET providers on a competitive basis for expansion or rehabilitation, for 
human resource development and the introduction of new programmes based 
on labour market needs in accordance with institutional development plans. 
Centres of excellence, where possible, managed by or in cooperation with 
industry or industry associations will be developed for particular occupations. 
All public and several private BTVET institutions will receive support during 
the plan period to upgrade their ICT facilities in order to introduce ICT-based 
training and improve training management. This will be based on a strategy 
to introduce ‘E-BTVET’ in Uganda.
GoU has a comprehensive policy and strategy for the support of private 
BTVET providers in cooperation with the Association of Uganda Private 
Vocation Institutions (UGAPRIVI). Towards that end, an inventory of formal 
and non-formal private training providers will be made. This will include the 
reduction of regulatory barriers for private training providers and simplifying 
registration/accreditation procedures, the provision of incentives for initiating 
and expanding private provision, e.g. through matching investment grants, 
and the introduction of redeemable vouchers and access to all support schemes 
offered to BTVET institutions.
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The implementation of the envisaged key reforms in skills development 
requires strong organisation and management of BTVET. At presently, the 
BTVET management is fragmented under various government agencies. It 
lacks focused direction and incentives to increase performance. The strategic 
plan therefore foresees the establishment of an integrated management body 
(SDA) for BTVET, the devolution of administrative power to training institu-
tions while introducing accountability, and building an effective management 
information and monitoring system dedicated to skills development. Together 
with stakeholders, especially employers, the SDA will be responsible for 
policy-making, standard-setting, assessment and certification and other 
quality assurance functions, information, monitoring and evaluation, ac-
creditation of training providers, financing and possibly the management of 
public training institutions. In addition, independent status could help to raise 
the image of skills development and counter the prevailing negative attitude 
towards technical-vocational training. Ultimately, BTVET institutions will 
be self-governed, able to set their own fees and budgets, receive funds and 
subsidies from the centre, hire and fire teaching and other staff within some 
flexible national norms, and introduce or change training programmes in 
response to market needs. Devolution of authority will be linked to the 
establishment of an internal quality management (IQM) system and the 
creation of a new accreditation system.
To increase the efficiency of BTVET provision through results-oriented 
transfer mechanisms, budget allocation to BTVET institutions will be linked 
to performance results. Currently, institutional base-funding is provided 
through payment of staff salaries. This funding mode is not related to the 
actual number of trainees enrolled or to other indicators of institutional 
performance. It furthermore discriminates against those institutions that en-
counter difficulties in attracting teachers, for instance because the institution 
is located in a remote area. A new funding formula will therefore be developed 
and gradually implemented based on actual performance, thus stimulating 
institutional initiatives to improve results. As a starting point, allocations 
should be based on the number of trainees enrolled. More outcome-oriented 
indicators may be introduced at a later stage, for example trainee completion 
rates, exam pass rates and the success of graduates in securing employment.
The resources available for BTVET will be increased through the upscaling 
of income-generating activities of public BTVET institutions such as the sale 
of items produced during training, services such as car repair or running 
a restaurant, contract work such as construction, the sale of agricultural 
produce, the renting of facilities, the organisation of special courses, and the 
introduction of a training levy through a consultative process with employers 
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and the business community to ensure that it is appropriate and efficiently 
managed. Currently, based on Education Management Information System 
(EMIS) data, income generated from the sale of BTVET products and services 
accounts for only 0.2–2.1 per cent of total expenditure. Experience in other 
countries such as Botswana suggests that up to about one quarter of total 
training costs can be recovered from income-generating activities. Apart from 
financial returns, income-generating activities can also link the institution 
better with local markets and stimulate a business culture. The resource base 
of the BTVET system needs to be increased and diversified. Depending on 
the type and level of training, annual unit costs of between 1.5 and 3.5 million 
UGX have to be calculated to deliver training at acceptable standards. Costs 
involved in non-formal basic level skills development are estimated at around 
350,000 UGX for a three-month programme. A skills development fund 
(SDF) will be established to pool all public resources available for BTVET 
in Uganda including the income from the training levy, allocations from the 
public budget, contributions from development partners and other income. 
The fund will cover training, special support and development programmes 
and the new organisational set-up costs for BTVET management.
Development Costs
The major share of the development expenditure, 35 per cent during the first 
and 82 per cent during the second phase of the plan period, is earmarked for 
rehabilitating and strengthening the existing network of BTVET institutions 
(without agriculture), both public and private, preferably in partnership with 
leading technical institutes abroad and with the support of considerable 
international technical assistance. Development costs include the establish-
ment of centres of excellence, the rehabilitation and expansion of physical 
facilities, the modernisation of equipment and workshops, staff development 
including overseas training of instructors, support to curriculum development 
and the development of training and learning materials, and management 
capacity building. The estimated costs also include the BTVET investment 
fund, which will allocate grants for institutional strengthening to public and 
private BTVET institutions on a competitive basis. It is expected that up to 40 
institutions will receive grant support under the investment fund every year.
Funding Gap and Options for Closing It
Public resources to implement the BTVET strategic plan are estimated at 
2,001 billion UGX or US$ 870 million divided into recurrent costs (55 per cent) 
and development costs (45 per cent). The bulk of development expenditure is 
earmarked for rehabilitating and strengthening existing BTVET institutions, 
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both public and private, and for agriculture training (much of which will be 
borne by the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries). About 
40 per cent of the recurrent budget is earmarked for raising access and quality. 
About 433 billion UGX would be spent on capitation grants/bursaries to 
support school leavers attending formal BTVET programmes. Enrolment 
in formal BTVET is projected to increase from 42,000 to 103,000 trainees 
in 2019/2020, an annual growth of 10 per cent. Per capita funding will be 
raised gradually to ensure that training is provided at good standards. About 
40 per cent of the formal BTVET trainees will receive public scholarships. 
Non-formal BTVET will be integrated permanently into the public BTVET 
portfolio. The plan allocates 160 billion UGX for non-formal BTVET. This is 
projected to increase enrolment in publicly sponsored non-formal training 
from 20,000 people in 2010/2011 to 40,000 in 2015 and 60,000 by 2016.
A substantial funding gap exists between requirements of the strategic plan 
and currently projected public expenditure under the revised ESSP (2010 
Revision). For the first four years, corresponding to the current medium-term 
expenditure framework (MTEF), the funding gap amounts to 60 per cent of 
total estimated costs, 424 billion UGX. Options for closing the funding gap 
include increased public allocation to BTVET, an increased engagement of 
development partners, co-funding by other government sectors, and develop-
ment of more cost-effective training delivery. Further, the strategic plan 
envisages the introduction of a training levy, which may become a significant 
additional revenue source for the BTVET system from 2015/2016 onwards. 
The current calculations exclude any potential proceeds from a levy. Priorities 
will have to be defined within the strategy should any gaps remain.
Options for closing the funding gap include increasing public budget 
allocation to BTVET through domestic and external borrowing and seeking 
grants from development partners and a contribution from international oil 
companies. Just over half of the estimated recurrent expenditure is required 
to expand enrolments in formal BTVET programmes (capitation grants, 
teacher salaries). Enrolment at fixed levels of public expenditure may be 
increased by channelling more funds through private BTVET providers, and 
by shifting parts of the BTVET supply towards cooperative (dual) training and 
enterprise-based training. The latter would require a dedicated approach to the 
policy of strengthening employer-based and dual training. The Strategic Plan 
envisages the introduction of a training levy, which may become a significant 
additional revenue source for the BTVET system from 2015/2016 onwards. 
Assuming that during the first phase of the plan period the post-primary 
seven (P7) programmes will gradually be converted into modular courses 
of one year’s duration on average, the total intake at this level is expected 
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to rise by 540 per cent. The expected increase is 220 per cent for BTVET at 
post-secondary (S4) levels and 185 per cent at post S6.
Monitoring and Evaluation
BTVET sub-sector monitoring has been weak. Yet thorough monitoring is 
an essential management tool to strengthen skills development. Systematic 
monitoring of BTVET outcomes will be introduced for the first time. A 
number of baseline studies will be carried out in the set-up of the monitoring 
system.
The Skilling Uganda interpretations of what the reform is about and where 
to go are widespread, and there is still a gap between the perceptions on the 
part of employers and the business community on the one hand, and the other 
hand with the officials in the Ministry of Education and Sports departments 
concerned, such as the BTVET Department and the Directorate of Industrial 
Training as the leading entities (Ministry of Education and Sports, 2011a). 
The perception is that training providers, companies and local authorities on 
the ground have had little voice in the process. If the two BTVET systems, 
the existing one and the new system laid out as a blueprint in the Skilling 
Uganda Strategic Plan, are compared, the key differences are as presented 
in the table below.
Table 9.1: Comparison of Old and New BTVET Systems
Characteristics of the old model Characteristics of the new model
1. Supply-driven Demand-driven
2. No public-private partnership Public-private partnership
3.
Policy and implementation are concen-
trated in the same hands/departments.
Policy and implementation are 
separated.
4.
The voice of the private sector, 
employers and trades unions is not 
systematically heard.
The private sector participates on all 
levels:
1) Policy formulation
2) Development of instruments and tools 
(programme development, training of 
trainers, certification, quality improve-
ment, innovation)
3) Governance of public and private 
training providers
5. Government funding, input financing
Government and private sector funding, 
output based financing
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Universities and Technical Colleges
Since 1999, the Department of Geology and Petroleum Studies, Makerere 
University, has been offering a Master of Science degree in Geology by 
coursework and thesis. However, the ongoing Master’s programme was 
started before the discovery of commercial petroleum reserves in the Albertine 
Graben and therefore does not adequately cover this discipline. In response, 
two years ago, a new undergraduate programme was launched, titled Bachelor 
of Science in Petroleum Geosciences and Production. The Department of 
Geology and Petroleum Studies also proposes to introduce a new Master of 
Science degree programme in petroleum geosciences by coursework and thesis 
the emphasis of which will be laid on various aspects of petroleum geology. 
This programme is intended to train geoscientists in Uganda and from the 
region to work in the emerging petroleum sector, taking into consideration 
the current global challenges. The areas of emphasis will include stratigraphy, 
structural geology, geophysics, geochemistry, sedimentology, environmental 
geology and fieldwork. Funding for teaching, learning and research costs 
will come from student tuition fees. The energy and petroleum (EnPe) 
scholarships fund supported by the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD) is expected to provide start-up (seed) funds by 
sponsoring students (the first cohort of five students for two years and another 
cohort of five students for one year), equipping laboratories and library, and 
providing expatriate staff. The programme will be taught by the existing 
members of staff from other departments such as physics and MUIENR, as 
well as external sources such as the Directorate of Petroleum of the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Development and expatriates from the University 
of Bergen, Norway. As part of the EnPe project, a number of academic and 
technical Staff will undertake refresher courses in Norway to enhance their 
ability to offer some of the courses in the programme.
The Norwegian Petroleum Academy (NPA) has launched training pro-
grammes in Makerere University aimed at beefing up services to support the 
oil and gas industry when production starts. In 2015, Makerere University in 
association with New College at Nottingham University, United Kingdom, 
established the Cormac Vocational Training Institute to produce as many 
as 2,000 artisans and craftsmen annually. Mbarara University of Science 
and Technology under its Faculty of Applied Sciences and Technology has 
established the Department of Energy, Mineral and Petroleum Studies to 
offer Bachelor of Chemical Engineering, Bachelor of Petroleum Engineering, 
Bachelor of Energy in Petroleum Studies and Bachelor of Mineral and Mining 
Engineering courses. Ndejje University offers basic engineering skills, while 
Makerere University Business School (MUBS) BTVET Department offers 
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certificate, diploma and degree programmes. However, at the present level 
of oil and gas industry development in Uganda, the petroleum contractors 
have advised that practical skills are vital rather than undergraduate/graduate 
university engineering and other programmes which focus on design and are 
not being absorbed by the industry.
9.5 Private Sector Contribution to the Provision of 
Relevant Skills Development in Uganda
The private sector is at the forefront of skills development in Uganda, the 
core framework of which consists of:
1. Formal, private skills education and training institutions
2. Internship training
3. Non-formal sector skills development
4. Corporate investment in employee skills development
5. Private sector associations training programmes
9.5.1 Private Sector Role in Formal Skills Training
The mainstream skills development in Uganda is through the BTVET formal 
education system beginning with post-primary education and training 
(PPET) and includes tertiary institutions awarding certificates and diplomas 
as an alternative for school leavers who do not proceed on the main academic 
pathway through secondary school to university. A significant number of 
BTVET institutions are owned by private providers, and include private 
commercial training institutions, faith-based training institutions, training 
institutions run by NGOs, CBOs and projects. According to the Ministry of 
Education and Sports’ Statistical Abstract (2011b), of the 189 PPET institutions 
96 (51 per cent) are privately run. Indeed, of all the PPET enrolment, about 
36 per cent is in private institutions. At the tertiary level, according to the 
National Council for Higher Education (NCHE), 86 of the 141 institutions are 
private and at university level, 31 of the 37 universities are private, enrolling 
55,000 students (42 per cent).
9.5.2 Internship Training in Private Sector Enterprises
In the formal training system of skills development, internship is critical in 
providing an opportunity for hands-on experience in an authentic workplace 
environment and it is a compulsory requirement. Internship opportunities 
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are sought in both public and private enterprises across the whole education 
system. Private primary and secondary schools support teacher training 
programmes through school practice placements. To illustrate this point, a 
review of internship placements for the Bachelor of Industrial Chemistry at 
Makerere University for the last two years reveals that 79 per cent of students 
did their internship in private companies.
9.5.3 Skills Development in the Informal Sector
The informal sector has a dominant share of economic activities in Uganda, 
covering mining, manufacturing, and commerce and finance sectors, among 
others. The specific activities include:
1. the processing and vending of food,
2. health care by traditional healers,
3. the tailoring of garments,
4. the manufacturing of furniture, and
5. the repair of automobiles.
The size of the sector is estimated to account for about 42 per cent of gross 
domestic product (GDP). About 80 per cent of those employed in the informal 
sector are self-employed and less than 5 per cent of these have a post-secondary 
education. The common approach to developing skills in the informal sector 
is through non-formal training, largely by apprenticeship. Over 90 per cent of 
the officially recognised non-formal training institutions are government-run 
(Ministry of Education and Sports, 2011b). However, there is a large number of 
privately run, unregistered, small-scale non-formal training outfits which are 
part of the informal sector themselves. These are for short duration to fit the 
‘just-in-time’ learning needs of trainees; the programmes offered often require 
limited investment in equipment and facilities and provide easy market entry 
and exit for the providers. The lack of standardisation and quality controls in 
this kind of training, the inadequate number of skilled craftspersons available 
to train apprentices, the fragmented and undocumented nature of the training 
that does not follow any qualifications and certification framework makes 
informal training ineffective.
Technical/vocational education in Uganda is very popular in non-formal 
settings. Non-formal and out-of-school technical and vocational education is 
taken to be an organised education activity outside the formal system. Many 
NGOs have vocational programmes for youth and adult learners throughout 
the country. They also have specific skill development programmes which 
are available through a number of delivery mechanisms. These non-formal 
216 JaCksOn a. mWak ali anD JaCksOn n.m. ByarUhanga
training centres have been very effective in establishing links with employers, 
especially in the areas of financing and labour market information. By design 
they are inherently better able to offer short courses based upon occupational 
analysis, and to use part-time instructors from industry from well managed 
non-formal training centres, which have the demonstrated capacity for 
flexible response to a changing labour market. Private training providers of 
technical/vocational education are over 400, about three times the number 
of the government-aided technical/vocational institutions, and they provide 
short and long courses to the public. The informal sector consists of small 
entrepreneurs and casual workers involved in a wide variety of activities, 
such as craftwork, workshop production, service activities and commercial 
ventures.
9.5.4 Corporate Investment in Employee Skills Development
Corporate firms in petroleum and mining, manufacturing and service 
industries provide needed skills training for their employees to promote 
efficiency in their operations to achieve their goals. The training offered 
tends to be short-term and uses the firm’s own skilled workers or engages 
external training consultants. In many cases, it is offered on-site in the form 
of apprenticeship, or offsite in instructional institutions. The focus is on key 
aspects in the development and management of businesses, corporate tax 
services, supply chain management, and marketing of their products.
9.5.5 Private Sector Associations’ Training Programmes
The private sector is also contributing to skills development through their 
agencies and associations. This is in a bid to provide specialised skills to 
address the gap in skills availability, especially in managerial and technical 
areas. Examples of such agencies are enterprise and industry associations 
serving the formal sector, for example, the Uganda Manufacturers’ Association 
(UMA) and Uganda Small Scale Industries Association (USSIA). USSIA’s 
enterprise-based skills development programme (ESDP) in partnership with 
the Chamber of Skilled Crafts and Small Businesses Cologne is focusing on 
strengthening the entrepreneurial and technical capacity of its members, 
while the USSIA Vocational Qualification Programme (UVQP) – Worker’s 
PAS is a programme implemented in partnership with the Chamber of Skilled 
Crafts and Small Businesses, Directorate of Industrial Training (DIT) and 
The Association of Uganda Private Vocational Institutions (UGAPRIVI) to 
validate the skills of the informal and formal sectors in Uganda through skills 
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assessments which result in acquiring a Worker’s PAS (Practically Acquired 
Skills) document. UVQP touches all the sectors of USSIA. USSIA is carrying 
out a programme for cottage training for business start-ups in all sectors. The 
associations’ training departments offer short-term courses that develop 
critical skills in business management, including business plan development, 
strategic management, customer care, marketing and export management by 
their members (Uganda Small Scale Industries Association, n.d.).
The Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU) and other business skills 
development and mentoring organisations such as TECHNOSERVE Uganda 
and the NEW VISION PAKASA initiative through which business training 
and advice to SMEs in entrepreneurship development is given need to be 
harmonised, standardised and certified by an internationally recognised 
arrangement. On the other hand, the Uganda National Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (UNCCI) should be revived to execute its mandate.
9.5.6 Oil Companies’ Contribution to BTEVT
Industrial Baseline Survey Findings
The 2013 Industrial Baseline Survey findings indicate that training in oilfield 
construction is best left to the Firm Foundations programme proposed by 
Tullow Oil (SBC, 2013). This programme is to set up a massive apprenticeship 
training scheme in association with the construction industry in Uganda to 
be conducted at Nakawa Vocational Training Institute and other selected 
Uganda Technical Colleges. The contribution of IOCs to BTVET seems 
to be fragmented and based on their corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
policies and strategies. They include sponsorship for BTVET, graduate and 
postgraduate training. International Oil Companies Tullow Oil, Total E&P, 
and CNOOC, the three oil majors in Uganda, in partnership with their 
governments, are all providing scholarships to Ugandans from all backgrounds 
for training locally and abroad in order to build the capacity of relevant 
government departments to handle oil and gas issues. There is a need to 
centrally coordinate and monitor oil company contribution to BTVET train-
ing in accordance with the Skilling Uganda programme, production sharing 
agreements (PSAs) and the Petroleum Act supervised by the Petroleum 
Authority of Uganda (PAU).
Policy Issues for Private Sector Contribution to Skills Development
In Uganda today there is no comprehensive, multi-sectoral government 
policy or consistent programme to encourage the private sector to invest 
in skills development. The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) for Universal 
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Post O’Level Education and Training (UPOLET) implementation is such an 
attempt, but it needs to be strengthened and focused. In the Skilling Uganda 
programme, as articulated in BTVET Strategic Plan 2012/2013–2021/22, there 
are plans to engage the private sector in skills development by supporting 
skills development centres and groups in terms of technical advice and ac-
cess to funding. Through DIT, the Ministry of Education and Sports is also 
supporting skills development in the non-formal sector, which is largely 
private, under the Uganda Vocational Qualifications Framework (UVQF) for 
non-formal training. However, the impact of all these efforts is reduced by the 
absence of an articulated and comprehensive policy framework to encourage, 
direct and coordinate private sector participation in skills development. It 
is expected that the planned Skills Development Authority will provide for 
articulation of such a framework that cuts across sectors of social service 
provision, including education, labour, agriculture and trade. The other 
policy issue relates to the need for Government to recognise the cost of skills 
training as a legitimate social responsibility expense by companies, which 
should qualify for tax rebates. A policy that allows companies to deduct 
eligible training costs from their income for tax purposes or that provides 
tax credits for proven training expenses would go a long way in encouraging 
the private sector to invest more in skills development. Under such a policy, 
Government may come up with feasible incentives that subsidise the cost of 
companies investing in skills development.
The envisaged loss of tax revenue by such incentives could be recovered 
through a complementary measure that introduces skills training levies. Like 
in a number of Sub-Saharan African countries, a national skills training fund 
could be established from levies on business and personal incomes to finance 
the provision of skills training in both public and private institutions and to 
reimburse enterprises for the cost of skills training undertaken.
9.6 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
The Government of Uganda has supported vocational education since 
independence in 1962, but until recently the proportion of expenditure has 
been extremely low, and thus the quality of vocational education has also been 
greatly affected. With significant attention now being given to education, the 
country faces enormous challenges from various aspects of the sub-sector, 
and because all these are being addressed simultaneously, the impact is slower 
than many people would like to see. Today, education is ranked amongst the 
top priority sectors of government. The mission of the Ministry of Education 
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and Sports is to provide quality education, to eradicate illiteracy and to 
equip individuals with basic knowledge, skills and attitudes to exploit the 
environment for self and national development. With very strong political 
support, vocational/technical education faces an uphill task of developing the 
nation’s workforce. It is blatantly clear that there is a dearth of skilled human 
resource in the Ugandan economy to meet the demands of the fledgling oil 
and gas industry. For many years during the production phase of the oil and 
gas industry, it is going to be difficult to satisfy the local content requirements 
of the petroleum laws and agreements.
Generally, Uganda’s education system is not practically oriented. It is 
apparent that the BTVET system’s capacity to deliver its intended objectives 
is lamentably weak. The current BTVET system is not in a position to cater 
for the present and future skills requirements of the petroleum industry in 
particular and the economy in general. Most BTVET providers do not refine 
their students to the required current and future skills needs. The training 
contains too much theory and too little hands-on experience. Reforming 
the BTVET system is an onerous task which must be handled seriously by 
all stakeholders through ongoing wide consultations.
In view of the fact that technical and vocational training is very dynamic 
and expensive, there is a need for strong institutional co-operation. Partner-
ship with the private sector and all beneficiaries of education, especially 
joint strategic planning, will inevitably improve on problem identification, 
prioritisation of activities and, above all, achieve optimum utilisation of scarce 
resources. There is also a need to develop a vocational teacher development 
and management plan to address the current problem of both shortage and 
quality of vocational teachers. The quality of education and training depends a 
great deal on the ability of institutions to adjust the content of training to meet 
changing skills needs. This is especially important in training for strategic 
occupations that are rapidly changing under the impact of new technology. A 
multi-disciplinary approach is necessary, involving professional groups and 
representatives of industry and general educators as well as the teachers of 
technical and vocational education.
Furthermore, there is a need to continuously sensitise the population about 
the importance of technical and vocational education and attract not just 
leftovers from academic education but first-class students who can impact 
on technological innovations and economic development. In addition, the 
public needs to be made aware that not everyone can go to college and that 
university education is not the only way to success in life. There are other 
ways to win (Gray and Herr, 2006). And, finally, there is serious need to assist 
institutions practically to integrate business and entrepreneurship skills 
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into technical and vocational education and build their capacity for income 
generation. Institutions should operate units to supplement their incomes. 
The excessive dependence on central government funds stifles the initiative of 
students, teachers and school administrators and they do not take advantage 
of their local communities and local talents to generate income to supplement 
government funding (Okou and Humphrey, 2002).
Uganda is a nascent oil nation. The education system therefore needs 
to be strengthened in terms of compliance with oil and gas certification 
requirements and on-the-job practical training. The existing institutions 
need to be more oriented on O&G qualifications in order to match the oil 
industries’ requirements. Focus should be on the technicians and not the 
engineers available in number. Emphasis should be put on the training of 
skilled people, the reinforcement of the oil and gas certification process and 
supporting the educational system by reinforcing the best academic institu-
tions already in place and by founding a training centre to develop qualified 
technicians. The Government of Uganda and the oil and gas operators need 
to support the educational system in Uganda since most institutions are too 
far from international O&G standards in terms of skills required. Oil and 
gas operators should target their support to the best existing institutions in 
Uganda. Yet, given that Uganda’s development approach is private-sector 
led, it is pertinent that the role of the private sector in skills development is 
adequately recognised, coherently planned for and deliberately promoted in 
the development of national policies and programmes. The contribution of 
IOCs to BTVET seems to be fragmented and based on their corporate social 
responsibility policies and strategies. There is a need centrally to coordinate 
and monitor oil company contributions to BTVET training in accordance 
with the Skilling Uganda programme, Production-sharing agreements and 
the Petroleum Acts supervised by the Petroleum Authority.
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Environmental Sustainability : 




Oil discovery in Uganda, now ranked the fourth largest crude oil reserve in 
sub-Saharan Africa (IMF), presents not only an opportunity to fix the coun-
try’s economic deficiencies but also the need to manage pollution challenges. 
Recovering 1.2–1.7 billion barrels of oil from crude oil deposits of 6.5 billion 
barrels will require considerable infrastructural developments that among 
others include: the construction of roads, railway and pipeline network, an 
air field, a refinery, and a 1444 km pipeline with a capacity of 200,000 barrels 
per day to Tanzania. Consequently, the oil sector presents an environmental 
challenge in the areas of chemical pollution, climate change, resource and 
energy depletion, and the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem integrity.
Focusing on the environment, Uganda’s regulatory system is well 
documented with good intentions to sustain the environment, albeit with 
the occurrence of gaps and weaknesses that limit the citizenry in fully 
exercising its informal hand in getting the regulatory system to work where 
environmental challenges exist. Section 52(3) of the National Environment 
Act, 1995 stipulates that waste originators shall minimise waste through the 
treatment, reclamation and recycling of waste materials. As reflected in the 
various policies, regulatory systems and planning documents, the national 
desire is to create fundamental changes that prevent pollution and promote 
sustainable development.
The challenges faced by state agencies like the National Environmental 
Management Authorities (NEMA), the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA), 
the National Forestry Authority (NFA) and Fisheries in implementing environ-
mental regulations are a pointer to inadequacies in existing regulatory systems 
to regulate potential environmental problems associated with the petroleum 
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industry. The objective of the current chapter is to assess the adequacy of the 
existing environmental regulatory systems in regulating potential problems 
associated with the upstream oil and gas activities in Uganda.
10.2 Environmental Factors Related to Upstream 
Petroleum Activities
The Albertine Rift area is biodiversity rich and recognised globally as a bio-
diversity hotspot with a variety of birds, mammals, amphibians and reptiles 
accommodated in protected areas such as forest reserves, community wildlife 
reserves, wildlife reserves and national parks (National Environmental 
Management Authorities [NEMA], 2010; 2012). The soils in the Albertine 
Rift are highly permeable and fragile with low resilience when exposed to 
agents of soil degradation including buffering against oil spills. The advent of 
petroleum activities has been described by UNESCO as incompatible with 
the Albertine Rift, also home to a quarter of the World’s mountain gorillas 
(Vision Reporter, 2015).
It is evident that petroleum-related issues are generally increasing over the 
years, with business issues leading and closely followed by societal interest 
that largely focuses on welfare (see Table 10.1). It is noteworthy that although 
the focus on environmental issues is currently low in importance they remain 
key determinants of sustainable development of the oil and gas sector.
Seismic ref lection techniques used in hydrocarbon exploration are 
associated with dynamite explosion that may disrupt animal patterns of 
feeding, breeding and communication, including relocation to other areas. 
Furthermore, exploration activities clear vegetation cover with consequent 
habitat disturbance, species loss, and accelerated soil loss with consequent long 
periods of plant recovery (NEMA, 2012). The oil development and production 
phase will be associated with vegetation clearing, earth movement, the influx 
of both vehicle and human traffic and subsequent urbanisation with likely 
devastation of the environment. Moreover, in the production phase, oil spills 
destroy ecosystems and kill biodiversity that includes birds, mammals, fish; 
the relocation of birds, destruction of breeding sites, disruption of migratory 
birds, destruction of their natural waterproofing and insulation against bad 
weather and sometimes death are the disasters faced by birds (NEMA, 2010).
In Nigeria, oil spill contamination of the topsoil has rendered the soil in the 
surrounding areas ‘unsuitable for plant growth by reducing the availability 
of nutrients or by increasing toxic contents in the soil’. Gas flaring has also 
been associated with reduced crop yields and plant growth on nearby farms, 
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and disruption of wildlife in the immediate vicinity (Trade Environmental 
Databases [TED], n.d.). Oil spills are also associated with poisoning by lead 
and barium through contamination of drinking water by oil spills triggered by 
political instability and civil wars (New Vision, 2016). In addition to causing 
lung cancer, gas flaring is also known to cause global warming and acid rain 
with the consequent destruction of trees and fish in acidified lakes.
10.3 Environmental Regulation Within the Framework of 
Petroleum Activities: The Stakeholders
The provisions for sustainable management of the environment are enshrined 
in a range of environmental acts, including most notably the 1995 National 
Environmental Act; the 1998 Land Act,; the 2003 National Forestry and Tree 
Planting Act, the 1997 Water Act; the 2001 Uganda Wildlife Act, the 1951 Fish 
Act and the 2013 Petroleum Act. The environmental Acts are operationalised 
through related regulations and guidelines supported by a legal framework 
and institutional structures (see Table 10.2). Working through a harmonised 
system, environmental Acts, regulations and institutions are expected to 
ensure a clean and healthy environment which is every citizen’s responsibility.
Table 10.1: Petroleum Issues in Newspapers (2000–2016) 














Legislation 10  3 2 10 8
Environment 5 6 5 3 2
Capacity 1 1 1 29 3









Source: Author’s analysis data on data drawn from The New Vision archives. Available at: 
www.newvision.co.ug.
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Oil is a highly valued resource with the potential to create resource 
management-related conflicts that cut across social, economic, administra-
tive and political boundaries. The responsibility for the management of the 
oil resource is shared between the Government, the Petroleum Authority, 
the national oil company and the oil refinery company. The institutional 
arrangement is complex with conflicting roles and responsibilities that may 
hinder the effective implementation of stakeholders at local, district and 
national levels. Since conflict of interest is likely to affect the effectiveness 
of the regulatory system, stakeholder analysis that will identify areas of 
Table 10.2: An Overview of Stakeholders in the Oil and Gas Framework
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conflict and suggest mitigation measures is necessary. By delineating what 
agencies do and interactions among them, it will be possible to minimise 
conflicts that might impede the functioning of environmental regulatory 
systems.
The working of government through the administrative law has a major 
influence on the environmental regulatory system, and therefore the sustain-
ability of the environment in relation to petroleum activities. It is therefore 
important to understand how the tripartite model of Ugandan government 
works in relation to environmental regulations, i.e. originating, regulating, 
implementing and financing. The Government of Uganda works through 
Parliament, the executive and the judiciary.
10.3.1 The Parliament
The Parliament of Uganda, in view of its mandates and functions, has a 
major influence on the environmental regulatory system, and therefore the 
sustainability of petroleum activities. Parliament, by working through the 
committees on natural resources, has the opportunity to influence agencies 
to operate according to their statutory mandate. Parliament has powers to 
amend the statute and perform oversight for agencies and agency officials, and 
apply sanctions such as the reduction of budgets. Furthermore, parliamentary 
appropriation of more funds to address an environmental concern at hand 
can greatly motivate the performance of agencies.
10.3.2 The Executive
The power of the executive is vested in the President of Uganda, who is 
responsible for implementing and enforcing the laws written by Parliament 
and also appoints the Cabinet. The implementation of the laws is done by 
ministries and related agencies. The executive controls the appointment 
process wherein a relevant minister appoints the top agency official. The 
budget is largely shaped within the executive before moving to Parliament 
for approval.
10.3.3 The Judiciary
Headed by the Chief Justice, appointed by the President, the judiciary is one of 
the three arms of the Government of Uganda charged with the responsibility 
to oversee justice in the country. The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 
Article 126(1), spells out the mandate of the judiciary: ‘Judicial Power is 
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derived from the people and shall be exercised by the Courts established under 
this Constitution in the name of the people and in conformity with the law 
and with the values, norms and aspirations of the people’ (see Republic 
of Uganda, 1995). The judiciary has the core role of promoting the rule of 
law and contributing to the maintenance of order in society in Uganda. Its 
functions focus on administering justice through resolving disputes between 
individuals, and between the State and individuals.
The courts are the arbiters of the meaning of a particular statute or con-
stitutional provision (see Republic of Uganda, 1995). What an agency can 
or must do is what the courts in interpreting the statutory or constitutional 
provisions say it can or must do. The judiciary may reverse an agency’s deci-
sion or remand it to the agency for further consideration if it finds that the 
agency has violated any of these sources of the law, including adherence to 
the originating statutory mandate, adherence to its own rules and procedure, 
and adherence to the Constitution.
10.3.4 The National Environment Management Authority
The National Environment Management Authority (NEMA), a creation 
of the National Environmental Act, 1995, has a statutory mandate to man-
age the environment through coordination, monitoring and supervision 
of environmental activities. While it is everyone’s duty to maintain and 
enhance the environment, NEMA has a statutory responsibility to enforce 
environmental regulations that may involve court actions. An Environ-
mental Police Force unit was established to consolidate the enforcement 
mandate. NEMA, a leading environmental agency, spearheads environ-
mental sustainability initiatives in the oil and gas sector. Section 10 of the 
Petroleum Act provides for the authority’s cooperation with ministries, 
departments and agencies of government with related duties, aims or 
functions. This provision facilitates the consistent implementation of 
all regulatory systems related to environmental management. As such 
environmental activity gaps arising from orphaned mandates or roles will 
be minimised or avoided altogether.
NEMA uses established environmental protection standards to moni-
tor changes in environmental quality by comparing with data from waste 
originators who are obliged to publish relevant data on environmental quality 
and resource use. The polluter pays principle is upheld where there is need 
for compensation and the covering of costs related to pollution by waste 
originators. Furthermore, a refundable performance deposit bond is levied 
to act as security for good environmental practice. The refund is made where 
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the operator has observed good environmental practice to the satisfaction 
of the authority.
NEMA is recognised as the principal agency responsible for environmental 
management within the petroleum sector. Therefore, NEMA has a statutory 
mandate to issue licences in consultation with the Petroleum Authority of 
Uganda. Accordingly, NEMA originates (NEA, section 107) regulations that 
are statutory instruments to the operationalisation section, section 52(3), 
that would manage and minimise waste during the production, transport, 
storage, treatment and disposal of waste arising out of petroleum activities.
10.3.5 The Citizenry and CSOs
While the Government holds petroleum rights on behalf of and for the benefit 
of the people of Uganda, it is everyone’s duty to protect and improve the 
environment. The citizenry has the responsibility to ensure that petroleum 
activities do not violate their rights to a clean and safe environment with 
Table 10.3: Stakeholder Analysis of Power in the Context of Environmental 
Impact
Institutions Parliament Cabinet Court Agencies Citizenry Companies Academia CSO
Goals 3 4 0 7 3 3 3 5
Direction of 
influence
5 5 3 2 0 6 2 5
Legal mandate 5 6 4 7 3 2 0 1
Human 
resources
3 3 1 7 0 5 4 5
Technical know 
how
3 2 1 7 0 6 5 4
Management 
capacities
5 3 0 7 0 5 2 4
Acceptance by 
population
4 3 5 2 7 0 1 6
Financial 
resources
5 7 4 2 0 6 1 3
Logistics 3 2 1 5 0 7 4 6
Commitment 5 4 1 7 2 2 1 6
Power/capacity 41 39 20 53 15 42 23 45
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Parliament Justice Absent 
Originator of agencies; grant new powers and respon-
sibilities; performance review; do amendments; budget 
control; makes regulations
Cabinet Justice Absent
Exercise control over agency decision making; control 
the appointment process; possibility of interference 
where interest differ; budget control; regulate the use of 




Interpretation and arbitration of the statute, enforce-
ment of regulations; supervisory jurisdiction
NEMA Water & Envt. Present
Manage the environment; coordinate, monitor and 
supervise activities in the field of environment; evaluate 
EIA; clear EIA expert; protect resources; make regula-
tions and policies; coordinate policy implementation; 
originate legislative proposals, standards and guidelines; 
promote public awareness about environmental issues
UWA Water & Envt. Present Make regulations and policies
NFA Water & Envt. Present
Control and monitor industrial and mining developments 
in Central Forest Reserves; authorise industrial and 




MAAIF Absent Make regulations and policies; 
UIA Finance Present Management and control of investment related activities
Oil 
Companies




Present Capacity building in the oil and gas sector
Local 
Govt. 
Absent Delegated custody of natural resources; 
Citizen
Manage and use land according to the Forest Act, the 
Mining Act, the National Environment Act, the Water 




ergy and Mineral 
Development
Present
Monitor and regulate petroleum activities including 






ergy and Mineral 
Development
Present
Subsidiary of national oil company
envirOnmental sUstainaBilit y 233
functional ecological and aesthetic services. As primary beneficiaries, all 
efforts should be focused on satisfying the needs of the citizenry. The citizenry 
should ensure that petroleum activities are sustainable, to the benefit of 
the public. The right of oil workers and the citizens in general to know the 
environmental hazards associated with oil production should be protected. 
Combined with the agency’s effort, their voice forms a political and legislative 
social pressure that can trigger legislative decisions to the benefit of the 
workers and citizenry.
10.4 Stakeholder Analysis of Power in the Context of 
Environmental Impact
The analysis of power for institutions affected by the petroleum activities 
was based on a pair-wise matrix comparison of the institutions for each 
of the following elements of power: goals, direction of inf luence, legal 
mandate, human resources, technical knowhow, management capacities, 
acceptance by the population, financial resources, logistics and commitment. 
It is clear from Table 10.3 that government agencies are the most ‘powerful’ 
institutions, closely followed by CSOs, Parliament, companies, and the 









ergy and Mineral 
Development
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Manage Uganda’s commercial aspects of petroleum 






















A platform where organisations working in the 
petroleum sector can share information, work together 
for synergy and strategise for joint advocacy on oil and 
gas matters
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tail end. The citizenry is the key beneficiary in environmental regulation 
and should therefore be at the forefront of checking the performance of the 
other stakeholders. Government agencies derive their power from their legal 
mandate, availability of human resources, technical knowhow, management 
capacity and commitment. Ideally, these government agencies are viewed as 
watchdogs and are highly respected by the citizenry. However, their autonomy 
and effectiveness are undermined by the fact that cabinet can control them 
through budget controls.
10.5 Government Institutional Roles and Conflict 
Identification
The legislation provides for the authority’s cooperation with ministries, 
departments and agencies of government with related duties, aims or func-
tions (see Table 10.4). This provision enables consistent implementation 
of all regulatory systems related to environmental management. As such 
environmental activity gaps arising from orphaned mandates or roles will be 
minimised or avoided altogether. However, there is a need to monitor closely 
the functional relationships between NEMA and the petroleum authority, 
and the petroleum authority and its subsidiary companies, the national oil 
company and the oil refinery company.
10.6 Challenges of Uganda’s Regulatory System
Statutory agencies are created to operate as independent entities and therefore 
expected to make environmental decisions independently. However, this 
independence is vulnerable to interference and eventual conflict, as there 
are cases where agencies’ directions will differ from the executive’s position. 
The executive asserts considerable control over agency decision making and 
much of the influence is likely to stem from the appointment and budgeting 
process. The top agency officials are appointed by the Minister. Occasionally, 
the executive also makes informal directives that restrain technical agency 
officials from enforcing regulations. Consequently, this erodes the citizenry’s 
confidence in the working of the agencies. It further curtails the enforcement 
of regulations meant to ensure sustainability.
The independence of Parliament is also doubted as the executive, who are 
members of the ruling party, can influence parliamentarians to make decisions 
that favour the government position which may be against the integrity of 
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the environment. Further, the courts are expected to operate independently 
and shall not be subject to the control or direction of any person or author-
ity. The judiciary focuses on administering justice by resolving disputes 
between individuals and between the State and individuals. The courts are 
the arbiters of the meaning of a particular statute or constitutional provision. 
Yet, the courts are also vulnerable to interference by the executive which 
appoints the top judicial officials. Therefore, courts may not arbitrate fairly 
in an environmental case where the executive has interest with a direction 
that puts environmental integrity at stake.
A court can correct an agency’s action only when the case is taken through 
the judicial system to an appropriate court. In a situation where both the 
executive and Parliament are adamant, justice is limited as an inadequately 
empowered disgruntled citizenry has a fear of courts, let alone the dreaded 
legal liabilities that come when a defendant loses a case. It also requires time 
and effort for a case to go through the judicial system to an appropriate court, 
say a Constitutional or Supreme Court.
While the citizenry is largely ignorant and not empowered to seek court 
redress against violators of the environmental statute, the critical citizenry 
mass may not be realised as areas where the drilling for petroleum is carried 
out are desolate because of migrated families and the occurrence of the 
national game parks. Furthermore, the citizenry’s voice must rise above the 
short-term political imperatives and therefore the need to ensure that strong 
social actors emerge (Kasita, 2013). Who can stand in the gap and become 
a citizenry voice in a situation where state agencies, the judiciary and even 
Parliament are not independent and liable to political interference? These 
interferences are at all levels of governance.
According to Karkkainen (2001), a knowledgeable community is necessary 
for risk reduction. The citizenry can deploy a variety of costly, disruptive and, 
therefore, frequent countermeasures, including boycotts, adverse publicity, 
court actions or the threat of them, and political pressure on regulators 
and elected officials to enforce existing regulatory standards, enact new 
requirements, or exercise discretionary governmental authority against the 
offending firm. But there is a hurdle to achieving Karkkainen’s observation 
in Uganda as the social divide between the lower- and middle-class citizens 
does not enable the use of costly measures to have their demands met.
Civil society organisations (CSOs), either individually or as a consortium, 
have pressured the authorities in various ways to act positively, but their effort 
has not yielded much. CSOs cannot achieve much as their very existence, 
including registration, monitoring and renewal of registrations, is owing to 
the executive, making them a vulnerable lot too. As such, CSOs exert limited 
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pressure compared to the citizenry who, given their voting power, can wield 
tremendous political and legislative pressure on elected officials and regulators 
to enforce standards or enact new regulations. Largely uneducated, poor 
and ignorant of its rights, the citizenry is powerless and not likely to act. By 
empowering the citizenry, CSOs strengthen the community’s informal hand 
to cause enforcement of regulations and relevant legislative amendments by 
the authorities.
Information management is a key element of environmental management 
wherein the obligations of the licensee, worker and citizenry are spelt out 
to ensure safety, health, environment and welfare. Whereas the polluter 
is obliged immediately to inform NEMA of the discharge of hazardous 
substances, chemicals, oil, etc. into the environment, information submitted 
about activities for which a pollution licence is required is proprietary in 
nature and treated as confidential. It is doubtful, given the current secret 
nature of managing petroleum activities, that the freedom to access this 
information can be exercised in situations where extensive pollution threatens 
environmental integrity.
10.7 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
According to the 1995 Constitution of Uganda, every Ugandan has a right to 
a clean and healthy environment (see Republic of Uganda, 1995). The 1995 
National Environment Act further empowers and encourages Ugandans 
to participate in the development of policies, plans and processes for the 
management of the environment. The Ugandan Parliament also has a crucial 
role to play in this regard. Although the Ugandan Parliament has on paper an 
influential position with respect to the development of environmental legisla-
tion, it is nonetheless dependent on the executive (in particular the President), 
which controls a lot of resources and can greatly influence the performance 
of individual members, and hence their re-election chances. It is further a 
sobering observation that so far, from an environmental point of view, the 
Ugandan Parliament has not been effective in legislating and monitoring the 
oil and gas sector. Similarly, statutory environmental agencies are vulnerable 
to interference and eventual conflict, as in most cases the direction favoured 
by the executive has differed from the position of the environmental agency. 
Moreover, the executive is known to make informal directives that restrain 
technical agency officials from enforcing regulations. Consequently, this 
erodes the citizenry’s confidence in the agencies and further curtails the 
enforcement of regulations meant to ensure environmental sustainability.
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Although environmental challenges are currently low in importance, 
they remain key determinants of sustainable development of the oil and 
gas sector. It is, therefore, vital to explore ways in which these challenges 
can be addressed before oil exploitation and production really takes off. 
A crucial policy recommendation to ensure that environmental laws and 
regulations are effectively monitored and upheld is the establishment of a legal 
non-partisan body of stakeholders, who will ensure that the oil sector will 
develop in a transparent and environmentally responsible way. Such a body 
could be constituted by representatives of academia, the religious sector, the 
traditional leaders, the elders’ forum and NGOs. Such arrangements to ensure 
transparency have positively contributed to the effective monitoring of the oil 
sector in countries such as Ghana, Chad and Alaska among others (Shepherd, 
2013). The envisaged body could promote the right to know and be informed 
to an extent where communities are empowered enough to challenge pollu-
tion originators in and outside courts. The independence and non-partisan 
nature of this body will also enable close monitoring of the effectiveness of 
the multi-institutional management of oil resources. Furthermore, the body 
can promote the establishment of a statutory institution that certifies waste 
management plans, access to waste production inventories and supervision of 
waste management. Such institutions, semi-voluntary or voluntary in nature, 
must be able to solicit support from Government or other key stakeholders, 
be specialised, focused and independent and be able to do impact research 
and also verify records of ‘source’ facilities.
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Land Grabbing in the Albertine Graben : 
Implications for Women’s Land Rights 
and the Oil Industry in Uganda
Roberts K. Muriisa and Specioza Twinamasiko
11.1 Introduction
The discovery of commercially viable oil deposits in Uganda in 2006 brought 
a lot of optimism about the contribution of this new discovery to the develop-
ment of the country. Optimistic voices have claimed that the discovery of 
oil will transform Uganda from a low into a middle-income country by 2030, 
and into a high-income country by 2040. Moreover, some people have even 
claimed that ‘Uganda is on the verge of becoming an OPEC powerhouse’ 
(Bategeka et al., 2013). According to Bategeka et al. (2013), these predictions 
are especially promoted by politicians who have a populist’s approach to 
politics, where leaders want to maintain themselves in power by overselling 
the expected benefits of the country’s oil wealth. The popular argument is 
that oil proceeds will finance the national budget, liberate Uganda from donor 
dependency and boost investment in the development of infrastructure such 
as roads, health, education and recreation. At the local level, the argument 
is that oil revenues will boost the districts and free them from dependence 
on the central government.
However, the optimism with which this discovery was associated fell 
short of reality when people in the oil-rich region of the Albertine Graben 
began facing evictions from their land. Some of them were even forced to 
live in internally displaced people’s camp (IDP)-like conditions.1 With more 
than 200 people evicted from their land to pave the way for an oil refinery in 
Kabaale, the initial hope and optimism of getting employment and a decent 
life from the oil industry quickly dissipated among local communities. In 
1 http://www.observer.ug/business/38-business/38987-oil-rich-hoima-struggles-to-solve-the-
land-question.
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addition to land being lost to oil exploration and development, there are 
reports that speculative land acquisitions have increased sharply. This also 
affects people’s livelihoods and may transform into conflicts which in turn 
may affect the oil industry in the long run.
Little academic work has examined the land-grabbing phenomenon in 
Uganda and its consequences. Much of the land-grabbing literature is on 
the ‘green grab’ (see, for example. Fairhead, Leach and Scoones, 2012), with 
justifications of the ‘green’, food and biofuels as necessitating land grabbing 
because of the expanse of land involved in agriculture and less focus on ‘black 
grabbing’. We argue that the manner in which the Government acquired 
the land for oil exploration as well as the speculative investments and land 
acquisitions by individuals in the Albertine Graben after the discovery of oil 
in 2006 needs to be studied.
Since 2006, the Government has embarked on the construction of the 
oil refinery which is expected to sit on approximately 29 square kilometers. 
Because of the oil refinery and the preparation for this refinery, which involves 
extensive infrastructural development, there is a lot of oil-related activities, 
which have affected the livelihoods of many people in the Albertine Graben. 
Apart from the oil-related developments, there is competition for land in this 
region by speculators who hope to gain from appreciations in land prices.
In this chapter, we explore the processes of land grabbing as a result of oil 
exploration and exploitation in Uganda in the districts of Buliisa and Hoima. 
We examine the nature of land grabbing related to oil discovery, the drivers 
of land grabbing, and the resultant outcomes of land grabbing. In this regard 
key questions raised and answered in this chapter are as follows: what is the 
nature and the process of land acquisitions? What are the resultant conflicts 
in the oil rich region of Uganda? How has land grabbing impacted on women’s 
rights? What are the implications for the oil industry?
11.2 Methodology and Theoretical Framework
The discussion in this chapter is based on data collected in Buliisa and Hoima, 
existing literature and government reports.2 We carried out field research in 
the villages of Bukona, Nyamasoga and Kyapolani, all in the Hoima district. 
2 Data for this chapter were gathered as part of a VLIR project entitled ‘Oil Wealth and Develop-
ment in Uganda: Prospects, Opportunities and Challenges’ and the preliminary findings of 
the Baseline Survey for the PhD project by Specioza Twinamasiko, entitled ‘Oil Discovery and 
Compensation: Conceptualizing the Risks and Vulnerabilities for Women’.
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These villages were purposely selected because of their close proximity to 
Kabaale Parish, where most people, especially those still awaiting compensa-
tion/relocation, lived. It is also the area where speculative land grabbing has 
taken place on a large scale and where the prospective oil refinery is planned 
to be constructed. We conducted a large number of in-depth interviews with 
local residents—a majority of whom were women—in order to understand 
the contestations over land and how their lives have been affected by the 
oil discovery in their region. Interviews were also held with civil society 
organisations as well as community leaders. In-depth interviewing was 
preferred because of the flexibility it allowed in getting more data through 
the detailed probing of respondents.
In this chapter we are guided by a political economy approach to under-
stand land grabbing. Further, land grabbing in the Albertine Graben can be 
positioned in the wider debates about land grabbing where capital accumula-
tion and capital gain for economic development are called upon to justify 
appropriations of land. Appropriation involves the transfer of ownership, 
user rights and control over resources that were once publicly or privately 
owned (Fairhead et al., 2012), by expelling the existing claimants (presumably 
a small investment) in the interest of large investment.
Using a political economy approach, one is able to understand the complex 
mix of formal and informal institutions that shape individual and group 
behaviours and State responses to these behaviours. The approach helps us to 
understand the policy processes and how they have shaped the land question 
in the Albertine Graben. The nature of legislation on oil and gas, land laws 
and how they evolved, and how they have impacted on land ownership, 
acquisition and compensation are all understood within this framework. The 
African Union observes that the colonial legacy of land-acquisition processes 
combined with the rush for land for energy and food production opened 
Africa to a new form of scramble for Africa, and recommends that countries 
must put in place policies and legislation for the avoidance of risks of losses 
of land by the poor, or at least to get proper compensation for land in case it 
is taken away (Wisborg, 2014). In addition, the political economy framework 
helps us to understand how different groups and individuals exploit policy 
weaknesses for their own benefit. We argue that the land question in the 
oil-rich region has largely been shaped by the weaknesses in the enforcement 
of the land law, weaknesses that have been exploited by land grabbers. The 
masses who hold customary land for example are insufficiently informed 
about the formal process of owning land. And those who grab land from 
people are not prosecuted.
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11.3 Conceptualising Land Grabbing
Land grabbing connotes a process in which land is acquired using fraudulent 
means. The process may be direct; i.e. a situation where previous landowners 
are forced to sell their rights and are evicted with little or no compensation 
(Muriisa, Mbabazi and Twinamatsiko, 2014). It may also be in the form 
of restricted access to land on which community livelihoods depend as a 
source of food (such as farming and grazing lands), fuel wood and water. 
These lands, which Willy (2010) argues the community holds an undivided 
share in due to their nature as woodlands/forests, rangelands/pasturelands 
and marshlands, are most at risk of involuntary loss to land grabbing. Land 
grabbing may also take an indirect form, where people are made to sell 
their land rights without actually realising that they have sold their rights 
to the land. Here people are made to sign documents which are drawn 
up to support the claim to the land by the land grabber. This may take 
place when people agree to the terms of the land sale or to move from land 
upon promises of compensation and benefits such as employment, service 
access and revenue/profit-sharing (Muriisa et al, 2014). Critics such as 
Kachika (2010) argue that such deals cannot amount to land grabbing, 
because such deals are legal and negotiated between people who consent 
to being compensated for their land and/or decide to voluntarily leave their 
land. It has to be noted, however, that a lot still remains unanswered with 
regard to the information people possess, the size of the compensation, 
the process of compensation, the value of the land and property on it, and 
the level of involvement in negotiating the compensation. Article 237 of 
Uganda’s Constitution vests land ownership in the hands of the people and 
Article 26b(i) of the Constitution stipulates that the compulsory taking of 
possession or acquisition of property is done under the guidance of law and 
requires prompt payment of fair and adequate compensation prior to the 
taking of possession or acquisition of the property.3
It has to be noted that land negotiations in the current period are often 
made secretly between the Government and investors without allowing local 
people to participate in the negotiations, not even to negotiate their right to 
continued access and utilisation. In some instances, negotiations are made 
between middlemen who purport to represent certain people. In all cases, 
3 The Government of Uganda is proposing to amend this Article by proposing to compulsorily 
take over land before compensating owners by depositing the amount of money it presumes to 
be fair for land it wishes to acquire in the event that there is contention over the adequacy of 
compensation by the land owner.
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whether indirect or direct, land grabbing affects people’s land ownership 
and livelihoods.
11.4 History of Oil Discovery in Uganda
Land grabbing in the Albertine Graben can be placed in the history and the 
process of exploration of this natural resource. The commercial oil exploration 
in Uganda started in the early 2000s, although the discovery of oil goes as 
far back as the early 1900s (Miriima, 2008). Following the confirmation of 
the presence of oil in early 1980s, Uganda introduced legislation regarding 
oil exploration and exploitation. What is important in these explorations and 
legislation for this paper is the manner in which exploration and legislation 
were carried out, and the influence on land grabbing.
The exploration lacked the transparency it deserved. It was largely ‘under-
ground’ and hidden, with no popular discussions and limited provision of 
information to people in the region. With the confirmation of the existence 
of oil in the region, the Government enacted the Petroleum Exploration 
Act in 1985 which made petroleum and oil recognised by Government as 
special minerals different from other minerals. Miirima (2008) claims that the 
investment code created in 1991 was crafted to attract foreign investors to invest 
in the oil sector since it required heavy investment. The 1985 legislation was 
followed by the Petroleum and Oil Exploration Act,4 which became the first 
formal and institutionalised way of looking at oil in Uganda, by gazzeting this 
important resource and other minerals as solely owned by the Government, 
although the land above these minerals belonged to the people. We argue 
that the discovery of oil opened the doors to large investments and a rush for 
land acquisitions by speculators who hoped to benefit from compensations 
for land. All these factors promoted land grabbing in the Albertine Graben 
region, which in turn made many residents lose their land.
11.5 The Nature of Land Grabbing in the Albertine Graben
Exploring the nature of land grabbing in the Albertine Graben indicates that 
land grabbing takes various forms and the process of land acquisition fulfils 
almost all the conditions for land grabbing. There are outright violations of 
4 http://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/150 29/09/2016 [what does this date 
signify?].
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land rights, there is limited information on the land acquisition and takeover, 
and there was limited participation in the process of land deals by local people. 
In addition, the forms included forcible take-overs followed by evictions, dubi-
ous dealings, and ‘compulsory acquisition’ – appropriations of public lands by 
Government in the public interest, as provided for under Articles 237(26) of 
the Constitution. The different forms of land grabbing are discussed below.
11.5.1 Appropriation of Public Lands
Most of the land where oil reserves are held in Hoima and Buliisa is public land. 
Mainly it is the national park, and along the shores of Lake Albert, and therefore 
protected public land. People evicted from these lands were illegal occupants (the 
Balalo) and migrant Congolese who had also settled in Buliisa. Land grabbing 
also involves public lands which may be given out by Government to foreigners 
at a give-away price or no price at all. Most lands in Buliisa was acquired through 
lease of land to oil, but in a special way by paying compensation for actual 
properties on site using district compensation rates (Muriisa et al., 2014). Most 
of the lands acquired are in national parks where people have been depending 
for survival on pasturelands and sources of fuel wood and medicinal plants.
11.5.2 Fraudulent/Dubious Land Deals
In Buliisa, the claim by land grabbers is that they bought the land. But inves-
tigations show that the people land grabbers claimed to have bought from 
either do not exist or never owned land. In an interview with the local council 
chairman of Kasenyi where the Kasemene oil well belonging to Tullow oil 
company is located, it was revealed that when the community land was sold 
there was no involvement of the community, but people who had previously 
settled on the land are said to have sold the land, and attempts to investigate the 
sale by communities were met with hostility and violence since land grabbers, 
who were mostly absent landlords, were supported by government operatives 
to prevent the repossession of land by local residents (Muriisa et al., 2014).
11.5.3 Forceful Evictions
Since 2006, the Government has been preparing the ground for the oil refinery 
to be located in Kabaale parish, Hoima district. In order to pave the way for 
the construction of the refinery, people were to vacate the land. The Govern-
ment was responsible for compensating them for their property to enable 
them get another decent living. People were to choose either money and 
lanD graBBing in the alBertine graBen 245
to look for their own place to go to, or to be relocated to a place chosen by 
the Government. In this case there emerged four groups; those people who 
refused the compensation because they felt the compensation process was 
not fair and their property was not given its true value and so they refused 
to move; those who agreed to be relocated and were waiting to be relocated; 
those who agreed to be compensated and had not yet been compensated; and 
those who were compensated and had vacated the land. Importantly, many 
people were dissatisfied with the amount as well as the procedure for obtaining 
compensation for their land. The compensation was often delayed and, in 
the meantime, people were not allowed to use their land for agriculture; i.e. 
their main source of livelihood. The Africa Institute for Energy Governance 
(AFIEGO) helped to lodge a case in the High Court of Uganda on behalf of 
the people waiting for their compensation. Even with a court case pending 
the Government was not moved and AFFIEGO had to step in and assist 
those who accepted the meagre compensation to acquire land and establish 
themselves in decent housing. As noted by AFIEGO (2014) in this respect:
… in addition to the case, we supported those who accepted the inadequate 
compensation to use it to begin a new life. We sensitized them on how to 
utilize their compensation and also provided legal protection to women who 
were being denied by their husbands to be signatories to the bank accounts 
in which the compensation funds were to be paid (AFIEGO, 2014, p.12).
11.5.4 Drivers of Land Grabbing in the Albertine Region
Unlike the green grab, which is driven by land for agriculture and carbon control, 
the ‘black grab’ is largely influenced by large capital gain from investment. In both 
cases, however, the facilitators of land grabbing are local economic and social 
conditions. In what follows we discuss facilitating conditions for land grabbing.
11.5.5 Land Tenure System
Land tenure refers to the complex relationship among people with respect to 
land and its resources. According to Rugadya (1999) land tenure security is 
the individual’s perception of his/her rights to a piece of land on a continual 
basis, free from imposition or interference from outside sources, as well as the 
ability to reap the benefits of labour or capital invested in land, either in use or 
upon alienation. The tenure system defines how land rights are assigned and 
who has access to the land or the rights of use. Uganda’s 1995 Constitution 
recognises four types of land tenure systems in Uganda: i.e. Mailo, leasehold 
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(public), freehold and customary land tenure systems, and the Land Act, 
2010, as amended, provides how tenure, particularly the customary system, 
can be secured. Interestingly, a majority of Ugandans are ignorant about how 
the land tenure system operates. It is this ignorance that land grabbers have 
exploited (Muriisa et al., 2014).
The majority of the land in the oil-rich region of the Buliisa and Hoima 
districts is customarily owned. This may not be surprising as customary land 
accounts for 85 per cent of land in the country (Government of Uganda, 2001, 
p.34). This is because the 1995 Constitution repealed extant legislature, notably 
the 1975 decree, which had vested ownership of all land on the state.5 Land 
holding in Albertine Graben in Buliisa and Bunyoro is customary. Control 
and distribution are vested in the hands of local council chiefs and elders in 
the area (Byakagaba and Twesigye, 2015), unlike the areas in the northern 
region where the control of land, although individualised, lies in the hands 
of the clan heads (Mabike, 2011). The Land Acts, 1998 and 2010 (as amended) 
provide that proof of ownership of land under the customary land tenure 
system shall be the possession of a certificate of registration. The Constitution 
of Uganda, Article 237(4a), provides that people may apply for a certificate 
of ownership of land but does not oblige them to do so, and this makes them 
vulnerable to land grabbing. Indeed, much of the land grabbing, especially 
by speculators, has been a result of this individualised land ownership in the 
region and lack of registration of customary tenure.
It has long been thought that customary tenure and authorities are inad-
equate in protecting tenure. In the Albertine Graben the distribution of power 
and wealth is affected by the land-holding position of community members. On 
the one hand the long-time settlers in the Albertine Graben have depended on 
the customary land tenure holding system with limited control, since no one 
has formally registered his/her customary rights. On the other hand, the elite 
group who are now driving out the former residents of the Albertine Graben 
region are able to do so because they have registered land in their names and 
acquired title to land. Possession of a land title is the only legal claim that one 
can show as evidence of owning land since titling and privatising guarantee 
land security and the protection of rights to land (Cousins, 2002).6 Cousins’ 
arguments resonate well with World Bank arguments for promoting agrarian 
5 The 1975 land decree which had declared all land to be public land was largely denounced by 
the Constitution, and this returned land in Bunyoro and Buliisa to customary holding.
6 This can, however, be challenged depending on how the title was acquired. In the Albertine 
Graben region, land titling has been largely fraudulent. Recently 14 titles to land in the oil-rich 
region were cancelled
lanD graBBing in the alBertine graBen 247
reforms and the formalisation of property rights (Deininger, 2003). It should 
however be noted that titling might contribute to inequality and exclusion, 
decrease security of tenure for women, and disregard communal rights as well as 
the variety of rights of different people to the same property. In a system where 
pursuing land rights is expensive and the poor dominate, the poor are on the 
losing side even when law supports their claim. The Constitution allows the 
conversion of customary land into freehold. But, besides a lack of knowledge not 
only of the process of conversion but also the Constitution, the process itself is 
expensive and unaffordable by most people (Muriisa et al., 2014), and therefore 
most of the lands in the Bunyoro region remain predominantly customary.
With the increased rush for land in the Albertine region for speculative 
purposes, the existing land tenure has clearly contributed to land grabbing. 
The region has been affected by land grabbing because the tenure system is 
weak and does not provide proper ways of formal individual ownership. As 
indicated earlier, the current legislation (see, for example, Article 237(1) of 
the Constitution of Uganda as well as the Land Act of 1998) provides for the 
existence of four types of land tenure in Uganda. Among the four types of 
tenure ownership and the claim of ownership of land is proven by possession 
of land title, except for customary tenure where ownership is acquired by 
simple registration.
The aim of making it possible for customary rights to be acquired by ‘simple’ 
registration was to make land ownership a less complicated procedure, and it 
was envisaged that it would enable customary landowners to acquire secure 
land rights without having to follow the cumbersome procedure of land 
titling as in the other three alternatives. Moreover, the legal requirements 
of surveying and stone marks were not a requirement for this. However, the 
law does not provide proper channels through which the certificate may be 
acquired, and people are not sensitised to the process of registering their 
customary rights. It is worth noting in this respect that both the Constitution 
of Uganda and the 1998 Land Act have not been widely disseminated to the 
people of Uganda (Stickler, 2012).
The powerful elites including government officials (Kwesiga, 2016), the 
Government and large investment farms have illegally taken over land which 
formerly belonged to people in some parts of the Bunyoro and Buliisa districts 
where most oilfields are found, leaving people who formerly occupied these 
lands without land.7 The land taken over is not well compensated for because 
of the lack of land titles and where it is located. The cancellation of 14 land 
7 According to this reporter, one of the 14 land titles which had been acquired illegally belonged 
to a former First Deputy Prime Minister in the NRM government.
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titles acquired illegally in the Albertine Graben is testament to this assertion 
(Kwesiga, 2016).
In Buliisa, most oil exploration sites are located in the national park and its 
surrounding areas and many local residents have already been evicted from 
these areas. Buliisa residents have petitioned the Government to allow them 
access to the 56-square mile piece of land from which pastoralists were evicted 
(Mugerwa, 2012). This land comprises block 2 in the Albertine Graben where 
Tullow Oil Uganda has registered oil discoveries. The land, which was fertile 
for cotton and food crop production, belonged to the native Bagungu who no 
longer have access to the land since it was sealed off by police (Mugerwa 2012).
11.6 Land Governance, State, State Institutions and Land 
Grabbing
Land governance considers policies, processes and institutions by which land, 
property and natural resources are managed. It involves putting in place the 
most efficient ways of administering land issues, and includes decisions on 
access, land rights, land use and planning, making investment decisions as 
well as legislation on land, land management, secure tenure and the transfer 
of land rights. It is the processes and structures through which decisions 
are made about the use of and control over land, the manner in which the 
decisions are implemented and enforced, and the way that competing interests 
in land are managed (Deininger, 2003). Legislation on land defines ownership 
rights and creates means through which land can be transferred. Central to 
land legislation is the role of the State and state institutions responsible for 
implementing the legislation. In what follows we discuss the manner in which 
legislation has aggravated land grabbing in the Albertine Graben. The manner 
in which land legislation is implemented, including sensitisation, providing 
for possible conflict resolution and quick response to conflict, influences land 
grabbing. Lack of legislation and poor implementation of legislation aggravate 
land grabbing. Land grabbing may thus be aggravated by state institutions 
either directly or indirectly. As Borras et al. (2011, p.30) have noted:
Stepping back, and looking at the bigger picture, there emerge three 
broadly distinct but interlinked areas of state actions that are relevant 
in understanding contemporary land grabs, namely, ‘state simplification 
process’, assertion of sovereignty and authority over territory, coercion 
through police and (para) military force to enforce compliance, extend 
territorialisation, and broker for private capital accumulation. First, in 
lanD graBBing in the alBertine graBen 249
order to administer and govern, states engage in simplification process 
to render complex social processes legible to the state. The creation of 
Cadastre, land records and titles are attempts at simplifying land-based 
social relations that are otherwise too complex for state administration 
(Borras et al., 2011, p.30).
The institutionalisation of land ownership is a first step that enables land 
grabbing. This is largely seen through poor/weak land laws or poor implemen-
tation of the would-be good land laws. Weak land laws facilitate grabbing by 
providing loopholes which land grabbers exploit to grab land. In essence the 
law provides an enabling environment for land grabbing. In Uganda, while 
it is stated by the Constitution that land belongs to people, there are other 
legislations such as the Acts for mineral and oil exploration and exploitation 
which indirectly indicate that the people after all have limited control of land.
In consideration that the exploration and mining of oil would require 
land, there has been legislation to guide exploration for and exploitation 
of oil. While care has been taken to minimise the impact of oil exploration 
and mining on the people resident on land, there is no doubt that licensing 
these companies to explore oil lead to mass displacement of people.8 This 
is either indirectly by oil spills and the pollution that is generated by oil 
drilling or directly by acquiring land for exploration. Direct displacement 
takes place through either buying or forced displacement. It should be noted 
that it was not envisaged that oil exploration would generate related land 
conflicts and land grabbing and human rights challenges (the subject of 
this chapter), and therefore there was no proper preparation for addressing 
these challenges. This is evidenced by various pieces of legislation that 
were drawn up to guide petroleum exploration in the pre-colonial and post-
colonial period until 2014. For example, it is an irony that the Petroleum 
Act of 2013 stipulates that people shall continue using the land surface for 
grazing and cultivation. How can this be if oil is exploited underneath and 
oil infrastructure has to be developed without interfering with exploitation? 
It should be emphasised that the legislation concerning oil exploration was 
8 The national oil and gas policy for Uganda 2008 (6.1.1) provides that people should be 
compensated for land acquired for oil exploration, infrastructure development and mining. 
The Petroleum Act, 2013 (135) restricts the licensed oil companies from exploiting people and 
undermining people’s rights, and directs that people’s interests should be taken care of in the 
process of oil exploitation and development. Cap 136(1) of the same Act provides that people 
shall continue using land for grazing and stocking and cultivation as long as the activities do not 
interfere with oil exploitation and mining.
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more concerned with oil-petroleum ‘theft’9 rather than human rights, and 
thus the legislation lacked a human face. The concentration was on the 
protection of oil as a national resource rather than the effects that the oil 
would have. Moreover, the legislation of the time considered only land title 
as granted by Government and Government was given express control of 
land where oil resource would be discovered. For example, Chapter 48 of 
the 1949 Mining Act (section 2), states
The entire property in and control of all minerals and petroleum in, 
under or upon any lands or waters in Uganda are and shall be vested in 
the Government, except insofar as the property and control may in any 
case be limited by any recognition of title or express grant (Republic of 
Uganda, 1949).
And the 1985 Petroleum and Oil Exploration Act states that:
Without prejudice to the exercise of any right under this Act, the property 
in, and the control of, petroleum in its natural condition in or upon any 
land in Uganda is vested in the Government on behalf of the Republic of 
Uganda (Republic of Uganda, 1985).
And defines who will explore oil thus:
No person shall carry on any exploration or development operations on 
petroleum in or upon any land in Uganda except under, and in accordance 
with, a license issued under this Act (Republic of Uganda, 1985).
It should be noted however that the later legislation and policies including 
Uganda’s 1995 Constitution and the oil and gas policy 2014 put the human 
face into mineral and land dealings. Ironically, the human face in the legisla-
tion is eroded as has been alluded to and as will be shown in later discussions, 
since the legislation that is supposed to protect people is used to advance 
land grabbing. The 1995 Constitution and the national oil and gas policy 
created optimism over land ownership. Chapter 15 of Uganda’s Constitution 
is dedicated to land and the environment, and in its opening statement it 
states that land belongs to the people (Article 237(1)). Uganda’s Constitution 
places ownership of land in the hands of Ugandans and recognises four 
9 There are outcries that the mining and exploration of oil in Uganda has remained secretive 
and largely less than transparent.
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land tenure systems under which land is held. The Constitution defines 
the rights and powers of a lawful occupant and bona fide occupants. The 
Constitution further defines the Government’s position on land ownership 
and shows that the Government’s ownership of land is limited to the rivers, 
lakes, wetlands, forest reserves, game reserves, national parks and any land to 
be reserved for ecological and touristic purposes for the common good 
of all citizens. Article 244 of the Constitution provides that all minerals 
and petroleum on or under any land or waters in Uganda are vested in the 
Government on behalf of the people of Uganda. This Article does not in any 
way contradict Article 237; rather it reinforces the fact that for Government 
to own this resource people who formerly owned land (Article 237) should 
be compensated before Government can mine its minerals and oil from land 
where it is found.
The 1998 Land Act also provides for easy access for everyone interested 
in land (including Government), provided that the landowner is adequately 
compensated for his/her land or the use of it. Ironically a law that is supposed 
to allow easy access has made it impossible for everyone to have equal and 
protected access. Instead the loophole in the law opens up vast lands for 
direct or indirect grabs (Muriisa et al., 2014; Rugadya, Nsamba-Gayiiya and 
Kamusime, 2008). It is these loopholes that open up the Albertine Graben 
for grabs. Moreover, Sticker (2012) and Deininger et al. (2011) argue that 
countries with weak land laws open up land for grabs.
11.7 State Organs and Operatives
The role of the State is to serve and protect the citizens. This is made possible 
by the use of state organs, the police, the judiciary, and the military and 
other state institutions. The other role of the State is to invest and to attract 
investment. In essence, serving and protecting citizens and attracting state 
or private or foreign investment in the country are aimed at sustaining the 
lives of the people, which is one of the cardinal goals of development (Goulet, 
1995). The two goals, however, have produced different outcomes which have 
negatively impacted on the lives of the people they are supposed to sustain.
With regard to state institutions, instead of protecting citizens there is 
increasing evidence from studies such as Muriisa et al., 2014 and Rugadya et 
al., 2008 that institutions of the State such as the police and the military, and 
in some cases the judiciary, have instead served the interests of land grabbers 
and not protected people. In Mubende District, it is alleged that state agencies 
including the military evicted 401 families to clear land for the occupancy 
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of Kaweri Coffee Co. Ltd to start its operations in 2001.10 In Buliisa, where 
this study is positioned, it is alleged that the police were instrumental in 
facilitating land grabbing by harassing and beating up people who protested 
at land takeovers by investors (see Muriisa, et al., 2014).
With regard to investment, the increasing role of the State in attracting 
foreign investors partly opens up land for potential land grabbers as a result 
of the positive provisions for the ‘investors’ to access land easily. According 
to the Uganda land policy:
The Government of Uganda has a duty to attract private investment both 
domestic and foreign, into productive sectors of the economy. The duties 
include creating an enabling investment climate, as well as facilitating 
investors to access land (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Develop-
ment 2011, p.7).
As already mentioned, the legislation over oil and the creation of an investment 
code allowed the attraction into the oil sector of investment by foreigners 
due to the heavy capital investment required in this industry.
11.8 Impact of Land Grabbing on the People of Buliisa and 
Hoima
When we interviewed people on what was compensated and how compensa-
tion for land was determined, it was indicated that if one had a land title the 
compensation was higher compared to when there was no land title. In other 
cases, some people were not compensated because of the lack of titles and 
because the land occupied was considered public land (national park and 
water bodies). In one of the villages on the shores of Lake Albert, a respondent 
interviewed said thus;
I was made to leave my land together with my family so as to give way for 
oil drilling I received compensation for the crops on land, my house, but 
not for the land because I held no land title and certificate of ownership 
10 See in particular ‘Complaint against Neumann Kaffee Gruppe under the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises (2000)–Request to the German National Contact Point (Federal 
Ministry of Economics and Technology) to initiate the procedures for the solution of conflicts and 
problems in the implementation of the Guidelines’. See also: https://www.business-humanrights.
org/en/kaweri-coffee-part-of-neumann-gruppe-lawsuit-re-forced-eviction-in-uganda.
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and in the process someone came with a land tittle claiming it was his 
land. Therefore, the compensation I received was not enough to enable me 
construct a new home (Key informant in Kasenyi, personal communication, 
November 2015).
In other areas such as Rwamutonga where oil waste is managed, people were 
evicted without compensation (Paulat, 2014).11 The matter is with court and 
people live in camp-like conditions.
When the matter was taken to court, it was ruled that we negotiate with 
government, we are doing that but the matter is not being settled. Our 
people have been frustrated and they are living a hopeless life (Local leader 
in Kabaale, Hoima, personal communication, November 2015).
There are claims that residents felt that they were made to sign agreements 
which they did not understand since they were written in English, and there 
were no mechanisms for interpreting the contents of the agreements. Some 
women claimed they did not know what they were signing, while others 
thought they were signing land use and access agreements, yet they were sign-
ing for compensation for destroyed crops (Uganda Human Rights Commis-
sion – UHRC, 2013). The Government and the compensation-implementing 
agency deny the claim and that people have not received compensation and 
are directing them to vacate without further notice.12
In other areas people were compensated for land and property taken away, 
although this compensation was not enough for the property, since the valu-
ation of property and assets was done by a government-appointed valuer who 
in some instances overlooked some property. Moreover, compensation took 
too long to arrive. For instance, by 2014 people had not received compensation 
even though the valuation exercise had ended in June 2012 (Uganda Human 
Rights Commission – UHRC, 2013). It was against this background that the 
Africa Institute for Energy Governance (AFIEGO) advised residents to file 
11 Evictions were conducted by a McAlester company, having paid a rich man who owned a land 
tittle and was the one who received compensation. About 1,000 hectares previously occupied by 
about 700 residents were cordoned off and residents were denied access to their gardens (https://
reliefweb.int/report/uganda/land-eviction-breeds-violence-oil-rich-hoima-uganda, accessed 
on 9 September 2019). The Land Act stipulates that before evictions or transactions on land, the 
Bona fide occupants must be adequately compensated.
12 http://ugandaoil.co/2014/10/refinery-site-residents-abandon-farming-as-they-await-oil-
compensation-money/, accessed on 17 November 2016.
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a case against the Government in the High Court of Uganda demanding 
immediate and adequate compensation:
… on 28th March 2014, led by AFIEGO, some residents of Kabaale parish, 
Buseruka sub-county, Hoima district affected by the refinery sued govern-
ment for violating their right to timely, fair and adequate compensation 
for the loss of their property (AFFIEGO, 2014, p.10).
It should be noted however that the Government denied any wrongdoing 
including unfair compensation and denying people access to and use of 
land before compensation (Ssekika, 2016). The Government’s denial of 
wrongdoing contradicts many media reports of the poor compensation and 
other injustices suffered by people in the oil-rich Buliisa (see, for example, 
AFIEGO, 2016a). The media reports are further supported by AFIEGO 
(2016c) which notes thus:
Families which refused compensation in the refinery project on grounds 
that it was low have not received compensation yet. Additionally, 93 families 
with over 465 members which opted for relocation have not been relocated 
yet despite the cut-off date for use of land in the refinery area having been 
put on June 2, 2012 (AFIEGO, 2016c, p.3).
It should also be noted that for those who were compensated, the compen-
sation was neither a negotiated nor a bargaining process. What was to be 
compensated for was predetermined by the contracted organisation (Strategic 
Friends International) and the government valuer. Many properties were 
not compensated for according to their owners’ expectations; there was no 
compensation for animals, some pieces of land were left out of the compensa-
tion, not all crops were compensated for as expected. A respondent who settled 
in Kigaga parish, when asked whether all her properties were compensated 
for, had this to say:
No. there are three pieces of land that were left out (approximately three 
hectares). When I asked, they told me for us we have already finished the 
work and we cannot go back; some crops were left out, these people came 
already determined to pay what they wanted not what we had, we were 
asked to show our gardens and for them they picked what they wanted, 
some mango trees were not counted, for example if one had 5 trees, they 
counted 3 and 2 left out; I had a garden of sugarcane but only for trees were 
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counted and not the whole garden (Key informant, personal communica-
tion, November 2015).
UHRC (2013) also found similar complaints that people were never consulted 
in the process of valuation to determine the true worth of their properties. 
The appointed government valuer never considered what residents were 
getting from mango trees and cabbages were undervalued at shillings 200 
compared to the market value of 2000 shillings. Indeed, an interview with 
one former resident of Kyapoloni now residing in Buseruka Trading Centre 
awaiting relocation, when asked to say what was compensated for and the 
value of the compensation, revealed:
Banana plantations, pineapples, maize and bean gardens, but they never 
paid for my fruit trees. Each banana plant was valued at 4000, maize garden 
120,000 and pineapple 500 (Key informant, personal communication, 
November 2015).
Asked about the adequacy of the compensation, it was indicated that this 
was not enough and that there was a lot of inequality in the compensation:
How can you compensate someone’s garden of beans, maize at just 120,000 
irrespective of the size the garden? This was unfair (Key informant in 
Buliisa, personal communication, November 2015).
In addition to the disappointment with compensation for the physical land, 
people felt that the compensation for land could not be worth the attachment 
they had to the land. Moreover, the value was based on land as a physical 
asset, but often the social implication of relocation was not determined. 
The importance of land is recognised by the Government. It is considered a 
basic resource in terms of the space it provides, the environmental resources 
it contains, and the capital it generates. It is an asset that can be traded and 
is important for national identity as it provides symbolic meaning for the 
nation and the people living on the land. It also ‘influences spirituality and 
aesthetic values of all … societies’ (Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban 
Development, 2011). Given this huge importance accorded to land, taking 
it away from people in any form creates insecurity, not only in terms of food 
but also pride, and psychological stress. Land is used as a burial ground, 
and people when relocating leave these grounds behind. The attachment 
to burial grounds and abandoning them cause psychological distress and 
emotional stress since memories and remembrance are part of human life 
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which cannot be erased. Moreover, in cases where people were given money 
to transfer graves, exhume and transport the remains of their loved ones, they 
claimed that the Uganda shillings 200,000 which was paid was not enough 
(UHRC, 2013).
11.9 Land Grabbing and Land Disputes
Disputes over land use and access continue to escalate in the Albertine 
Graben. The land tribunals which had been put in place to assist the justice 
system were suspended in 2006, leaving a big gap in the land conflict resolution 
system, especially as the formal justice system lacks the capacity to handle a 
large number of cases. The court system is expensive for most local people and 
this has also undermined the justice system as regards land dispute resolution. 
It should be noted that while the State is supposed to protect its citizens, the 
State has delegated its responsibility; for example, the Government hired a 
consultant—Strategic Friends International Ltd—to take over the valuation 
of and payment of compensation for land, and the relocation process of 
people affected by the oil refinery. The organisation has not done much to 
educate people on the land compensation process, and land that is eligible 
and ineligible for compensation. The situation has culminated in a number 
of land-related disputes ranging from contestation over compensation to 
outright confrontation between locals and the Government (in the form of 
mass protests), and between locals and the investors.
The other dispute over oil discovery is related to revenue-sharing between 
the Bunyoro kingdom and Government. The relations between Bunyoro 
kingdom and the central Government over revenue-sharing are souring day 
by day. The policy that considers revenue-sharing ignores the traditional 
leadership in the area. According to the Oil and Gas Revenue Management 
Policy (MFPED, 2012), 7 per cent of all royalty revenues are to be set aside for 
sharing between local governments and the communities directly affected by 
the oil and gas mining. It is not clear what ‘communities’ mean here. Moreover, 
it was not specified beforehand how the sharing between communities and 
local government would be done. The assumption could be that the 7 per 
cent share is used by local communities to develop themselves by way of the 
construction of community infrastructure such as roads, health centres and 
schools, to mention just a few. However, it should be noted that the people 
of Bunyoro, especially the kingdom, expect more. That the kingdom should 
benefit from oil is a matter that should not be ignored. Uganda, although 
not having a federal system of governance, respects the functioning of local 
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cultural institutions as long as they do not engage in partisan politics, as 
provided for in Chapter 246 (3e) of the Constitution of Uganda.
11.10 Land Grabbing, Land Rights and Women’s Livelihoods
Land grabbing has a negative impact on all people, but for the vulnerable 
groups such as women and children, who largely depend on land for their 
livelihood, the situation is worse. Land is a source of women’s livelihoods and 
survival; they grow food and it is a means through which they can provide for 
their families. These common lands have the most insecure tenure; they are 
often considered by Government to be wastelands, and therefore are given 
away to outside investors (Behrman, Meinzen-Dick, and Quisumbing, 2011). 
Giving away or limiting access to these lands undermines women’s source 
of livelihood and their welfare. Women depend on these lands for collecting 
firewood, water, fodder and medicinal plants necessary for a healthy living 
for them and their families.
Apart from common lands, women derive their livelihoods from family 
land to which, although having no rights of control and disposal (Jacobs, 
2009), they have access rights and from which they can produce food and get 
vegetables. In the African tradition, the woman should provide food for the 
family. Having rights over land increases women’s economic strength and 
ability to bargain, both in and outside the household. In addition, women 
can access services such as financial, maternal and family planning and 
maternal health care services. Jacobs (2009) provides three basic reasons why 
land rights are important for women: equity, welfare and efficiency. Taking 
rights to land away from women denies them the ability to be efficient in 
decision making and the right to welfare. The 1998 Land Act states that any 
decision made on customary land according to the customs or traditions 
that denies women access to ownership, occupation or use of any land, 
violates the rights of women. Section 39 of the Act give all spouses the right 
to security of occupancy of family land and requires the consent of the spouse 
for transactions in family land (Republic of Uganda, 1998). In spite of these 
provisions, it should be noted that, as in most African countries, in Uganda 
women’s rights are largely limited to access, and other rights such as control, 
as well as disposal and use, are held by men. As a result, women were never 
fully involved in the process of negotiating land deals and compensation for 
land. Most women, when asked about their involvement in the negotiation 
and valuation of property, intimated that the men were the ones involved 
and that they were never consulted. The compensation money was deposited 
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in men’s accounts and they could do anything with it, including taking on 
second families (marrying new wives, often abandoning the old one) without 
involving women.
Reports indicate that the involvement of women in compensation negotia-
tions was minimal (AFFIEGO, 2014), a situation that put women at a risk of 
losing their husbands to young women. Media reports indicated that women 
have not been involved in the compensation process and that some men, 
after getting compensation, had to marry other wives while others left their 
families completely.
Our men were ok when they were still poor but after getting money, they 
forgot about us, my husband married another woman whom we have to 
share everything we have… I have lost everything including my husband 
who was like a brother to me before oil discovery (Key informant, personal 
communication, November 2015).
A key informant corroborated the above evidence and said, ‘some women are 
still here, they have nowhere to go, their husbands left them’ (Local Council 
Chairman, Nyamasoga, personal communication, November 2015). It was 
found that the welfare of many women was affected by the oil discovery and 
exploration most especially after the compensation was received. In the 
first instance there was family unity with strong relationships between men 
and women before compensation was paid. Men and women used to work 
together, even on the farm. But as the compensation was paid out to men, 
this was followed by social disunity in many households. Many men either 
left their wives or married others and became polygamous. Many women 
were affected because they were not given opportunities to be part of the 
agreement when receiving compensation. According to available sources, 
there was no provision for spousal consent in documents to be filed before 
compensation was paid out, and bank accounts opened for the compensation 
process were largely registered in the names of men (Ongode, 2015). It should 
be noted that the compensation was to be either in the form of cash or to buy 
and relocate people to the new places. Those who received cash, especially 
in Kabaale where the oil refinery was to be built, have already left the place. 
Those who were to be relocated have waited for relocation and the matter is 
taking too long. Some women have been abandoned by their husbands in this 
process and have remained behind. For those women who are abandoned 
by their husbands and not yet relocated, the challenges are many, ranging 
from failure to tend their gardens as they are not allowed to plant to fear of 
being raped by strangers since the place they live is almost abandoned, many 
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people having left. In Kabaale Kitengwa, an interview with a respondent who 
is a woman village leader revealed:
When the exercise was just starting they promised to care for the vulnerable 
like women, children and disabled. They also promised to train women 
with hands on skills to help them use the money from compensation very 
well, none of these came as promised. Men have married other women 
and have left us with children alone. We are not progressing in any way, 
nobody cared about us. We are being raped by strangers because the area is 
empty and bushy. Girls and other children no longer go to school because 
of fear to let them move alone. Our children have no future because they 
are not being educated (Woman Village Leader, Kitengwa village, Personal 
communication, November 2015).
The above is supported by Global Rights Alert (2015) which reports that many 
people awaiting compensation are faced with the challenge of broken-down 
institutions such as schools and water systems, surroundings of bush as 
many people have left the area and a threatening future for them and their 
children. Some of the parents withdrew their children from school awaiting 
compensation, while others forced them into early marriage (Uganda Human 
Rights Commission-UHRC, 2013; AFIEGO, 2016b).
11.11 Implications for the Oil Industry
The immediate implication of the above for the oil industry in Uganda is 
delayed oil exploitation and mining. As indicated above, people have resisted 
moving from the land where the refinery is to be located. Until these people 
move, the mining of oil cannot start. The implication of not giving a specific 
share of oil proceeds to the kingdom of Bunyoro is that a conflict between the 
kingdom and the Government of Uganda can cause paralysis in the mining 
and exploitation of oil. Throughout the world there are a number of examples; 
Sudan, and now southern Sudan and Nigeria, where control of oil resource 
has resulted in civil war and/or armed conflicts leading to a halt in mining 
the resource. Ross (2004) posits that discontent among local communities 
about the extraction of oil leads to civil war. This hypothesis postulates that 
grievances among local communities over land appropriation, the failure 
to provide jobs, social disruptions and environmental hazards lead to civil 
war. In the previous discussion, we have already indicated that the people 
of Bunyoro are discontented about their land, and in Muriisa, Mbabazi and 
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Twinamastiko (2014) it is argued that there is limited contribution to creating 
job opportunities by way of the oil extraction. While Ross (2004) found no 
evidence linking grievance and civil war, it is not unlikely that grievance may 
lead to political crisis. Uganda recently experienced a political crisis in the 
Kasese region where the King of Rwenzulu expressed discontent and wanted 
to secede from the republic of Uganda.13
The last expected implication of land grabbing for the oil industry is 
the disruption of the flow of oil in the pipeline. As already discussed, oil 
exploration and exploitation in the Albertine Grabben have led to the internal 
displacement of people from the lands on which their livelihood depends. The 
likely implication of this is that the people, especially the youth, will probably 
start looting the oil in order to survive by disrupting the pipeline once it has 
been laid to carry unprocessed crude oil to the refinery. In Nigeria, oil theft 
and vandalism are the biggest crimes the oil industry is facing, and these 
result in massive loss of both crude oil and revenue (Ogunleye, 2016). It is 
further indicated that many of these crimes began as economic crimes. With 
the oil displacements in the Albertine Graben with no immediate economic 
benefits it is likely that once the pipeline is finally laid it will face vandalism.
11.12 Conclusions
The discovery of oil in Uganda brought a lot of optimism that oil would bring 
development. Ironically the initial stages of oil exploration and preparation 
for its extraction and processing has led to desperation and despair among the 
highly optimistic and expectant Ugandans. In particular, the discovery has 
led to land takeovers and the displacement of people brings the phenomenon 
into the discourse of land grabbing. This paper has examined how Uganda’s 
oil discovery has led to land grabbing with particular emphasis on the nature 
of land grabbing related to oil discovery, the drivers of land grabbing, the 
impact of land grabbing on people’s land rights, particularly women’s, and 
the implications for the oil industry in Uganda.
From the discussions presented, the paper concludes that land grabbing 
in the Albertine Graben is real and is manifested through government 
takeover and the grant of concessions of public lands to investors through 
forceful evictions and dubious dealings. The drivers are many, but given their 
manifestations we conclude that the drivers of land grabbing in the Albertine 
13 This matter is in court and it cannot be discussed any further in this paper until the courts 
resolve the matter.
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Graben are the result of institutional failure, ranging from poor institutions 
and laws to the failure of institutions to protect people. Uganda’s move to 
amend Article 26b(i) of the Constitution will do nothing but will aggravate 
land grabbing, and this is likely to be seen more in the Albertine Graben. 
With regard to the impact on women, it is concluded that land grabbing has 
affected women negatively since the source of livelihoods for them has been 
taken away. Given the fact that oil exploration and mining have been met 
with contention and resistance, we conclude that this is likely to affect the 
oil industry by interfering with mining and tampering with the oil lines, and 
to a minimal level it may lead to civil war resulting from discontent about 
sharing the oil proceeds.
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Expecting Eldorado? An Analysis of 




When Uganda found oil in 2006, President Yoweri Museveni held national 
thanksgiving prayers to celebrate the historic discovery. Just like the President, 
the majority of Ugandans then were very excited that the country would 
soon start reaping billions from its oil and gas resources and join the likes 
of Nigeria and Libya in the prestigious ranks of Africa’s oil producers at the 
time. Shortly after that discovery, the Ugandan Government endorsed a 
proposal for an early production scheme1 (EPS) that would see the country 
start producing oil in the shortest time possible. This was perhaps the biggest 
indicator then of how urgently the Government needed to start pumping and 
earning from the country’s petroleum resources.
The discovery was perceived as a great win for all Ugandans, and the 
media were awash with stories about how oil would significantly alter the 
country’s development trajectory for the better. Some doubted that the 
NRM government, which had been in power for over two decades, would be 
inclined to manage the country’s oil resources for the benefit of all Ugandans. 
They pointed to early signs of elite capture, an overbearing presidency and 
increasing militarisation of the oil producing areas as warning signs of what 
might come (Global Witness, 2010).
Ugandan civil society, known for too often being in bed with the ‘other 
side’, quickly jumped on the oil bandwagon and cautioned Government 
against misusing oil money. They brought into this discourse terms like the 
1 The EPS was planned to start in 2009 with production of 4,000–5,000 barrels of oil per day.
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‘resource curse’2 and ‘Dutch disease’3 and went into the oil-producing areas 
to sensitise people about the wealth beneath their soil. There was talk in civil 
society circles about some NGOs revising their strategic plans to justify 
funding from donors to enable them ‘work on oil’.
Communities in oil-producing areas were convinced that they could earn 
from oil either by way of providing goods and services to the industry or by 
their children obtaining employment in the oil camps. Politicians took it a notch 
higher and started making demands for what they believed should be their 
region’s fair share of oil proceeds. In an unprecedented move, the King of Bu-
nyoro stormed Parliament demanding that his kingdom receive 12.5 per cent of 
oil royalties (Ssekanjako, 2012). Young professionals sniffed out an opportunity 
to cash in, and those who could afford it sought post-graduate qualifications in 
oil and gas disciplines, most of them in fairly expensive universities in Europe 
(Ongode, 2013). The business community was perhaps the most excited of all, 
with many local businessmen rushing to banks to acquire loans to set up a 
facility or service to feed the oil and gas industry. This was generally the mood 
across Uganda in the first few years that followed the historic announcement 
that the country had oil and gas in commercial quantities.
Almost 13 years later, Uganda is yet to see its first oil, despite an impressive 
exploration programme that has confirmed that the country possesses in 
excess of 6.5 billion barrels of oil in the ground, with only a fraction of the 
mapped oil basins explored (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development, 
2016). The Government insists that it deliberately decided to take its time in 
mapping its oil future because it wanted everything to be done right for the 
benefit of the country, specifically defending what the oil companies perceived 
as slow action in approving production licences to enable commencement 
of the production phase. There has been some progress on the development 
of infrastructure, with the Government finally agreeing on the route for the 
crude pipeline to the export terminal at Tanga, Tanzania. However, beyond 
announcements that the international oil companies (IOCs) had been granted 
2 The resource curse, also known as the paradox of plenty, refers to the paradox that countries 
with an abundance of natural resources, specifically non-renewable resources like minerals and 
fuels, tend to have less economic growth, less democracy and worse development outcomes than 
countries with fewer natural resources.
3 ‘Dutch disease’ refers to a situation where growth in income from natural resources damages 
other sectors of a country’s economy. This happens because increased revenues from natural 
resource exports tend to increase the value of the exporting nation’s currency. That makes the 
country’s other exports, such as agricultural products and manufactured goods, more expensive 
and therefore less competitive in world markets. The economy thus becomes over-reliant on the 
natural resources that it is exporting—and this can be particularly damaging if, for any reason, 
there is a drop in world price for those natural resources.
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additional production licences, Ugandan citizens remain largely uninformed 
of developments in the oil industry.
In fact, the past five years have been confusing. First was the slump in global 
crude oil prices that led some to question the viability of Uganda’s oil and gas 
projects; then Government and the IOCs disagreed on how to proceed with 
development of the country’s oil and gas resources, initially about the refinery 
and later the route of the pipeline (Aching, 2016). The businesspeople who 
borrowed heavily from commercial banks have been unable to repay their 
loans and the Government has faced difficulty getting a viable investor to 
build its refinery (Matsiko, 2016). Many of the young people who invested in 
acquiring an oil education cannot find jobs. In the oil-bearing areas there has 
been a surge of land conflicts and some communities have been dispossessed 
of their land, losing lives and property in violent confrontations with those 
interested in the land.
This chapter will, in the context of the background sketched above, analyse 
the expectations Ugandans have concerning their country’s oil and gas re-
sources, and whether the Government and the oil companies are managing 
those expectations adequately. The chapter will systematically examine the 
roles of the different key players in the oil and gas sector, in particular the 
Presidency, politicians, the media, civil society and academia, with specific 
focus on how they have helped to shape the public’s expectations either 
positively or otherwise over the past decade. The information presented in 
this chapter is based on a critical review of the published literature, press 
reports, government documents, oil company statements and reports from 
civil society groups. These were augmented with additional data collected 
by the author in the course of his work as a writer and editor of an oil and 
gas sector publication, which included interviewing key stakeholders in the 
oil and gas industry over a period of five years.4
12.2 Understanding Ugandans’ Expectations
The average Ugandan adult is aware that Uganda has oil and gas resources and 
expects that exploitation of those resources will have an impact on them either 
directly or indirectly, positively or negatively. For the purposes of this chapter, 
the Ugandan population has been divided into three different groups: the 
hosts, the poachers and the spectators. Each group has different expectations 
from the oil and gas industry. The degree of expectation varies depending on 
4 See www.oilinuganda.org.
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several factors that include the person’s proximity (in geographical terms) 
to the oil-producing areas, and their involvement politically, economically, 
culturally or professionally in the oil and gas sector. The three groups are 
discussed in more detail below.
12.2.1 The Hosts
These are the people in the eye of the storm. They are inhabitants of the oil-rich 
Albertine Region and perceive the oil and gas as being beneath ‘their’ land. 
Although Ugandan law grants ownership of natural resources to the State,5 
these people still claim ownership of the oil resources and feel they deserve 
more benefits from its extraction than the rest of the country. They argue that 
they will face the brunt of its exploitation either socially or environmentally, 
and hence need to be adequately compensated. Indeed, the Government 
recognises this and even made a provision in the Public Finance Management 
Act, 2015 returning some of the revenues earned from oil production to the 
hosts. Section 75(1) of that Act therefore explicitly states: ‘Government shall 
retain 94% of the revenue from royalties arising from petroleum production 
and the remaining 6% shall be shared among local governments within the 
petroleum exploration and production areas of Uganda’.6
The law further makes provision for the cultural institutions that may exist 
in those oil-producing areas by granting them 1 per cent of the royalties due 
to the Central Government.7 The Bunyoro Kingdom, the most prominent 
cultural institution in the Albertine Region, had initially made demands to 
Parliament seeking to be allocated much more of the revenue from royalties. 
The King of Bunyoro, Solomon Gafabusa Iguru, presented those demands to 
the parliamentary Committee on Natural Resources in 2012. He demanded 
that his Kingdom,8 which includes the seven districts of Hoima, Masindi, 
Buliisa, Kiryandongo, Kagadi, Kakumiro and Kibaale, should be given 12.5 
5 See the Petroleum (Exploration, Development and Production) Act, 2013, Part II Section 4: 
Vesting of petroleum rights: (1) in accordance with Article 244 of the Constitution, the entire 
property in, and the control of, petroleum in its natural condition in, on or under any land or 
waters in Uganda is vested in the Government on behalf of the Republic of Uganda. (2) For the 
avoidance of doubt, the Government of Uganda shall hold petroleum rights on behalf of and for 
the benefit of the people of Uganda.
6 Ministr y of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Uganda Public Fi-
nance Management Act, 2015, retr ieved from: https://f inance.go.ug/test/ser v ices/
uganda-public-finance-management-act-2015/.
7 Section 75(8) of the Public Finance Management Act, 2015.
8 Of the seven districts that comprise Bunyoro Kingdom, only Hoima and Buliisa have proven 
oil reserves.
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per cent of royalties when oil production commences. He reminded the 
Committee that he was the valid trustee of the Bunyoro customary lands 
and natural resources, and therefore needed a fair share of the royalties so 
that he could develop the kingdom.
In a separate interview in 2012, the Bunyoro King justified his kingdom’s 
demands as follows:
All the kings and cultural leaders must be given a percentage so that they 
can continue doing something good for the people. For example, building 
schools, hospitals, roads—and culture and behaviour will be addressed 
using the resources. HIV/AIDS is spreading fast, so how do we stop it? 
We need that money to teach our youth how to behave well. Young people 
must also have skills to address issues of poverty that are spreading like a 
wild bush fire. We need money for this (cited in Young, 2012).
The King’s claims are entrenched in a colonial agreement his father, Tito 
Gafabusa Winyi IV, signed with the British in 1955.9 In particular, Article 36 of 
that agreement stipulated the following: ‘In the event of any mineral develop-
ment taking place, a substantial part of the mineral royalties and revenues from 
the mining leases shall be paid to the native government of Bunyoro-Kitara’.
In other parts of the Albertine Region some leaders have formed lobby 
groups to advocate for the interests of their people. An example is the Acholi 
Technical Working Committee on Oil and Gas (ATWCOG) in Northern 
Uganda. This particular group has repeatedly expressed concern at what it 
considers its deliberate exclusion by Government from the oil discourse. 
Its sentiments arise from a belief that its Region is contributing most of the 
oil and hence deserves to be involved in the planning processes.10 In a 2014 
interview, Prof. Morris Ogenga-Latigo, a leading politician and Chairman 
of ATWCOG at the time, said:
The basic story you hear is that oil is in Bunyoro. It turns out that the refinery 
in Hoima will get its crude oil largely from the Jobi oil field in Acholi. That 
the refinery in Hoima will get literally more than ninety percent of its oil 
from one oil field in Acholi. Yet the other entire (planned) oil infrastructure 
9 See for more information the Bunyoro-Kitara Kingdom website, retrieved from: https://
bunyorokitarakingdom.org/.
10 This is an unverified claim by Acholi leaders that most of the oil discovered so far lies in 
basins located in Northern Uganda (Nwoya and Nebbi Districts) and not in Hoima and Buliisa 
as reported by the Ugandan Government.
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like the Refinery, Central Processing Facilities and the pipelines and pump 
stations are not in Acholi. Other than just piping of the oil for refining in 
Hoima and export, there is nothing planned for Acholi (cited in Nalubega 
and Ongode, 2014).
Both Government and the oil companies deny those claims and insist that 
their decisions are purely technical, not political, and are based on assess-
ments of least-cost options. They point out that the oil in northern Uganda 
is found in the Murchison Falls National Park which makes it impossible 
to set up infrastructure. That does not stop the negative sentiments within 
communities in Northern Uganda from growing nonetheless. Even in areas 
where exploration efforts yielded no oil, the residents there still feel a strong 
sense of ownership and look forward to becoming oil producers. In Rhino 
Camp, Arua District, Neptune Petroleum drilled three wells but was not 
lucky, forcing it to abandon the area. However, the residents remain hopeful 
that the company will return and find oil. They believe that a tree species, 
known locally as ‘Tiika’ and relatively abundant in the area, is a sign of oil 
lying beneath the surface (Oil in Uganda, 2013a).
At the southern tip of the Albertine Graben is Ntoroko District. One of 
the prospective areas, Kanywataba, was leased out to the Chinese National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) (Tullow Oil plc, 2011). The company 
did some drilling there in 2012 but did not find oil. The Chinese packed up 
and left the area and their licence consequently expired and reverted to the 
Uganda Government for possible re-licensing. It was eventually awarded to 
Armour Energy, an Australian Company, in 2017 (Acomai, 2017). However, 
residents remain confused about the status of ‘their’ oil resources, but many 
are optimistic that their area has oil. They seem unprepared to accept that 
perhaps they may not be as lucky as their countrymen further north.
12.2.2 The Poachers
This category includes people who are mainly driven by their personal desire 
to gain individually from the oil sector, through deals, career development, 
employment, consultancies, business opportunities, etc. Many of these people 
do not hail from the oil-producing areas but are merely taking advantage of a 
nascent, potentially lucrative oil and gas sector. Many of them are part of or 
are in some way associated with the business, professional or political class. 
A classic example is the select group of 42 people who received a combined 
pay-out of 6 billion shillings (US$ 1.8 million) from the Government as 
appreciation for their efforts in winning a tax case against British oil firms, 
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Heritage Oil and Gas and Tullow Oil. Heritage Oil was instructed to pay 
US$ 434 million to Uganda in capital gains tax, from which award 6 bil-
lion shillings was retained and split amongst staff of the Uganda Revenue 
Authority (URA), officials from the Ministries of Justice and Constitutional 
Affairs, Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Energy and Mineral 
Development and others. Media reports indicate that this scheme was initiated 
and coordinated by the head of the URA, who convinced the President that 
the officials concerned needed to be rewarded for their effort in salvaging 
billions of Uganda’s tax money (Musisi, 2017).
That case demonstrates how poachers typically operate. For them, the oil 
and gas sector is a cash cow that must be milked dry irrespective of what other 
members of the public stand to lose. The expectations of poachers tend to lean 
more towards personal needs because they have made some investments and 
expect returns from the sector. For example, career people may have invested 
in a postgraduate education abroad, or the business community may have 
borrowed heavily from commercial banks to set up oil-related facilities or 
politicians may have spent heavily to be elected into office. Whatever the 
case may be, all these people expect a return.
12.2.3 The Spectators
This group of Ugandans is somewhat detached from developments in the oil 
and gas sector because they do not see how they can benefit directly. They hail 
from outside the Albertine Region and are not associated with the business, 
professional or political class. They perceive oil as the preserve of a minority 
group of people close to the political establishment. They are aware of the 
potential of the sector but do not have any point of entry because they lack the 
connections. These people will wait for whatever Government apportions to 
them, preferably by way of improved service delivery. They are the majority of 
Ugandans. In 2013, Oil in Uganda, a Ugandan oil and gas publication, carried 
out a survey that set out to establish the interest of a cross-section of Ugandans 
in Kampala and Luwero Districts (Central Region) in oil issues. The survey 
discovered that most people regard oil as a preserve of the Government and 
connected ‘big people’. Below are some of the quotations from a few of the 
respondents who were interviewed:
‘I don’t know much and I don’t need to know much because we will not 
benefit much. We are in Luwero, oil is in Hoima. I don’t think we shall 
benefit so much like the people in Hoima. If they decrease transport costs, 
that is all we need.’
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‘I have heard about Uganda’s oil. I think extraction started some time back. 
People like me who are not so much into oil only get information when we 
stumble upon it. I do not know how I am going to benefit; truth be told. 
Everything is going to the big guys up there.’
‘I hear they are going to drill oil from Hoima but the big people are the 
owners of this oil. President Museveni and his cabinet own the oil, they 
will be the major beneficiaries. We shall benefit little, we the people at the 
ground. They will earn the big money—like 99 per cent of the oil money 
and us the little ones will get 1 per cent’ (Nalubega and Ongode, 2013).
These quotations demonstrate that there is a section of Ugandans that does not 
anticipate any tangible benefit from oil revenues. They also bring up the issue 
of the ‘big men’ in government and the private sector—the poachers, who are 
connected to the political establishment and have positioned themselves to 
reap big from the sector. One may argue that the spectators are disinterested 
in oil because the country has not commenced production and they do not 
know what difference oil revenues will make. That is a possibility. But the 
underlying reason for their lack of interest is simply because they see nothing 
in it for them.
12.3 Oil Expectations: Realistic or Not?
The people of Uganda in general, and in other areas where the discoveries 
have been made in particular, expect quick revenues, jobs and businesses, 
among other things.11
The above quotation was picked from the 2013 Annual Report of the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Development. It demonstrates that the Government 
is aware that many Ugandans indeed expect Eldorado from the exploitation 
of oil and gas resources. The quotation distinguishes between the ‘people of 
Uganda in general’, i.e. ‘the spectators’, and those in ‘areas where discoveries 
have been made’, i.e. the hosts. Indeed, the expectations of the ‘people of 
Uganda in general’ and those in ‘areas where discoveries have been made’ 
are quite different. The former tend to have general-type demands like better 
public services, while the latter have personal and community-based demands 
like jobs and a share of the oil money in cash.
11 See Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (2013), Annual Report, retrieved from: 
https://www.energyandminerals.go.ug/resources/topics-and-issues/.
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The survey mentioned above, which was carried out in non-oil-producing 
districts in Western and Central Uganda revealed that a bigger percentage of 
Ugandans there would like the Government to invest oil proceeds in improv-
ing roads and other transport infrastructure. Out of a total of 595 respondents 
who were randomly interviewed in the three districts, 21 per cent said they 
would like the Government to spend oil money on improving feeder roads 
in the rural areas. 14 per cent said they wanted to see improvements in the 
health sector, 12 per cent vouched for education, while 11.6 per cent revealed 
that they would prefer it if the oil money were used to create more jobs and 
employment for Ugandans. 11 per cent of the people spoken to suggested 
that Government should take advantage of the additional revenue from 
oil to institute subsidies that would reduce the cost of living for Ugandans, 
including through cheaper fuel (Oil in Uganda, 2015).
These expectations are generalist in nature and, if realised, would benefit 
all of Uganda. Expectations of the ‘hosts’ tend to be more localised and 
more provincial than generalist. They tend to focus on communal benefits 
for the people living in that particular area where the oil activity is taking 
place. Common demands are communal infrastructure facilities like roads 
and health centres. However, mainly due to the work of some NGOs and 
politicians, some community members are seeking individual benefits like 
employment (especially for their children), direct cash transfers and business 
opportunities. One of the biggest expectations is employment, because people 
generally assume that oil brings with it a massive job bonanza. The reality is 
not as rosy. A three-month survey commissioned by the joint venture partners 
(Total, CNOOC and Tullow) gave some figures on jobs that will be generated 
by the sector, reporting that at production stage only 13,000 people will be 
directly employed by the sector, although it has the potential to generate up 
to 150,000 new jobs through ‘indirect and induced’ opportunities in other 
sectors that will be feeding off it (Hamman, 2014).
The report analyses the labour demand in the sector in the run-up to 
production as well as the potential of the market to meet this demand. Out 
of the total manpower required, 15 per cent are engineers and managers, 60 
per cent are technicians while 25 per cent are unskilled labourers with no 
educational background. The Ugandan Government is doing all it can to 
maximise available jobs and business opportunities for Ugandans, but still 
those jobs and opportunities are way less than what the public, especially in 
the oil-producing areas, believes. Some of the provisions12 the Government 
has put in place include banning the IOCs from employing expatriates where 
12 National content regulations under the Petroleum Acts.
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there are Ugandans with similar qualifications, skills and competences. 
National content regulations also provide benchmarks on the employment 
of Ugandans. For instance, 20 per cent of management staff in IOCs and 
other international companies should be Ugandans at the start of operations, 
which should increase to 60 per cent after five years and 80 per cent within 
ten years. For technical staff, 30 per cent of all technical staff in international 
companies should be Ugandans at the start of operations, which should 
increase to 60 per cent in five years and 80 per cent in ten years, while 95 per 
cent of support staff and middle-level staff must be Ugandans. The regula-
tions also ring-fence 15 categories of goods and services that will be provided 
exclusively by Ugandans.13
However, the Government has not been efficient in communicating these 
efforts, leaving the public at the mercy of the media, NGOs and politicians. 
These have spun the facts whichever way they pleased, depending on their 
motives at the time.
12.4 The Role of Politicians, Media and NGOs in Shaping 
Expectations
Expectations can be explicit or implicit, clear or fuzzy. They can be realistic 
or unrealistic; evidence based or opinionated (Bategeka et al., 2011, p.2).
Expectations, whether positive or negative, are largely shaped by the kind of 
information a person is consistently exposed to. Ever since oil was discovered 
in Uganda, there have been four main sources of information: politicians, the 
media, NGOs and Government (in partnership with the IOCs). Uganda has 
a vibrant and fast-growing media industry composed of print newspapers in 
both English and local languages, state- and privately-owned television and 
radio stations as well as a rising social media movement. Newspapers are 
popular in urban centres and provide the most extensive political and business 
coverage in Uganda. However, only 2 per cent of Ugandan households report 
print media as their primary source of information, according to a 2016 report 
from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics.
13 The goods and services ‘ring-fenced’ include transport, security, foods and beverages, hotel 
accommodation and catering services, human resource management, office supply, fuel supply, 
land surveying, clearing and forwarding, crane hire, locally available construction materials, civil 
works, environmental studies and environmental impact assessments (EIAs), communications 
and information technology (ICT) services, and waste management.
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The most popular medium remains radio. According to the Uganda Com-
munications Commission (UCC)’s third-quarter report of 2015, there were 
292 operational FM radio stations. With advancements in technology, most 
mobile phones now come with a radio function. This means that the more 
than 19 million Ugandans who own mobile phones can practically access a 
radio station of choice that broadcasts in a language they are familiar with on 
their phones.14 One can safely assume, then, that at least half the households 
in rural Uganda have access to one radio station at the minimum.
The majority of the rural population relies on radio for its daily dose of news 
and current affairs, including information on the oil and gas sector. Although 
UCC estimates that radio ownership by politicians stands at about 15 per cent, 
other media analysts claim that NRM politicians or businesspeople linked 
to the ruling party own about 70 per cent of all private FM radio stations, 
with the bulk of those based in the rural areas (Africa Centre for Media 
Excellence, 2015). Over the past decade, Ugandan politicians have discovered 
the importance of owning a radio station as both a source of revenue and, 
more importantly, a political mouthpiece to promote their political agendas. 
The hundreds of different radio stations in the country therefore broadcast 
material that serves those two interests. Inevitably, those radio stations that 
are owned by ruling party politicians will normally air programmes that are 
in support of the regime and its development programmes.
There is a strong relationship between the political inclination of the 
ownership of the radio and the kind of material that the station broadcasts. 
Kibazo and Kanaabi (2007) found, for instance, that proprietors interfere with 
operations, sometimes issuing instructions to prioritise or downplay specific 
stories. They also found that there is still a considerable amount of political 
interference in the broadcast sector, despite its liberalisation as exemplified 
in the following quotation:
In Central, Eastern and Western Uganda, there are radio stations on which 
alternative political or religious views cannot be aired. … In other instances, 
editors and presenters are under instruction to propagate certain agendas 
and suppress news that is not in the interest of the station owners or their 
associates (Kibazo and Kanaabi, 2007, p.11).
14 Uganda Telecommunications Commission (July-September 2015, p.11), Post, Broadcasting and 
Telecommunications Market and Industry Report, retrieved from: https://www.ucc.co.ug/files/
downloads/Q 3-Market%20Report%20%20for%20Third%20Quarter%20-%20July-September%20
2015.pdf.
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This influence is more common in upcountry radio stations, mainly because 
the radio managers have less influence and the communities are less exposed. 
Wasswa (2011) attributes this to financial pressure, largely unskilled man-
power, excessive owner influence, as well as poor management, editorial and 
marketing skills. As a result, different communities in the oil-producing areas 
will have access to different types of information that will ultimately shape 
their expectations from the oil and gas sector. For example, interactions with 
different sections of people in Hoima District, which is a National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) stronghold where party candidate Yoweri Museveni 
garnered 74.7 per cent of the votes in the 2016 election, will reveal more 
positive expectations from oil than those with people in Nwoya District 
where the opposition is more dominant (only 41.64 per cent of the electorate 
voted for President Museveni).
Politicians have captured the radio waves upcountry and they can feed 
listeners with all sorts of information and misinformation to favour their 
own political agendas. For example, a baseline study on the impact of oil 
exploration on women and women’s leadership in the Albertine sub-region 
reported some community concerns about oil as a result of different radio 
programmes in the oil-producing areas (Centre for Women in Governance 
[CEWIGO], 2012). Some quotations from that report are given below:
‘I only heard from politicians when they were campaigning that if we voted 
for them they would fight for us to benefit from our oil’.
‘We hear that our oil is already being taken away especially in Hoima and 
Buliisa districts.’
‘I have heard from my MP that the oil is not there; that it has already been 
taken.’
‘I heard that there is oil in Bunyoro and that whites had already camped 
around Lake Albert to exploit the oil.’
‘I heard that there is oil production but the tender was awarded without 
consent of the area MPs… and that an oil refinery shall be constructed 
in Bunyoro.’
The second category of people who have captured the upcountry airwaves 
are NGOs, which dictate radio programming through sponsorship of talk 
shows and advertising. Through sponsored programmes, NGOs were able 
to educate communities about oil and gas issues, update them about recent 
developments and advise them on how to engage with Government and the 
international oil companies. In many ways they were the main providers of 
information to communities because Government was largely absent. This 
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set them on a collision course with the authorities who perceived them as 
enemies of progress because of their ability to mobilise large groups of people 
to talk about issues which the Government held as sensitive.
It is NGOs that educated people about the ‘Dutch disease’, the ‘Oil Curse’ 
and aired videos of the Niger Delta conflict in Nigeria at their meetings and 
workshops. They told people to be cautious about their land and, where 
compensation was involved, encouraged them to ask for more. The NGOs 
questioned why the Government was keeping its contracts with the IOCs 
secret and called on people to put their leaders on the spot regarding oil 
transparency. International NGOs as well were critical sources of information 
and contributed a great deal to the local oil discourse.
In 2014, international campaigner Global Witness released a report 
exposing the details of some of the ‘secret’ contracts the Ugandan Govern-
ment had with the international oil companies operating in the country 
(see Global Witness, 2014). That was the first time that Ugandans started 
getting a real sense of what the country had negotiated for its oil and gas 
resources. What was puzzling was that the report confirmed what several 
industry experts, including some employees of the oil companies, had 
claimed for some time: Uganda got a good deal, at least compared to many 
other oil-producing countries in Africa. According to the report, the country 
stands to retain anywhere from 80 to more than 90 per cent of the revenues 
that will be collected from oil, a considerably high take going by global 
industry standards. In addition, the contracts include a favourable revi-
sion of the royalty payments the oil companies will make to Government 
to factor in cumulative oil production so that they are not only based on 
daily production, potentially increasing the Government’s earnings. The 
Ugandan Government also renegotiated the contentious stabilisation clause 
to leave room for it to introduce a new tax as production progresses, as well 
as clearer terms regarding payment of capital gains tax, a potential source 
of massive income when companies are either selling or acquiring shares 
in existing oil blocks.
All this information was brought into the public domain by the work of 
an NGO and it got Ugandans asking, ‘Why the secrecy if Uganda got a good 
deal? What is the Government hiding? What are they not telling us?’. The 
political opposition fuelled this debate further and brought it to the floor of 
Parliament. It attempted to paint a picture that the Government could not be 
trusted and many key politicians had already pocketed bribes from IOCs to 
facilitate the latter’s acquisition of oil concessions (Platform London, 2010).
According to Dr. Peter Mwesige the Executive Director at the Africa 
Centre for Media Excellence (ACME), media reporting on oil has—along-
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side NGOs’ efforts— contributed to wider public knowledge about oil 
and gas.
There is no doubt that the media here have really popularised that whole 
question of oil and tried to help people understand what is going on. I 
remember two years ago, 2011, that debate in parliament, it was broadcast 
live on television and for very many people it was the first time to get a sense 
of ‘Wow! What is going on with oil in this country?’ why this is a big deal, 
why this is important. And I have my cynicism about NGOs and all that 
but I quite frankly think that without the NGOs it could have been worse. 
Because a lot of Ugandans, including MPs, have only got to know about 
this oil story from workshops that have been organised by NGOs. They 
just didn’t know what this whole thing was about, why it was important 
(Oil in Uganda, 2013b, p.11).
12.5 The Long Wait and its Impact on Ugandans’ 
Perceptions
The delay in commencing oil production has had a sobering effect on 
Ugandans as the time lag has given them an opportunity to understand the 
sector better. The fluctuation in global oil prices has caused many to come 
to terms with the volatility of the sector and realise that oil may not fix all 
of Uganda’s economic problems. In 2017, the Central Bank warned that the 
delay in starting pumping oil may cause debt distress by 2019 (Baryabarema, 
2017). Uganda’s external debt stands at over US$ 10 billion, largely because 
infrastructure projects like roads, a railway, an airport and hydropower dams, 
many of which are targeting the oil and gas sector, are yet to be operational.
It is not only the national debt that is getting out of hand. Even individual 
and corporate debt for many players in the oil and gas industry has become 
unmanageable. Many of the companies seeking a bail-out from Government 
to help them with their debt obligations borrowed heavily from commercial 
banks to invest in oil and gas-related businesses, but the slow development of 
the industry has meant that they are not able to meet their debt obligations 
(Muhumuza and Adengo, 2016). These include steel giant, Steel Rolling Mills, 
which invested in a new plant to ramp up production but has been unable 
to get a market for its steel. Although the Government is reportedly seeking 
ways of helping those businesses out, the experience has demonstrated how 
risky the oil and gas industry can be. Perhaps the biggest casualty eventually 
will be the legitimacy of the NRM regime, which based many of its political 
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promises on increased income from oil and gas. Before the oil prices plum-
meted, for example, the Government was assured of a refinery investor and 
a host of other downstream investors, all of whom now seem doubtful. If the 
Government cannot deliver on its promises of jobs, business opportunities 
and enhanced service delivery, the population will probably continue to 
withdraw its already diminishing support.
The 2016 presidential election revealed just how central the oil question is 
to the President and the ruling party. At one of the campaign rallies, President 
Museveni intimated that losing the election would by implication place control 
of the country’s oil and gas resources in the hands of the opposition, and he 
was not ready to accept that. He said a victory by the opposition would force 
him to resort to rebellion to regain political power. Moreover, Uganda’s Daily 
Monitor newspaper quoted the President as saying, ‘… Then you hear people 
say “Museveni should go”. But go and leave oil money? They want me to go 
so they can come and spoil the oil money. These people want me to go back 
to the bush’ (Kafeero, 2015). The other candidates also routinely vowed to 
manage the country’s oil and gas resources better, ensure transparency and 
accountability as well as equitable benefits for all Ugandans.
The presidential debate was the climax of the 2016 presidential campaigns. 
It was the first televised debate that the country had conducted, and it was 
an opportunity for Ugandans, especially the educated and elite, to assess the 
potential of the candidates to run the country. As expected, oil was a central 
issue. Some of the candidates had absolutely no idea about the sector, but 
others challenged the President on his overbearing stance on the sector, lack of 
transparency, secrecy of oil transactions and corruption. Yet again, the country 
learned of President Museveni’s tight grip on the sector. All the candidates 
confessed that they had no clue about the country’s oil and gas sector.
‘I found it rather disheartening, absurd and archaic that none of the seven 
contenders for the presidency of this country has had access to the Production 
Sharing Agreements that Uganda entered into with the international oil 
companies operating in Uganda’, wrote James Muhindo after the presidential 
debate (see Muhindo, 2016). Meanwhile at the community level, the delay 
in commencing oil production has enabled some of the host communities 
to mobilise themselves along tribal and ethnic lines to prevent those they 
perceive as ‘outsiders’ from enjoying benefits of the extraction of oil and gas. 
Tribal rhetoric from politicians was especially evident in the 2016 parliamen-
tary elections, with many contestants calling out people from outside oil-rich 
Bunyoro Region and urging their tribesmen to deny them access to land.
One shocking incident was in Kaseeta Parish, Kabwooya Sub-county in 
Hoima in December 2014, when more than 70 houses were burnt and several 
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people injured after violence broke out between Bunyoro Kingdom loyalists 
and residents over the control of a seven-square-mile piece of land bordering 
the proposed crude oil refinery area. The land, which is also strategically 
located close to the Waraga, Nzizi and Mputa oil wells, was being claimed 
by Bunyoro Kingdom from squatters who kingdom officials claim are of 
Congolese origin. Eager to cash in on oil activities, kingdom officials had 
successfully persuaded the King to distribute the land amongst his subjects 
for them to set up income-generating projects to service the oil industry. 
Such incidents are likely to rise as the production phase kicks in, given the 
high rates of youth unemployment in the oil-producing areas.
12.6 Managing the Expectations
The latest projection from Government is that ‘first oil’ will be around 2022, 
after which the country expects to keep pumping crude for at least another 
25 years, considering the current reserve estimates (The Daily Monitor, 
2019). However, the expectations of the different stakeholders have to be 
managed properly for Uganda’s oil and gas sector to flourish and make a 
positive contribution to the country’s development. There is a need to strike 
a balance between the expectations of the Government, the oil companies, 
the host communities and the Ugandan population. The expectations of the 
Government and the oil companies are clear and detailed in the production-
sharing agreements (PSAs) and other documents. As such, the expectations 
of the Ugandan public have to be understood and taken into consideration. As 
we have seen in some African countries, failure to manage the expectations of 
communities efficiently leads to undesired resentment of the oil companies 
operating in those areas. In extreme cases, the locals end up targeting those 
projects.
The first step in managing public expectations is to provide as much 
information as possible. Lack of reliable and accurate information from 
Government is the main cause of unrealistic expectations, as it leaves the 
public vulnerable to whatever messages come out in the media. The public, 
especially the host communities, need to be educated about the oil and gas 
industry, how it operates, what is possible and what is not. Government and 
the oil companies should dispel the illusion that the industry is like a very 
huge construction site where every able-bodied individual is assured of a job as 
long as he or she expresses interest. The Government should strive to provide 
timely information to all stakeholders including local communities, civil 
society organisations, the broader public, local government, Parliament and 
exPeC ting elDOraDO? 281
private sector on any developments in the oil and gas sector. The Government’s 
communication strategy15 needs to be applied.
Secondly, Ugandans should be supported to earn from the oil and gas 
industry. The Government must come out strongly on local content. Oil 
companies have expressed concern about the capacity of Ugandans to supply 
goods or services to the sector, claiming that they lack the requisite expertise 
and quality. The Government should therefore come up with training pro-
grammes that can build that capacity in Ugandans and then engage the oil 
companies so that they give due consideration to Ugandan suppliers. Once 
that capacity is built, then Government should consider providing finance to 
local service providers to enable them to compete with the well-capitalised 
international oil service providers operating in the country.
The Government should be strong on transparency. There is a fear amongst 
Ugandans that oil money will not be used to improve their living conditions, 
and most of it will be ‘stolen’. A recent case in which the President awarded 
a select group of 42 government officials a special bonus amounting to 6 
billion shillings (US$ 1.8 million) after the Government had won a court 
case against Heritage Oil and Gas following a tax dispute has reawakened 
these sentiments amongst Ugandans. The Government must be seen to be 
committed to proper utilisation and allocation of the oil revenues and must 
take a firm stand against corruption. Civil society should be given room to 
operate and monitor the oil and gas sector freely. The occasional censorship of 
the activities of NGOs operating in the Albertine Region should be stopped, 
so that they can freely interact with communities there. The Government 
has now embarked on steps to join the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) (Draku, 2019). This is commendable because it will enable 
Ugandans easily to track financial transactions in the sector. Proper use of 
oil money in itself is a good start to managing public expectations because 
it will stimulate government projects within the communities and improve, 
or rehabilitate, basic infrastructure. When people start seeing real change 
in their way of life, they will begin to appreciate the oil and gas industry.
The international oil companies should set up meaningful corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) projects. While production and refining are several 
years away, and so are the direct benefits, CSR is an ongoing business strategy 
which can be used to support the host communities. In some Albertine 
Region communities there is criticism of the projects that the oil companies 
15 Two of the objectives of the communications strategy are to meet the information needs of 
the public through regular information dissemination, exchange and sharing; and to promote 
accurate and balanced coverage of Uganda’s oil and gas sector through proactive communication.
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have set up, while in others there is unanimous gratitude. These projects can 
be used to show the communities that the oil companies, and Government, 
are committed to improving their welfare. Prior to setting up a CSR project, 
the companies should consult with different stakeholders in the communi-
ties, including vulnerable groups like women. They should not only rely on 
district leaders and government officials. Communities should be given an 
opportunity to voice their needs. The companies should use such consultations 
also to establish what kind of projects would benefit the community most 
and where they should be located. This will ensure the sustainability of the 
projects even beyond the company’s presence in the area.
An outcome of the NGO sensitisation initiatives in the host communities 
has been the selective empowerment of beneficiaries. This has altered the power 
dynamics in the communities as those that have attained the knowledge end up 
being more empowered than those that have not. Ultimately, they transform 
into opinion leaders on all matters oil, influence their peers and mobilise them 
to confront whatever issues they may face at the time. They are increasingly 
creating power centres which the oil companies and Government have to 
recognise and manage sensitively if their projects are to proceed smoothly.
12.7 Conclusion
Ugandans are undoubtedly expecting that oil and gas will be a useful addition 
to the list of the country’s natural resources. A big part of the population may 
not know exactly how these resources will impact on the country positively 
or otherwise, but they know for sure how they would like to benefit if given 
the opportunity. The list of expectations is long, but the three key ones 
are employment, business opportunities and better public services. The 
Government of Uganda is in a good place right now. Despite the delays in 
starting production, they have had an opportunity to learn first-hand what 
good, or bad, oil can bring with it. Given that Uganda may not produce oil 
for another three to four years, it has plenty of time to correct whatever 
wrong impressions may have developed amongst citizens, as well as engage 
Ugandans on their expectations so that they know what to expect. But above 
all, the Government’s biggest task should be to build trust and confidence 
with the population that oil money will be used for the greater public good 
and will not be stolen through corruption. The starting point in building 
this confidence is to give as much information as possible to the public so 
that they can follow developments in the sector, monitor performance and 
appreciate any challenges that may arise.
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The discovery of commercially viable oil deposits in the Albertine Graben in 
2006 has negatively impacted local communities and consequently has led 
to numerous grievances (Holterman, 2014; NAPE, 2016; Ogwang, Vanclay 
and Van den Assem, 2018). The discovery of oil has also led to widespread 
tensions and social conflicts. Moreover, land and resource conflicts have 
morphed in Uganda, as the Government’s and private sector’s drive to exploit 
the country’s natural resource wealth often conflicts with its human rights 
obligations, with long-lasting consequences for surrounding communities 
and the environment (de Kock and Sturman, 2012; Van der Ploeg and Vanclay, 
2017). Many communities in the mid-western region of Uganda have been 
negatively affected by Uganda’s emerging oil industry (Ogwang et al., 2018; 
Ogwang and Vanclay, 2019; Ogwang, Vanclay and Van den Assem, 2019; 
Olanya, 2015) and consequently many of them have lodged complaints with 
the central Government (Holterman, 2014; NAPE, 2016).
The current chapter focuses on the emergent social tensions and conflicts 
linked to the oil exploration and development in Uganda. The chapter seeks to 
analyse how communities and different groups in society are being affected by 
the multi-facetted intrusions occasioned by the quest for oil. It also explores 
the different mechanisms and interventions that have been undertaken to 
address these tensions. The empirical analysis is based on extensive field 
research in Hoima and Buliisa, the two districts at the heart of the country’s 
oil exploration and development. During this field research, about 40 in-depth 
interviews were conducted with district officials, oil companies’ liaison 
officers, Bunyoro Kitara kingdom officials, Members of Parliament and civil 
society organisations (CSOs). These in-depth interviews were complemented 
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by focus group discussions (FGDs) with different groups, including com-
munity elders, local council (LC) chairpersons and their executives in the 
communities affected as well as local community members. The study also 
benefited from secondary sources which included journal articles, reports 
from the line ministries and departments especially the Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Development (MEMD), reports from civil society organisations, 
newspapers and newscasts.
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 13.2, I will discuss and 
analyse the main sources of tensions and grievances associated with the oil 
exploration and exploitation. In Section 13.3, I will then analyse how these 
different grievances and tensions are being managed, and how far these 
interventions have been effective in this respect. Section 13.4 concludes.
13.2 Sources of Tensions and Grievances
According to Vanclay (2017, p.3), ‘irrespective of their purpose, large-scale 
development and infrastructure projects… require land, and sometimes very 
large tracts of land’. Such projects also lead to economic and physical displace-
ment. Natural resource exploitation and extraction is a fast-growing industry 
in resource-rich Africa, with adverse results for communities living in or 
around project affected areas (Avocats Sans Frontières, 2014; Bainomugisha, 
Kivengyere and Tusasirwe, 2006; International Alert, 2013; Mosbacher, 2013; 
Uganda Land Alliance, 2011). Activities carried out by various actors involved 
in natural resource exploitation and extraction—including government 
entities and private companies—have led to complex violations and abuses 
affecting an array of socio-cultural, environmental, political and social and 
economic development, with long-term and sometimes irreversible effects 
on people living in and around project-affected areas.
13.2.1 Environmental Concerns
Many studies have documented how oil exploitation is associated with nega-
tive social and environmental impacts (Aristide and Moundigbaye, 2017; 
Eggert, 2001; Ogwang et al., 2018; Söderholm and Svahn, 2015). The Uganda 
2013 Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of Oil and Gas Activities 
in the Albertine Graben observed that the discovery of oil and gas resources 
presented great socio-economic prospects for the Albertine Graben and 
the country at large, but it also noted that the area is of high ecological and 
biodiversity significance. This presents various challenges for environmental 
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protection (Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development [MEMD], 2013; 
Tumusiime, Mawejje and Byakagaba, 2016). At the same time people in 
developing countries like Uganda depend on the surrounding environment 
for their daily livelihoods (Schwarte, 2008). The oil companies in Uganda 
(CNOOC, Total and Tullow) finished the exploration phase and are now 
heading into development, which will consequently lead to the production 
of Ugandan oil resources by 2020 (MEMD, 2017), which has been postponed 
again to 2022 (The Independent, 2018). Once produced, the crude oil will be 
partly refined in Uganda to supply the local market and partly exported to 
the international market.
The export to the international market will be through an export crude oil 
pipeline: the East Africa Crude Oil export pipeline (EACOP). This pipeline 
will be constructed and operated through a pipeline company whose share-
holders are the Uganda National Oil Company, the Tanzania Petroleum 
Development Corporation and the three oil companies. The East African 
crude oil pipeline (EACOP) is 1,445 km long (with 296 kms in Uganda), and 
will transport crude oil from Kabaale in the Hoima district in Uganda to 
the Chongoleani peninsula near Tanga port in Tanzania. The pipeline route 
was selected by the Government of Uganda as the least cost (at an estimated 
tariff of US$ 12.2 per barrel) and most robust route. Due to the viscous and 
waxy nature of the oil, the pipeline will need to be heated along the entire 
route, making the EACOP the longest electrically heated pipeline in the 
world (MEMD, 2017). The pipeline will be buried (1.2 metres deep), and in 
some cases it will require to be bored under waterways and roads by using 
horizontal drilling. Some facilities will be above ground such as coating plants 
and pipeline storage yards, additional workspace for fuel, waste, etc. and access 
roads and borrow pits. The pipeline also involves pumping stations and pres-
sure reduction stations (EACOP–TILENGA Uganda Scoping Report, 2017).
According to WWF and CSCO (2017), there are opportunities for increased 
employment and business growth because the EACOP is expected to pro-
vide a total of 5,000 jobs, of which an estimated 300 will be permanent and 
4,700 temporary. However, the report also highlighted the fear of increased 
inequality resulting from the socio-economic changes associated with the 
new employment opportunities, which consequently will lead to income 
differentials as different local groups and individuals benefit or are negatively 
impacted upon unevenly from the induced socio-economic opportunities 
and challenges from the EACOP project. WWF and CSCO (2017) further 
observed that there are also concerns that more stress, crime and disruption 
will disrupt community cohesion as a result of rapid population growth from 
immigrations associated with the development of the EACOP project, and 
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that these can increase stress, change individuals’ patterns of interaction 
within communities, reduce community cohesion, and change a community’s 
character.
The role of land and natural resources in conflict is attracting increased 
international attention (UN HABITAT, 2012, p.13). The concern in the 
Albertine region is that changes in land-use patterns such as agriculture, 
fishing, logging or hunting could increase as a direct consequence of land 
take or exclusion during the EACOP project, which could potentially lead 
to conflict (Kobusingye, Van Leeuwen and Van Dijk, 2017). According to 
UN HABITAT (2012, p.8), while ‘environmental factors are rarely, if ever, 
the sole cause of violent conflict … the exploitation of natural resources and 
related environmental stresses can be implicated in all phases of the conflict 
cycle, from contributing to the outbreak and perpetuation of violence to 
undermining prospects for peace’. According to W WF and CSCO (2017, 
p.3), ‘contamination of water, land and other basic livelihood necessities 
like oil spills and leakages could lead to chemical contamination of soil and 
water resources, exposure to fires and disruption of livelihoods’. It further 
suggests that ‘oil pipelines are reported to cause disproportionate impacts on 
low-income and minority communities especially with regard to human rights 
violations in several areas around the world’. These impacts have been reported 
in African countries like Nigeria, Angola and South Sudan (Alozieuwa, 2012; 
Fidelis, 2010; UN HABITAT, 2012). There are also fears that the ‘reduced 
State capacity and risk of armed conflict’ due to ‘oil dependence could skew 
the institutional development of the state because oil rents weaken agencies 
of restraint unlike in resource-poor countries’ (WWF and CSCO, 2017, p.3).
According to a private consultant on oil and gas management and environ-
ment, most of the social tensions and grievances in the region stem from land, 
which he attributed to the influx of job seekers. He observed that:
Because of oil discovery, most people have stamped this area to fetch for 
opportunities and as a result they want land which is now scarce and on 
high demand. As a result, they end up grabbing other people’s land and 
moving to forest reserves and swamps because almost 90% of the people 
in this area don’t have land tittles and this has increased social tensions 
within in the community. If you went to court today you will find most 
of the cases are related to land. At the district level, the leaders who have 
got key information regarding on where certain infrastructures and oil 
related developments will take place, they quickly run to these places and 
grab off the land and title it and yet the land has got squatters (Private oil 
consultant Mr. R. Byaruhanga, Personal communication, November 2016).
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During the construction of some roads in the region, there were also tensions 
and community grievances. One of the respondents claimed that during the 
construction of the 95 km Kaiso-Tonya road there was a lot of stone blasting, 
especially in one village called Kyenjojo which affected many houses and led 
to the deaths of animals like cows and the destruction of people’s crops. Some 
women miscarried and most of these people have never been compensated 
for those injuries. These losses, according to him, were sources of grievances 
and were brewing tensions. He claimed that such people were ‘potential 
candidates’ who will cut the oil pipeline passing through their gardens because 
of the conflict that exists there.
Another respondent explained how the discovery of oil has affected the 
communities both positively and negatively, thereby creating tensions and 
grievances among the communities. He observed that the discovery of oil and 
gas in this region had increased a lot of expectations where people started to 
anticipate that there was going to be a lot of money. This has been documented 
by many researchers (Kiiza, Bategeka and Ssewanyana, 2011; Tumusiime et al, 
2016). As a result, this led to the scramble for and partitioning of land, which 
worsened the land problems in the region, especially in Buhuka Kyangwali 
and Kyakaboga, Bugambe sub-counties in Hoima District. A local community 
mobiliser working in the area observed that a local organisation—Bunyoro 
Albertine Network of Civil Society Organisations on Environmental 
Conservation (BAPENECO)—conducted research to ascertain people’s 
perceptions on oil and their involvement, and in one of its findings found 
that three cases of murder had happened between the Alur community and 
the pastoralists over land use and control. This, according to him, was one 
example of the tensions which have pitted these two communities against 
each other in the region.
13.2.2 Socio-economic and Political Concerns
According to local newspaper reports, in 2011 the Bunyoro kingdom, a tra-
ditional kingdom where most of Uganda’s oil was discovered, made it clear 
that it wants the central government to pay it 10 per cent of revenues from the 
crude reserves once commercial production starts. An official from Bunyoro 
kingdom noted that the kingdom, which has had long-standing grievances 
against the central government, arrived at the final figure it is demanding 
after what he called ‘intense discussions’ by its Cabinet. He asserted that the 
Omukama King’s cabinet deliberated over this issue for a long time and they 
had arrived at the figure of 10 per cent based on similar industry practices 
in other countries like Ghana. However, according to the Public Finance 
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Management Act (2015), central government will retain 94 per cent, while 
the local governments in the region will get 6 per cent. There is no specific 
mention of Bunyoro Kitara Kingdom in the Act. However, section 75(8) of the 
same Act (2015, p.69) states that ‘the Government shall grant one percentage 
point of the royalty due to the Central Government to a gazetted cultural or 
traditional institutions’.
The kingdom has pointed to Article 36 of the 1955 Bunyoro Agreement 
which states that ‘in the event of any mineral development taking place, a 
substantial part of the mineral royalties and the revenues from mining leases 
shall be paid to the Native Government of Bunyoro-Kitara’. Article 37 adds 
that ‘[a]ll natives shall have the right of fishing in all public waters…’. The 
surrounding communities along Lake Albert claim that fishing on the lake 
has some restrictions (International Alert, 2013; Ogwang et al., 2018; Vanclay, 
2017) which have impacted on their livelihoods. These may result in major 
tensions and grievances. The kingdom is also demanding a publicly-funded 
university to be located in its area and a financial allocation to cover any 
environmental damage from petroleum production. There are fears that if the 
central government fails to meet the kingdom’s demands, these grievances 
could produce hostility against oil companies and possible sabotage of oil 
installations, especially by the region’s swelling ranks of unemployed youth.
A recurrent source of social tensions and grievances in the region is related 
to land grabbing and compensation (Ogwang and Vanclay, 2019; Olanya, 2015; 
Tusiime et al., 2016), some of which have been married with domestic violence. 
According to one respondent there was no element of gender sensitivity as far 
as giving compensation money was concerned. He observed that the moment 
men got the money they went ahead and did what pleased them rather than 
their families. For example, they marred more women, bought motorcycles 
(boda bodas) and alcohol, which led to domestic conflicts and some families 
broke apart. He further noted that while some people opted for relocation, 
many of them faced difficulties in moving on with their lives because of the 
Government’s delays in relocating them.
In July 2013, the Africa Institute for Energy Governance (AFIEGO) in 
partnership with Oil Watch Network Uganda, and Publish What You Pay 
Bunyoro Chapter, mobilised the representatives of the project-affected persons 
for a ‘dialogue’ on the ‘Violation of the Rights of People Affected by Uganda’s 
Refinery Development’. This was in line with the principles of stakeholder 
engagement (International Finance Cooperation [IFC], 2007) and addressing 
issues related to project-induced in-migration (IFC, 2009), respectively. 
The dialogue brought together 25 participants comprising representatives 
from all the 13 affected villages of Kabaale which had over 7,000 people. 
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Other participants came from the districts of Kibaale, Buliisa, Masindi and 
Kiryandongo. During the meeting, a number of concerns were raised, in 
particular.
The failure to put regulations for the assessment and payment of com-
pensation in place. It was noted that for the last 20 years the Minister for 
Lands, Housing and Urban Development had failed to make regulations 
for the assessment and payment of compensation as required by section 20 
of the Compulsory Land Acquisition Act. This had left the people affected 
at the discretion of districts that are required to compile rates and the chief 
government valuer who endorses all payments. As a result, it remains difficult 
for one to challenge the rates in cases of disagreement.
The participants also noted that there was a conflict of interest and bias 
because it was inappropriate for the MEMD to allow the Strategic Friends 
International (SFI) company to conduct the Resettlement Action Plan 
(RAP) and at the same time to implement the plan through the ongoing 
compensation disclosures. This was irregular and falls below the required 
transparency necessary to guarantee respect for the rights and the future 
livelihoods of the local communities affected. The participants further 
observed that the MEMD and the SFI company had failed to make public 
the findings of the RAP for the last two years (2011 and 2012). By then, even 
Parliament and especially the Members of Parliament (MPs) representing 
the affected communities had no access to the RAP report. The participants 
were concerned that the SFI company was unable to avoid bias and conflict 
of interest in this case.
Furthermore, members were concerned about the secrecy around the 
contractual relationship between the MEMD and SFI. It was noted that there 
was no evidence that the services of SFI were procured through competitive 
processes and there was no guarantee that Ugandans would get value for 
money. Members were also aggrieved about the lack of competence on the part 
of SFI. They observed that while the SFI has been conducting several training 
sessions and research studies with a number of local districts and health 
centres across Uganda, there was no evidence to indicate any competence 
to deal with a project such as the proposed oil refinery in Kabaale that was 
scheduled to displace over 7,000 people. They pointed to the fact that the 
SFI and the MEMD had for two years failed to make public the RAP report, 
which brought its incompetence to the surface. In addition, they had also 
failed to advise Hoima district to put in place the 2013 compensation rates 
and were using an unapproved rate from 2011/2012. This, according to them, 
might lead to the possibility of the people affected opting to take the law into 
their hands in future.
292 tOm OgWang
In addition, the members were also concerned about the lack of respect for 
the right to information, public participation and access to justice necessary 
to guarantee common benefits, collectively termed as ‘violation of access 
rights’. They asserted that Hoima district’s local government, for instance, 
had ignored the need to involve the people in setting up and making deci-
sions on compensation rates as required under the Land Act. Instead, the 
communities affected were being indirectly coerced to sign compensation 
forms without being given time to study them and make a decision whether 
or not to sign. This formed a basis for grievance among the project affected 
communities.
There were grievances related to several petitions to Parliament and 
government ministries which were not given much attention. Members felt 
that the grievances contained in these petitions were ignored. They noted that 
in May 2013 a delegation of 36 people representing all the 13 affected villages 
in Hoima and others from Buliisa petitioned the Parliament of Uganda, the 
Minister for Energy and Mineral Development, the Minister for Lands, 
Housing and Urban Development, the Minister for Bunyoro Affairs and 
the Hoima District Council, calling upon the Government to address the 
injustice and violation of their rights in the RAP process by MEMD and 
SFI. Therefore, this was interpreted by some locals as ‘undermining’ their 
grievances and integrity, and remained a permanent thorn in their relationship 
with the Government.
According to the Constitution, under Article 26, a person is entitled to 
adequate and prompt compensation for loss of any property rights. However, 
some of the people observed that the project-affected communities had 
been denied the right to negotiate their compensation or decide where to 
be resettled. They asserted that SFI had told the affected communities to 
sign documents for compensation, which were written in English, yet most 
of the affected communities cannot write or read English. To make it worse, 
they were not told the specific dates on which to expect their payments to 
enable them to plan properly for their future. As a result, the communities 
were subjected to a lot of speculation and anxiety.
Concerns over under-valuation of fruit trees such as mangoes were also 
raised by the members. They argued that UGX 80,000/= as the value of a 
mature mango tree under the 2012 rates was too small and did not take into 
account the fact that a mango tree could produce mangoes worth over UGX 
100,000/= in a season. They also observed that it takes over six years for a new 
tree to grow before any harvesting can take place. Therefore, these six years 
should be compensated for at the rate of UGX 100,000 per season to cater for 
the years of deprivation as they waited for the new harvest.
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In addition to the above, the proposed EACOP pipeline has already 
created concerns among the locals where the pipe will be constructed. 
This project will need land to build above-ground facilities (AGFs) like 
pumping stations, camps, and access roads among others. These will lead to 
displacements. According to the EACOP ESIA report (2018), the number of 
project affected persons (PAPs), with regards to temporary and permanent 
resettlement-related impacts, is estimated at 300–400 households. An esti-
mated 1,700–3,000 households will be economically displaced. But, given 
the past experiences (Global Rights Alert, 2015; Imaka and Musisi, 2013), 
tensions are already building high among some communities which will be 
affected by this development which puts their livelihoods into uncertainty. 
According to IFC (2012, p.1), livelihood refers to the ‘full range of means that 
individuals, families, and communities utilize to make a living, such as wage-
based income, agriculture, fishing, foraging, other natural resource-based 
livelihoods, petty trade, and bartering’. IFC Performance Standard 5 (2012, 
p.1) recognises that ‘project-related land acquisition and restrictions on land 
use can have adverse impacts on communities and persons that use this land’. 
According to IFC (2012, p.1), ‘involuntary resettlement refers both to physical 
displacement (relocation or loss of shelter) and to economic displacement 
(loss of assets or access to assets that leads to loss of income sources or other 
means of livelihood) as a result of project-related land acquisition and/or 
restrictions on land use’. It further suggests that ‘resettlement is considered 
involuntary when affected persons or communities do not have the right to 
refuse land acquisition or restrictions on land use that result in physical or 
economic displacement’.
This occurs in cases of; (i) lawful expropriation or temporary or permanent 
restrictions on land use; and (ii) negotiated settlements in which the buyer can 
resort to expropriation or impose legal restrictions on land use if negotiations 
with the seller fail (IFC, 2012, p.1). While some of the respondents were 
compensated, many complained of low rates for their land and crops. These, 
according to them, affected their livelihoods in many respects. This is why the 
Government and the oil companies should constructively engage with the 
affected communities to address any speculation regarding land acquisition 
and utilisation in the region. Reddy, Smyth and Steyn (2015, p.59) argue that 
anxiety, fear and speculation should be avoided because ‘perception is reality 
if you do not engage then, people will create their own reality’.
Another source of social tensions and community grievances is related 
to suspicion, hatred and mistrust (Tumusiime et al., 2016), which is mainly 
caused by a lack of information-sharing. One respondent claimed that 
important information is often concealed from the general population by 
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being labelled ‘classified’ by the Government and oil companies. Many 
people have especially questions concerning the distribution and allocation 
of oil revenues. Illustratively, one respondent interviewed as part of this 
study, raised the following questions about the allocation of oil revenues: 
‘How much will the 6% given to local districts be? We also don’t know 
where some of the crude oil which was drilled during oil testing went? Well 
we heard that some of this oil was sold to Nakansongola, others to Hima 
cement factory. Where did the money that came from it go? Where did the 
government put that money?’ (Mr. K. Mugume, personal communication, 
November 2016). All these questions remain unanswered, so all these form 
sources of tension.
The area Member of Parliament for Buliisa county noted that there was 
still a feeling that oil and gas is a highly ‘technical issue’. He was concerned 
that most people do not have access to information, and procedures for 
accessing oil-related documents are not known; oil contracts are not easily 
accessible. He wondered how an ordinary citizen can access information on 
the oil sector if the Members of Parliament cannot have ready access to some 
of the information. While he argued that participation was a right of all the 
citizens, many do not know that they have the right to participate and some 
believe that such issues belong to Government. He castigated the Govern-
ment for thwarting their efforts in trying to prepare the public to participate 
effectively. In his view, public participation was constrained by lack of access 
to information, under-developed capacity, and lack of sensitisation. He argued 
that many stakeholders lacked the capacity to understand the content of the 
documents concerning oil and gas. He concluded that ‘issues like the laws, 
content of the contract are severely lacking so even where information is 
availed many don’t have capacity to comprehend the content’ (Ssewante, F., 
personal communication, November 2016).
The above grievances are not new. For example, a number of studies have 
documented many concerns about the secrecy surrounding the operations 
of oil and gas companies and their dealings with the Government, which 
proved to be problematic at both the national and regional levels (Avocats 
Sans Frontières, 2014; Global Witness, 2013a; 2013b; Kiiza et al., 2011; Og-
wang et al., 2018). For instance, in 2010 there was a parliamentary revolt over 
the undisclosed terms of agreements between the oil companies and the 
Government that were not made public. Parliamentarians accused some 
cabinet ministers of taking bribes from the companies in exchange for oil 
deals. After several verbal clashes and debates, in 2012 the Government 
disclosed to parliamentarians aspects of the oil deals it had with international 
oil companies, but details of the agreement remained confidential due to 
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‘commercial interests’, sparking further speculation about corruption and 
how these deals benefit the average Ugandan citizen.
This secrecy and lack of information is also replicated at local levels 
(Avocats Sans Frontières, 2014; Mawejje and Bategeka, 2013). There have 
been only minimal efforts, and in some cases no efforts, to enable community 
members to understand the legal requirements, procedures, processes, and the 
entire management framework of the oil and gas industry in the region. For 
instance, the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) which is the most important 
document detailing terms and conditions for resettlement and compensation 
was not revealed initially to the project-affected people in Kabaale, Buseruka 
sub county in Hoima. Even the district leadership did not have accessto it, 
leaving a huge communications void. Ideally the, RAP should not only be 
made available to the affected populations and their leadership, but should 
also be translated into languages that people understand so that they can 
make informed decisions.
According to a top local government official in Kibaale District, most 
of the sources of social tensions and community grievances arose from the 
displacement of people from their areas to pave way for oil infrastructures 
like the oil refinery, pipelines and the airport. He observed that whereas some 
people were compensated the money given to them was not enough and they 
have been complaining to this day. He further noted that since the discovery of 
oil, local communities and their leaders were not allowed access to areas with 
oil infrastructure. One of the respondents working with a community-based 
organisation observed that there were concerns over the 29 square kilometres 
which the Government acquired legally for the construction of the oil refinery 
in Kabaale in Hoima district. According to him there were some people who 
opted for relocation while others opted for compensation. He noted that the 
whole compensation process was punctuated with irregularities, ranging 
from under-valuation of property, and limited capacity training for the people 
on how to use their compensation money. For example, a person who got 
one million in a lump sum and had never got it before thought that all their 
problems were solved, which led to mismanagement of money.
According to him the problem was compounded by the fact that those who 
were outside the 29 square kilometres knew that those who were displaced 
were paid and decided to raise the price of land way beyond what the displaced 
people could afford with the money they received. In the end most of them 
ended up in wetlands and public forest reserves, leading to deforestation 
and environmental degradation. In addition, the community in the refinery 
areas claims that rates used for the valuation of their property were not com-
municated to them, and some claim that even after the completion of the 
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property valuation there was no feedback on the value of their property, so they 
had no idea how much money they would get. This has led to dissatisfaction 
among the local communities, who questioned why the valuation team did 
not allow them to raise complaints before displaying details of the valuation.
Some locals also complained that the problem of low compensation was 
further compounded by the fact that the compensation agreements were in 
English. They argued that the majority of people cannot read or write English. 
There were allegations that some women thought they had signed land-use 
agreements, yet they were actually signing for compensation for destroyed 
crops, while others signed without knowing what they were signing for. There 
was also another concern by the respondents who claimed that the farmers 
were encouraged to produce a lot, hoping to get a bigger market from the oil 
industry. But this did not happen, as most of the supplies came from Kampala. 
The local communities do not ideally consume the surplus produced, thus 
discouraging the farmers from growing crops on a large scale. But one of 
the workers with the District Farmers Association observed that ‘everybody 
wants to supply directly to the camps which is not possible. You find that many 
people want to enter the system and yet not all people can be taken on in this 
kind of arrangement’ (Angeno, J., personal communication, November 2016).
13.3 Management Mechanisms and their Effectiveness
The management of social tensions and grievances mechanisms and their 
effectiveness are classified into formal and informal processes. In an interview 
with one of the staff members of ACODE, a pilot exercise to facilitate the 
locals acquiring customary land certificates had been introduced to help the 
community, especially those who could not afford to process freehold tittles 
easily. He said that people are now being helped to demarcate their land and 
acquire ownership of land. There is also sensitisation of the masses on how to 
resolve land-related conflicts. An important mechanism, which has worked 
at least for now, is the executive pronouncement of the President to stop the 
issuing of land tittles in Bunyoro region has to some extent helped to reduce 
the gravity of the problem. But this also meant that people who are well placed 
can continue processing these land titles at the expense of the local people.
According to one of the respondents, one of the mechanisms which a 
locally based NGO called Mid-Western Region Anti-Corruption Coalition 
(MIRAC) adopted in handling the grievances was to organise community 
round-table dialogues where the duty bearers and the communities are invited 
to share information concerning oil and gas-related topics and give feedback 
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on the different issues happening in the area, but also amicably find solutions 
to different conflicts that are related to oil activities. The respondent stated 
that they bring different stakeholders like government officials who inform 
the people about the different government programmes in relation to oil 
and gas, but also listen to their grievances at the same time. According to 
him, when such government officials cannot offer sufficient answers to the 
questions asked, then they forward the matter to higher offices. He revealed 
that, for example, his organisation had petitioned different officers including 
those from the Ministries of Energy, and Mineral Development, and Lands, 
Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD). In particular, they petitioned 
the Ministry of MLHUD on the issue of land grabbing, and as a result of 
their interventions a total of 14 land tittles which were illegally acquired in 
Buhuka area, Kyangwali sub-county, were all cancelled. As an organisation, it 
felt proud of having contributed to this cancellation. The organisation is also 
involved in increased environmental civic consciousness. Amidst petroleum 
development, it tells people that environmental degradation and climate 
change are real. So, they encourage them to plant trees so as to prepare for 
it normally through tree planting; at times they also help the community 
to add value to its land and in case it is required for oil-related development 
then the people get more money through compensation.
According to a top official of Kibaale district local government, there 
are many different development partners, for example CSOs which are 
advocating for better management of the oil resource (Amara, P., personal 
communication, November 2016). Apart from the CSOs, there are also area 
Members of Parliament who were rallying the citizens on what can be done 
to manage the oil resource better. Their main concern was oil discovery and 
was awakening the masses about what they can do on the issues concern-
ing oil. He also noted that, as local governments in the Albertine Graben, 
they held a workshop in Kampala with different stakeholders on what their 
contribution could be concerning the oil resources. As local governments 
from the region, they were also trying to lobby on how much oil revenues 
can be given because the current arrangement of 7 per cent (6 for the local 
governments and 1 for traditional leaders) was not ‘fair’. As noted earlier, 
the sharing of the oil dividends is one of the key concerns which needs to be 
addressed by the Government.
The involvement of the cultural institution, for example the Bunyoro Kitara 
kingdom and cultural and religious leaders, is seen as important in trying to 
address the social tensions and grievances. These are also being augmented by 
Parliament and the local government councils. But even with some of these 
mechanisms in place, and despite the scrutiny and constant media coverage 
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of the growing natural resource industry, including oil policies, laws and 
production agreements, little attention has been given to the legal recourse 
available for people and communities affected.
According to a study by Avocats Sans Frontières (2014), when asked 
whether they considered formal mechanisms as means of seeking redress 
or channelling their grievances 35 per cent of respondents in Buseruka sub-
county stated that they had considered formal mechanisms as a means of 
obtaining redress, while 45 per cent stated that they did not consider the courts 
as possible redress mechanisms because they did not have any knowledge of 
the courts or how they functioned. The study further stated that half of the 
respondents noted that they did not use the courts because they could not 
afford the legal fees and other charges necessary to have a case filed. The study 
also revealed the distrust that formal justice mechanisms will meet their needs, 
citing corruption as the main reason. Some of the respondents assumed that 
corruption was the cause of delays in court proceedings, especially when the 
lawyer requested adjournments. The study noted that this points to other 
problems relating to lack of understanding of court procedures and processes.
Another factor presented as a barrier to accessing courts was the distance 
that most communities were required to travel. A person whose matter is 
before the magistrates’ court was required to travel approximately 80km 
from Kabaale Parish to access the nearest magistrates’ court in Hoima town 
council. Another person whose case was before the High Court had to travel 
over 150km from Kabaale Parish to Masindi town council where the High 
Court is situated (Avocats Sans Frontières, 2014). The formal mechanisms 
established by Ugandan law include courts of law (including the magistrates’ 
courts, High Court, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court), the Uganda 
Human Rights Commission and quasi-judicial mechanisms including local 
council courts.
Another mechanism introduced for the management of social tensions 
and grievances was the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) Mechanisms. Ac-
cording to Avocats Sans Frontières (2014, p.47), the affected communities’ 
lack of use of the formal justice mechanisms could also be partly explained 
by the dispute resolution mechanisms created by the Resettlement Action 
Plan (RAP). The research noted that discussions with district government 
officials in Hoima District revealed that affected communities had been 
sensitised about the RAP mechanisms, and had been advised that if they had 
any grievances related to RAP implementation, they could seek redress from 
these mechanisms. Within this framework, the community was expected to 
complain to the village RAP committee, who forwarded their complaints to 
Strategic Friends International.
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Avocats Sans Frontières (2014) observed that similarly, according to the 
affected communities in Kabaale Parish in Buseruka sub-county, sensitisation 
was carried out by Strategic Friends International (SFI), the Resident District 
Commissioner (RDC) and the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Develop-
ment (MEMD). The communities confirmed that during the sensitisation 
meetings they were told to use the RAP structures, which implied to them 
that the courts did not have the mandate to handle matters related to RAP 
implementation. However, some CSOs, like the Africa Institute for Energy 
Governance (AFIEGO, 2013), have since resorted to the courts on behalf of the 
people affected. People take their land-related grievances to different groups 
of people, for example some organisations that are fighting for the rights of 
the people. Some of the concerns are taken to Parliament so that they can be 
heard from there. Also, those who can are encouraged to process land titles 
because the ‘land grabbers’ cannot take lands away from people who have 
got land tittles because the locals will have ownership of the land already.
The other mechanisms which were proposed by the RAP are mediation 
fora constituted by representatives from the village councils, parish land 
committees, Ministry of Justice, a representative from the former Petro-
leum Exploration and Production Department (PEPD), now the Petroleum 
Directorate, Area District Councillor, a civil society representative, an area 
woman councillor, among others. In the event that an amicable decision is 
not reached, a complaint may seek legal redress in courts of law (Avocats Sans 
Frontières, 2014). At the village level, the RAP committee was elected by the 
community and composed of two community representatives and the local 
council 1 (LC 1). According to the community, they were informed that this 
RAP committee would be their first point of contact if they were dissatisfied 
with the valuation process. However, the village RAP committee only registers 
complaints from people who signed forms accepting the valuation outcomes 
and amount claimed as compensation. This therefore means that those who 
had grievances regarding compensation are left out of this arrangement.
According to Avocats Sans Frontières (2014), residents on land earmarked 
for the construction of the oil refinery indicated that they were to be paid 
compensation that ranged from 3.5 to 7 million Ugandan shillings (US$ 
1,400–2,800) per acre of land, depending on the location. They indicated 
that this amount was too little to enable them to afford land of the same size 
elsewhere in the neighbouring communities. They also questioned why 
compensation rates were not uniform across the area marked for the refinery. 
While the people on the actual site of the refinery were to be compensated at 
the rate of at least 7 million Ugandan shillings (US$ 2,800) per acre, however, 
according to the residents some land was valued at 7 million while other land 
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was valued at 3.5 to 6 million Ugandan shillings. These differing compensa-
tion rates, while all residents were displaced, became a source of stress and 
discontent among residents. The lack of transparency in the valuation process, 
the sole determinant of what a person is paid in compensation, led over 
300 community members to refuse to sign the compensation claim form. 
Therefore, a person cannot be dissatisfied with the valuation process and at the 
same time sign the compensation claim form, which means that the limited 
scope of action of the village RAP committee was rendered ineffective for 
people to use to seek redress. According to Avocats Sans Frontières (2014, 
p.49), in the words of one of the people who rejected the valuation outcome 
and refused to sign the compensation claim form, ‘the RAP committee did 
not help us at all; they just signed forms and received allowances. I thought 
they would have helped us voice our issues and give us feedback but they 
did nothing’.
Avocats Sans Frontières (2014, p.50) documented that Strategic Friends 
International (the RAP implementing agency) and MEMD were to be the 
next level of reference should the village RAP committee fail to resolve a 
grievance. The village RAP committee was required to forward the com-
munity complaints to Strategic Friends International (SFI). SFI did not 
handle issues of land revaluation for compensation. Instead, it convened 
community meetings together with the MEMD representatives to meet 
complainants. The community asserted that during these meetings their 
grievances were not dealt with, nor did they get answers from SFI or the 
MEMD representatives, who instead promised them that their issues would 
be resolved. On other occasions they were told to accept what was offered 
and stop impeding development (Kinyera, 2019). The Tilenga oil project in 
Buliisa district faced some resistance from the communities affected when 
it came to compensation rates for land acquisition for oil and gas projects 
(NTV Uganda, 2018; Ogwang and Vanclay, 2019).
In many places where there are cases of land disputes in Uganda, the 
communities normally approach the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) 
for assistance with their problems. According to Article 205 of the Ugandan 
Constitution, the RDC has two main tasks: coordinating the administration 
of government services in the district, and advising the District Chairperson 
on matters of a national nature that may affect the district or its plans and 
programmes, particularly in relations between the district and the Gov-
ernment. This mandate does not include judicial or arbitration functions. 
Nevertheless, despite this clear assignment of roles, the RDC is approached 
by individuals and communities because s/he is commonly viewed as the 
President’s representative in a district. But in some instances they have been 
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accused of supporting government programmes or siding with the rich against 
the local people.
According to Avocats Sans Frontières (2014), the perception of the RDC 
as the President’s representative gives the community the misguided belief 
that, like the President, s/he has the power to grant favours, including the 
expeditious resolution of problems at the local level. Numerous groups and 
individuals have made appeals to the President for redress, compensation and 
the return of property. The communities pointed out that the RDC had not 
been helpful and had often dismissed their concerns. On one specific occasion, 
when people with complaints about the measurement and valuation of their 
land mobilised in large numbers to meet SFI and MEMD representatives, 
the RDC came with police and security personnel armed with tear gas and 
water cannons. They noted that although ‘the tear gas and water cannons 
were not used, the presence of these items and the police and security person-
nel frightened them into not demanding answers from SFI’ (Avocats Sans 
Frontières, 2014, p.51).
Avocats Sans Frontières (2014) further observed that the RAP mechanisms 
have created a perception that access to justice for RAP implementation-
related issues can only be achieved through the executive arm of government, 
in which MEMD and RDC are located. This contravenes the doctrine of 
separation of powers and checks and balances enshrined in the Constitution 
of the Republic of Uganda which provides in Article 126 that judicial power 
shall be exercised by courts established under the Constitution. Subsequently, 
these findings showed the strong inclination of the people to utilise justice 
mechanisms they understand, are comfortable with and can afford, despite 
the fact that their choices are not based on their appropriateness to address 
the legal concerns and human rights issues they face. This is a legal vacuum 
that needs to be addressed to ensure access to justice and redress (Avocats 
Sans Frontières, 2014, p.51).
13.4 Conclusion and Recommendations
This chapter has analysed the major tensions and grievances that exist in the 
communities in and around the oil-rich Albertine region. It further examined 
the mechanisms and policies which have been implemented by the Govern-
ment and other stakeholders, including international oil companies (IOC), 
to manage and mitigate the prevailing social tensions and grievances, and 
assessed how effective these mechanisms have been in resolving the tensions 
and grievances which have emerged as a result of the oil exploration- and 
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production-related activities. While several studies (Kutesa, 2014; UNDP, 
2016) have recognised that the extractive industry sector, especially oil 
production, could double or triple Uganda’s current export earnings, some 
studies have also highlighted the dark side of this industry (Karl, 1997; Vokes, 
2012; Mosbacher, 2013; Ogwang et al., 2019). It is therefore important that the 
different stakeholders need to take into account people’s grievances in order 
to avoid the negative experiences of other oil producing countries.
Government should empower the local councils to handle the land issues at 
the local level, and where they are ineffective the cases should then be handled 
at the sub-county level. As there is still need for more land to accommodate 
the increasing demand for oil and gas infrastructure, it would be prudent to 
develop and provide a clear description of the potential extent/magnitude 
of displacement of persons/settlements including clear compensation and 
livelihoods restoration plans (LRPs). A well communicated compensation 
scheme (Honeyman, 2003) should be provided in the RAP to the potential 
and actual project affected persons (PAPs). The stakeholders should try to 
reduce suspicion among the locals by reducing the restriction on accessing 
oilfields to enable the locals to access firewood and medicinal herbs.
To avoid unnecessary and unrealistic expectations from these communities, 
it is recommended that the Government and the oil companies should develop 
clear management of expectations and anxiety plans. The process of this 
development should include the relevant stakeholders so that their voices 
are heard. Some of these could include providing upfront, clear, concrete 
and well communicated procedures for the provision of goods and services, 
hiring labour (both local and national), including their working conditions 
and duration. There is need for open, honest and realistic estimates (for 
example 5,000 for EACOP) to be provided with regard to labour requirements 
for the project, as well as training and transfer of knowledge. In addition, 
clear communication procedures should be introduced to allow for effective 
collection of complaints and responses to grievances of the people affected 
by the project’s activities.
Furthermore, the stakeholders involved in the EACOP project and feeder 
pipelines should provide clear descriptions of how the pipeline’s construction 
will be undertaken without causing significant environmental disturbance, for 
instance for forests, wetlands and other areas with vulnerable water conditions. 
It is also recommended that mitigation measures should be provided for all 
impacts that cannot be avoided. In summary, all the potential environmental 
and social consequences of these risks with regard to the pipeline should be 
addressed.
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This chapter attempts to discuss the different regimes that have evolved 
as Nigeria’s post-colonial State seeks to govern oil. It argues that there are 
clearly four generations of regimes for the governance of oil in Nigeria. 
The chapter draws attention to the underlying pressures that underpin the 
emergence of each generation and ongoing efforts to address challenges in 
the successive regulatory and engagement frameworks. It is divided into five 
sections. This next section provides a background analysis of the Nigerian oil 
sector and seeks to explain its historical and contemporary challenges. This is 
followed in Section 3 with an examination of the first-generation governance 
regime for oil, which focused on ownership and control as well as production 
relationships. Section 4 focusses on the second-generation regime of oil that 
concentrates mostly on distributional and benefits issues. In Section 5, the 
paper addresses the concerns of third-generation regimes on environmental 
protection and sustainability. The sixth and concluding section explores 
contemporary efforts to address various challenges of oil governance through 
the instrumentality of an omnibus Petroleum Industry Bill.
14.2 Historical and Sectoral Overview of the Nigerian Oil 
Industry
For over two decades, Nigeria has been sub-Saharan African’s largest producer 
of oil and the world’s eighth largest producer of oil.1 Nigeria’s foray into oil 
production started in 1907 when exploration activities by Nigerian Bitumen 
1 Nigeria’s status as Africa’s biggest oil producer/exporter has intermittently been undermined 
by production losses caused by militancy in the Niger Delta. For instance, between November 2015 
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Corporation (NBC) began. Exploration activities ceased with the onset of 
the First World War as the NBC departed the shores of Nigeria. Following 
the end of the war, D’Arcy Exploration Company and White Hall Petroleum 
also secured licences for exploration but returned the licences in 1923 after a 
frustrating exploration experience. In 1937, Shell D’Arcy, a merger between 
Shell and British Petroleum, commenced exploration activities.
However, it was not until the eve of the country’s independence that oil 
was found in commercial quantities. The company’s investment of over six 
million pounds over almost two decades yielded a significant find in Oloibiri in 
1956 where oil was found in commercial quantity. By 1958, half a century after 
the commencement of exploration activities, Nigeria joined the league of oil 
producing nations by producing and exporting an average of 5,100 barrels per 
day. It is important to underscore this coincidence between independence and 
the commercial exploitation of oil because it explains the pervasive role of oil 
in shaping the character of the Nigerian post-colonial State. The discovery of 
exportable oil served to reinforce the foundational workings of the colonial 
enterprise in the framing of the Nigerian State as an extractive phenomenon. 
To the extent that the colonial State specialised in the extraction of rents from 
commodity production and the export and imports of finished products, the 
post-colonial period has witnessed continuities in the State’s preoccupation 
with extraction and the appropriation of rents from oil.
A major discontinuity witnessed in the post-colonial period as a result 
of the ascendancy of oil has been the centralisation of ownership, control 
and appropriation of oil revenues. To be sure, while the central government 
representing the British Crown owned and controlled oil in the colonial 
period, this ownership and control was mostly titular and symbolic since it 
was fiscally inconsequential. This rentier orientation was inherited by the 
post-colonial State which, as shall become evident, extended its control in 
the oil sphere without making commensurate investments for the exploration 
and development of the sector.
The reaffirmation of central ownership, control and appropriation in 
the post-colonial period when oil graduated to become the mainstay of the 
Nigerian economy and cash cow of the Nigerian State came under stiff chal-
lenges from regional elites and peoples who were socialised into and had been 
accustomed to regionalisation of commodity export rent appropriation in 
the colonial period. The accumulated grievance of these elites partly found 
expression in the Twelve Day Revolution orchestrated for the stillborn Niger 
and July 2016, Angola marginally overtook Nigeria as Africa’s largest producer. See http://punchng.
com/angola-overtakes-nigeria-as-africas-top-oil-producer/.
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Delta Republic (1966) and Three-Year Nigeria Civil War that culminated in 
the abortion of the Biafran Republic (1967–1970). The resurgence of these 
sentiments and the attendant grievance since the late 1980s in the sites of oil 
extraction remain one of the greatest challenges that threaten Nigeria’s aspira-
tions towards petro-hegemony. By petro-hegemony I mean the conscious 
unmistakable efforts of the Nigerian political, social and economic power 
elites to instrumentalise oil for state building and nation building as well as 
regional and global prominence.
As at 2010, the proven oil reserve was put at 36 billion barrels. This reserve, 
which is one of the biggest in the world, is estimated to last for 46 years. 
Nigeria’s low sulphur oil (Bonny light) is very much in high demand in 
North America and European markets (KPMG, 2014). Over the past decade 
production and export levels have averaged between 1.2 and 2.7 billion barrels 
per day after picking up in 2009 from an all-time low of 200–700 million 
barrels per day following the commencement of the amnesty programme for 
militants in the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta. However, exploration 
and exploitation are still undermined by instability and crisis in the region, 
as well as declining levels of investments. The declining investments in the 
sector are the consequence of uncertainties engendered by the protracted 
debates in the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill. The challenges in the 
sector threaten the realisation of the national energy policy, the target of 
which is to build up reserves to 40 billion barrels and increase export to 4 
million barrels per day (see Madueke, 2013).
The prospects for gas appear to be brighter, with Nigeria believed to have 
5.39 trillion cubic metres in reserves, which is about 2.7 per cent of the world’s 
gas reserves. The rich gas endowment of the country has led analysts to 
describe Nigeria as a massive gas basin with some oil reserves (see Madueke, 
2013). The quality of the gas is also very high, with low sulphur content and 
rich liquids. However, 75 per cent of gas is currently flared in the process of oil 
production, given the country’s poor technological base and lack of incentives 
for oil-producing companies to invest in gas reinjection and production. Only 
12 per cent of gas is reinjected.
The significance of oil and gas is not only to be seen in their contributions 
to bolstering the country’s stature in the global political economy but also 
with respect to its centrality to the Nigerian political economy. Since 1970, oil 
has accounted for not less than 80 per cent of public revenues and a minimum 
of 90 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange. As Nigeria has moved from 
an agricultural commodity exporter to a rentier State since the 1970s, oil 
has come to define the strength and weakness of the Nigerian State. Both in 
national and international politics, the exercise and projection of state power 
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have risen and waned as a result of vicissitudes and cyclical fluctuations in 
global energy markets. Instructively, the two cases of de-legitimation and loss 
of power by democratically elected governments—President Shehu Shagari 
through a military coup in 1983 and President Goodluck Jonathan through 
elections in 2015—occurred when Nigeria’s political economy was severally 
affected by an oil glut and declining petro-dollars.
Recognition of the strategic risks of mono-cultural oil dependency has over 
the years spewed successive rhetoric and efforts at diversification. However, 
tackling oil dependency has been challenging with reform programmes ending 
as truncated visions and stillbirths. While successive Nigerian governments 
have expressed intentions to promote diversification, they have maintained 
a policy of monopolising access to and control of the oil industry. This quest 
for control is ironically evidenced by the decision of two Nigerian presidents 
who promised reform of the oil industry to insist on direct control of oil to 
retain the post of Minister of Petroleum Resources.
This is one of the contradictions of the Nigeria oil industry. Two other 
contradictions that the nature and character of oil exploration, exploitation 
and production have historically thrown up are worth highlighting at this 
juncture. First is the competing regional and national claim to ownership of 
oil arising from the fact that oil and gas resources are mostly produced from 
three basins located in Southern Nigeria. These are: 1) the Onshore Anambra 
basin; 2) the offshore Benin-Dahomey deepwater and ultra-deepwater basins; 
and 3) the Niger Delta shallow and deep offshore basins. Although seismic 
activities suggest the presence of oil and gas in other locations, notably 
Benue Trough and Chad Basin, exploitation and production have been in 
the three aforementioned locations in Southern Nigeria, with the Benin 
and Niger Delta basins accounting for most of the oil finds and products. 
The restricted endowment of oil and gas deposits continues to serve as a 
basis for contestation of national ownership of oil by communal and ethnic 
communities in oil-producing regions. This contestation has intensified 
since the late 1980s alongside rising ethno-regional tensions in the Nigerian 
federation. Second is the dominance of foreign technology and capital in 
the exploration, exploitation and production of oil and gas. The historical 
dominance of multinational oil-producing companies in production and the 
outward orientation of the industry in terms of both inputs and outputs has 
undermined the quest for national ownership and control.
Given these contradictions, I argue that it is hardly surprising that the 
regulatory institutions that have evolved over the years have primarily sought 
to address and/or mitigate the conundrum of regionalism versus nationalism as 
well as nationalism versus transnationalism/globalism in the oil and gas industry.
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14.3 First Generation Oil Governance Regimes
The first category of regulatory institutions includes those that seek firstly 
to define ownership and control of oil resources, and secondly to define 
relationships needed for oil exploration, exploitation and production. In this 
vein, the first legislation on oil in Nigeria was the Nigerian Minerals Ordinance 
of 1914, enacted shortly after the Northern and Southern protectorates of 
Nigeria, which vested control and ownership of oil as all mineral resources in 
the Nigerian land and waters in the British Crown. It provided that prospec-
tive explorers for oil should secure licences from the Crown or its sworn 
representative. The legislation opened the doors to British companies to 
explore for oil in Nigeria, culminating in the monopoly concession granted 
to Shell D’Arcy to explore for oil throughout Nigerian land and waters in 
1938. However, following the end of the Second World War and the push of 
the United States against colonial monopoly, other Western European and 
North American international oil companies (IOCs) mobilised to secure oil 
exploration licences in Nigerian oilfields. These pressures caused the Nigerian 
colonial state to relax laws that granted a monopoly to Shell D’Arcy. This 
relaxation led to successful licensing of major international oil companies 
to undertake oil exploration in Nigeria in quick succession as follows: Mobil 
in 1955, Tenneco in 1960, Gulf Oil and Chevron in 1961, Agip in 1962, and Elf 
in 1962.
Meanwhile, the Ordinance stipulated a production contract regime of a 
50–50 profit-sharing arrangement between the oil company and the govern-
ment. The main provisions of the statute were retained by the Mineral Act of 
1958 and Petroleum Act of 1958, enacted as the country was being prepared for 
independence. It was only in the late 1960s that the Federal Military Govern-
ment took decisive steps to gain greater control of the oil industry. This was 
accomplished through the promulgation of the Petroleum Decree 1969 (later 
called the Petroleum Act of 1969). The Act, which supersedes the Mineral 
Act of 1958, Petroleum Act of 1958 and Petroleum Control Law of 1967, gives 
extensive power to the Minister of Petroleum, acting on behalf of the Nigerian 
State, to exercise ownership and control over oil. The ownership clauses are 
evident in section 2 of the Act, which empowers the Minister to grant:
a) a licence, to be known as an oil exploration licence, to explore for 
petroleum;
b) a licence, to be known as an oil prospecting licence, to prospect for 
petroleum; and
c) a lease, to be known as an oil mining lease, to search for, win, work, carry 
away and dispose of petroleum.
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The Act also grants expansive powers to the Minister to exercise control 
over refining, distribution and pricing of petroleum products as well as the 
imposition of sanctions on actors who contravene the laws. As stipulated in 
section 8(1) of the Act, the Minister:
a) shall exercise general supervision over all operations carried on under 
licences and leases granted under this Act;
b) shall report annually to the Federal Government on the progress of the 
oil industry in Nigeria;
c) shall have access at all times to the areas covered by oil exploration 
licences, oil prospecting licences and oil mining leases, and to all refiner-
ies and installations which are subject to this Act, for the purpose of 
inspecting the operations conducted therein and enforcing the provisions 
of this Act and any regulations made thereunder and the conditions of 
any licences or leases granted under this Act or under any corresponding 
law for the time being in force in Nigeria;
d) may arrest without warrant any person whom he finds committing, or 
whom he reasonably suspects of having committed, any offence under 
this Act or any regulations made thereunder, and shall hand over any 
person so arrested to a police officer with as little delay as possible;
e) may by notice in writing require the holder of a licence or lease granted 
under this Act or any contractor working for the holder (or any servant or 
agent of the holder or the contractor) to appear before him at a reasonable 
time and place to give such information as he may require about the 
operations being conducted under the licence or lease, and every person 
so required to appear shall be legally bound to comply with the notice 
and give the information;
f) may direct in writing that operations under a licence or lease granted 
under this Act shall be suspended in any area until arrangements have 
been made which in his opinion are necessary to prevent danger to life 
or property;
g) may direct in writing the suspension of any operations which in his 
opinion are not being conducted in accordance with good oil field practice; 
and
h) may direct in writing the suspension of any operations where in his 
opinion a contravention of this Act or any regulations made thereunder 
has been or may have been or is likely to be committed.
The reasons for the dramatic extension of state control were the alleged 
duplicitous roles of IOCs in the Civil War, the challenges encountered by 
successive post-colonial governments in exercising control of the IOCs, and 
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the country’s application to join the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). The membership of OPEC was particularly significant 
as OPEC’s flagship policy was control of the oil industry by member States 
in furtherance of the objective to control supply and prices of oil. It is against 
this background that the post-Civil War era witnessed progressive steps 
by the Nigerian State to nationalise the oil industry. The Nigerian military 
government in 1973 initiated the First Participation Agreement and secured 
35 per cent of the shares in IOCs which, by the Petroleum Act of 1969, were 
now incorporated in Nigeria. Barely a year after this, the Government upped 
its stake to 55 per cent. By 1979, the Government’s equity had increased to 
60 per cent. Following the nationalisation of British Petroleum the same 
year to influence the British position on the independence of Zimbabwe, the 
Nigerian Government extended its holdings to 80 per cent. However, with 
declining investments in the oil and gas sector, the Government decided to 
revert to 60 per cent equity in 1989 in the Fifth Participation Agreement and 
55 per cent in the Sixth Participation Agreement in 1993.
Alongside strategic management of equity holdings, the State created 
institutions to exercise control over the industry. The Department of Pe-
troleum Resources (DPR) and Nigerian National Oil Company (NNOC) 
were created in 1970 and 1971 respectively. In 1974, the DPR was upgraded 
to the status of Ministry of Petroleum Resources. However, in 1977 both 
the NNOC and MPR were abolished by the Act establishing the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The Act made the NNPC the 
Government’s sole agent in exercising control and ownership of oil in the 
upstream, downstream and service sectors. The Act vested the following 
powers and roles on the NNPC:
a) exploring and prospecting for, working, winning or otherwise acquiring, 
possessing and disposing of
b) petroleum;
c) refining, treating, processing and generally engaging in the handling of 
petroleum for the manufacture
d) and production of petroleum products and its derivatives;
e) purchasing and marketing petroleum, its products and by-products;
f) providing and operating pipelines, tanker-ships or other facilities for the 
carriage or conveyance of
g) crude oil, natural gas and their products and derivatives, water and any 
other liquids or other
h) commodities related to the Corporation’s operations;
i) constructing, equipping and maintaining tank farms and other facilities 
for the handling and treatment
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j) of petroleum and its products and derivatives;
k) carrying out research in connection with petroleum or anything derived 
from it and promoting activities
l) for the purpose of turning to account the results of such research;
m) doing anything required for the purpose of giving effect to agreements 
entered into by the Federal Government with a view to securing participa-
tion by the Government or the Corporation in activities
n) connected with petroleum;
o) generally engaging in activities that would enhance the petroleum 
industry in the overall interest of Nigeria; and
p) undertaking such other activities as are necessary or expedient for giving 
full effect to the provisions of this Act.
Principally under this governance framework, the NNPC enters into partner-
ships with IOCs for the purpose of oil exploration and production in the 
upstream sector. The partnerships take four major forms, namely: joint venture 
agreements, production-sharing contracts, service contracts and marginal 
field concessions. Production-sharing contracts have in recent years become 
more common as IOCs exercise caution in signing joint venture agreements, 
given the inability of the NNPC to meet its own funding commitments to 
exploration and production.
Efforts at nationalisation were not only restricted to initiatives to secure 
state ownership and control. There were also efforts to widen access to 
oil resources among the Nigerian public. This was implemented through 
institutionalisation of price control and uniform pricing in the downstream 
sector. Linked to the post-war national integration ideology, the policy sought 
to ensure that Nigerians from all regions enjoyed equal access to cheap 
petroleum products (see Ukiwo, 2008a; 2008b).
However, the perennial defaults in payment of joint venture funding 
commitments and continued foreign control of the industry, as well as oil 
theft and cross-border smuggling of subsidised petroleum products, have 
severely limited efforts at exercising national control and ownership. These 
lingering challenges have given rise to advocacy for reform of the sector. 
Since the return to civil rule in 1999, pressures for reform have revolved 
around the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill, which we shall return 
to shortly.
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14.4 Second Generation Oil Governance Regimes
The second generation of oil governance regimes seeks to govern the dis-
tribution formula and relative share of all stakeholders of oil resources and 
revenues. From the outset, different Nigerian stakeholders have mobilised for 
access to benefits from the oil sector. For instance, one of the preoccupations 
of Nigeria’s nationalists in the colonial period was to aggregate concerns 
of communities in sites of oil exploration activities whose interests were 
hardly captured by the Nigerian Mineral Ordinance (see Steyn, 2009). These 
early mobilisations were mellowed as independence approached because 
the nationalists clearly began to contemplate the potential role of oil in the 
stability of the post-colonial State.
It is hardly surprising therefore that the Independence Constitution of 
1960 merely pandered to the interest of regional-based elite when it retained 
a 50–50 ratio of benefits between the regional and national governments 
based on the principle of derivation. The first step to reduce the percentage 
of revenues accruing to areas of derivation was the promulgation of the 
Petroleum Act in 1969 which reduced the share of states to 45 per cent while 
increasing the federal share to 55 per cent. Interestingly, the development did 
not generate much resentment in the oil-producing areas at the time because 
the oil-bearing areas had benefitted from the state creation exercise of 1967, 
which granted autonomy to minority areas in the former Eastern Region. 
Moreover, the adjustment was not considered a major incursion into the share 
of the sub-national units as the ratio accruing to the Federal Government 
was marginally higher than what was accruing to the state governments. 
This increment was also tolerated as a result of the increasing responsibility 
of the Federal Government in the Civil War and early post-Civil War years. 
The absence of any major social movement to resist the revised revenue 
distribution formula at the time no doubt contributed to the context in which 
the ascendant Federal Military Government was emboldened to further slash 
allocations to states on the basis of derivation from 35to 20 per cent in 1975.
The gradual reduction of state quotas of oil revenues persisted when the 
revised revenue allocation formula of 1982 provided that 1.5 per cent of revenues 
accruing to the Federation Account would be shared on the basis of derivation. 
This reduction was undertaken by the short-lived civilian government in the 
Second Republic as the economic crisis, partly driven by oil glut and falling 
prices, set in. The resumption of military rule and expansion of the Federal 
Government by January 1984 witnessed further reduction in revenues accruing 
to oil-producing states on the basis of derivation, ebbing at 1 per cent by 1990. 
This development led to growing resentments in the oil-producing areas 
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and gave rise to mobilisations for autonomy. Faced by self-determination 
movements in the oil-producing areas, the Federal Military Government 
established the Oil Minerals Producing Areas Commission (OMPADEC) 
in 1993, which was endowed with 3 per cent of oil revenues to address the 
ecological, social and economic challenges of the region.
However, the advent of OMPADEC did not address the quest and advocacy 
for autonomy and the reduction of federal control of oil rents. This is because 
OMPADEC was a federal intervention to address developmental challenges 
in the region. Much of its resources remained under federal rather than state 
control. The members and key officers of the Commission were appointed 
by and responsible to the President, the chief executive officer of the Federal 
Military Government. Consequently, OMPADEC did not satisfy the quest 
of the people for autonomy and greater benefits from oil production (see 
Ozo-Eson and Ukiwo, 2001). Little wonder that protests persisted in the 
region throughout the 1990s (see Human Rights Watch, 1999).
Part of the protests stemmed from perceptions of marginalisation by 
the peoples of the region. Not only was the successive diminution of the 
percentage of revenues that accrued to the oil-bearing areas linked to the 
minority status of the areas but also access to the oil industry in the forms 
of employment and business opportunities were perceived as favouring the 
people from major ethnic groups in Nigeria. Thus, the marginalisation of 
oil-producing minority groups became a salient manifestation of horizontal 
inequalities in Nigeria (see Langer and Ukiwo, 2009). A key moment for 
advocacy for the oil-producing minorities was the 1995 constitutional confer-
ence. Representatives of the minority groups campaigned for the percentage 
of revenue allocated on the principle of derivation to be increased to 50 per 
cent. Before the conference adjourned sine die, some consensus had been 
reached that a minimum of 13 per cent of revenues generated would be paid 
to originating states on the basis of derivation. This consensus informed the 
insertion of a provision for payment of a minimum of 13 per cent derivation 
revenues in the 1999 Constitution (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; Uche 
and Uche, 2004).
Following the return to civilian rule in 1999, OMPADEC was abolished as 
it had become redolent of the corruption that pervaded the years of military 
rule. The newly elected civilian administration replaced OMPADEC with the 
Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC). The take-off of the NDDC 
was initially marred by controversies, as the Federal Government initially 
declined to backdate payments of derivation revenues to benefitting states 
to 29 May 1999 when the Fourth Republic was inaugurated (see Edevbie, 
2000). Regional elites and social movements in the Niger Delta were also 
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peeved by the re-introduction of the offshore-onshore dichotomy in payment 
of derivation revenues. Under the policy first introduced in 1978, revenues 
from offshore oil which by international law belongs to the Federation were 
excluded in the application of the derivation principle. The enactment of the 
law, which occurred at a time when exploration for oil in deep waters showed 
promising results, had attracted protests in oil-producing states. The persistent 
protests by Niger Delta elites had influenced the military administration to 
abolish the policy. Thus, its reintroduction by the civilian administration 
undermined relations between the Federal and oil-producing States.
Furthermore, protests in the region were mobilised around poor funding 
of NDDC and dissatisfaction with the 13 per cent derivation revenues. These 
sentiments overshadowed the deliberations at the 2005 Constitutional Confer-
ence and led to its indefinite closure. The failure of the Niger Delta delegates 
to secure an increment in derivation from 13 per cent to between 25 and 50 
per cent was one of the remote causes of the upsurge in militancy that saw 
militant groups taking action to stop oil production. In order to pacify the 
region, the Federal Government created a Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
in 2007 and granted amnesty to militants in the region.
However, these measures have not reduced grievances in the region. 
One of the sources of grievance is that derivation revenues have accrued 
to states rather than oil-bearing communities. Accrual of oil benefits to 
states is believed to have led to diversion and misappropriation of funds by 
state elites and their patrons. Thus, many state governors of the oil-bearing 
states are believed to have been constrained to transfer resources to political 
patrons outside their states to maintain relevance in the country’s prebendal 
democracy (see Ukiwo, 2007). This grievance has led to advocacy for a com-
munity trust fund to which an additional percentage of oil revenues should 
be paid for the direct benefit of oil-bearing communities. This movement has 
canvassed inclusion of the community trust fund in the Petroleum Industry 
Governance Bill (PIB).
Apart from ethno-regional mobilisations for access, there have also been 
class-based mobilisations. These mobilisations can be traced to the colonial 
period as Nigerian technocratic and business interests complained about 
foreign domination of the oil sector. The indigenisation policies of the 1970s 
were partly aimed at addressing the concerns of the fledgling professional 
and business elites. However, indigenisation policies had their limitations in 
making Nigerians take control of the so-called commanding heights of the 
economy (see Ake, 1985) as IOCs retained control of the industry nearly 30 
years after the initial attempts at indigenisation. It is against this background 
that the Government gradually introduced the policy on marginal field 
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concessions which incentivised IOCs to cede holdings of unexploited fields 
in their leases to emergent indigenous oil companies.
In addition, persistent pressures for Nigerian participation has also led 
to the enactment of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Content Development Act 
(NOGIC Act) 2010. The main objective of the NOGIC Act is to increase 
the level of Nigerian content in the country’s oil and gas industry. The Act 
defines Nigerian content as ‘the quantum of composite value added to or 
created in the Nigerian economy by a systematic development of capacity and 
capabilities through the deliberate utilization of Nigerian human, material 
resources and services in the Nigerian oil and gas industry’. The ‘NOGIC 
Act provides that first consideration shall be given to Nigerian independent 
operators, goods and services and also to Nigerians in employment and 
training. All fabrication and welding activities carried out in the industry 
must be performed in-country’ (KPMG, 2014). It sets aside a levy of 1 per 
cent of contracts awarded in the upstream sector for payment to the Nigerian 
Content Development Fund, which is managed by the Nigerian Content 
Development Board.
The development has recorded some promising results, with indigenous 
companies increasingly entering into the upstream sector and service sector 
and also taking over onshore holdings currently being relinquished by the 
IOCs (see Madueke, 2013). Assessments of the policy suggest that some 
marginal gains have been recorded in engendering linkages and job creation 
(see Adedeji, Sidique, Rahman and Law, 2016). Since the introduction of 
the policy about 18 per cent of both oil and gas production is controlled by 
enterprises owned by Nigerian nationals (Mossman, 2017). It is envisaged 
that the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill (PIB) would further enhance 
indigenous participation in the sector.
14.5 Third Generation Oil Governance Regimes
Social pressures on oil exploration and production activities have also stemmed 
from concerns about the deleterious effects of hydrocarbons on the environ-
ment and attendant implications for livelihoods. A major complaint of locals 
was that the colonial Minerals Ordinance did not take due cognizance of the 
potential impact of exploration and exploitation activities on the environment 
(see Steyn, 2009). The Ordinance merely provided for compensatory payments 
for damage to economic crops in the course of exploration and production 
activities. Dissatisfaction with provisions for protection of the environment 
and remediation for damage continued through the colonial period, featuring 
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prominently in the submissions of the peoples of the Niger Delta to the Henry 
Willinks Commission established by the Colonial Administration in 1958 
to investigate the concerns of minority groups in Nigeria. The agitations 
intensified in the late colonial period as minorities sought regional autonomy, 
affirmative action and protection policies to forestall consolidation of their 
marginalisation in the post-colonial period. It is not surprising that one of 
the recommendations of the Commission was the establishment of a Niger 
Delta Development Board (NDDB), which inter alia was supposed to address 
ecological challenges and environmental protection.
As in the colonial period, the post-colonial State became increasingly 
faced with agitations by communities protesting about damage to their 
environment. These concerns led to clauses on environmental issues being 
inserted in different laws regulating the exploration for and production of oil 
(see Yalaju, 1999). The Petroleum Inspectorate Division was partly created to 
address the environmental challenges through monitoring of the operations 
of the IOCs. From its inception, oversight and monitoring of operations of 
the IOCs was hampered by the fact that it lacked real powers of prosecution, 
as well as by the absolute dependence of the Nigerian State on oil revenues. 
Given that oil exploration and production were increasingly a joint venture 
between the State and the IOCs, the state regulatory agencies became wary 
of imposing fines and sanctions on oil companies as the Government would 
have to pick up some of the bills—the quantum of potential fines and levies 
grew in proportion as the Nigerian State increased its equity in the joint 
ventures. The result is that throughout the 1970s and 1980s institutional 
weaknesses and petro-dependency undermined any effort to protect the 
Niger Delta environment. Symptomatic of this weakness is the longstanding 
inability of the Nigerian State to affirm and enforce the terminal date for gas 
flaring that has been extended on several occasions.
Aggrieved communities increasingly resorted to litigation to gain compen-
sation for damage done to the environment and livelihoods (see Human Rights 
Watch, 1999). Obviously, protracted litigation due to the penchant of IOCs to 
appeal judgments of lower courts to higher courts and paltry awards based on 
contentious compensation rates tested the patience of communities (Frynas, 
1999). Exasperated by the situation, some elements within the communities 
increasingly resorted to self-help by sabotaging vital oil infrastructures and 
imposing losses on IOCs and the Nigerian rentier state (see Ukiwo, 2011). To 
be sure, some of the sabotage of equipment stemmed from the intent not to 
punish IOCs for the damaged environment but to extract rents from them. 
This development was a culmination of the perverse incentives created by 
existing regulatory regimes which inadvertently established an order in 
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which compensatory claims over pollution and destruction of the environ-
ment increasingly became the main means of accessing the benefits of oil 
production. The culture of compensation payments pitched communities 
against IOCs and the Nigerian State because the burden of proof rested on 
communities which had to prove that oil spills were not caused by sabotage.
The emergence of global environmental rights movements and their 
interconnection with local communities helped to amplify the voices of the 
communities in the Niger Delta in the 1980s. One result of this phenomenon 
was the rise of environmental rights groups in Nigeria, starting with the 
establishment of the Environmental Rights Action (ERA). ERA, which started 
as a project of the civil liberties organisations (CLO) and became an affiliate 
of the Friends of the Earth International. ERA subsequently encouraged the 
proliferation of similar movements including community-based groups that 
monitored, documented and published cases of oil spills and environmental 
pollution. Through international networking and advocacy, the environmental 
rights groups helped to question the environmental standards of IOCs. 
The groups also invoked international law and normative frameworks on 
environmental protection and best practices. This strategy increasingly 
pressured the Nigerian State to update its repertoire of laws on environmental 
protection as the existence of international law significantly constrained the 
capacity of IOCs and the Nigerian State to ignore environmental standards.
It is against this background that the Government created the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency in 1988 and followed up with the enact-
ment of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act 1992. The Act, among 
other things, provided for an environmental audit to be conducted before 
the commencement of exploration and production activities. Although the 
EIA regime was not exclusive to the oil industry, it had strong implications 
for the relations between the State, IOCs and oil-producing communities. 
However, the EIA regime suffered from poor implementation with reported 
cases of collusion between rent-seeking community elites and prospecting 
communities to organise phony consultation meetings required for the 
acquisition of an EIA certificate.
The growing incidence of oil spillage and the weakness of existing institu-
tions further led to the establishment of the National Oil Spills Detection 
Agency (NOSDRA). NOSDRA was principally charged with managing the 
prevention and control of oils spills by interfacing between oil companies and 
communities. One of the instruments for the interface is the joint investigation 
visits (JIV) which, the NOSDRA Act stipulates, should involve oil companies, 
state ministries of environment and community representatives. The visits 
are intended to ascertain the causes of spills, the extent of the impact of spills 
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and modality for response and remediation. Like the Petroleum Inspectorate 
Unit before it, the NOSDRA Act is weak and the agency is poorly resourced to 
check and manage oil spills. For instance, NOSDRA does not have helicopters 
and boats and routinely depends on the good offices of the IOCs to access sites 
of spills in the hard-to-reach creeks of the Niger Delta. The poor standing of 
NOSDRA and its ineffectiveness have eroded its authority and legitimacy, 
creating a situation whereby communities actually avoid rather than ap-
proach the agency for report and action on oil spills. Amidst the weakness 
of NOSDRA, which has not been addressed despite sustained advocacy for 
review of the NOSDRA Act, the Federal Government has established another 
agency called the Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project (HYPREP) 
to lead the implementation of the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) Report on the Ogoni environment. Moreover, the Government’s 
assumption that most of the spills stem from sabotage of equipment has led 
to securitisation. This is evidenced by the deployment of military and police 
forces to checkmate oil pollution and oil theft. The failed attempts to secure 
oil through troop deployment have also led the engagement of local strong 
militia groups to complement the securitisation agenda.
Contemporaneous to the mobilisations around the environmental chal-
lenge posed by oil are mobilisations intended to improve the governance of oil 
and its sustainability. This tendency has arisen largely from the international 
conventional wisdom that correlates oil with dictatorship, violent conflicts 
and state failure (see Omeje, 2006; Perouse de Montclos, 2014). Nigeria has 
been presented as a case par excellence of a country that failed to use oil to 
transform the lives of its people for good. A plethora of state-based and civil 
society initiatives have been mobilised to ensure that oil delivers benefits for 
a greater proportion of both living and unborn populations. These mobilisa-
tions crystalised with the enactment of the Nigeria Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative Act (NEITI) in 2004. The initiative, which drew 
inspiration from the advocacy of groups such as Transparency International, 
Extractive Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Revenue Watch Institute 
(RWI), has sought to enhance the monitoring, disclosure and publication 
of revenue flows in the industry and to governmental institutions.
While laudable, NEITI got a slow start as it took time to get government 
agencies and IOCs to respond and to conduct the necessary audits. However, 
even with the conclusion of the audits the NEITI Act was considered insuf-
ficiently strong as it depended largely on moral suasion and apportioned 
ridiculously low fines that are insufficient to restrain oil companies or state 
agencies. The weakness of NEITI stemmed not just from its voluntary prov-
enance but from the inadequate stakeholder consultation, given the interest 
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of President Olusegun Obasanjo (assisted by a reformist Finance Minister) 
to push through the legislation in order to gain international legitimacy. 
Although Nigeria gained legitimacy as one of the first countries to introduce 
an EITI law, the initiative did not enjoy widespread support in the political 
circles where it was considered a pet policy of the President.
What is more, the NEITI was unpopular among Niger Delta governors 
who superintended derivation revenues accruing to oil-producing states and 
saw the initiative as a subterfuge by the Federal Government to undermine 
their authority and weaken agitations for resource control in the region. The 
response of state governments and dominant elites in the Niger Delta to 
NEITI is understandable, given the tension between competing perceptions 
of the Niger Delta crises. While the Federal Government and the international 
community blame governance deficits, dominant Niger Delta elites implicate 
marginalisation and disempowerment for the development challenges (see 
Ukiwo, 2008a; 2008b). Consequently, while the Federal Government and 
the international community generally believe that existing resources should 
be better managed to promote development, the regional elites clamour for 
more resources, claiming that current resources are insufficient.
Similar tensions appear to have undermined mobilisations to create a 
regime to sustain gains of oil for future populations. Publication of reports 
of how trillions of dollars accumulated from oil have been frittered away and 
spent on conspicuous consumption by the elite as well as stark comparisons 
made between Nigeria and the oil-rich Gulf States have increasingly raised 
interests among reformist elements in government for the conservation 
of oil revenues. The growing interest in saving for a rainy day became the 
conventional wisdom as periodic fluctuations in oil prices undermined 
macroeconomic stability. This led to the creation of an excess crude account 
(ECA) where Government saved oil receipts in excess of projected incomes 
as a result of positive price fluctuations.
The ECA was established in 2004 to ensure that resources are saved to 
bolster revenues in periods of falling production and low prices. The Federal 
Government unilaterally transferred funds from the Federation account to 
the excess crude account and reverted to it when fiscal pressures mounted 
on the State. The ECA dispensation was fraught with controversy as many 
actors, especially state governors, challenged its illegality. The fact that the 
ECA was controlled by the Federal Government also raised suspicions of 
mismanagement of the account. Savings and administrations were criticised 
for making withdrawals from the ECA. For example, the Yar Adua and 
Jonathan administrations faced criticisms for allegedly depleting the ECA 
following a fall in global oil prices.
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It is against this background that the Jonathan administration proposed 
the introduction of a sovereign wealth fund (SWF). The proposal was adopted 
by the National Economic Council and the National Assembly, which passed 
the Sovereign Wealth Investment Authority Establishment Act in 2011. The 
fund is made up of three major investments, namely: the Future Genera-
tion Funds, the Infrastructure Fund and the Stabilisation Fund. They are 
respectively intended to serve sustainability and justice for the young and 
unborn, bankroll major infrastructural developments and provide short-term 
funds to stabilise the economy.
By its structure, the ownership of the SWF is as follows: Federal Govern-
ment (45.83 per cent), states (36.25 per cent) and the 774 local governments 
(17.76 per cent) while the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) has 0.16 per cent. 
However, although there was considerable consensus around the passage 
of the SWF Act, its implementation has been dogged by controversies. The 
critical commentaries about the fund have mainly emanated from state 
governors who challenged the usage of the fund and frequently pressurised 
the Federal Government for bail-outs from the fund. Consequently, some 
state governments have challenged the constitutional basis of the SWF. For 
instance, Mr. Raji Fashola, Governor of Lagos State (2007–2015), who was 
one of the arrowheads of the mobilisations of the Nigerian Governors’ Forum 
against the SWF said:
I must be clear. I do not support it (SWF) not because I am against sav-
ings; I disagree because for me there are fundamental and constitutional 
issues… The countries given as examples to support the initiative are 
either monarchies or emirates whereas Nigeria is a democracy …How do 
we save money by an Act of the National Assembly when the Constitu-
tion that created the National Assembly itself says that every monies 
that come into the accounts of the country must go to the Federation 
Account and that any monies standing in credit in that Account must 
be distributed between the states, local government and the Federal 
Government? …Why do we save money when our entire infrastructure is 
over 40 years old? This country is running on an infrastructure that was 
built after the civil war. But the population we had then has multiplied 
in many folds.2
2 See Olusegun Adeniyi’s column entitled ‘Buhari and the Sovereign Wealth Dilemma’, 
published in ThisDay on 22 October 2015, available at: http://newsexpressngr.com/news/detail.
php?news=16581&title=Buhari-and-the-Sovereign-Wealth-Dilemma,-By-Olusegun-Adeniyi.
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The frequent criticism of the SWF has the potential to contribute to its 
delegitimation. It is envisaged that the enactment of the Petroleum Industry 
Governance Bill would help to create a hospitable policy and political environ-
ment for the successful implementation of the sovereign wealth fund and the 
popularisation of its stabilisation and sustainability agenda.
14.6 Conclusion: Is PIB the Panacea?
After 60 years of oil production, the country adopted a national energy policy 
in 2004. Key elements of the policy include diversification, improved revenues 
for national development, cost effective, adequate and environmentally friendly 
supply, substantive indigenous participation and technological transfer and 
adaptation, robust private participation and better use of energy resources to 
project power and influence in the continent and globally for the attainment of 
national interest and foreign policy objectives. The current structure of the oil 
industry and extant regulatory frameworks is considered inadequate for the 
realisation of these laudable objectives. This explains why substantial attention 
has been trained on the PIB. The objectives of the PIB include the following:
1. To enhance exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources
2. To significantly increase domestic gas supplies especially for power and 
industry
3. To create a competitive business environment for the exploitation of oil 
and gas
4. To establish a fiscal framework that is flexible, stable and competitively 
attractive
5. To create a commercially viable national oil company
6. To create strong and effective regulatory institutions
7. To promote Nigerian content and
8. To promote and protect health, safety and the environment
Three main regulatory and institutional changes are proposed as follows:
1. The unbundling of NNPC as presently constituted through the creation 
of a national oil company that promotes indigenous operational capacity 
development
2. The creation of an asset management limited liability company to manage 
the JV assets on behalf of the federation
3. The excision of the Nigerian Gas Company (NGC) from NNPC as a 
separate partially privatised entity to cater for domestic gas marketing 
and gas infrastructure development.
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In addition, the following policy objectives are expected from fiscal reforms 
proposed in the PIB:
1. To simplify the collection of government revenues,
2. To cream off windfall profits in the case of high oil prices
3. To collect more revenues from large profitable fields in the deep offshore 
waters, and
4. To create Nigerian employment and business opportunities by encourag-
ing investment in small oil and gas fields.
Lofty as some of these objectives may appear at face value, it has been a 
herculean task to enact the PIB since 2000 when mobilisations commenced 
and 2011 when it was formally presented to the National Assembly. There are 
concerns that covert disagreements by powerful forces, including IOCs, may 
have stalled progress of the PIB in the legislature. Criticisms of the PIB also 
suggest that not much change would materialise as the proposed reform is 
light on transparency and accountability mechanisms, sustainable funding 
mechanisms and industry autonomy provisions and contains controversial 
provision for host community benefits (see Sayne et al., 2012). There have 
also been concerns that some clauses of the PIB may lead to violation of 
existing contracts, retroactive applications and generally engender a situation 
where the responsibility crisis of the State worsens by relieving the State of its 
statutory responsibilities in securing social licence to operate and securing 
the sites of extraction (Okigbo, 2012).
As noted earlier, the delayed passage of the PIB has affected investment in 
both upstream and downstream sectors. This aggravated the damage to the 
sector which has been adversely affected by falling prices due to decreasing 
demand, increasing energy security in the US, which has historically been a 
major importer of Nigerian oil, and the challenges of human security in the 
Niger Delta. It is against this background that the NEITI Policy Brief made 
a clarion call that:
The PIB ship should be rescued from a start-stop, unhurried and unco-
ordinated mode and brought swiftly ashore. There is need for President 
Muhammadu Buhari to take the lead by investing his presidential capital 
on this all-important legislation, putting in place a mechanism for rallying 
the stakeholders to a consensus, and using this law as one of the pillars 
of the bridge to a much-needed economic recovery (NEITI, 2016, p.1).
However, such calls ignore the diverse stakeholders in the oil sector that 
have divergent interests in reforms. It even overlooks the possibility that 
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relinquishing control of state oil—which full-scale reform would require—is 
not in the interest of key political and industry actors, including the powerful 
labour aristocracy. There seems to be no end in sight as President Muhammadu 
Buhari eventually withheld assent to the Bill, signalling that the PIG Bill will 
return to the next National Assembly to be constituted after the 2019 General 
Elections.3 Thus, while the Nigeria oil sector is in dire need of reform to avoid 
collapse in view of maturing oil fields, declining investments and falling 
demand from longstanding customers (see Gupte, 2019), the prospects for 
reform in the oil sector remain precarious due to political economy factors. 
At the top political level, power flows from the barrel of oil. Control of oil and 
steady flow of revenues are vital to regime survival. Reform would require 
the easing of political control over oil. This is why reform is not attractive to 
incumbents. It is not only the top political actors that benefit from the status 
quo. Powerful IOCs reject elements of reform that would further erode profit 
margins without guaranteeing secure and hospitable operating environments. 
Labour unions in the sector reject reforms that would lead to privatisation 
and further liberalisation of the sector. The citizenry, accustomed to cheap 
fuel that they perceive to be their share of the national cake, reject reforms 
that would entail the removal of subsidies.
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Ghana’s Oil Governance Regime: 
Challenges and Policies
Peter Quartey and Emmanuel Abbey
15.1 Introduction
Managing the economic gains from oil production has been a major challenge 
for many African economies. This is because of the perceived weakness in the 
governance structure not only of the oil industry but also for some of these 
economies as a whole. Indeed, several examples exist of African economies 
that have not been able to develop as expected following their discovery of 
oil, notwithstanding the significant change in revenues afterwards—Nigeria, 
Cameron and Gabon. While several lessons and policy recommendations have 
been extensively suggested, especially for the more recent economies that are 
now discovering oil, there is still some level of scepticism as to whether their 
governance structures are robust enough to withstand the challenges associ-
ated with the oil industry. This is because of the very visible deterioration in 
the social and economic infrastructure of their other natural resource sectors 
(mostly mining), with worsening situations in some of the most prominent 
communities of these countries where these resources are extracted.
These concerns are not very different in the case of Ghana. Since the 
UK-Irish firm Tullow announced that it had discovered oil around the 
Cape Three Points off Ghana’s Western Region in June 2007, many have 
thought the economic woes of the country had come to an end because 
of the vast projected revenues. The significant high-end estimate of the 
expected revenue flow over the lifespan of the extraction process was seen 
as significant for the economic development of the country. Unfortunately, 
Ghana’s history with the extractive industries has been very contentious. 
Aside from concerns about the country’s inability to use revenues from the 
extractive sector to finance its development agenda properly, there is very 
visible deterioration in the social and economic infrastructure in some of the 
most prominent mining communities such as Obuasi and Prestea (Aryeetey, 
Osei and Quartey, 2016).
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Fortunately, the Government of Ghana had a set of rules governing the 
oil industry (i.e. the Petroleum Exploration and Production Law, 1984), 
following existing regulations for some earlier oil discoveries in the 1970s, 
although production actually took place in very limited quantities from the 
Saltpond Fields in the 1980s. In particular, production was estimated to be a 
mere 700 barrels per day. This system of rules was recently comprehensively 
restructured to be in line with international best practices and also to support 
the Government’s objective of providing an adequate and reliable supply 
of petroleum products and reduce the country’s dependence on crude oil 
imports, through the development of the country’s own petroleum resources. 
More recently new discoveries have been made, suggesting that the country 
even has commercial quantities of oil. Accordingly, the restructuring of the 
governance regime was supposed to deal with financial and environmental 
challenges that existed earlier on as well as to ensure local content and local 
participation in the oil industry.
This chapter presents an overview of the oil governance regime in Ghana. 
The objective is to review the existing regime and identify any policy chal-
lenges thereof. An attempt will also be made to tease out any relevant policy 
suggestions. More importantly, an attempt is made to identify the specific 
measures required to engender efficiency, transparency and accountability 
in the management of oil revenues as this underpins the governance regime 
of the most successful oil-rich countries. An understanding of Ghana’s oil 
governance regime is critical to ensuring that the new oil resource becomes a 
blessing to the country and not a curse, as experienced by some other African 
countries extracting oil. It will also serve as a useful guide to other countries 
that are on the path of making new petroleum discoveries.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some 
stylised facts about Ghana’s oil industry. Section 3 presents an overview of the 
governance regime. Section 4 elaborates on the challenges realised so far and 
what policy solutions have been offered. The last section offers some policy 
suggestions and the likely challenges with its restructured governance regime.
15.2 Background on Ghana’s Oil Industry
The oil industry in Ghana is not completely new, as production has been taking 
place since the 1980s, albeit on a limited scale (PIAC, 2011). Unfortunately, no 
official records are readily available to show revenue being paid into the country’s 
petroleum holding fund until the fiscal year 2010 (PIAC, 2011). Therefore, 
statistics about production volumes and receipts before 2010 are difficult to find.
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Currently, the major producing fields are the Jubilee field (which started 
production in November 2010), the Tweneboa-Enyenra-Ntomme (TEN, 
which started production in August 2016) and the Sankofa-Gye-Nyame 
(SGN, which started production in 2017). Conversely, there is the Saltpond 
Field, which has also been producing since the 1980s but on a very small scale. 
There are other major fields that are currently being developed, the major 
ones being the Deep Water Tano/Cape Three Points (DWT/CTP) Project, 
the Offshore Cape Three Points (OCTP) Project and the onshore (Voltaian) 
Basin project, which is the first oil exploration project in Ghana managed by 
the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation.
The major stakeholders in the oil fields of Ghana are Tullow, Kosmos, 
Anadarko, the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), Petro SA 
and ENI. For the Jubilee unit area, Tullow (the operator) owns 35.48 per 
cent, Kosmos owns 24.08 per cent, Anadarko owns 24.08 per cent, GNPC 
owns 13.64 per cent and Petro SA owns 2.73 per cent. For the TEN Develop-
ment area, Tullow (the operator) owns 47.18 per cent, Kosmos owns 17.0 per 
cent, Anadarko owns 17.0 per cent, GNPC owns 15.0 per cent and Petro SA 
owns 3.82 per cent. ENI currently operates the Sankofa-Gye-Nyame project 
and owns 44.44 per cent. For the Saltpond field the current operator is the 






















2010 1,181,088 1,181,088 0 - 1,181,088
2011 24,195,895 25,376,983 24,450,155 3,930,189 926,828 444,124,723
2012 26,351,278 51,728,261 26,430,934 4,931,034 847,172 541,071,323
2013 35,587,558 36,434,730 36,048,290 6,793,449 386,440 628,580,078
2014 37,201,691 37,588,131 36,988,315 7,681,120 599,816 691,991,133
2015 37,411,661 38,011,477 37,167,225 5,730,090 844,252 374,292,488
2016 32,298,638 33,142,890 30,765,005 5,856,921 2,377,885 207,787,586




Source: Republic of Ghana, Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC), PIAC Annual 
Reports (Various Issues). Available at: http://www.piacghana.org/portal/5/25/piac-reports.
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Saltpond Offshore Producing Company with GNPC owning a 45 per cent 
stake and Lushann-Eternit Energy Ltd owning 55 per cent.
Ghana’s total proven oil reserve base, as at the end of 2015, was assessed at 
1,247.5 million barrels of oil (MMBOE), comprising 898 million barrels of oil 
and 2,024 billion cubic feet of proven gas reserves (GNPC, 2016). Available 
production volumes are presented in Table 15.1. At least until 2017, production 
volumes have been increasing over time. It needs to be emphasised that 
production at the Saltpond field has remained completely shut down since 2015 
and awaiting decommissioning because of an ‘unresolved industrial issue with 
the offshore crew’ (PIAC, 2018). Table 15.2 presents the corresponding total 
annual petroleum receipts obtained between 2010 and 2017. The total annual 
petroleum receipts increased over time until 2014 when they subsequently 
declined. The highest petroleum receipts received so far were in 2014, after 
which there was a decrease in 2015 mainly because of the decline in the average 
achieved price of crude per barrel. Similarly, oil rents (i.e. the difference 
between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total costs of 
production) as a percentage of GDP have also been increasing (see Figure 15.1).
Most of the petroleum receipts have accrued from the carried and participat-
ing interest on crude (see Table 15.3). Over time, there have been significant dif-
ferences in the projected and the actual outturn of these revenue components 
because of the drastic changes in petroleum prices. The hardest hit in recent 
times is corporate income tax, thereby explaining its instability over time.
Table 15.2: Total Petroleum Receipts for Ghana












2011 3,930,189 113.08 444,124,723 - 444,124,724
2012 4,931,034 110.18 541,071,323 552,418 541,623,741
2013 6,793,449 106.95 628,580,078 218,187,106 846.767,184
2014 7,681,120 103.50 691,991,133 286,026,559 978,017,693
2015 5,730,090 52.36 374,292,488 21,880,422 396,172,909








Source: Republic of Ghana, Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC), PIAC Annual 
Reports (Various Issues). Available at: http://www.piacghana.org/portal/5/25/piac-reports.
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Table 15.4 below presents the allocation of the total petroleum receipts 
acquired by the Government of Ghana (GoG) between 2010 and 2017. This 
involves two major disbursements: a transfer to GNPC1 and a net receipt 
to the Government, with the latter further sub-distributed between the 
petroleum fund (i.e. the Ghana Heritage Fund and the Ghana Stabilisation 
1 The disbursement to GNPC is in respect of equity financing and a net carried and participating 
interest.
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Source: Data drawn from World Development Indicators, The World Bank, 2018. Available at: 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators















2011 72.49% 27.51% - - - - -
2012 72.08% 27.88% - - - - -
2013 53.57% 20.69% - 25.63% - - -
2014 51.01% 19.70% 0.18% 29.07% 0.01% 0.03% -
2015 68.17% 26.30% 0.12% 5.15% 0.01% 0.11% 0.14%
2016 60.66% 23.40% 0.19% 11.95% 0.03% - 3.76%
2017 67.62% 25.14% 0.29% 6.84% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00%
Source: Republic of Ghana, Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC), PIAC Annual 
Reports (Various Issues). Available at: http://www.piacghana.org/portal/5/25/piac-reports.
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Fund) and the Consolidated Fund to support the annual budget (Annual 
Budget Funding Amount – ABFA). The guidelines for the disbursements 
are contained in the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815), 
which was later amended in 2015 as the Petroleum Revenue Management 
(Amendment) Act, 2015 (Act 893). In particular Act 893 stipulates that not 
more than 70 per cent of the annual benchmark revenue2 shall be paid to 
the Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA) and not less than 30 per cent 
of the benchmark revenue shall be paid into the Ghana Petroleum Funds 
(GPFs). As at the end of 2017, the total accumulated petroleum receipts by the 
Government of Ghana were US$ 3.994 billion, out of which 44 per cent was 
transferred to the ABFA, 30 per cent to GNPC and 26 per cent to the GPFs.
Exploration activities suffered a major setback in 2014 following an interim 
ruling of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) regarding 
a national border dispute between Ghana and Ivory Coast (PIAC, 2015). The 
two countries have not been able to agree upon the location of their maritime 
boundary, with Ivory Coast requesting Ghana to suspend all oil exploration 
and exploitation activities in the disputed zone, which includes the TEN 
project. The case got to the ITLOS after ten failed negotiation attempts. 
2 Benchmark revenue = expected current receipts from crude oil + expected current receipts 
from gas + expected dividends from a national oil company + corporate income tax + surface 
rentals + any other revenue identified in the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (section C).
Table 15.4: Allocation of Total Petroleum Receipts by the Government of 
Ghana (Mill. US$)
Year GNPC ABFA GSF GHF
2011 207.96 166.96 54.81 14.4
2012 230.95 286.55 16.88 7.34
2013 222.32 273,20 245.73 105.31
2014 180.71 409.07 271.76 116.47
2015 126,86 292.98 15.17 6.5
2016 88.6 98.38 29.51 12.65
2017 182.04 169.46 142.68 61.15
Note: Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), Annual Budget Funding Amount (ABFA), 
Ghana Sovereignty Fund (GSF), Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF). 
Source: Republic of Ghana, Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC), PIAC Annual 
Reports (Various Issues). Available at: http://www.piacghana.org/portal/5/25/piac-reports.
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The interim ruling placed a moratorium on new exploration and drilling 
activities in the disputed areas. This affected the drilling of new wells in the 
TEN project as well as other blocks that fall within the disputed area, but 
not ongoing works. This was expected to affect the volumes of production 
from the TEN project.
The ruling in respect of the Ghana–Cote d’Ivoire maritime boundary 
dispute by the ITLOS was delivered on 23 September 2017 and was in Ghana’s 
favour (PIAC, 2017). ITLOS ruled that there has not been any violation 
by Ghana of La Cote d’Ivoire’s maritime boundary (PIAC, 2017). This has 
de-risked the uncertainty of the area and has led to the intensification of 
exploration by upstream petroleum companies in the previously contested 
area (PIAC, 2017).
15.3 Oil Governance Regimes
Oil governance regimes have a history. This history hinges on who the 
dominant players are and the power they exercise in terms of the set of rules 
guiding the industry. Mommer (2000) provides a useful review of the history 
of how these dominant players have changed over time. He asserts that 
before the First World War, private oil companies (which constituted the 
International Petroleum Cartel) established the first notable oil governance 
regime. These companies rented oil fields and paid a reservation cost to the 
landlords; accordingly, rules were formulated to guide the process, given this 
structure. However, as oil became an important asset immediately after the 
Second World War and when the power of the imperial countries over the 
Third World began to weaken, oil-exporting countries (which were mainly the 
imperial countries) started gaining control over their own oil fields (Mommer, 
2000). This led to the introduction of a second oil governance regime, as these 
oil-exporting countries formed their own cartel, OPEC. Unfortunately, for 
many oil-consuming nations OPEC was a threat to the pricing of oil products 
(Mommer, 2000). Therefore, to ensure the security of supply and reasonable 
pricing, a third governance regime emerged from oil-consuming nations 
through the creation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) (Mommer, 
2000). This basically has been the way oil governance regimes were established 
and the dominant role was played by the different actors.
More recently, and especially for many developing countries extracting 
oil, and given the opacity and perceived widespread corruption along the 
value chain of other natural resource extractions, the governance framework 
underpinning the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is 
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mostly relied upon. The initiative is a global effort to end the culture of opacity 
in the generation and use of extractive revenues and to ensure that resource 
extraction contributes to national development and poverty reduction. This 
framework encourages public disclosure of company payments and govern-
ment receipts of extractive revenues as well as the demand for accountability 
in terms of how the revenues are used. The framework also requires countries 
publicly to disclose information on revenue management and expenditures, 
information on contracts and licences as well as the establishment of a legally 
mandated open contracting regime. This framework is supported by the 
Natural Resources Charter, which is organised around 12 core precepts 
offering guidance on key decisions governments face, beginning with whether 
or not to extract resources and ending with how generated revenues can 
produce maximum good for citizens.
For many African countries, there is the African Mining Vision (AMV),3 
which imposes an obligation on all African Union member States to align 
their governance arrangements and approaches to the management of their 
natural resources to a set of prescribed principles in line with international 
best practices as well as to the lessons drawn from the continent’s century-old 
experience in mining. This focus affords the natural-resource-dependent 
African States the opportunity to integrate their natural resources into the 
rest of the national economy, and through that make a critical and sustainable 
paradigm shift from the enclave nature of resource extraction.
For the specific case of Ghana, the oil governance regime is a hybrid version; 
the people and government of Ghana own the oil, while international oil 
companies are doing the extraction, based on an agreement ratified in the 
Constitution of Ghana. Critical requirements from the EITI as well as the 
AMV have been complied with. Accordingly, the governance regime that 
guides the entire process focuses on two sub-sectors: the upstream and the 
downstream. The upstream sub-sector ensures the effective management of oil 
resources of the country and accelerates the exploitation and development of 
new hydrocarbon resources for the overall benefit and welfare of Ghanaians, 
present and future. The downstream sub-sector is to rehabilitate and expand 
petroleum refining, storage, distribution and marketing infrastructure as well 
as ensure fair distribution of petroleum products to all parts of the country 
and reduce the heavy burden of oil imports on the country’s economy by 
accelerating the exploitation of indigenous hydrocarbon resources.
3 The Africa Mining Vision was adopted by Heads of State at the February 2009 AU summit 
following the October 2008 meeting of African Ministers responsible for Mineral Resources 
Development.
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In Ghana, the key institution responsible for the upstream sub-sector 
is the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC); meanwhile, the 
National Petroleum Authority (NPA) regulates the downstream sub-sector. 
The following laws regulate the upstream oil sub-sector:
– Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Law, 1983 (PNDCL 64)
– Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016
 [previously, the Petroleum Exploration and Production Law, 1984 (PNDC 
Law 84)]
– Income Tax Act, 2015 (Act 896)
 [previously, the Internal Revenue Act, 2000 (Act 592)]
– The Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815).
– The Petroleum Commission Acts, 2011 (Act 821)
– Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) Regulations, 2013 
(LI2204)
– The Petroleum Agreements.
The Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Law, 1983 (PNDCL 64) 
established GNPC as the national oil company of the upstream oil and gas 
industry. It gives GNPC the right to the development of the oil sector, oil 
exploration and production. The law sets out the functions, administration 
and corporate governance of the GNPC. The Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Act, 2016, replaced the Petroleum Exploration and Production 
Law, 1984 (PNDC Law 84). It contains provisions related to petroleum 
activities within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Ghana, including activities 
in, under and upon its territorial land, inland waters, territorial sea, exclusive 
economic zone and its continental shelf. The Act aims to provide for and 
ensure safe, secure, sustainable and efficient petroleum activities in order 
to achieve optimal long-term petroleum resource exploitation and utilisa-
tion for the benefit and welfare of the people of Ghana. The law makes all 
petroleum resources existing within the country’s jurisdiction the property 
of the Republic of Ghana, which must be managed in accordance with the 
principles of good governance, including transparency and accountability. 
Broadly, the law caters for issues regarding area management, the provision of 
a reconnaissance licence, defines a petroleum agreement and has provisions 
regarding the exploration, development and production, transportation 
and storage, cessation, decommissioning and removal of facilities after 
the extraction. It also has provisions on health and safety, security and the 
environment as well as general requirements for petroleum activities in 
Ghana.
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The Income Tax Act, 2015 (Act 896), previously the Internal Revenue Act, 
2000 (Act 592), provides details of income and withholding taxes levied at 
the upstream stage of oil and gas operations. This law replaces any other law, 
including the Petroleum Income Tax Law, (1987), to the extent that provisions 
in those laws are inconsistent with provisions in this new Act. The Act also 
establishes activities in the petroleum industry as a special industry with the 
various tax elements defined in the Petroleum Agreement.
The Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) provides the 
framework for the collection, allocation and management of petroleum 
revenue derived from upstream and midstream petroleum operations.4 The 
Act establishes the Petroleum Holding Fund as the designated public fund 
at the Bank of Ghana to receive and disburse petroleum revenue due to the 
Republic, and these funds are to be transferred into the Ghana Petroleum 
Fund (a collection of the Ghana Stabilisation Fund and the Ghana Heritage 
Fund). The object of the stabilisation fund is to cushion the impact on or 
sustain public expenditure capacity during periods of unanticipated petroleum 
revenue shortfalls. The object of the Ghana Heritage Fund is to provide an 
endowment to support the development for future generations when the 
petroleum reserves have been depleted. Receipts into the Petroleum Holding 
Fund come from the following:
a) royalties from oil and gas, additional oil entitlements, surface rentals, 
other receipts from any petroleum operations and the sale or export of 
petroleum;
b) any amount from direct or indirect participation of government in 
petroleum operations;
c) corporate income taxes in cash from upstream and midstream petroleum 
companies;
d) any amount payable by the national oil company as corporate income 
tax, royalty, dividends, or any other amount due in accordance with the 
laws of Ghana; and
e) any amount received by the Government directly or indirectly from 
petroleum resources not covered by paragraphs (a) to (d), including 
where applicable capital gains tax derived from the sale of ownership of 
exploration, development and production rights.
4 Mid-stream operations are activities between the wellhead and refinery, transportation and 
storage. For instance, the activities of Ghana Gas constitute a mid-stream activity; they process 
natural gas liquids.
ghana’s Oil gOvernanCe regime: Challenges anD POliCies 341
The Petroleum Revenue Management Act also establishes two key institu-
tions: the Investment Advisory Committee (IAC) and the Public Interest and 
Accountability Committee (PIAC). While IAC advises on the management 
of the Ghana Petroleum Fund, PIAC ensures compliance with the Revenue 
Management Act while providing a platform for the public to debate whether 
spending prospects and management of revenues conform to development 
priorities as provided for in the Revenue Management Act.
Recently, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) was 
amended as the Petroleum Revenue Management (Amendment) Act, 2015 
(Act 893). The Act provides for the allocation of some petroleum receipts to 
the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund for the purposes of infrastructure 
development. The Act also makes provision for the composition of the Invest-
ment Advisory Committee and related matters as well as other amendments 
to revenue allocation.
The Petroleum Commissions Act, 2011 (Act 821), establishes the Petroleum 
Commission as the body to regulate and manage the utilisation of petroleum 
products and coordinate policies in relation to them. The Commission is also 
tasked to ensure compliance with health, safety and environmental standards 
in petroleum activities in accordance with applicable laws, regulations and 
agreements set forth by the Republic of Ghana. In addition, the Commission 
is to promote local content and local participation in petroleum activities as 
prescribed in the Local Content and Local Participation Regulations. The 
Commission, therefore, receives and stores petroleum data as well as managing 
the national petroleum repository upon request from the relevant Minister.
The Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) Regulations, 2013 
(LI2204), were established to, amongst other things, promote the maximisa-
tion of value-addition and job creation for Ghanaians, develop local capacity, 
achieve a minimum local employment level and increase the capability and 
international competitiveness of domestic firms. It also seeks to create 
petroleum and related supportive industries and ensure Ghanaians have a 
degree of control over development initiatives. The law requires international 
companies to submit a local content plan, an employment and training sub-
plan and succession plan, a programme for research and development as well 
as a technology transfer programme and report. In addition, the law requires 
international companies to provide their local insurance services content, 
legal services content, financial services content as well as data on the above 
issues to ensure monitoring, compliance and enforcement.
The Petroleum Agreement defines the duration of an exploration and 
extraction contract, the delineated area where the petroleum operations are 
to be carried out as well as possible sanctions and levies on production to 
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be paid to the Government. The applicable taxes as specified in the model 
petroleum agreements are as follows:
a) Royalty – 10 per cent
b) GNPC Initial Interest (Carried) – 10 per cent
c) GNPC Additional Interest (Paying) – 15 per cent
d) Petroleum Income tax – 35 per cent
e) Surface Rental – US$ 30/sq.km/year (Initial Exploration phase)
In addition, the Government of Ghana is signatory to the following interna-
tional conventions that respectively define the rights and responsibilities of 
nations with respect to their use of the world’s oceans, establish measures for 
dealing with pollution and for cooperation in the protection, management and 
development of the marine and coastal environment in the Atlantic Ocean:
– United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
– International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Co-operation (OPRC)
– Abidjan Convention (The Convention for the Co-operation in the Protec-
tion and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the 
West and Central African Region)
Though the GNPC is the key institution responsible for the upstream oil 
industry, the following institutions also play an important role: the Ministry of 
Energy and Petroleum, the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Ghana, the Parlia-
ment of Ghana, the Petroleum Commission, the Environmental Protection 
Agency, the State Enterprise Commission, the Public Interest Accountability 
Committee, the Auditor General and Ghana Gas. For instance, the Minister 
of Petroleum, in consultation with the Petroleum Commission, prepares a 
reference map showing areas of possible accumulation of petroleum within 
the jurisdiction of Ghana. The Minister of Finance monitors oil revenues that 
accrue to the State and estimates the benchmark revenue as provided for by 
law. The Bank of Ghana manages the petroleum account while the Ghana 
Revenue Authority accounts for the petroleum revenues. Lastly, Parliament 
ratifies all petroleum agreements.
The main law that regulates the downstream oil sub-sector is the National 
Petroleum Act, 2005 (Act 691).5 This Act establishes the National Petroleum 
Authority as a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal, 
and may sue or be sued in its corporate name. The object of the Authority 
is to regulate, oversee and monitor activities in the petroleum downstream 
5 This law is under review – National Petroleum Authority (Amendment) Bill, 2015.
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industry and, where applicable, do so in pursuance of the prescribed petro-
leum pricing formula. The Authority, therefore, monitors the ceiling on the 
price of petroleum products, grants licences, maintains a register of licences 
granted and overall monitors standards or performance. The Authority also 
specifies the powers and functions of petroleum service providers, ensures 
that the downstream oil sector is liberalised, acts against the formulation of 
monopolies, receives complaints in the downstream sub-sector and settles 
disputes that may arise. The establishments operating in this downstream 
oil sub-sector are the Tema Oil Refinery (TOR), the Bulk Oil Storage and 
Transportation Company Limited (BOST), bulk storage depots and other 
service providers.
Particularly for the upstream oil sub-sector, the structure of Ghana’s oil 
governance is similar to the Norwegian model—an administrative design that 
separates commercial functions from policy and regulatory functions. Ghana 
has a national oil company that engages in commercial operation (GNPC), 
a government ministry that directs policy (Ministry of Petroleum) and a 
regulatory body to provide oversight (PIAC). Regarding revenue manage-
ment, the Norwegian model has a savings and a stabilisation fund; similarly, 
Ghana has a petroleum fund, which comprises a stabilisation and a heritage 
account. More importantly, regulations have been introduced to deal with 
inefficiencies that may be peculiar to the country, which may be absent from 
the more effective administrative regimes in Norway. One such action is the 
role played by PIAC.
Although the Norwegian model is by far the most recommended for many 
developing countries because of its reliance on separated functions, the 
development literature cautions in a general sense that governance strategies 
that work well in countries with mature institutions may be ill-suited to 
countries lacking certain institutions’ endowments (see, for instance, Rodrik, 
2008 and Moore and Putzel, 1999). Those who issue these cautions are quick 
to mention the examples of countries like Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Angola 
that have performed creditably well in the absence of separated functions. 
Yet, Ghana’s choice of the Norwegian model seems to depend heavily on its 
institutional and democratic development. Ghana’s democracy is one that 
involves the separation of powers into different branches of government 
guided by a codified constitution.
One important milestone that has characterised Ghana’s oil governance 
so far is the galvanised collective action of the civil society. Working together 
with the media and Parliament, civil society has played an influential role 
in the development of key legal and institutional frameworks for managing 
Ghana’s oil (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012). For instance, immediately 
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Ghana began oil production in 2010, the country had no revenue-management 
law and no independent regulator. Several civil society groups called for a 
moratorium on the issue of new exploration licences until a new legal and 
regulatory regime was developed. Although the call was not entirely suc-
cessful, it later led to the introduction of transparency in the management 
of oil revenues, with support from some Members of Parliament and some 
international organisations. These actions by the civil societies made the 
government realise that people were determined to participate in and to 
monitor the development of an appropriate policy and legal framework for 
the sector.
15.4 Challenges with Ghana’s Oil Governance Regime
The oil governance regime in Ghana has had some challenges since production 
began in 2010. A few of the main challenges are summarised in the following 
paragraphs. When Ghana began its major oil operations in 2010, the country 
did not immediately have a comprehensive set of instructions for the oil 
industry. Most parts of the robust regulatory regime were established later. For 
instance, in 2010 the country did not have comprehensive provisions regarding 
the use of local content or the employment of locals by the international 
companies. A few guidelines existed in the previous Petroleum Exploration 
and Production Law, 1984 (PNDC Law 84). Yet, local community content 
was conspicuously absent.6 This received criticism from communities very 
close to the oil field such as the Western Regional House of Chief. These 
communities were the first to experience the negative social and economic 
impact of extraction. In addition are other outstanding legal instruments 
such as regulations to the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, regulations 
to the new Exploration and Production Law, metering regulations as well as 
the Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment of the Volta Basin.
Aside from the incomplete governance framework is the poor sequencing 
of the entire governance framework, the anomaly of passing the Petroleum 
Revenue Management Act ahead of the Petroleum (Exploration and Produc-
tion) Law. This is accompanied by a weak institutional collaboration which 
manifests itself in weak geological data-gathering, poor revenue collection 
as well as a lack of proper integration of the oil and gas sector into the rest 
of the economy.
6 Even though there are plans for such communities to benefit from corporate social responsibili-
ties such as the retooling of bad roads and the improvement of social infrastructure.
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Regarding revenue management, the 2015 Annual Report of PIAC cited 
some worrying instances of mismanagement. For instance, there were con-
cerns about some extraction companies failing to pay their surface rentals. 
There were also concerns about the Government abusing petroleum revenues 
through many social intervention projects and, worst of all, not being trans-
parent with the process of choosing them. In addition, the Government 
was cautioned to desist from spending more than the required budgetary 
allocation from oil revenues and ensure that the required parliamentary 
approval of revenue receipts to fund governmental projects were strictly 
adhered to. Furthermore, the committee expressed worry about the non-use 
of the funds for capacity building and recommended that a sizeable proportion 
of the petroleum revenues be channelled into the agricultural sector to boost 
productivity, giving its strategic importance to the people of the Republic 
of Ghana. Several recommendations have been made by PIAC to address 
these shortcomings, though there are still some instances of non-compliance.
Another challenge with Ghana’s governance regime is the non-compliance 
with some key provisions in the country’s legislative instruments for the oil 
sector. For instance, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act prescribes 
that all revenue reporting agencies must apply the same reporting standards. 
Yet, a report by the Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(GHEITI) suggested that there was no standard format for reporting crude oil 
lifting for the year 2014 (GHEITI, 2015). Conversely, the Petroleum Revenue 
Management Act, 2011 (Act 815) entreats the Investment Advisory Committee 
to provide a benchmark on the returns from oil revenues; at least, for the year 
2015 no such benchmark existed. There were also huge discrepancies in amounts 
stated for royalty, carried interest and participating interests. Lastly, there are 
concerns about the lack of transparency in the issue of licences to organisations 
interested in the exploration process as well as some oil companies not comply-
ing with the country’s local content laws. The new Petroleum (Exploration 
and Production) Act, 2016 addresses some of these concerns.
In addition, there were some obstacles to ensuring full transparency regard-
ing information reporting about the oil industry. For instance, the Petroleum 
Commission is required to have an online repository where information such 
as ownership of blocks, coordinates of oil blocks, allocation of blocks as well as 
annual payments is supposed to be reported. Currently, this online repository 
does not exist. However, some steps have been taken to address these concerns, 
and this includes the Petroleum Commission’s commencement of activities 
to establish the online repository. In other perspectives, information about 
the issue of licences as well as the entire process of bidding for a licence is 
currently being made public.
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There are also concerns about the effects of the oil industry on the type of 
political governance existing in Ghana. Some policy analysts fear that the oil 
industry will only worsen the already dysfunctional nature of contemporary 
Ghanaian politics and political culture, which is already described as factional, 
venomous and acrimonious (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012).7 Within the 
limits established by the Constitution of Ghana, the party in power controls 
the Presidency and Parliament as well as making appointments to key min-
istries, departments and even agencies that are supposed to be independent 
by law. A typical example is the President appointing the executive directors 
and board of the Economic and Organised Crime Office—an institution that 
has the authority to investigate crimes involving financial loss to the State. A 
comparable institution, the Commission of Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice (CHRAG), which has the constitutional and statutory mandate to 
investigate corruption, abuse of office and human rights violation, has been 
rendered ineffective because of inadequate resources. Accordingly, issues of 
conflict of interest and self-dealing are routine amongst public officeholders.
Finally, there are concerns about non-compliance with key recommenda-
tions coming from bodies that are mandated to regulate the oil industry. The 
Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (GHEITI) list several 
such recommendations that are still outstanding, with a few where no detailed 
information exists on their progress (GHEITI, 2015). It is important to men-
tion that most of these recommendations are directed towards improvement 
in revenue management, as well as the introduction of transparency into the 
activities of the oil industry.
The major attempts made to address some of the above challenges can be 
found in the new Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 2016 as well as 
in some of the existing laws. For instance, in the new Petroleum Act there is a 
local content law that addresses challenges regarding the use of local content 
and as well as the employment and training of locals for the oil sector; in 
addition, the law requires certain minimum equity for companies applying 
for a licence and compliance with the Insurance Act, 2006 (Act 724). There 
is also a commitment to open contracting; a committee was established to 
develop regulation in the Petroleum Revenue and Management Act; there 
was the establishment of an infrastructure development fund to support 
investments in infrastructure; there was the development of a national oil spill 
contingency; the Companies Act of 1963 was amended to provide for beneficial 
ownership; and the development of separate guidelines for the conduct of 
environmental and social impact assessment. The Revenue Management Law 
7 This is because of the gaps in the legislative and institutional framework of the country.
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also makes clear provision as to how petroleum receipts are to be disbursed 
and /or utilised. The new Petroleum Law further consolidates concerns about 
finance and the protection of the environment.
15.5 Conclusion and Policy Suggestions
Even though some steps have been taken to deal with the challenges identified 
in the previous section, there are still a few steps that need to be taken to 
ensure that oil does not become a curse to the country, but rather a blessing. 
Many policy analysts still worry about the local content law and the ability 
of local content to meet its requirements. There are also concerns about 
revenue mismanagement, giving the gaps in the legislative and institutional 
framework of the country. In addition, there are concerns about the lack of 
transparency in the industry. In that regard, the following policy suggestions 
are offered to deal with these likely challenges.
First, there is the need to use oil revenues consciously to develop an auxiliary 
industry since oil is a non-renewable resource, and sooner or later it will be 
effectively depleted. Ghana already has this policy direction and attempts are 
being made to modernise the agriculture sector including the recent Planting 
for Food and Jobs Programmes. Accordingly, steps have been taken to ensure 
that budgetary allocations from the petroleum fund are indeed channelled to 
the relevant sub-sector. For instance, PIAC has urged the Ministry of Finance 
to ensure that the allocated budget is disbursed and used to support interven-
tions in agricultural mechanisation and post-harvest losses technologies. 
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive guideline specifying any timelines 
as to when and how the country wants the agriculture sector to be modernised 
with proceeds from the oil revenues. More importantly, the agriculture sector 
has several important links with other key sectors of the economy, such as the 
manufacturing sector, and attempts should be made to strengthen these links.
Second, there should be further consolidation of the democratic governance 
system in Ghana since the ways in which political traditions are organised 
have a very strong influence on the extent to which the oil industry can also be 
effectively managed. This can be begun by the relegation of some powers given 
to the President to make appointments to the executive boards of institutions 
that are supposed to serve as checks on democratic governance. In addition, 
some opinion leaders have expressed concern about the President appointing 
chief executives for all the different districts in Ghana. They hold the view 
that such appointments should be made through a democratic system where 
people vote for such positions. We see this as key to ensuring that Ghanaians 
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own their development process. Another area where democratic governance 
could be consolidated is the Government’s commitment to passing the Right 
to Information Bill to increase transparency.
Third, to make Ghanaians feel a sense of ownership in the oil industry, 
an attempt should be made to adopt more cautious, transparent and flexible 
budgeting and transfer part of the incomes from the oil revenues directly to 
all Ghanaians during boom periods to reduce pressure for explosive spending 
followed by lock-in and fiscal crises during downturns. The transfer can take 
the form of utility subsidies. This is a policy suggestion offered by Sala-i-Martin 
and Subramanian (2012) for Nigeria; they argued that the solution prevails 
over the status quo of corruption and waste. Popularly known as the Alaska-
style system, Palley (2014) also made a similar suggestion for Iraq, arguing 
that this will facilitate the political and economic reform of the country by 
building citizen ownership and engagement. We make a similar suggestion for 
Ghana and argue that such a process will increase individual and community 
participation in governance, and this will reduce the incentives for conflicts. 
Conflicts related to oil occur because of the politicisation in ways that make 
the control of oil resources the exclusive preserve of a few to the exclusion 
of the others. More importantly, such a system empowers civil societies 
effectively to serve as a check on the government as they will be having a large 
constituency interested in their activities. In the end, the quality of public 
institutions will be improved. Even though such a mechanism of transfer 
would be difficult to implement, given the context of Ghana where most 
people have no personal bank account. An alternative possibility, as suggested 
by Eifert et al. (2003), would be to use a transparent system of transferring 
the funds to communities, schools or local leaders.
Lastly, the country must implement prototypes of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention and the UK’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. For 
instance, the Anti-Bribery Convention is a central international mechanism 
that many advanced countries have developed to prosecute payments from 
multinational investors to public officials in developing countries (see, for 
instance, Moran, 2006). On the other hand, the UK’s Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative contains provisions that enhance transparency in 
the management of resource revenues (see Haaufler, 2010). While Ghana 
has institutions such as the EITI, tasked with some of these issues, they are 
poorly resourced and there are weaknesses in their legal frameworks. For 
instance, Ghana has an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and 
its legal support comes from the Mining Law. The country, therefore, needs 
to review the law and make it relevant to the oil industry as well as identify 
obstacles to the institution and possibly codify and institutionalise its actions.
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Opinions about the possible impact of oil exploration and production in 
Sub-Saharan Africa differ sharply. Some policy makers and academics see 
oil as a blessing for Africa, because oil revenues could be used to finance 
social and physical infrastructures that many African countries have been 
unable to undertake for a long time. Public infrastructure facilities, such 
as health and education systems, transport and communication networks, 
and research centres, are hard to build because of the lumpy nature of the 
investment that must be undertaken to construct them. Thus, the prospect 
of substantial oil revenues leads to higher welfare expectations in policy 
circles and local communities. Other policy makers and academics are more 
sceptical of the benefits that oil exploitation is likely to bring. Indeed, some of 
them see natural resources as a curse or a potential disease, because of their 
strong association with conflicts precipitated by groups that want to possess 
oil reserves exclusively for their selfish goals. In between a blessing and a 
curse exists a spectrum of viewpoints, one of which is that the oil resource 
itself is welfare-neutral. That is, it has no inherent potential to enhance or 
harm social welfare or the performance of an economy. Thus, any welfare 
or efficiency consequence of an oil resource depends on how it is extracted, 
managed, shared, and how its proceeds are deployed.
The view that oil is a curse is a description of society’s complete failure in 
the management of oil, while the blessing perspective is a description of the 
polar case of success. The chapter argues that the kinds of welfare outcomes 
and economy-wide effects that are associated with oil critically depend on 
governance regimes that society designs and implements to get oil out of 
the ground, to use it to satisfy immediate population needs, to sustain its 
benefits for the future generations, and to improve the livelihoods of local 
communities. A governance regime to address these issues is proposed, 
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based primarily on a review of a limited number of papers on oil and gas 
governance. The framework is used to point out what can be done to avoid 
the oil curse and to enhance the social and economic benefits associated 
with oil discoveries. The chapter examines all these issues with reference to 
Kenya, a country where oil exploration is in full swing.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews 
the literature on the oil governance framework, with a focus on the Kenyan 
regime. Section 3 discusses challenges that might arise in applying the 
framework once the country starts producing oil on a commercial scale. 
Attention here is given to the adequacy of the legal and regulatory mechanisms 
(derived from the Constitution) in restraining rent-seeking and in averting 
ethnic conflicts that can be precipitated by disagreements in the sharing 
of oil benefits. Section 4 deals with optimal oil management policies and 
Section 5 concludes the chapter.
16.2 Natural Resources Exploration and Exploitation 
in Kenya
The extractives sector in Kenya (including the oil and gas industry) contributes 
only about 1 per cent to the country’s gross domestic product (Institute of 
Economic Affairs, 2015). However, the economic and social roles of the sector 
have been changed by the recent discovery of oil. Although oil explora-
tion started in Kenya in the 1950s, it was not until March 2012 that oil was 
discovered in Turkana by a UK firm, Tullow Oil plc. Even though the proven 
oil reserve is small, amounting roughly to 600 million barrels, there are good 
prospects for more discoveries. Since Turkana is within the proximity of the 
Ugandan region that is known to have considerably much larger reserves, 
there is reason to hope that large commercial reserves will be found in Kenya 
in the near future. Oil and gas explorations are also proceeding apace in the 
coastal region. Figure 16.1 shows the Kenyan region with oil and other areas 
with potential for more oil discoveries.
Figure 16.1 shows that the small quantities of oil and gas that have been 
discovered are in the northern part of the country, an arid and semi-arid 
region, occupied mainly by populations that depend on livestock and 
semi-sedentary activities for their livelihoods. However, as is also shown 
in that figure, the country has great potential for oil and gas discoveries. 
As is shown by the onshore and offshore exploration blocks, expectations 
of finding additional oil and gas reserves in Kenya are very high. Thus, 
despite the relatively small oil quantities ascertained, the policy makers 
kenya’s Oil gOvernanCe regime: Challenges anD POliCies 353
in Kenya have already begun developing a framework for governing its 
extraction and use.
Kenya’s oil governance regime is contained in the new (August 2010) 
Constitution. The Constitution sets out, inter alia, the general principles to 
guide Kenyan citizens and other economic agents in pursuit of their private 
and social objectives. The principles related to natural resources and public 
affairs ensure:
– fair land tenure and efficient land use;
– environmental preservation and protection;
– citizen participation in the management of natural assets;
– fair benefit-sharing from natural resources and associated fiscal revenues;
– transparency in the management of public services and assets;
– access to information of a public nature.

















































Source: Institute of Economic Affairs (2014, p. 2).
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The above principles were exercised by the Kenyan Parliament in 2013 
(under the new Constitution) to enact a law establishing the mechanism 
for implementing Vision 2030, which inter alia states that ‘oil development is 
for the benefit of the people with priority to be given to local communities’. 
The Parliament spelt out the principles specific to the governance of oil and 
gas in a number of policies and laws, e.g., the National Energy Policy, the 
Energy Bill and the Natural Resources (County Royalties) Bill. The new 
Parliament further updated the legislation governing the management and 
regulation of the biophysical environment and socioeconomic conditions 
in relation to the exploitation of oil and gas. The legislation amended the 
Environmental Management and Coordination Act, the Wildlife Policy and 
the Wildlife Protection Act, the Draft Wetlands Policy, the Land Act and 
the Land Registration Act, and the Community Land Bill. It is important to 
note that Kenya’s oil governance framework is a component of the country’s 
national governance framework as specified in the Constitution.
Figure 16.2 shows the interaction between Kenya’s oil governance set-up 
and the national governance framework as specified in the Constitution. As 
can be seen from this Figure, the overarching structure for oil governance 
in Kenya, as in Uganda and in many other countries (Alba, 2009), is the 
national Constitution. The core of the oil governance framework is a set of 
oil-related policies and legislations. In Kenya, as in many other countries, 
oil governance is part of a broader national development framework. In the 
case of Kenya, the national development plan is Vision 2030—the country’s 
long-term blueprint for economic, social and political prosperity. The first 
panel in Figure 16.2 shows the social institutions in which the natural resource 
governance framework is anchored, namely, the legal system derived from 
the Constitution. The second panel depicts the legislations specific to the 
governance of oil and gas. The next panels indicate laws that protect the envi-
ronment and livelihoods in the process of exploiting natural resources more 
generally. Taken together, the policies and legislation shown in Figure 16.2 
constitute the formal rules designed to govern the exploitation and use of oil 
in Kenya. Moreover, in addition to the formal rules and their enforcement, 
the oil sector is governed by numerous informal institutions, such as the local 
land use practices; the people’s beliefs about the enforceability, duration and 
durability of exploration contracts; the established relationships between oil 
companies and local communities; and the norms for side payments made 
to obtain business licences.
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Country Government Act (2012)
National Policy for the SD [of…] Arid Lands
Access to Information Bill (2013)
Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill 2013
Public Benefit Organisation (PBO) Act, 2013
National Energy Policy (2014)
Petroleum Exploration and Production Act (1986)
Energy Act (2006)
Energy Bill (2014)
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act (1986)
Mining Bill (2014)
Natural Resources (Counties Royalties) Bill 2013
Petroleum Master Plan (PMP) (in dev.)
Environmental Mgt and Coordination Act (1999) and (2013)
EIA and Audit Regulations (EIAAR) (2003)
Draft EMCA (Deposit Bonds) Regulations (2014)
Wildlife Policy (2013)
Wildlife Conservation and Management Act (2013)
Land Act of 2012






EMCA (Waste management) Regulations (2006)
EMCA (Noise […]) Control Regulations of 2009
EMCA (Air Quality Standards) Regulations of 2007
Land Act (2012)
National Land Commission Act 2012
Land Registration Act of 2012
Community Land Bill (2013)
[…] Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons […] Act (2012)
Bill of Rights
Private Security Bill (2014)


















Source: Golombok and Jones (2015, p. 35).
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It should be noted that Figure 16.2 is limited mainly to legal aspects of the 
oil and natural gas governance. In particular, other important governance 
issues, such as the procedures for awarding oil exploration and exploitation 
contracts; the mechanisms for monitoring exploration and production activi-
ties; methods of collecting and sharing oil taxes and royalties; the principles 
for investing the oil revenues for sustainable development are not included 
in this framework. However, these issues are also critical for the effective 
management of a country’s oil resources and for averting the ‘curses’ and 
conflicts associated with the exploitation of natural resources. Alba (2009) 
extends the oil governance framework in Figure 16.2 in a way that addresses 
some of the above concerns. Alba’s framework recognises the volatility, 
uncertainty and exhaustibility of oil revenue, and the technical complexities 
associated with oil extraction, processing and marketing.
The main contribution of Alba’s paper to the analysis of the oil sector is the 
incorporation of local capacity building in an oil governance framework to 
ensure that professionals and entrepreneurs of host countries are equipped 
with the skills necessary to manage oil industries effectively, and to invest the 
oil revenue in ways that take into account the welfare of future generations and 
also recognise the fact that oil is an exhaustible resource. Further, Alba argues 
for transparency in the awarding of oil contracts to foreign and domestic firms 
alike, and in the allocation of oil revenue among communities and between 
central and local governments to avoid corruption—the root cause of social 
inequalities and ethnic conflicts (KIPPRA, 2011). Alba (2009, p.6) describes 
best practices in the award of contracts and licences as follows:
– The sector law and regulations should define the legal and institutional 
framework for the exploration and exploitation of a country’s hydrocarbon 
and mineral resources.
– The role of state companies should be defined in the sector law, ideally 
separating commercial activities from the State’s regulatory functions.
– Licensing procedures and contract terms should take into account the 
geological, financial and country risks. Country, sector and market 
knowledge is needed to define appropriate licensing and contractual 
terms.
– Transparent and non-discretionary procedures should be defined to 
attract investors.
– The fiscal terms that determine the sharing of benefits between the 
Government and the investors should be progressive and preferably linked 
to project profitability to cope with changes in prices and different site 
conditions throughout the project’s life.
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– The development of ‘local content’—including local consultations and the 
use of local labour, goods and services—is a key aspect of hydrocarbon 
and mining projects.
In addition, Alba stresses the need to gather relevant geological information 
for proper management of the oil sector, and notes that such data are important 
for managing access to oil and gas resources, reducing land use conflicts, 
providing a better understanding of the country’s oil potential, and helping 
to define sector policies and facilitating bidding processes. Another best 
practice recommended in Alba’s paper is the establishment of a ‘one stop’ 
clearance shop, preferably in the Ministry of Mining or Natural Resources, 
to handle all matters related to the extractive industries.
Kenya’s oil governance framework largely addresses corporate, state, 
environmental and fiscal issues in the extraction and use of oil. It says little 
about the management of political, social and security risks that the country’s 
nascent oil sector faces and is likely to continue confronting in the future 
(Patey, 2014). As already noted, oil in Kenya is located in Turkana County, 
the homeland of the Turkana people. Since ethnicity and politics in Kenya 
are intertwined, this location has social, ethnic and political implications for 
oil governance. In particular, national institutions are needed for responding 
to ethnic concerns about benefits from the Turkana oil and from localities 
occupied by other ethnic groups. Although the Constitution states that oil is a 
national resource and belongs to the national Government, this is not the view 
of the local communities, who believe that the oil benefits (e.g., employment 
opportunities) should be reserved to them (Patey, 2014). Demonstrations 
have already been held by local communities over this issue, disrupting the 
oil exploitation activities of Tullow Oil Company.
Recently, Tullow Oil Company threatened to suspend its activities fol-
lowing local disagreements. A Kenyan newspaper (The Standard) filed the 
following report on the incident:
Tullow Oil has threatened to suspend its operations in Turkana County 
just a day before a self-imposed deadline for the start of transportation of 
crude oil to Mombasa for export. The latest development has set off a chain 
reaction that will today see the Government announce suspension of the 
plan. The Standard has reliably established that for close to a month now, 
Tullow’s employees have been unable to gain access to two of its sites where 
40,000 barrels of oil that form the first batch of crude that is supposed to 
be transported to Mombasa is stored (The Standard, 2 June 2017).
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Moreover, the surrounding communities view oil as a new scarce resource over 
which they should contest along the same lines as the traditional contestations 
for cattle, water and pasture (Patey, 2014), an issue that is a potential cause 
of ethnic conflicts. There are no established mechanisms as yet for dealing 
with risks that firms face due to ethnic rivalries over oil. Similarly, disputes 
have emerged between local communities and political leaders who have 
used their political positions to acquire or control land in the vicinity of oil 
wells. Again, mechanisms for resolving such risks are missing.
The greatest challenge facing oil governance in Kenya is the security risk, 
as terrorist groups can easily damage high-value oil investment or harm oil 
personnel. The areas where oil has been found (Turkana County) or where 
large reserves of oil and gas are likely to be discovered (the coastal region) 
have scanty security infrastructure, and are the ones most vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks. Moreover, absent from the current governance framework 
is a mechanism for the safe transport of oil and related products from produc-
tion sites to harbours and ports for export. The Standard has described the 
insecurity that oil transport is facing as follows:
Further, one of the seven companies contracted to upgrade the Kitale-
Turkana road, which leads to the oil fields, has suspended works after three 
of its employees were attacked. … In a letter sent to the Kenya Highways 
Management Authority (KeNHA), which The Standard has seen, Rowla 
Construction on May 20 said it had discontinued the construction of the 
road upgrade to the oil fields until the security of its staff was guaranteed 
(The Standard, 29 June 2017).
Apart from the insecurity problem, the investment that oil transportation 
infrastructure requires is too large to be undertaken by one oil company or 
by one country. Patey (2014) therefore proposes that Kenya, Uganda and, 
possibly, South Sudan combine efforts to build such infrastructure. However, 
as the Standard has reported, cooperation from Kenya’s neighbours that are 
also beginning to develop their extractive industries may not be forthcoming 
(see The Standard, 29 June 2017). Safe transportation infrastructure for oil and 
gas is an integral component of the sector’s governance structure. Thus, every 
effort should be made to construct it. The consequence for bad governance 
of a high-value natural resource, such as oil or gas, is underdevelopment, 
manifested by poverty and social conflicts (Institute of Economic Affairs, 
2014).
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16.3 Kenya’s Oil Governance Regime
16.3.1 Guidelines from the Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Act
The Petroleum Act guides the contracting and negotiations between the 
Government and potential oil exploitation and production firms. It empowers 
the minister responsible for the energy ministry to start negotiations and 
the contracting processes once the decision to commence oil exploration or 
production has been made. Table 16.1 highlights some of the issues addressed 
by the law to ensure proper sharing of oil production activities and oil revenue 
among stakeholders and to guide negotiations and contractual processes 
under different circumstances.
As noted by the Institute of Economic Affairs (2014), the production-sharing 
mechanism detailed in Table 16.1 has a number of limitations, the main one 
being lack of provisions for corporate social responsibility that the corporate 
agents must fulfil. Other shortcomings include the absence of a compensa-
tion regime for locally recruited staff, and the lack of a company licensing 
timetable, as licence issue is on a first-come-first-served basis. There is also no 
formal provision for community participation in oil exploration or production 
activities. Since mechanisms for transfer of the business interests specified in 
production-sharing contracts are also lacking, investments in local oil ventures 
can happen only sporadically at best, limiting the steady growth of the local oil 
industry. The criteria for evaluating oil exploration or production are ad hoc, 
and this affects the quality of contractual agreements that can be concluded. 
Further, since the terms relating to environmental protection, conservation 
and management are not fully specified in production-sharing agreements, 
rigorous enforcement of the laws that safeguard the environment is not possible.
A new Bill (the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill 2014) updates 
the original Act in important respects, but reportedly has not received 
presidential assent. The Bill sets out fees and levies to be paid by oil firms 
and specifies the formula for sharing the oil revenue. According to the Bill, 
when the oil sale begins, the National Government will get 75 per cent of 
the revenue, the county governments will take 20 per cent, and the local 
communities will receive 5 per cent. These sharing ratios will probably be 
heavily contested, given that the local communities host the oil and are the 
principals of county governments (see the Kenya Senate Bill on this issue 
below). Moreover, given the nature of Kenyan politics, the contestation is 
likely to have tribal dimensions that could precipitate ethnic tensions (The 
Standard, 2 June 2017).
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Table 16.1: Kenya’s Model for Oil Exploration and Production
Subject of contractual 
negotiation 
Comment on contractual terms
Oil exploration or 
production area
Map of a specified block size is provided with its coordinates.
Exploration period
Exploration is conducted in phases, with the initial period 
lasting 2–3 years, with the possibility of 2 extensions of 2 years 
each. Thus, the exploration period lasts 6–7 years.
Taxation
Taxes are paid in lieu for and on behalf of the contractor out of 
the government share of profit, i.e., the government share of 
the profit includes the tax amount that the oil company must 
pay the government. 
Depreciation
This is a five-year straight-line depreciation for capital costs, 
which begins when production starts.
Ring fencing




The minimum participation of the Government is 10 per cent 
of the expected proceeds. The government share is carried 
through exploration phase and paid in full during the develop-
ment and production stages.
The cost recovery limit 
for the oil company 
The absolute amount is determined by the negotiated gross 
revenue but cannot exceed 60% of annual revenues.
Profit oil split between 
the government and the 
investor
This is based on a Daily Rate of Production of profit oil on a 
sliding scale of 50/50 at the start of production, rising to a 
maximum of 78% in favour of the Kenya Government for profit 
oil of volumes of 100 k bbl/day onshore and 120 k bbl/day 
offshore. 
Natural gas
In the case where the contractor considers that it is economical 
to produce natural gas, the contractor agrees to sell all or part 
of its share on natural gas to the Kenya Government, provided 
that the parties agree on price, volume, and terms of sale.
Supply of oil for 
domestic consumption
The contactor shall have the obligation to supply on a priority 
basis, the crude oil for domestic consumption.
Audit rights of 
government
The Kenya Government shall have the right to audit the joint 
venture accounts within 24-month period following the end of 
the accounting period.
Source: Author’s compilation based on IEA (2014, p. 23–24).
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16.3.2 The Income Tax Act as It Relates to Oil Companies
This Act is administered by the Kenya Revenue Authority on behalf of the 
Government of Kenya (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2014). The ninth 
schedule to the Income Tax Act regulates the taxation of oil companies. 
The following are examples of oil taxation to which the schedule applies.
Withholding Tax on Transfer or Assignment of PSC (production-sharing 
contracts) Rights
The ninth schedule to the Income Tax Act requires that assignment of rights 
under each production-sharing contract (PSC) be taxed as income. The 
law imposes a 10 per cent tax on the total value of the rights transferred (or 
assigned) for residents and a 20 per cent tax for foreigners. The taxed amount 
is the ‘transfer gain’, defined as the pre-depreciation difference between the 
proceeds and capital expenditure. The schedule is silent on the actions the 
Kenya Revenue Authority should take in the event of a transfer loss.
Tax on income derived from employment in oil-related activities
The income derived from employment in oil and gas firms is taxed on a ‘Pay 
As You Earn’ (PAYE) basis at the rate of 30 per cent. The employers must also 
collect social security contributions for remittance to the National Social 
Security Fund. It was not possible to establish the extent to which oil firms 
comply with the latter requirement.
Offsetting of Losses
Petroleum companies can offset losses incurred in a given year of production 
with proceeds from activities of the succeeding four years, including the years 
of the loss, a measure that essentially allows the oil company to reduce its tax 
burden. This tax measure is an incentive for risk-taking (see Mauritzen, 2017).
Determination of the Value of Sales for Tax Purposes
The schedule forbids transfer pricing practices across oil firms, as this affects 
the value of taxable sales revenue. This requirement, however, is hard to 
enforce without strict auditing of oil firms by the Kenya Revenue Authority.
Depreciation of Capital Expenditure for Tax Purposes
The schedule provides for a straight-line annual depreciation of 20 per cent, 
starting with the year the assets were deployed for commercial use or the 
year of production, whichever is more recent. It also allows full deduction 
of operational costs, such as the expenses of all kinds of drilling.
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Capitalisation Rules for Petroleum Companies for Tax Purposes
The schedule stipulates rules for capitalisation of both foreign and local 
firms. In particular, it disallows the deduction of interest expenses from 
sales revenue for tax purposes if the loan amount or loan interest amount 
exceeds what is expected for short-term transactions. It sets no requirements 
for the debt-to-equity ratio that needs to be fulfilled for loan expenses to be 
tax deductible.
16.3.3 The Environmental Management and Coordination Act 
(EMCA)
The Act was passed by the Kenyan Parliament to ‘provide for the establishment 
of an appropriate legal and institutional framework for the management of the 
environment’ and ‘improve the legal and administrative coordination of the 
diverse sectoral initiatives…necessary in order to improve the national capac-
ity for the management of the environment’ (as cited in Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 2014, pp.27–28). The Act establishes the National Environmental 
Management Authority (NEMA), the parastatal organisation responsible 
for general supervision and coordination of environmental matters in Kenya. 
However, EMCA is silent on measures to be taken by extractive firms to 
restore the integrity of the environment after their commercial activities 
have ceased. As a consequence, mining and extraction sites are abandoned 
without proper sealing, to the detriment of the environment.
16.3.4 The Sovereign Wealth Fund
Kenya’s Sovereign Wealth Fund is mandated by the 2010 Constitution but 
is not designed to safeguard the oil revenues alone. The officers of the Fund 
comprise the President and a few members of the Cabinet. The objectives of 
the fund include building a sound savings base for the country; protecting 
and stabilising the budget and the economy from excess volatility in exports 
revenues; providing a mechanism for the diversification of the economy away 
from non-renewable commodity exports; assisting in dissipating unwanted 
liquidity; funding socio-economic development; and promoting strategic 
national objectives. The Sovereign Wealth Fund is a portfolio of three other 
funds, namely, the stabilisation fund, the infrastructure and development 
fund, and the future generations fund, which is financed by revenues from 
minerals, petroleum reserves, and exploitation of other exhaustible natural 
resources.
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16.3.5 The Natural Resources (Benefit Sharing) Bill
The purpose of this Bill (by the Senate, rather than by the National Assembly) 
is to establish a method for sharing revenues from natural resource exploita-
tion—particularly oil—between firms, the National Government, the county 
governments and the local communities. According to the sharing formula 
proposed, 20 per cent of the revenue from a natural resource, such as oil or gas, 
will be deposited into the Sovereign Wealth Fund, and the remainder (80 per 
cent) will go in a 60–40 per cent split to national and county governments, 
respectively. Moreover, the Bill mandates that 40 per cent of the amount 
received by the local governments be allocated to local communities.
A weakness of this Bill is that it does not specify the means by which the 
transfer of 40 per cent of the oil money received by county governments 
to local communities will be accomplished. Moreover, even if the transfer 
is actually made, it is not clear who would receive it in communities. Such 
monies can easily suffer the misuse and misallocations seen at the constitu-
tional development funds that are typically under the control of a Member of 
National Assembly or of the ward development funds under the member of the 
county assembly. The establishment of legal and organisational institutions 
for receiving funds assigned to communities and investing them efficiently 
is needed. Such institutions would be managed by local people, with elected 
officials playing advisory and non-voting roles.
16.3.6 Institutional Architecture for Regulating the Oil and Gas 
Industry
The Kenyan oil and gas industry is regulated by constitutional institutions 
that govern the extractive sector, and these include:
– The Inter-Ministerial Committee on the Policy and Legal Framework 
for Geology, Mining
– and Minerals which implements policy and legal frameworks related to 
the extractive industry;
– The National Fossil Fuels Advisory Committee that licenses the petroleum 
industry;
– -The National Lands Commission that has the power to acquire private 
and public lands for natural resource exploitation;
– The Auditor General, an independent officer who audits and reports on 
accounts of national interest, such as of the national oil corporation, the 
courts, Parliament and political parties;
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– The Controller of the Budget, an independent officer who has the con-
stitutional power to authorise withdrawals from public accounts;
– The Legislature (National Assembly and the Senate), which inter alia 
ratifies agreements on the exploitation of natural resources and protects 
the interests of counties in such matters.
– The judiciary, a constitutional arm of government that handles specific 
disputes emanating from the extractive industry;
– The county governments directly control the regions with oil and gas 
discoveries;
– The National Oil Corporation of Kenya, a state corporation that col-
laborates with other oil firms in the upstream oil and gas ventures, and 
to some extent regulates the extractive industry.
16.4 Local Content and Gender Issues in the Governance 
of the Oil and Gas Industry
The policy, legal and institutional frameworks for governing the extractive 
sector contain little information about economic empowerment of local 
communities, and practically nothing about the participation of women 
in the extractive sector. The gender issue is tangentially covered in laws 
related to small-scale mining activities. Moreover, the laws on local content 
development are at the earliest stages, and have not begun seriously to address 
the issues of inclusivity and the safety of women in extractive industries. 
With regard to local content, oil firms and governments need to establish 
value-adding activities in upstream and downstream industries from which 
local communities can benefit. In particular, labour-intensive exploitation 
and production technologies should be given high priority.
Incentives should be designed for foreign oil firms to create opportunities 
for good jobs in local economies by training local entrepreneurs, transferring 
new technologies to them, and awarding contracts to local firms. There is 
evidence that the main foreign oil company in Kenya—Tullow Oil plc—is 
working closely with Kenya’s National Oil Corporation to strengthen its 
procurement capacity and to create jobs in the area where oil reserves are 
being exploited, namely Turkana County. As reported by Kenya’s National 
Treasury:
Tullow Oil Kenya B.V. awarded National Oil the tender for the supply of 
bulk fuels, construction of a fuel station in Turkana and management of 
the fuel Distribution. One of the conditions of the contract with Tullow 
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entailed National Oil sourcing for a firm to supply the containerized sta-
tions as per specifications provided by Tullow. The proposed firm—Petrol 
Industry—provided specifications similar to those provided by Tullow in 
the post tender clarification on the tender awarded to National Oil. The 
total cost of the fuel storage facility and the dispensing pumps would be 
recovered within the Three (3) year contract if National Oil was awarded 
the tender. Pursuant to Section 74 (2) (b) of PPDA 2005 there is no suitable 
alternative for supply of containerized offices as Petro Industrial Solu-
tion (PTY) had the specifications required by Tullow Kenya B.V. (Kenya 
National Treasury, 2015).
The contractual partnership between Tullow Oil and the Kenya National Oil 
Corporation is in the spirit of the Senate Local Content Bill of 2016 which 
is yet to be enacted by Parliament (Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 115). 
Furthermore, in addition to the industrial side of local content development, 
provision of social services, such as education and health care—inputs into 
human capital formation—should also receive equal attention. In creating 
the infrastructure for local content development, care should be taken not 
to overlook protection and preservation of the natural environment—a form 
of capital that has sustained local communities for centuries.
16.5 Challenges in the Workings of Kenya’s Oil Governance 
Regime
As is clear from the transport and safety problems already highlighted, Kenya’s 
oil governance regime will face a number of challenges in the future.
First, an important challenge is likely to be in fulfilling or in managing the 
high expectations that people already hold about oil benefits. The quantity 
produced might be too little to be shared in the manner specified in the govern-
ance framework. For example, the revenue earned may be sufficient only for 
the sovereign wealth fund or just enough to augment the fiscal budget of the 
National Government—the owner of the oil. If reporting on the magnitude 
of oil earnings is not transparent, or is not sufficient, unnecessary conflict can 
arise among the stakeholders, particularly between the National Government 
and local communities, the custodians of the oil.
Second, a related challenge concerns the price of oil. Moderately large 
quantities of oil can be produced but sold at low prices, yielding little revenue. 
However, the critical question here is the effect the oil price has on oil produc-
tion. There is evidence that a fall in oil price may not affect oil production 
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(Mauritzen, 2017) because oil firms tend to produce oil in excess of current 
demand so that extra oil can be stored and sold at better prices in the future. 
The evidence from Norway supports this viewpoint and shows further that 
low oil prices can divert exploration investments to oil production in existing 
fields (Mauritzen, 2017).
Third, a lack of transparency in reporting sales income can be a source of 
social tensions or disappointments. It is not at all clear how transparency in 
reporting can be convincingly conveyed to diverse ethnic groupings that tend 
to distrust each other, except members of their own communities (KIPPRA, 
2013).
Fourth, even without information asymmetries between the stakeholders, 
the revenue from oil production may be insufficient to cover exploration and 
production costs or the large expense needed to heal the environment from 
exploration damage, raising legitimate inefficiency concerns on the part of 
the National Government. Such a circumstance can raise the risk of political 
and macroeconomic instability and hurt the whole economy.
Fifth, a somewhat different challenge is in using the governance framework 
to ensure that appropriate technologies are used to protect the environment 
during oil exploration, extraction and transportation. Oil exploration and 
production can plunge local communities into poverty if the activities damage 
the ecosystem beyond repair—via, for example, uncontrolled drilling, oil 
spills, the clearance of forested areas, disruption of aquifers, pollution of 
lakes and rivers, and via improper disposal of unwanted extraction material. 
Moreover, extraction dusts, noise, gases and debris can cause unanticipated 
health problems to local people.
Sixth, the aforementioned risks can be greatly reduced by making local 
communities aware of them, by involving the communities in the application 
of the framework, and by assigning them substantive interests in the oil 
industry. However, the assignment of business stakes has the potential for 
good and bad consequences for the environment. While it can restrain the 
oil firms from harming the environment, it can also be an incentive for the 
communities to align with oil companies to damage the environment for 
short-term commercial gains. The application of the governance framework 
should consider both short- and long-term dynamics in business relationships 
between communities and the oil industry.
Seventh, the most serious challenge facing the application of Kenya’s oil 
governance framework arguably relates to averting or minimising conflicts 
in the control and use of oil. In the case of Kenya, this might appear to be a 
minor issue because of the existence of a solid and broadly based framework 
to that end—discussed in section 2. The challenge in its application is in 
kenya’s Oil gOvernanCe regime: Challenges anD POliCies 367
sufficiently satisfying the interests of diverse ethnic communities that feel 
themselves to be equally entitled to oil benefits as the communities in which 
the oil is located.
Ethnic identities in Kenya are strong and are enshrined in the Constitution 
(promulgated by the Government in 2010), after landslide approval in a 
national referendum (Republic of Kenya, 2010). The Kenyan people are proud 
of their ethnic diversity—a phenomenon that the Constitution considers 
a national heritage. The reason Kenya’s supreme law protects ethnicity is 
that ethnicity per se does no harm. It is a beautiful cultural phenomenon, 
especially as expressed in tribal songs, dances, some aspects of traditional 
medicine, costumes and methods of subsistence. The resilience of some 
communities to onslaughts of nature, such as droughts and floods, can inform 
the national response to natural disasters. However, some ethnic practices 
(such as the cultural mutilation of girls, early marriages and livestock rustling) 
are a constraint on inclusive development and should be discouraged. In 
this regard, it is important to note that unwelcome ethnic practices are not 
inherent attributes of some communities. Every community worldwide has 
some cultural aspect that needs changing in light of new knowledge and 
technologies.
Political parties or groupings have been organised along ethnic lines since 
the pre-independence days (Hino et al., 2012). The Constitution does not 
disallow political alliances along tribal gradients. Furthermore, politicisation 
of national issues along ethnic lines (negative ethnic politics), while generally 
not approved, is not illegal. As already reported by the Standard, there is little 
doubt that when the oil revenue begins to flow in large quantities it will be 
politicised along ethnic lines, and some ethnic tensions can be expected. It 
should be possible to find workable mechanisms for averting or managing 
such tensions.
The risk of rebel groups attempting to control oil enclaves should be 
expected, especially if large quantities of oil become available. The groups 
would be a formidable threat to the stability of the country if organised along 
ethnic lines. However, in the case of Kenya, such groups would also threaten 
the ethnic diversity of the country, as groups of that kind have secession 
tendencies. The country would certainly find ways of forestalling its activities. 
The challenge would be how to do so with a minimum of social conflicts. 
One way to that end is to strength public and civil society institutions that 
promote social cohesion. Such institutions (e.g., the National Integration 
and Social Commission, religious organisations and traditional leadership 
systems) can be empowered to bring different communities together to 
respond to a national crisis of that kind.
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16.6 Policies for Oil-led Prosperity
Despite the development challenges posed by oil discoveries, it is possible to 
design and implement policies whereby oil revenues can be effectively used 
to reduce horizontal inequalities, to overcome extreme poverty, to address 
historical marginalisation, to diversify a country’s economy, and to place a 
country on a higher growth trajectory. However, in order for Kenya really 
to benefit from its oil wealth, it will have aptly and proactively to deal with 
three important issues.
A first issue which requires proactive management is the prevention of the 
so-called ‘natural resource curse’, i.e. a situation in which oil wealth results 
in political instability and conflict rather than increased prosperity (see, for 
example, Auty, 1993). In particular, in a country without a strong rule of law 
or respect for norms of public order, some people or groups in society may 
attempt to use organised violence to gain control of the country’s oil resources 
or other natural resource for that matter. Kenyan political leadership can 
reduce the risk of this type of economic violence by strengthening its internal 
security institutions and intelligence system.
A second issue which requires proactive management is the prevention of 
the so-called ‘Dutch disease’ (The Economist, 1977). The Dutch disease is a 
term coined by The Economist in 1977 in a description of the Dutch economy 
following its poor performance after massive oil and gas finds in the 1960s. 
Moreover, it is a metaphor for the over-concentration of investments in the 
oil (or other natural resource) sector, which exposes an economy to risks of 
depressions and recessions in the event of a decline in the demand for oil 
exports or in the case of a large decrease in international oil prices. There is 
evidence that a sudden increase in oil or gas prices can cause serious crises 
in the banking sector, and in the extreme case lead to a collapse of the banks. 
A partial cause of this malaise is the resultant non-competitiveness of export 
firms that hold large bank loans that the firms fail to repay (Kinda et al., 2016; 
Mlachila and Ouedraogo, 2017). The non-indebted export firms are also 
starved of credit by banks because banks know these firms are unlikely to 
meet their loan obligations. It is easy to see that this liquidity problem can 
easily cascade to all firms.
Policies that use a country’s oil revenues to diversify the economy would 
strengthen the economy’s resilience to adverse shocks to oil exports. The 
over-investment in the export sector starves the rest of the economy of the 
resources needed to develop agricultural and service industries, which tend 
to be labour-intensive and thus are capable of employing a large proportion of 
the population, in contrast to the oil sector which tends to be capital-intensive 
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(thus creating high-wage jobs for a relatively small number of people). As 
already noted, the emergence of an oil enclave can increase supplies of inter-
national currency in the domestic economy and reduce the profitability of 
non-oil exporters. Moreover, the regional imbalance in investment resulting 
from oil discoveries can cause large social inequalities and extreme poverty. 
Thus, in addition to being used for diversification of economic activities, 
the oil revenues should be used to fight horizontal inequalities and extreme 
poverty. Policy makers should also strive to reduce macroeconomic and 
regulatory uncertainties as these reduce returns on oil stocks (Wensheng 
et al., 2017). In general, policy uncertainty is not good for profitability of oil 
companies and is a disincentive for investments that add value to domestic 
products or create employment for local communities.
A third issue deals with the association between resource extraction and 
environmental degradation. The degradation adversely affects the welfare of 
the future generations and reduces the ability of the present generations to 
maintain their current living standards. Oil is part and parcel of the natural 
environment. Its extraction necessarily tears apart the environmental struc-
ture. Thus, without the repair of the environment—after oil extraction—it 
would continue to deteriorate as the oil reserve is run to exhaustion. It follows 
that without a programme to preserve the environment as oil is extracted, 
the country would end up without oil and without a usable environment. For 
example, the grassland that supported livestock in a pre-oil period may not be 
able to serve this purpose if the oil extraction is done in an environmentally 
unsustainable way. Furthermore, some habitats for fauna and flora would be 
destroyed due to the highly intrusive nature of oil exploration technologies.
The long-term consequence of uncontrolled extraction is under-devel-
opment and widespread poverty. Although Hotelling (1931) has noted that 
exhaustion of one natural resource, such as oil or gas, need not thrust the 
whole country into extreme poverty, this situation can easily befall a com-
munity whose natural resource has been depleted or damaged irreparably. 
This reasoning reveals the need to preserve the local environment and to 
invest oil revenues in assets that yield returns into a distant future, if oil 
exploitation is to bring lasting prosperity. The Kenyan political leaders and 
their development partners should use Kenya’s sovereign wealth fund to 
sustain oil benefits, and further rely on provisions of the Environmental 




Oil exploitation is associated with three negative social externalities, namely, 
the natural resource curse, the Dutch disease and environmental degradation. 
Moreover, as noted by Hotelling (1931), exhaustion or degradation of a natural 
resource is a public bad that needs collective action to address. Taken together, 
the three externalities constitute large hidden social costs of natural resource 
exploitation in any country. The purpose of oil governance regimes worldwide 
should be to minimise these costs or avert them where possible. In the case 
of Kenya, the costs have not yet been incurred on a large scale because the 
oil industry is still at the embryonic stage. The costs will however increase 
considerably as soon as commercial oil begins to flow on a regular basis.
The oil governance framework discussed in section 2 will be an important 
tool for addressing the negative social externalities of establishing an oil 
industry in Kenya. If the framework is applied correctly, the country will 
prosper in both the short and long run. Recognising that social costs of 
extraction are negative externalities of establishing an oil industry is the 
crucial step in averting resource curses and Dutch disease. It is important to 
note that the cost of natural resource exploitation is not limited to negative 
social externalities associated with private outlays made by firms but also 
includes general equilibrium effects of such outlays and similar activities.
In assessing whether a natural resource such as oil or gas should be ex-
ploited, both the industry level and economy-wide costs and benefits should 
be considered explicitly. In the case of Kenya, oil production activities should 
be commenced on a commercial scale if the expected benefit of establishing 
the oil industry exceeds the associated social cost, including the expense of 
addressing negative social externalities. Such a cost-benefit calculation can 
help to avoid equating (at a later date) bad managerial decisions of the past 
to exogenously imposed curses or diseases.
There is need to stress that the problem of violent conflicts over a natural 
resource such as oil or gas among social groups is not inevitable. The conflict 
(curse or ‘disease’) often occurs due to a lack of institutional restraints on 
agents’ self-regarding behaviours or because of unacceptably high level of 
horizontal inequalities that groups associate with natural resource exploita-
tion. In the case of Kenya, the oil governance regime could address this 
issue through equitable provision of public goods across regions (including 
employment opportunities), and through acceptable sharing of political 
power across ethnic groups, as the ethnic structure of such power will in the 
Kenyan context invariably determine the degree of fairness in the allocation 
and use of oil proceeds.
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Oil Wealth and Development in Uganda 
and Beyond: Conclusions and Policy 
Recommendations
By Ukoha Ukiwo, Pamela Mbabazi, and Arnim Langer
17.1 Introduction
The 2006 announcement of major oil finds in Uganda’s Lake AIbert Basin 
generated much jubilation and trepidation. On the one hand, the jubilation 
arose from the improved prospects of this East African country fast-tracking 
its ascendancy to the status of a middle-income country based on the singular 
instrumentality of oil wealth. On the other hand, the trepidation that was 
felt both locally and globally stemmed from concerns about the fate of other 
developing countries that have had the fortune (or arguably misfortune) of 
discovering large quantities of oil or other natural resources.
In many of these countries the discovery, exploration, and exploitation of 
oil resources have been associated with mono-cultural economies, economic 
disruptions and vulnerabilities, mismanagement and corruption, subversion 
of democracy, and even violent conflicts. The ‘poisonous’ cocktail of these 
interlinked phenomena, which is often referred to as the ‘resource curse’ 
or ‘governance curse’ (see the Introduction to this book), has tended to 
moderate celebrations in developing countries which have discovered large 
quantities of oil or other natural resources. This is the context of this book, 
which is concerned with how well prepared Uganda is to manage its recently 
discovered oil wealth effectively, efficiently, and transparently. It is worth 
repeating that the question at the heart of this book is as follows: to what 
extent is Uganda ready to effectively harness its oil revenues for national and 
human development, thereby avoiding the oil governance curse?
The preceding chapters in this book have provided an in-depth analysis 
and deep insights into the diverse set of efforts and institutions that the 
Ugandan State has introduced in recent years in order to harness the country’s 
oil wealth for national development. In this respect extensive attention was 
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paid to the shortcomings and ongoing challenges of Uganda’s oil governance 
regime. The comparative case study chapters have provided similar analysis 
on and insights from Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya. Drawing extensively on the 
analysis and insights offered in the preceding chapters, in the current chapter 
we will draw a number of conclusions concerning Uganda’s oil governance 
regime and the challenges the country is facing in effectively, efficiently, and 
transparently managing its oil sector and revenues. We will also formulate 
and reflect upon some possible policy options for harnessing oil for the benefit 
of the people of oil-producing countries in Africa.
17.2 Oil Governance Institutions in Uganda: Work in 
Progress
Uganda has recorded important progress in putting in place the necessary 
legislation to guide the nature of the relationship between the State, repre-
senting the Ugandan people, and the international oil companies (IOCs); 
the management of oil revenues for the common good of Ugandans; and 
the management of externalities associated with distortions to macroeco-
nomic management and the pernicious effects of oil on the environment. 
The National Oil and Gas Policy, which is subsidiary to the Constitution 
of the Republic of Uganda, is the overarching policy framework that seeks 
to enhance the prospects of optimal benefits from oil (see, in particular, 
Chapter 2 by Mbabazi and Muhangi; and Chapter 3 by J. Oloka-Onyango).
The policy framework is codified in laws that stipulate the regulations in 
upstream, midstream, and downstream operations. Foremost among these 
laws is the Petroleum Exploration Development and Production Act, 2013, 
which has established the Petroleum Authority of Uganda, which is charged 
with regulating all operations in the petroleum industry as well as monitoring 
and ensuring compliance by all industry stakeholders. The Act also authorises 
the Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC) to manage the country’s com-
mercial interests in this sector. This principally involves transactions and 
partnerships with international oil companies (IOCs). Another key law was 
the Petroleum Refining, Conversion, Storage and Transportation Act 2013, 
which is a crucial piece of legislation with regard to attracting investment 
and the development of oil and gas infrastructure. Also worthy of note is 
the Public Finance Management Act 2015, which is aimed at ensuring that 
the country’s oil revenues are managed in an accountable and responsible 
manner. Finally, the National Content Policy and Implementation Strategy 
and Plan has established mechanisms for guaranteeing that the oil industry is 
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not dominated by foreign interests and ensures the involvement of Ugandans 
by providing rules for the employment of Ugandan citizens and patronage 
of Ugandan businesses in procurement and service provision in the sector. 
Uganda’s Local Content Policy (LCPs) further emphasises the building 
capacity of local companies to participate actively across the entire value chain 
of the oil and gas sector. This support by government shall be extended to local 
companies by means of providing cheap credit through the recently proposed 
Uganda Development Bank (UDB), as well as supporting the acquisition of 
the latest equipment and technology to use across the entire value chain.
In order to achieve maximum returns and dividends on its oil wealth, 
Uganda uses the model of production sharing agreements (PSAs). Using 
this approach, the Government of Uganda believes it has obtained the best 
deals for Uganda in its negotiations with the international oil companies that 
participate in the upstream to downstream operations. Added to this is the fact 
that negotiations with neighbouring states, notably Tanzania through which 
Ugandan oil will be exported, have produced concessions and tax holidays 
which ensure that Uganda’s oil will probably have one of the lowest costs 
of production at US$ 12.1 This achievement came at the cost of abandoning 
earlier plans to transport the oil through Kenya (Patey, 2019). It should be 
noted though that the acclaimed capacity of Ugandan state representatives 
in deal-making has not come without costs (see Patey, 2015). In particular, 
protracted negotiations are seen to be one of the factors that have significantly 
delayed the time at which Uganda will be likely to achieve full production 
(now estimated to happen sometime in the period 2021–2023).2
Notwithstanding, the capacity of the Ugandan State to maintain its stance 
on negotiations at this early stage, when there is so much political and social 
pressure for the commencement of production, is a promising indicator of the 
strength necessary to ensuring that the country does not become vulnerable 
to the stranglehold of IOCs and vicissitudes of global energy markets.3 Having 
said this, there are nonetheless a number of serious challenges in the legal and 







3 For instance, at the insistence of the Ugandan Government that Tullow Oil should pay capital 
gains tax, which it tried to avoid during protracted negotiations about the sale of its shares to 
CNOC and Total. See https://allafrica.com/stories/201811190539.html.
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regulatory framework that engender concerns and raise suspicions about the 
motives of state actors and industry operators. Some of these concerns include 
excessive executive control, limitations of the oversight functions of Parliament, 
lack of transparency with regard to the contracts agreed with the IOCs, and 
limitations concerning local content development. Although the Ugandan 
Parliament has formally been given the power to oversee the licensing and 
governance processes, there are some clauses that have been capitalised upon by 
the executive to devalue the efficacy of the checks and balances that are included 
in Uganda’s oil governance regime. These include provisions that allow the 
minister to negotiate with foreign companies and countries without recourse to 
the Parliament, since parliamentary approval is not necessary for the activation 
of the contracts. Parliamentary oversight is also circumvented by the fact that 
Parliament is not privy to the details of contracts entered into by the Government 
of Uganda with international oil companies (see Global Rights Alert, 2016).
The local content law is also seen as problematic for being ambivalent in 
its operationalisation of local content. One of the contentious issues is the 
law’s designation of a national business enterprise as a business that has in its 
employ up to 70 per cent of staff members who are Ugandans. This provision, 
which is blind to ownership structure, is suspected of creating a window for 
fully-owned foreign companies to become ‘Ugandan’ by simply nationalising 
its labour force (Argom and Magona, 2017). Despite the observed limitations 
in its legal framework and governance institutions, Uganda appears to be 
relatively better prepared compared to earlier African oil-producing countries. 
It may be idealistic to assume even in the best of conditions that the whole 
gamut of legislation would be perfect from Day One. Arguably, perfection in 
the regulatory framework can only evolve from practice and experimentation 
over time based on a culture of learning. Moreover, as most of the chapters 
in this book have clearly indicated, it is risky to overplay the salience of the 
rules of the game, as the national experience suggests that it is not the dearth 
of good laws that afflicts the land, but rather a lack of consistency in the 
implementation and enforcement of existing laws. This experience is not 
dissimilar to the experiences of Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria.
In Uganda and these other countries, policy implementation and the 
functioning of institutions is contingent on the political economy. So far, the 
predominance of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in the polity 
and the towering influence of President Museveni have created the stability 
required for engagement with national and global interests in the exploration 
processes. The institutions will be tested when Uganda commences full oil 
production and export in the next few years. A critical test will be how the 
NRM government under President Museveni will be able to preside over 
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sustainable management of the oil revenues amidst expectations from diverse 
national actors. Another important variable is the longevity of the NRM 
regime as well as the Museveni presidency. With the constitutional reforms 
concerning presidential age and term limits successfully pushed through a 
number of years ago, Museveni is set to remain in power for the long haul. 
There is little doubt that the expected oil boom will contribute to mobilisations 
towards regime consolidation and tenure elongation and perpetuation. The 
continuation of the NRM regime is likely to guarantee short- to medium-term 
stability in institutions. The Ugandan one-party dominant system will likely 
allow for gradual reform of the sector characterised by the introduction of 
the piecemeal reforms that would contribute to regime legitimation and 
consolidation. This is evidenced by the acceptance of the executive and 
Parliament to join the EITI in 2019 after years of hesitation. The signing 
of the EITI suggests that the Government of Uganda is disposed to make 
Ugandans and the international community believe it is conforming to global 
best practice on the exploitation and production of oil.
17.3 Policy Options for Uganda and African Oil Producers
Experiences of oil-producing countries around the world point towards a 
number of policy options for Uganda and other oil-producing States in Africa.
17.3.1 The Role of the State
A fundamental issue to be addressed in order to prevent the resource or 
governance curse and associated impacts from taking hold is the role of the 
State in a country’s oil exploitation and production process. The prevalent 
governance mechanisms evident in the case studies in this book, and in 
other African States for that matter, is one where the State plays a central 
and overwhelming role. The State is at once owner, law maker, monitor and 
regulator, investor, rent collector, and developer. The omnibus function of 
the State is evident in the mandate assigned to the national oil company 
(NOC), which usually personifies and represents state interests. National 
oil companies (NOCs) usually have a number of roles that go beyond profit 
maximisation and include oil wealth redistribution to the society, wealth 
creation for the nation, industrialisation and economic development, energy 
security especially for domestic consumption and stable exports, strategic 
foreign policy and participation in national politics (see James Baker Institute, 
2007). However, these priorities often have implications for the capacity of 
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national oil companies to maximise the value of oil reserves, replace reserves, 
expand production and attain technical efficiency (Jaffe, 2007).
The model of national oil companies did not originate in the African continent 
and it appears not to have served African countries particularly well. This is 
because of the self-negating and contradictory implications of its multifarious 
mandates. Prominent here is the contradiction between its roles as owner/
investor and regulator. This creates a situation of conflict of interests that affects 
unbiased legislation, regulation and enforcement. In Nigeria, the NNPC—the 
national oil company—has shown serious deficiencies in the discharge of its 
many roles and responsibilities. As an investor, it has chronically defaulted on 
payment of costs of production and costs of maintenance with serious implica-
tions for investment in the sector. For over a decade, many investors have avoided 
the joint venture agreements (JVA) model because of the infamous incapacity 
and unwillingness of the Nigerian state investor to meet its cash obligations. By 
December 2018, the Joint Venture Cash Call (JVCC) stood at US$ 5.1 billion.4 
The Nigerian Government has sought to mitigate the risks by coming out of 
the cash call arrangement, which has made investors shun investments.5 One 
area where investments have been affected is the downstream sub-sector of 
refining. With the national oil company owning all existing malfunctioning 
refineries that are sustained by state subsidies, investors have shied away from 
Nigeria, despite the extremely large domestic market. Instead, investors have 
been particularly attracted to the massively subsidised import of petroleum 
products to mitigate the perennial shortfall of refined oil products in Nigeria.
Another self-negating result of the omnibus mandate of the state oil 
company is evident in the context of environmental sustainability. State 
capacity to develop and enforce laws aimed at effectively preventing and/
or curtailing environmental pollution is seriously undermined by the fact 
that the State is also an investor. As the leading partner in most JVAs, the 
State itself is bound to pick up a large proportion of the fines imposed for 
environmental breaches in the exploration and exploitation of oil resources. 
This removes the incentive to apply rigour in their enforcement as the State 





6 Nigeria has been unable to end gas flares. There are indications that barely five years before 
the date fixed for ending gas flares, Nigeria has dropped in the global ranking on gas flaring. See 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/297472-special-report-nigerias-gas-flares-
increase-ahead-2020-deadline.html.
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Another challenge associated with national oil companies relates to the 
State’s control over the appointment of top management positions and boards 
of directors. This creates a context for nepotism and the politicisation of 
appointments, as evidenced in Angola, where the long-time president ap-
pointed his daughter to head the national oil company.7 This may also lead to 
frequent changes in the executive leadership of the NOCs with implications 
for the strategic vision.
Comparative studies suggest that national oil companies are varied 
in their nature and missions, even though they may be largely similar in 
ownership structure (James Baker Institute, 2007). They have also achieved 
varying degrees of efficiency and results. Key lessons from comparative 
studies suggest that success factors include: 1) competition in the home 
industry; 2) competition in international exploration and refining; 3) strict 
monitoring of accounting and financial reporting practices; 4) investments 
in international stock markets, and 5) autonomous boards of directors and 
professional management (Jaffe, 2007). These factors contribute to the optimal 
performance of NOCs, because they moderate the impact of their pursuit of 
non-commercial national strategic objectives, keep them more focused on core 
business activities and ensure more probity and accountability. In Norway, 
for instance, competition in the home country created incentives for the State 
gradually to remove preferential treatment for Statoil, thereby enabling it to 
function more efficiently over time (see Gordon and Stenvoll, 2007).
It is noteworthy that Uganda and Kenya have established national oil 
companies and have sought to follow the model of separating the national oil 
company from the regulatory authority. While this is an important start, it 
should be noted that Nigeria also has a similar structure where the Ministry 
of Petroleum Resources8 and the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
are statutory regulators. However, the relationship between the regulators and 
the NOC has remained complex. Although the Nigerian NOC was excised 
from the DPR, it has over the years become more powerful than the DPR. 
In fact, in the late 1970s when reforms in the sector led to the emergence of 
the NNPC, the Ministry of Petroleum and DPR were subsumed under the 
NNPC (see Nwokeji, 2007). This complex history and the imperatives of 
power politics—where the political leadership is drawn closer to the NOC and 
7 Of course, the newly elected president sacked the former president’s daughter in his 
bid to take control of the country. See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/15/
angolan-president-sacks-predecessors-daughter-as-state-oil-chief.
8 This ministry has had a chequered history. Originally excised from the Ministry of Mines and 
Power, it has been scrapped under some administrations and even when other administrations 
tolerated its existence the chief executive has retained the position of Minister of Petroleum.
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at the best of times barely takes notice of the regulator—has had implications 
for the capacity of regulatory institutions. Clearly, there is a need for a clear 
separation of roles and the creation of the right incentives to subordinate 
the national oil companies to regulatory institutions, as is evident in Saudi 
Arabia and Norway. New oil producers such as Uganda, Ghana and Kenya 
have the opportunity to get it right from the outset. Nigeria’s efforts to reform 
the industry and the NOC in particular have been stalled for the umpteenth 
time partly due to vested interests.9
17.3.2 Unburdening Oil
Africa’s oil producers should make conscious efforts to unburden their oil. A 
recurrent concomitant of the discovery of oil is the explosion of expectations 
of the good life among the population and leadership. The historical role of oil 
wealth in transforming some poor nations to prosperous ones clearly shows 
that oil wealth may be a catalyst for national development. However, care 
should be taken to manage popular perceptions and communication to ensure 
that other sources of national wealth are not ignored in the craze to exploit 
oil for national development. Key priority sectors that have been supporting 
the economy, for example, the agriculture sector that usually employs a large 
proportion of the working population in most African countries, should 
still be prioritised since they are infinite resources compared to a petroleum 
resource which is finite. This fixation on oil as a source of national prosperity 
is often one of the sources of the ‘Dutch disease’, as aspirations for economic 
diversification become rhetorical.
Nigeria’s experience is instructive in this context. Although economic 
diversification has featured as a priority national objective in successive 
Nigerian national development plans and annual budgets since independence, 
this has remained aspirational as a result of the fixation of the state and society 
on oil wealth. The fixation on oil is evidenced by the fact that all governments 
in Nigeria have privileged oil revenues in their national budgets. Nigeria’s 
federal budget is usually based on projections of national production levels 
for oil and global benchmark prices. This practice, which may be rationalised 
on the ground that oil revenues account for up to 70 per cent of government 
revenues, diverts attention and investments from other sectors of the economy. 
This is because, since oil sustains the State, state policies are overly focused on 
9 The main opposition candidate in the 2019 presidential elections promised to privatise the 
NNPC.
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protecting the sector. This has gradually resulted in an enormous dependence 
on oil revenues and an economy characterised by monoculturalism.
As the chapters in this book have clearly shown, the governments of Ghana, 
Kenya and Uganda have also identified economic diversification as national 
priorities in order to avoid the Dutch disease. Oil revenues should serve as 
a lever to stimulate more investments in traditional and upcoming revenue-
generating sectors in a competitive and efficient manner. While ensuring that 
a sustainable ratio of revenue from oil is reserved for the future generation 
fund, priority should be given to the development of infrastructure (including 
in rural areas) to foster traditional sources of livelihood and national income; 
the facilitation of human capital development through efficient education and 
health care systems; and the enactment of a policy framework that achieves 
the right balance between protecting national markets and attracting foreign 
investments in both the oil and non-oil sectors.
The role of society in unburdening oil is also important. The mythical 
perception in many oil-producing countries of oil as a ‘national cake’ that 
has to be shared among the citizenry has important policy implications. It 
undermines the efficient management of resources as the citizenry crave 
for subsidies as part of their share of the national cake. In strategic com-
munications and practical examples, such as the avoidance of extravagance 
and conspicuous consumption, leaders of Africa’s oil-producing countries 
should do away with the popular imagination that connects oil with sudden 
free wealth. This may be one of the benefits of transparency and openness 
in information on investment decisions and contract negotiations which is 
canvassed in virtually all chapters in this book. The people need to know that 
though a free gift of nature, oil, like corn and cocoa, costs money to produce. 
Therefore, it should not be disbursed freely. This might perhaps tame popular 
expectations that are often at the root of demands for subsidies and favour 
consumption over investment and saving for the future.
17.3.3 The Role of Politics and Leadership
Apart from institutional factors, the prospect of oil serving as a catalyst for 
national transformation is also contingent on the nature of a country’s politics 
and leadership. In fact, in the context of developing countries, politics and 
leadership play overwhelming roles, given the tendency for institutional 
weaknesses which serve to undermine accountability (see Karl, 1997). Critical 
variables include the balance of power or nature of the political settlement, 
the role of oil in politics and the quality of leadership. A study of Indonesia 
and Nigeria found that these contingent factors alongside institutions explain 
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why these two countries have experienced different development outcomes 
following the advent of oil (see Lewis, 2007). The nature of the political 
settlement is critical because it explains the patterns of conflicts likely to evolve 
as contending social forces mobilise to access oil resources. For instance, 
where oil is extracted from areas populated by minority groups, the State 
may ignore demands for compensation mechanisms and set the basis for 
grievances and dissent. This is likely to be the case if oil is extracted from 
an area whose people have a controlling coalition to threaten the State or at 
least the ruling coalition.
The nature of the political settlement is linked to the role of oil in shaping 
political identities and political contestations. It is important for the State to 
moderate the degree to which oil becomes the focus for political contestation. 
This is usually not an easy task, especially as the electorate usually develops 
a keen interest regarding the manifestos of political parties and their candi-
dates concerning the proposed management and distribution of a country’s 
oil revenues. For instance, during the 2016 Ugandan elections, different 
candidates and parties presented their different perspectives concerning the 
management of the oil sector (see Global Rights Alert, 2016). Much of the 
political instability associated with oil derives from the heightened stakes of 
controlling petro-states that not only attract many to the political contest, but 
also turn political contestations into zero-sum games (see Ross, 2001; 2008). 
This is often inimical to democratic development as incumbents circumvent 
rules to hold on to power perpetually.
The quality of national leadership is crucial to mitigating some of these 
effects. Historically, there is reason to suggest that countries that have man-
aged oil wealth more efficiently for national development are those with 
established political settlements and effective leadership. Leadership efficacy 
involves being able to lead the country to achieve specific results for the public 
good. It involves rising above competing political actors to enforce rules and 
implement policies aimed at the attainment of strategic national objectives. 
While this may not always occur in democratic settings, it can be useful in the 
long term. This is evident in the developments in Uganda, where President 
Yoweri Museveni has clearly determined the direction for managing oil, 
against political actors seeking to undermine the developmental orientation 
of the State. As Hickey and Izama (2016) have observed:
The president has deployed at least three strategic moves to countervail 
these tendencies, apparently driven by a genuine commitment to ensuring 
that oil wealth is used in line with his nationalist vision of development. 
These have involved efforts to control moves by other powerful members 
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of the ruling coalition to extract rents from the oil sector and central-
ize such rent-seeking; enabling the development of high-level technical 
bureaucratic capacity within at least one mainstream government agency; 
and resisting the temptation to link incoming oil wealth to populist election 
pledges. Instead, he has repeatedly ear-marked oil revenue for investment in 
agriculture and infrastructural development. Taken together, these moves 
suggest possible routes through which even ‘weak dominant’ coalitions can 
promote institution-building and development, when a leader is sufficiently 
committed and is able to draw on investments in bureaucratic capacity from 
an earlier phase of dominance (Hickey and Izama, 2016, pp.184–185).
All told therefore, auspicious political economy and the right set of institutions 
are necessary for transforming oil into a beneficial resource for national 
development in both old and new African oil producers. Uganda should 
take these important policy reflections to heart if it wants to ensure that its 
oil wealth will be used for the benefit of national development. The detailed 
policy recommendations offered throughout this book can further help to 
strengthen and improve the country’s oil governance regime and ensure 
that its oil wealth will be managed effectively, efficiently and transparently.
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Large quantities of oil were discovered in the Albertine Rift Valley in 
Western Uganda in 2006. The sound management of these oil resources 
and revenues is undoubtedly one of the key public policy challenges 
for Uganda as it is for other African countries with large oil and/or gas 
endowments. With oil expected to start flowing in 2021, the current book 
analyses how this East African country is preparing for the challenge 
of effectively, efficiently, and transparently managing its oil sector and 
resources. Adopting a multidisciplinary, comprehensive, and comparative 
approach, the book identifies a broad scope of issues that need to be 
addressed in order for Uganda to realise the full potential of its oil 
wealth for national economic transformation. Predominantly grounded 
in local scholarship and including chapters drawing on the experiences 
of Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya, the book blazes a trail on governance of 
African oil in an era of emerging producers. Oil Wealth and Development 
in Uganda and Beyond will be of great interest to social scientists and 
economic and social policy makers in oil-producing countries. It is 
suitable for course adoption across such disciplines as International/
Global Affairs, Political Economy, Geography, Environmental Studies, 
Economics, Energy Studies, Development, Politics, Peace, Security and 
African Studies.
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